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ABSTRACT 
The construction and improvement of roadway infrastructure has been the dominant 
direction of transportation policy throughout East-Central Europe (ECE) since the democratic 
transition began in 1989.  In Poland, the government has been developing a nationwide network 
of motorways and expressways in order to meet economic and social demand.  The Polish 
government has pursued a construction program with the political and financial support of the 
European Union, which it joined in May 2004.  Reforms in government administration have been 
necessary for ensuring the proper development and implementation of infrastructure policy.  This 
dissertation examines the course of administrative reform in the Ministry of Transport, 
Construction and Maritime Economy (MTBiGM), the General Directorate of National Roads and 
Motorways (GDDKiA), and the Ministry of Regional Development (MRR) in Poland.  
Additionally, it discusses some consequences of the recent merger of the MTBiGM and MRR 
into the new Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR) in November 2013.  The central 
question guiding the dissertation research has been whether an administrative legacy from state 
socialism continues to affect policy implementation.  The question of an administrative legacy is 
addressed by the following four research questions: 1) Which mechanisms reproduced the 
administrative legacy of state-socialism in the national roads policy area in Poland after 1989? 2) 
Have mechanisms of accountability successfully compelled the Polish administration to 
undertake reforms? 3) Has decentralization empowered self-governments (regional and local 
governments) in Poland to fully participate in the policy process of national roads? 4) Have the 
Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Regional Development nurtured internal policy capacity in 
response to the need for coordination? 
The hypotheses corresponding to the research questions were the following: 1) The 
central element of a legacy explanation, politicization, was largely maintained by a lack of a 
good civil service law until 1998 and elite hostility to their control over the administration being 
circumscribed. 2) The mechanisms of accountability, especially political mechanisms linking the 
MTBiGM, GDDKiA and MRR to the political leadership in the Polish government and to the 
European Union have compelled the government bodies responsible for transportation policy in 
Poland to undertake reforms. 3) Decentralization has indeed had an impact on highway 
transportation policy in Poland insofar as regional governments have greater policy input and 
implementation responsibilities, however ultimate authority still lies with the central government. 
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4) The need for coordination and rationalization of policy making and implementation have 
proven to be a strong impetus for the Ministry Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy 
and the Ministry of Regional Development to develop stronger policy capacity.   
This dissertation research argues and demonstrates that an administrative legacy, defined 
as a reactionary cadre of officials from the socialist regime, no longer has a meaningful influence 
on the outcomes of national roads infrastructure policy in Poland.  If, however, an administrative 
legacy is defined as the politicization of the government administration in Poland by political 
leaders, then there is a discernable and persistent legacy within the units of government 
administration responsible for the transportation policy, albeit to varying degrees.  Furthermore, 
there is anecdotal evidence of a lingering mentality (i.e. the lack of a sense of public duty) 
among some public employees as constituting a legacy of state socialism.  Addressing Research 
Question 1, Chapter 5 demonstrates that politicization is the primary remaining administrative 
legacy of state socialism.  Analytically speaking, politicization is both an objective of the 
political leadership and a mechanism by which to achieve other goals.  Politicization has been 
maintained by successive governments determined to utilize the administration as a means to 
realize their transportation policies, although the ability of ruling parties to politicize the whole 
of the administration has been curtailed by civil service laws passed in 1998 and 2008.  
Politicization as a legacy was maintained by the mechanism of rational-historical institutionalism 
proposed by Meyer-Sahling (2009b).  On the other hand, a lingering mentality as an 
administrative legacy of state socialism was maintained by social-constructivist institutionalism, 
an alternative also proposed by Meyer-Sahling (2009b), as it centered on the beliefs of individual 
employees.  Chapter 6, focusing on Research Question 2, demonstrates that government 
administration has been compelled to undertake reforms primarily by political mechanisms of 
accountability, which are used by the domestic political leadership and the European Union to 
enforce their policies.  Political accountability is almost exclusively vertical.  Internal 
mechanisms of accountability, such as investigations and professional norms, also compel 
government administration to pursue reforms.  Chapter 7 addresses Research Question 3 and 
finds that, counter to initial expectations, decentralization has not empowered regional and local 
governments to have a major and consistent voice in national roads policy in Poland.  However, 
in light of the fact that some spatial planning powers were recentralized, a government policy of 
the centralization of planning powers related to national roads can be explained as a rational 
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process through which central government ministries and agencies will be more effective as 
policymakers and implementers.  Chapter 8, addressing Research Question 4, demonstrates that 
the MTBiGM and MRR nurtured internal policy capacity in order to better coordinate planning 
and implementation activities, a process that was aided by recentralization.  Policy capacity also 
provided the legitimacy needed by civil servants of the MTBiGM and MRR to resist 
politicization by the political leadership.  
The primary contribution to the literatures on public administration and the political 
transition is the Revised Model of Public Management Reform based on the Model of Public 
Management Reform developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011).  The  Revised Model is an 
adaptation better suited to analyzing the process of administrative reform in East-Central 
European countries which have either already joined or will join the European Union.  The 
revised model includes an explicit role for international organizations such as the European 
Union, Weberian concepts of bureaucracy, and greater agency on the part of the bureaucracy. 
The revised model can serve as an effective analytical tool for scholars engaged in studying 
administrative reforms in contemporary East-Central Europe.  
A contribution to the transition literature on administrative reforms in ECE is that it 
shows that politicization is a theme common to Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) alternatives to an 
administrative legacy (defined as a residual cadre of officials from the previous regime with 
ideological loyalties to socialism). According to Meyer-Sahling (2009b), alternative explanations 
to the (cadre) legacy still having influence on the course of reform include 1) an early end to the 
(cadre) legacy’s influence, 2) EU conditionality, 3) foreign models of administration, and 4) 
party competition over the administration.  The issue of politicization is found at the core of 
these alternatives for the following reasons: 1) Politicization was used as a mechanism to remove 
the old cadre early on, 2) EU conditionality sought to minimize politicization as part of its 
recommended reforms, 3) foreign models of administration restraining excessive politicization 
were sought, and 4) party competition over control of the administration was enabled by the 
prospect of utilizing the politicized structures of the administration for rewarding supporters.   
Thus, politicization is arguably the most important remaining administrative legacy of state 
socialism.  
The study is important for transportation geography in that it closely scrutinizes the 
institutional processes by which policy actors in bureaucratic government are influenced, thus 
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potentially shaping transportation policymaking and implementation. The same contribution is 
made to human geography as a whole, as public administration remains woefully understudied 
by scholars in that field.  Promising opportunities exist in examining public administration from 
a spatial perspective, a task well suited to the theoretical skills nurtured among geographers 
today.  A final and practical contribution of this research is that it will prove useful as a source of 
insight into the efforts of the Polish government to implement a national roads program for 
policy-makers both in the European Union, the United States, and elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO STUDY 
In Poland, it is self-evident that contemporary economic and political development has 
been strongly affected by its experience during state socialism, albeit to a continuously 
decreasing degree. However, this is not to say that the past is becoming irrelevant. Rather, 
economic, political, and social progress has been less and less influenced by the past as 
contemporary development pressures have largely superseded old ones.   Reforms which began 
in the early 1990s have fundamentally restructured the economy and ustrój (or political system) 
in Poland, with the continuous adjustments being made largely improving and consolidating 
these new institutional arrangements.  Contemporary Polish transport policy is a good example 
of how a policy area inherited from state socialism has been transformed in order to meet the 
needs of European integration.  During the transition, Polish transport policy saw significant 
change in modal priorities from rail to private passenger cars and commercial roadway transport.  
EU funds, which have stringent accounting requirements, have partially facilitated this modal 
shift. Owing to the conditionality placed on the use of these funds, their widespread use has 
necessitated administrative reforms within the government bodies in the transport policy sector.
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The reforms have not only sought to improve accountability, but they have also served to 
increase the quality of government administration in this vital policy sector. The centerpiece of 
the current policy is the construction of a new network of autostrady and ekspresówki, or of 
motorways and expressways, respectively. 
There have been many studies conducted and many proposals made on the shape and 
extent of a motorway network since the 1950s.  In fact, the basic shape of the network currently 
under construction has been known for decades now.  Despite developing a vision for the 
network of motorways and expressways, during state socialism there was neither the political 
will nor the available financing to proceed with what would have been a massive infrastructural 
                                                 
1
 The term of convenience, transport policy sector will be used throughout this dissertation to denote the collection 
of government ministries, agencies, and other entities which are responsible for transportation policy.  In a broader 
sense, it also includes civil society groups, industrial lobbies, and academics which all have some input in the public 
policy debates surrounding transportation in Poland. 
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undertaking with transformative social consequences.  A well-developed network of motorways 
would have been favorable to an increasing rate of private automobile ownership, which was 
quite low during state socialism but more than tripled from 1990 to 2010 (European Commission 
2012) despite the period of severe economic hardship in the early 1990s initiated by “shock 
therapy.”  Rail, as a collective and decidedly more efficient means of transport was strongly 
supported by the policies of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), which dominated both 
politics and the state administrative apparatus.  When the PZPR and its satellite parties fell from 
power in 1989, official policies discouraging private automobile ownership were discontinued.  
As a symbol of personal mobility and even freedom, the private automobile became immensely 
popular with the citizenry.  At the same time that many countries in Western Europe and North 
America were beginning to implement policies for curbing some of the effects of excessive 
automobilization, the new Polish political system was actively seeking means to facilitate the 
growth of personal automobile ownership.  Herein a tension developed.  Poland and Poles were 
just beginning to move away decades of enforced collective transport towards more individual 
means of transport at the same time as the West was hoping to encourage a return to public 
transport after years of experience with congestion and the ill effects of automobile pollution.  
This agenda for sustainability was brought to Poland by the conditions placed on EU financial 
assistance
2
 for developing the transport network.  While the EU accession process emphasized 
public transport, domestic proponents of public transport in Poland had long defended the 
existence of bus, rail, and streetcar transport in the face of countervailing pressures during the 
transition period.  As is apparent, many different sources have created potential policy impulses, 
which have certainly had an impact on the development and implementation of national roads
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infrastructure policy within the transport policy sector. 
This study is concerned with how the dynamics of a changing administration have 
affected current motorway infrastructure policy in Poland with implications for a better 
understanding of the relationship between transportation policy and government administration.  
Additionally, EU policy-makers and international academics concerned with the topic of national 
roads policy and regional development in Poland and East-Central Europe may find this study 
                                                 
2
 In the case of motorways and expressways, the specific financial instrument employed by the EU was the Cohesion 
Fund. 
3
 In Poland, national roads are classified as those falling under the responsibility of the central government.  
Motorways (autostrady) and expressways (ekspresówki) belong exclusively to this category. 
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useful. This study proceeds with the understanding that government administration and 
policymaking are fundamentally connected and that any attempt to extricate one from the other 
would result in an inherently flawed analysis.  Just as one cannot separate policymaking from 
government administration, one cannot isolate the current state of policymaking and 
administration within transport sector policy from the inheritance of the past.   This study 
borrows heavily from the fields of public administration and post-communist transition with the 
aim of creating a more detailed picture of national roads transport policy in Poland today.  The 
central concept to be explored in this study is that of an administrative legacy as factor, which 
can influence the current outcomes of national roads infrastructure policy in Poland.  The 
research for this dissertation focuses on the following government entities: the Ministry of 
Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy (Polish acronym: MTBiGM) and its subordinate 
agency the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA), as well as the 
Ministry of Regional Development (MRR). The merger of the MTBiGM and MRR into the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR) in November 2013 will also be discussed. 
 
1.2 On the Problems of Administrative Legacy 
One can only speak of a common administrative legacy of communism across ECE in the 
most general of terms.  These terms are indeed so general that referring to a common 
administrative legacy is often unproductive as it minimizes the real and important differences 
between government administrations throughout the former Eastern Bloc countries both during 
and after communism.  Herbert Kitschelt et al. (1999) created a three-fold typology of former 
communist regimes in ECE, of which the national-accommodative type found in Hungary and 
Poland is the most relevant for this study.  These typologies are a useful description of the 
political system during late state socialism and thus are a good point of departure for scholars 
who study administrative legacies. The national-accommodative type enjoyed some advantages 
compared to regime-types described in the two remaining typologies (see section 2.2).  These 
advantages seemingly included a legal distinction between government workers and non-
government workers, and some traditions preserved from before the communist takeover in the 
late 1940s.  Relative to some other countries in the region, this typology (if taken to constitute an 
administrative legacy in Poland) would be positive, and furthermore, it would suggest that 
Poland would currently be at forefront of reform efforts in the region.  However, Meyer-Sahling 
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(2009a) showed that there is not a correlation between Poland and Hungary’s status and 
progressives in the area of public administration in late state socialism and their current status, 
which lags behind other countries in the region, particularly the Baltic States.  Nevertheless, 
Meyer-Sahling (2009b) saw these typologies as a starting point from which one could develop a 
better understanding of the evolution of administrative legacies or legacy explanations.   
  A known pitfall of any argument supporting a legacy explanation is that it is difficult to 
determine what constitutes an administrative legacy from communism.   In some quarters, an 
administrative legacy might be taken to mean a cabal of officials from the previous regime 
determined to enrich themselves with the wealth at the state’s disposal, if not reverting the state 
back to communism.  In other quarters, an administrative legacy is a set of institutions comprised 
of the bureaucratic structures and procedures found within government entities which bear the 
mark of the previous regime and are ineffective and retrograde in the present economic and 
political reality.  Some might argue that an obsolete administrative culture has been inherited 
from state socialism that is impeding the smooth functioning of the current public administration 
along Weberian lines.  All of these definitions above are problematic, while at the same time 
containing some degree of truth.  More concrete suggestions were made by Meyer-Sahling 
(2009b) when he argued that administrative legacies in ECE were generally characterized by:  
1) a tendency of governments or government employees to not follow the formal rules 
and procedures,  
2) weak political institutions and a “preference for personalistic and discretionary 
governance” and  
3) party politicization of the government administration, especially in regards to 
personnel
4
.   
The first characteristic would best be described as a reason rooted in an inherited administrative 
culture.  The second characteristic is rooted both in administrative culture (as a reaction to 
undesirable rules and procedures) and an institutional explanation because of the existence of 
these rules.  The third characteristic of party politicization remains the most tangible sign of past 
practices today.   All three characteristics of Meyer-Sahling’s legacy explanation involve the 
                                                 
4
 Politicization of the bureaucracy is found in most Western countries at the higher levels of the public 
administration.  Although politicization is not in and of itself unique to state socialism, the pervasiveness of this 
phenomenon in ECE is arguably exacerbated by the politicizing tendencies found during state socialism. 
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behavior of groups of people within the administration, whether or not they form a coherent 
group or a collection of individuals.  A final thought is that what may be seen as legacies of 
communism are in fact legacies of the transition, i.e. they are unintended consequences of 
reactions to communist rule after the transition began in 1989. 
While it is intuitive that some sort of connection must exist between the outcomes of 
today and the government administrations and policies of yesterday, it may prove impossible to 
precisely define the contents of administrative legacy, as vexing as this may be.   Beyond 
defining a legacy, Meyer-Sahling (2009b) writes that it is equally important to find the 
mechanisms by which a legacy was reproduced over the years.  He suggests rational-historical 
institutionalism and social-constructivist institutionalism as two prime candidates for these 
mechanisms of reproduction.  Nevertheless, it is necessary to know which concrete 
manifestations of a legacy to look for when determining how they were reproduced with the 
government administration in Poland after 1989.  Ironically, strong emphasis placed on possible 
manifestations of a legacy explanation can in fact lead to alternatives to legacy explanation. For 
example, greatly emphasizing the role of party politicization inherited from state socialism can 
lead to the assertion that party competition for control of the government is more influential than 
a legacy explanation. Meyer-Sahling (2009b) mentions four alternatives to an isolated legacy 
explanation of current reform outcomes:  
1) any legacy of communism ended early on in the transition,  
2) the conditionality placed on ECE countries by the EU during the accession process 
supplanted legacies   
3) domestic reformers sought out inspiration from mostly Western administrative-/civil-
service systems,  
4) the influence of party competition was the dominant influence upon the administration.   
Although the four alternatives discussed by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) would indeed depart from a 
legacy explanation limited to a cadre of older officials, it will be argued below that they are in 
fact quite connected to the administrative legacy of politicization of the government 
administration.  Having described the broad contours of the idea of an administrative legacy 
above, the next section will present the specific topics of this dissertation. 
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1.3 Refining the Topic of Inquiry 
The basic question which has driven this research project is whether or not an 
administrative legacy (or legacy explanation) as commonly described in the transition literature 
has influenced outcomes regarding the implementation of motorway and expressway 
infrastructure policy in Poland.  Thus, if Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) three general characteristics of 
post-socialist administrative legacies are to serve as a guide, it must be asked whether 1) a 
tendency for governments and government employees to circumvent rules, 2) weak political and 
administrative institutions leading to “personalistic and discretionary governance”, and 3) 
downward politicization
5
 of the government administration by ruling parties, are essential to 
explaining the implementation outcomes of current national roads infrastructure policy.  During 
the course of interviews conducted for this study in Poland, participants were asked if, broadly 
speaking, they believed that there was any sort of influence of communist administration on 
current transportation policy outcomes.  The interviewer qualified the question by letting them 
know that it was not intended to imply the existence of an elaborate conspiracy among some 
cabal of officials within the current administration who had begun their careers during 
communism.   Even with this qualification, participants overwhelmingly responded that there 
was not such an influence in the administration presently, and furthermore, it is not a meaningful 
source of delays or current problems.  They often substantiated this answer with the fact that 
communist officials within the ministries were largely replaced within the first few years of the 
transition.  Even if this cohort of officials had not been replaced at the outset, it was certainly 
retired by now.   
Turnover of officials
6
 at all levels of administration is only one reason why a legacy 
explanation may not be viable in the case of the implementation of national roads policy.  The 
adoption of strict rules and procedures for evaluating projects and handling EU Cohesion Funds 
among others has seriously curtailed the ability of individuals to exercise any significant 
discretion in the execution of their duties in this policy area.  Furthermore, internal and external 
(including both the Polish government and the EU) oversight has made it much more difficult to 
ignore rules and procedures in place.  The introduction of a functioning civil service law in 1998 
                                                 
5
 “Downward politicization” is meant to denote the control exercised by the political leadership on the government 
administration by means of appointed positions reaching down the hierarchy starting with the position of the 
minister. 
6
 The role of people permeates all three characteristics described by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) above. 
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(Dz. U. z 1999 r. Nr 49, poz. 483) initiated the process of reversing the politicization of the 
government administration by creating a career civil service which was to be insulated from 
political interference. However, full de-politicization remains an unmet goal because high-level 
positions in the transport sector ministries and agencies have remained subject to political 
appointment.  Although the politicization of high-level positions within the ministries still does 
not fully explain the current difficulties faced in policy implementation, it is certainly a tangible 
manifestation of an administrative legacy which has been inherited from state socialism.   
A defining characteristic of government and public administration during communism 
was the level of politicization of the ministerial bureaucracies.  As is well known, there was a 
hierarchy of the Party parallel to that of the ministries.  These Party bureaucrats produced policy 
and effectively led the ministries.  Politics, and not merit, was the quality sought in individual 
workers.  It was this very system (and indeed tradition) of politicization inherited from state 
socialism that enabled the newly elected democratic governments to quickly replace the top 
levels of the ministries after 1989 (Meyer-Sahling’s alternative explanation of an early demise of   
legacy).  It was this system of power relations for which alternatives were sought abroad (Meyer-
Sahling’s alternative explanation of seeking foreign administrative models).  It was this inherited 
institution of politicization that allowed for the competition among political parties to influence 
the bureaucracy so strongly.  Perhaps the existence of the tool of politicization of the 
bureaucracy also led to hesitance within Poland’s political elite, generating disagreement on 
reform measures and even producing faulty ones as well.  Other alternative explanations can be 
related to politicization, but are not direct consequences of it.  With that in mind, the prominence 
of politicization within the contents of an administrative legacy is sufficient to consider it the 
main aspect of a legacy explanation.  The task of Research Question 1 will be to identify which 
manifestations of either rational-historical or social-constructivist institutionalism have served as 
mechanisms which have reproduced it over time. 
Politicization of bureaucracy exploits the inbuilt structures which render these 
bureaucracies accountable to the political leadership.  Every bureaucracy is responsible to some 
form of leadership, even if this leadership is comprised of the collective heads of the 
bureaucracies themselves.  In nearly every case, however, bureaucracy is accountable to an 
external collection of leaders.  What has just been described now is an example of vertical 
accountability, the essential accountability found in every functioning bureaucracy.  There are 
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many other forms of accountability as well.  Peters (2010b) names five kinds of controls on a 
bureaucracy:  organizational methods, market and external controls, group and public methods, 
as well as normative methods in addition to political methods, which correspond to vertical 
methods.  Administrative reforms may well restructure what kinds of accountability exist in the 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the political leadership, adding fluidity to the situation 
when reorganizations, the most drastic type of reforms, occur.  Mechanisms of accountability 
mechanisms can be wielded by the political leadership and other external forces in order to 
compel change within the bureaucracy.  In the case of Poland it would be very interesting to see 
which mechanisms of accountability have been effectively employed by external forces in order 
to compel reform in the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR.  One would expect to find strong 
influence from both the domestic political leadership and the European Union in encouraging 
reforms in the administration.  This relationship between those people and institutions to which 
the MTBiGM, GDDKiA and MRR are responsible and the sources of pressure for administrative 
reform will be addressed in Research Question 2.   
Centralization and decentralization constitute a very important dimension of 
administrative structure at a national scale.   Much of the administrative reforms in the West in 
the past few decades have focused on decentralizing government structures and decision-making 
which had had become very centralized in the previous political era.  Likewise, there was a good 
deal of attention paid to decentralization of government administration and political power in 
ECE after 1989.   The focus on decentralization was discussed so often that one might assume 
that it was fully implemented with little meaningful resistance throughout the region.  In fact, the 
opposite is true.  Decentralization was met with a great deal of resistance by central authorities in 
most cases, and not without justification.  While it is to be expected that central authorities would 
simply resist the idea of ceding power to lower levels of government, some more concrete 
concerns involved a belief that local and regional governments were not capable of leading in 
specific policy areas and that coordination would become a problem.  The significance of 
decentralization for national roads policy will be analyzed in Research Question 3.                                                                                                                  
Some powers in spatial planning which were decentralized in Poland early in the 
transition were later deemed necessary to recentralize in the early 2000s.  This was part of an 
effort to increase the effectiveness of spatial and transport planning capabilities of the central 
government.  Ultimately, policy capacity (i.e. the capability of an executive government entity to 
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develop and implement policy largely through its own human resources) would improve as a 
result of greater powers and responsibilities being placed within the purview of the responsible 
ministries which possessed greater talent and know-how than the local governments.  In addition 
to creating greater effectiveness, policy capacity is a good means of avoiding excessive 
politicization of the government administration by the elected political leadership.  It will be 
shown here that a lack of policy capacity was directly related to the high levels of politicization 
in the Polish civil service since 1989.   The development of policy capacity as an outgrowth of 
rationalization of the policy-making process will be examined in Research Question 4. 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Below are the four research questions which have driven this study.  Together they seek 
to address the influence of a state socialist legacy on highway transportation policy in 
contemporary Poland.  The questions and hypotheses are: 
 
Research Question 1:  Which mechanisms reproduced the administrative legacy of state-
socialism in the national roads policy area in Poland after 1989? 
Hypothesis 1:  The central element of a legacy explanation, politicization, was largely 
maintained by a lack of a good civil service law until 1998 and elite hostility
7
 to their control 
over the administration being circumscribed. 
 
Research Question 2:  Have mechanisms of accountability successfully compelled the Polish 
administration to undertake reforms?  
Hypothesis 2:  Yes, the mechanisms of accountability, especially political mechanisms linking 
the transport policy sector to the political leadership in the Polish government and to the 
European Union have compelled the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR to undertake reforms. 
 
Research Question 3: Has decentralization empowered self-governments in Poland to fully 
participate in the national roads policy sector
8
? 
                                                 
7
 The elite here include politicians who exercise control over the bureaucracy. 
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Hypothesis 3: Decentralization has indeed had an impact on highway transportation policy in 
Poland insofar as regional governments have greater policy input and implementation 
responsibilities; however, ultimate authority still lies with the central government. 
 
Research Question 4:  Have the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Regional Development 
nurtured internal policy capacity in response to the need for coordination? 
Hypothesis 4:  Yes, the need for coordination and rationalization of policy making and 
implementation has proven to be a strong impetus for the Ministry Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy and the Ministry of Regional Development to develop stronger policy 
capacity. 
 
Analysis conducted on these research questions has yielded the following results.  Hypothesis 1 
was supported by evidence which demonstrated that politicization constitutes the most visible 
attribute of a past legacy from state socialism.  This legacy survived the old cadre of senior-level 
officials which was replaced in the early 1990s; however, its influence has been curtailed since 
the passage of a series of civil service laws in 1998 and 2008.   Hypothesis 2 was also supported 
by evidence that mechanisms of accountability enabled the political leadership, the European 
Union, and the ministries themselves to pursue reforms within the administration.  Mechanisms 
of accountability were not only used to identify problems and discipline or remove those 
responsible, but also to ensure the further implementation of government policy
9
. Hypothesis 3 
could not be supported. The national roads policy sector within which the Ministry of Transport, 
Construction and Maritime Economy (MTBiGM) and the General Directorate of National Roads 
and Motorways (GDDKiA) operated was and remains decidedly centralized. Despite 
decentralization being the discourse it did not happen in practice. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Regional Development (MRR) has been pursuing a recentralization of spatial planning powers 
related to, among others, transportation policy – despite that they were never decentralized; a 
policy of further centralization.  The institutionalized influence of regional and local 
governments in the national roads infrastructure policy sector is minimal.  Hypothesis 4 was 
                                                                                                                                                             
8
 National roads policy sector is a term of convenience which, like the term transport policy sector, means the 
collection of government entities responsible for the transport policy area.  However, this term is specific to policy 
regarding national roads. 
9
 This is more fully developed in Section 6.4.2 with the help of media sources. 
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supported by evidence that demonstrated that the MTBiGM and MRR have been increasing their 
policy-making capacity in response to problems in coordination and the need to rationalize the 
policy process.  Given these outcomes, and the nature of the evidence supporting them, it can be 
observed that a direct legacy of state socialism is no longer an influential factor in the reform 
trajectory and performance outcomes of the MTBiGM (including the GDDKiA) and the MRR.  
While politicization of the administration is a legacy of state socialism in Poland, it is an indirect 
one which has served all parties in power since the political transition began in 1989.   
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 The research conducted for this dissertation demonstrates that an administrative legacy 
embodied in residual personnel from state socialism is not presently a major influence on policy 
implementation outcomes in the government entities in the national roads policy sector in Poland.  
Its primary contribution to the literatures on public administration and the political transition is 
the Revised Model of Public Management Reform based on the Model of Public Management 
Reform developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011).  The Revised Model is an adaptation of the 
original which is better suited to analyzing the process of administrative reform in East-Central 
European countries which have either already joined or will join the European Union.  It accords 
influence from the EU and other international organizations, Weberian bureaucracy, and greater 
agency on the part of employees in government administration where Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
model did not. The Revised Model can serve as an effective analytical tool for scholars engaged 
in studying administrative reforms in contemporary East-Central Europe. A contribution to the 
transition literature on administrative reforms in ECE is that it demonstrates that issue of 
politicization within government administration synthesizes alternatives to the commonly 
proposed administrative legacy defined as a residual cadre of officials from the previous regime 
with ideological loyalties to socialism. According to Meyer-Sahling (2009b), alternative 
explanations to the (cadre) legacy still having influence on the course of reform, include 1) an 
early end to the (cadre) legacy’s influence, 2) EU conditionality, 3) foreign models of 
administration, and 4) party competition over the administration.  The issue of politicization is 
found at the core of these alternatives for the following reasons: 1) Politicization was used as a 
mechanism to remove the old cadre early on, 2) EU conditionality sought to minimize 
politicization as part of its recommended reforms, 3) foreign models of administration restraining 
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excessive politicization were sought, and 4) party competition over control of the administration 
was enabled by the prospect of utilizing the politicized structures of the administration for 
rewarding supporters.  In this way, it underscores the importance of politicization as the chief 
remaining legacy of government administration from state socialism, which continues to resist 
reform efforts in many countries.  The study is important for transportation geography in that it 
closely scrutinizes the institutional processes by which policy actors in bureaucratic government 
are influenced, thus potentially influencing transportation policymaking and implementation. 
Transportation geography would greatly benefit from a concerted effort at understanding the 
inner workings of institutions which control transportation policy in the state.  The same 
contribution is made to human geography as a whole, as public administration remains woefully 
understudied by scholars in that field.  Promising opportunities exist in examining public 
administration from a spatial perspective, a task well suited to the theoretical skills nurtured 
among geographers today.  A final and practical contribution of this research is that it will prove 
useful as a source of insight into the efforts of the Polish government to implement a national 
roads program for policy-makers both in the European Union, the United States, and elsewhere.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:  
THEORY AND POLISH PRACTICE   
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses both background information regarding government 
administration in Poland as well as serving as a review of public administration literature, 
political transition literature, and some aspects of EU integration not directly connected with 
transportation.  It will lay the groundwork for a background and review of the transportation 
geography and mobilities literatures in chapter 3.  Administration is perhaps the most tangible 
manifestation of the state aside from borders.  The role of the state in society is recognized as 
central to understanding of the broader social patterns of economy, inequality, and of course 
politics.  In far too many analyses, however, the state is simply recognized as the creator of 
certain conditions which influence the outcomes of other processes, with the emphasis on these 
conditions.  The state is a far more active entity than this.  Public Administration refers to the 
organs of government which implement government policy and effectively operate the 
government.  Administration and the bureaucracy contained within it truly do have an important 
role to play in government and society, a fact that is lost in widely held perceptions
10
. It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that while the role of administration (or bureaucracy) in a given 
problem is often explicitly mentioned, it is often not explored in any greater detail than the use of 
the descriptors, overly bureaucratic, red tape, inefficient, wasteful etc… or derivations thereof.  
Beyond these frequently applied descriptions of administration, there lay very real and serious 
existential issues pertaining to the structure and functioning of government administration.  The 
outward and inner complexities of bureaucracies present a daunting object of study deterring 
many from further investigation.  As Hartwig writes, “The charm of a bureaucracy is the charm 
                                                 
10
 Peters (2010b, 266) writes, “…the basic dualism with which the person on the street – not to mention politicians 
and academic commentators – regards bureaucracy is apparent.  On the one hand, bureaucracy is characterized as a 
leviathan, a monolithic and virtually uncontrollable force eating away at personal liberties and economic resources.  
On the other hand, bureaucracy is a fool:  a fragmented set of individuals so bound with red tape and rule books that 
they do not know what they are doing at any one time, sending television sets to people who lack electricity and 
doing research on the optimal shape of toilet seats." 
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of a maze.  Bureaucracies are complex and frustrating, yet like mazes, they have their own 
peculiar appeal” (1983, 143).    Below begins an overview of the important and relevant works 
and ideas in the literature on public administration.   Included are theoretical works as well as 
those that focus specifically on East-Central Europe. 
Government administration, bureaucracy, and civil service are three words that are often 
used interchangeably outside of the study of public administration.  The first term, government 
administration, and the last term, civil service, both have several variants although it is less clear 
whether these variations differ significantly in meaning.  Government administration denotes the 
organs of government that implement and indeed define laws and regulations set forth by the 
legislative and executive.  This is the generally neutral term emphasizing public administration 
as part of government which is commonly used within the field of public administration.  
Bureaucracy is often used as a collective noun to refer to government administrators as well as 
the practices, institutions, rules, and procedures that guide their activity. It is more of an 
abstraction than something concrete, regularly being employed in derision by politicians 
pandering to potential voters as well nearly anyone who has become exasperated by the burden 
of having to deal with the cumbersome functioning of government agencies. For our purposes 
here, the term bureaucracy will be employed in the sense of the collective practices, institutions, 
rules, and procedures as well as the positions of administrators. Civil Service is simplest of these 
three terms to define.  Civil Service denotes the politically-neutral workforce of professionals 
within government administration having attained their positions on the basis of merit, be it in 
the form of competitive exam, education and training, or experience. The relationship between 
government administration, bureaucracy, and civil service can thus be described as the civil 
service being part of the government administration, both of which are encompassed by the 
abstraction of bureaucracy.  Differentiating between these three words is necessary in order to 
proceed further in the present discussion, where they will be treated as terms having stable 
definitions. The differences in meaning between the words mentioned above allude to the 
theoretical debates within the field of public administration that created them.  It is not the 
purpose here to directly trace their origins, although it will become apparent why these terms 
arose as a result of different conceptions of public administration.   Many different attributes are 
found in public administrations, the most fundamental of which is organization of activity in 
order to implement the laws and policies of the state.   
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An applied study of the geography of administration in England and Wales by Freeman 
(1968) was perhaps among the first to treat administration in a geographical context.  Nearly two 
decades later, Johnston (1983) critically examined the place of the state, including administration, 
within geography in his book, Geography and the State.  Bennett’s (1983) Geography of Public 
Finance extensively examined the role of administration as a distributor of public funds.  His 
work would be later revisited by Miszczuk (2009) for its application to circumstances in Poland.  
Surya Kant (1988), in his PhD dissertation of Administrative Geography of India, delved into the 
very geographic nature of public administration and suggested that a new sub-discipline of 
Geography was under development.  Nancy Obermeyer (1989) critiqued the existing literature 
on geography and administration.  What both Kant (1988) and Obermeyer (1989) recognized is 
the need for the small literature on geography and administration to be more unified and 
theoretically sound.  The discussion above has served as a preface to the more specific literature 
on administration in East-Central Europe.  The review of transition literature will serve as a 
contextualized point of departure for the rest of the literature review contained in this chapter. 
                                                           
2.1.1 Characteristics of Government Administration in Real Socialism 
The historical administrative traditions of ECE countries developed under the influence 
of the foreign empires to which they were subjugated.  In the case of Poland, their historical 
administrative traditions derived from the three partitioning powers: the Hapsburg Empire, the 
Prussian (later German) Empire, and the Russian Empire (see Hamilton and Roszkowski 1991, 
Malec and Malec 2003, and Witkowski 2007).  The historical regions of Bohemia, Moravia, 
Silesia, and Slovakia, which would later form Czechoslovakia, drew their administrative 
traditions from the Hapsburg Empire.  Upon independence following the First World War, the 
administrative traditions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) were marked by the legalism and formality of the Rechtstaat (German: a state of laws), 
a very Austro-German concept. The establishment of state socialism after the Second World War 
greatly changed the structure of these administrations.  The nomenklatura system
11
 developed, 
wherein usually corrupt high-ranking officials of the Party gained privileged access to the organs 
of state, as well as the most important positions of the state administration in a supposedly 
                                                 
11
 Although first developed in the Soviet Union prior to WW II, analogues of this system emerged in the countries 
“liberated” by the Soviet Union following their defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.  
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“classless” society. Rigby (1988) pointed to the all-encompassing nature of these arrangements 
that differentiate a nomenklatura system from other systems around the world.  Hirszowicz 
(1986) described the corruption and oppression of the Polish state during the 1980s that 
ultimately led to the events of 1989.   
A unifying feature of government administration throughout the Eastern Bloc was the 
leading position of the communist parties in directing the government administration
12
.  
Politicization of the government administration was a result of the very nature of the system of 
communism, which would inscribe the attainment of socialist ideals as an official mission and 
purpose of the state within national constitutions.  However, the popular characterization of 
communist-era bureaucracy as a monolithic entity is a pervasive misconception.  Instead of 
absolute uniformity in terms of structure and personnel, scholarship on the topic has found 
internal differentiation.  Administrative structures varied across the Eastern Bloc according to the 
immediate needs of a given regime and even pre-communist administrative traditions.  Personnel 
policy also varied across the Eastern Bloc according to these same factors.   
The internal dynamics of personnel within socialist government administration are 
arguably more important for understanding administration of that era than formal structures. 
Formal administrative structures during state socialism were in fact not so different from the 
formal institutional architecture of government administration found in capitalist countries 
(Izdebski 2001).  One must examine what kind of people were recruited into the government 
administration and how this changed over time in order to have a better understanding how the 
post-socialist reforms of public administration would play out after 1989.  A useful point of 
departure is offered by Jacek Wasilewski (1990) who detailed the changing patterns of 
recruitment to the government administration in the People’s Republic of Poland:  
 
In Poland, the processes of appointment to leading political, administrative 
and industrial-executive posts have followed four successive patterns of 
recruitment. 
                                                 
12
 Hubert Izdebski (2001) writes that the central administration in socialist countries, “was subject to the leadership 
of the communist parties above all else. Party organs, possessing their own extensive auxiliary apparatus, made 
many decisions that in capitalist countries would normally be made by the government or even ministers. At the 
same time, the policies of the communist parties’ leadership were generally implemented by the administration 
without the mediation of representative bodies, to which the administrative organs were formally subject. This 
brought about a relationship of direct dependency between the administration and the extensive party organs”. (pg. 
202). 
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 The first pattern existed from the end of the World War II until the 
immediate post-war years.  It was the pattern of the communist-combatant.  The 
primary criteria of selection to bureaucratic posts were faithfulness to the 
currently operating communist principles. Confirmed by membership of the 
Polish Workers’ Party, activity in the political organizations operating in the 
USSR in the 1940s and subsequently in Poland, or recommendation from active 
war service in the Polish Armed Forces formed in the Soviet Union. 
 The second pattern was established in the Stalinist period. On the one 
hand it made the criteria of the first pattern more stringent.  On the other, it 
broadened the privileged group to included people of the right class origin and 
class membership. In accordance with this communist-combatant-proletarian 
pattern, individuals who came from the urban and rural proletariat and supported 
the new regime had a chance of direct advancement to high managerial posts. 
 Since October 1956 greater stress has been laid on occupational skill.  The 
third pattern, that of the party-specialist, was an attempt to reconcile political and 
qualificational requirements.  To satisfy the first provision a candidate was 
expected to be a party member, to satisfy the second one – a diploma holder.  
Actually, however, the political requirements were of greater importance, and – 
particularly in times of political destabilization or economic slump – distinctly 
predominated.  Moreover, occupational credentials were often treated as a pure 
formality: it was the degree or diploma which counted, not the merit of a 
candidate. 
 The fourth pattern, that of the loyal expert, was proclaimed in the 
Solidarity period (August 1980 – December 1981) when the regime could no 
longer ignore popular demands for meritocratic selection of the elite.  This pattern 
was to be based exclusively of qualificational credentials.  The political 
involvement and political preferences of a candidate were not to be a subject 
matter of the appointment procedure, as long as an appointee declared his/ her 
loyalty to the Constitution. (pp. 744-745). 
 
The designations of communist-combatant, communist-combatant-proletarian, party specialist, 
and loyal expert are useful for understanding the intended composition of government 
administration at various times.  However (1990), Wasilewski demonstrates that while the first 
three patterns predominated in succession, the pattern of the loyal expert was never fully realized 
as the transition from the party specialist pattern was incomplete.  Furthermore, Wasilewski 
asserts that the incomplete transition from a party specialist pattern to a loyal expert pattern was 
the result of resistance of the bureaucracy against the intended reform program of the PZPR, 
which would have seen a greater infusion of experts into the administration.  This infusion of 
experts would have necessarily occurred to the detriment of party specialists who were still 
considered part of the nomenklatura.  According to Wasilewski, the resistance of the party 
specialists within the bureaucracy towards the reform program of the PZPR is evidence that 
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refutes the contention that the bureaucracy always accepted party edicts submissively, a 
characterization that accepts “a monocentric, totalitarian vision of communism” (pg. 744) as 
much as the view that the ruling party and state were puppets of the bureaucracy. If disagreement 
existed between the bureaucracy and the party, then neither characterization could be entirely 
accurate. 
 The apparent rivalry between party specialists, who were still outwardly politicized, and 
the loyal experts is an important internal dynamic of the socialist government administration.  It 
sets the stage for the eventual ascendancy of the technocrats in late state-socialism and the 
eventual collapse of the system.  Lawrence King and Iván Szelényi (2004) argue that newly 
emergent technocrats during late state-socialism were largely responsible for that system’s 
collapse, which came as a result of an alliance of government technocrats with humanistic 
intellectuals in the opposition movement.  The roots of this alliance lay in the dissatisfaction of 
the technocrats with politicized bureaucracy found in state socialism.  King and Szelényi use 
“the bureaucracy estate” to designate the older, ideologically motivated employees within the 
political-administrative apparatus by the 1970s and 1980s.  Their usage of “the bureaucracy 
estate” appears to conflate the separate party and administrative apparatuses; however, it is still 
useful in what is an important distinction between the old guard and late reformers.  King and 
Szelényi’s use of “technocrat” is arguably applicable to some individuals from Wasilewski’s 
party specialists (especially those from the later period) and certainly loyal experts.   
The members of bureaucratic estate most often had proletarian backgrounds and had 
managed to enter the bureaucracy primarily through a demonstration of their ideological 
commitment to socialism, with expertise being a secondary qualification.  Members of the new 
cadre of technocrats were often, but not always, children of those employed in the bureaucratic 
estate.  The technocrats were less ideological than the older bureaucrats and sought to establish 
their legitimacy based upon their merit.  In fact, their qualifications and motivations were not 
entirely different from that of their Western counterparts (Wiatr 1995, 154).  The technocrats’ 
desire to implement reforms in what they saw as a failing system set them against the older 
hardliners within the bureaucracy.  King and Szelényi argue that the technocrats had gained 
control by the end of state socialism and began negotiations with the opposition, which was 
particularly the case in Hungary and Poland. The opposition in Poland was comprised of both a 
trade unionist and a humanist intellectual element.  And while they negotiated with the 
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technocrats to end socialism, they sought to quickly replace them once the transition began.  The 
technocrats would change their ideological loyalties from the socialist PZPR to social-
democratic parties after 1989, however, this did not stop the new political elite (the former 
opposition) from seeing them as relics of the past, in effect conflating the technocrats with the 
old political hardliners whom they themselves had displaced before the end of socialism in 
Poland.  While the technocrats from the previous regime would have a tenuous position in the 
new administrative system, the old political hardliners of the bureaucratic estate would have no 
role in post-socialist Poland.  The technocrats were able to remain in the administration for some 
time after the beginning of the political transition as the new political elite (Solidarity and former 
opposition members) did not yet possess enough qualified individuals with which to replace 
them. 
More recently, Regulski (2003) examines the process of political reform and 
decentralization in Poland in the early 1990s from his own vantage point as parliamentarian 
during that time.  Wiatr (1995), Elster et al. (1998), Goetz (2001), and Ferens and Macek (2002) 
examine the challenges of political and administrative reform in Poland throughout the 1990s as 
EU membership, and the relevant stringent requirements for accession, came closer to being 
reality. Dimitrova (2005) and Arcimowicz (2009) examine the efforts of the civil services in 
Poland to “Europeanize”, whereas Dąbrowski (2008a and 2008b) and Bukowski, Gadowska, and 
Polak (2008) explore the problems within the administration in managing and allocating EU 
Structural Funds
13
 after accession in 2004. Authors such as Goetz (2001), Ryšavý (2007), 
Scherepreel (2009), and Camyar (2010) have written about the reforms in the Czech Republic. 
Reform in the ECE region as a whole has been covered in larger analyses by Verheijen (1999), 
Goetz (2001), Grzymała-Busse and Luong (2002), O’Dwyer (2004), Grzymała-Busse (2007), 
Ghindar (2009), Meyer-Sahling (2009b and 2010), and Verheijen (2010). 
 
2.1.2 Polish Literature on Public Administration 
Public administration and public administrative thought reflect Poland’s historical                                                      
political context.  Polish philosophical traditions are rooted in Continental philosophy, being 
                                                 
13
 Structural Funds are aid given to primarily underdeveloped regions within member states in order to achieve 
greater parity with the EU average of development and quality of life.  They are the major source of funding for 
infrastructure projects in most ECE countries. 
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heavily influenced by French and especially German legal traditions.  Two Polish textbooks on 
public administration are of interest here.  Malec and Malec wrote Historia administracji i myśli 
administracyjnej (History of Administration and Administrative Thought) in 2003.  Malec and 
Malec explore the history of administrative thought in Poland as well as the origins of various 
influences from abroad.  The Age of Absolutism saw the arrival of centralized government 
administration as a supporting apparatus to the newly absolute monarch into whose person (and 
by extension city of residence) all temporal power had been concentrated.  Malec and Malec laid 
out nine ‘principles and traits’ in the first chapter of their book14:   
1) Principle of Departmentalism - Zasada resortowości,  
2) Principle of Centralization and Decentralization -Zasady centralizacji i decentralizacji, 
3) Principle of Concentration and Deconcentration - Zasady koncentracji i dekoncentracji, 
4) Principle of Hierarchical Subordination - Zasada hierarchicznego podporządkowania, 
5) Principle of Collegialness and Individual Direction - Zasady kolegialności i 
jednoosobowego kierownictowa,  
6) Principle of Bureaucracy - Zasada biurokratyzmu,  
7) Body of Administrators - Korpus urzędniczy,  
8) Boundaries of Administrative Activity - Granice działalności administracyjnej, and  
9) Criteria for the Creating of Territorial Divisions - Kryteria kształtowania podziałów 
terytorialnych.   
The focus on order and hierarchy clearly associates Polish thought on administration with 
German sociologist Max Weber and his model.  That being said, Weberian thought on 
bureaucracy has become integral to most bureaucratic organizations throughout the world, 
including in the Anglo-American world.  Another important textbook is Witkowski’s, Historia 
adminsitracji w Polsce 1764-1989
15
 (2007).  This book is more of a history of administration in 
Poland, with less emphasis on administrative thought.  Witkowski’s work will prove very useful 
as a resource in putting the together the appropriate historical and political context specific to 
Poland in which transportation administration issues will be explored later in my dissertation.  
                                                 
14
 Chapter title “Cechy charakterystyczne  i podstawowe zasady organizacji nowożytnej administracji państwowej” 
which can be translated as “Characteristic traits and fundamental principles of organization in modern state 
administration." 
15
 Translated as “History of Administration in Poland 1764-1989.” 
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The theoretical issues to be explored in this chapter serve to frame the analysis conducted 
in this dissertation. The chapter begins by examining some of the common perceptions of public 
administration and bureaucracy and attempting to clarify the differences between government 
administration, bureaucracy, and civil service so that a more precise analysis of the literature can 
occur.  Major scholarship from both Poland and elsewhere concerning the role of public 
administration in the political transition in ECE will then be briefly noted.  This will lead to an 
in-depth discussion of Meyer-Sahling’s work on administrative reform in ECE.  Meyer-Sahling’s 
work on the problems of an administrative legacy is central to research for this dissertation.  The 
proposed mechanisms that reproduce a past legacy are a promising direction for further research 
on this topic. The notion of a European Administrative Space is explored as it calls attention to 
the influence of the EU on administrative reforms in ECE.  A model that synthesized possible 
non-legacy explanations by means of the theme of politicization will then be presented.  The 
literature review then turns to specific elements of public administration, using Diesing’s (1962) 
discussion of various kinds of rationality as a point of departure for examining Weberian 
bureaucracy and its modern antithesis, New Public Management.  Differences in accountability 
structures separate these two models of public administration and therefore lead to a discussion 
of mechanisms of accountability articulated by Peters (2010b).  The element of centralization 
and decentralization in government administration is then addressed, stressing how 
accountability is affected by greater or lesser decentralization.  Capacities of government will 
then bereviewed in light of the topics previously visited.  Farazmand’s (2009) work on capacities 
of government is a second central element of this research.  A model describing reform in public 
administration by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) is then critiqued and will later be revised (Chapter 
4) for the purposes of making it more suitable to conditions in ECE.  Finally, a summary of 
theoretical issues relevant to the dissertation’s research questions will then be offered, 
concluding the chapter. 
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2.2. Administrative Reform and Legacy Explanations 
The literature on governmental reform in East-Central Europe since 1989 has privileged 
policymaking over state structures since its emergence in the early 1990s (Ganev 2007).   Thus a 
glaring lack of literature exists on the transformations of administrative capacity in ECE.  
Grzymała-Busse (2010) points to a lack of sustained dialogue between scholars of the 
transformations and scholars of the state. Ganev (2007) took it upon himself to rectify the 
paucity of transition research centered on the role of the state, in his very insightful book Preying 
on the State:  The Transformation in Bulgaria after 1989.  Ganev argues for the centrality of the 
state in the transition process, writing, “The realization that the transformative energy affecting 
state structures is not reducible to more general patterns of political, economic, and social change 
necessitates exploration of the historical and institutional peculiarities of post-Communist state 
structures and, more generally, of post-Communism as an episode of state transformation” (pg. 
3). In Preying on the State, Ganev describes how a policy-centered approach to studying the 
transition, by far the most common, cannot explain how the reforms following the collapse of 
communism in 1989 proceeded.  A policy-centered approach is based upon the belief that the 
political and ideological convictions of the ruling elite, be they politicians or others, were the 
guiding force behind the transition; however, Ganev questions the widely held contention that 
the elites all became reformers with the same ideological conviction
16
 and whether the elites 
were even capable of moving the state in such a direction so rapidly (2007, pg. 18).   As Preying 
on the State examines state transformation and corruption in Bulgaria after 1989, it is important 
to mention what the role of the ideological convictions of the elite has to do with the transition.  
Ganev is making clear that the adherence of the elite to a neoliberal ideology alone would have 
not been enough to explain a successful course of the transition for Bulgaria, nor would an 
ideological rejection of neoliberalism and democracy by the elites (presumably corrupt) have 
explained a failed transition.  It is not that Ganev holds the ideologies and political programs of 
the elite to be immaterial, but instead that the ambitions (political or otherwise) of the elite could 
not have been realized without taking the role of the state into consideration.  Thus Ganev 
depicts the suppression of the state apparatus by corrupt elites so that they could enrich 
themselves with the state’s resources and remove the possibility of the state institutions from 
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 Here Ganev is implicitly referring to neoliberalism and democratic leanings. 
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preventing their plundering.  Ganev’s emphasis on the role of the state during the transition as 
well as his description of how corrupt elites damaged the organs of the state in the process of 
enriching themselves is not just limited to Bulgaria, but can be fruitfully applied to other 
countries in East-Central Europe during this period as well. 
Some prominent experts on administrative reform in ECE, including König (1992) and 
Meyer-Sahling (2009a, 2009b, and 2010), identify communist-era administrative legacies as 
quite influential on varying outcomes of reform.  Meyer-Sahling (2009b) critiques Kitschelt’s et 
al. (1999) typology
17
 of communist era parties in his analysis.  Kitschelt argued that the Czech 
Republic inherited an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime
18
, and Poland a national-accommodative 
type
19
, typologies with potential bearing on their reform trajectories
20
. Meyer-Sahling (2009b) 
finds Kitschelt’s typologies to be limited in explanatory power.  They may have been suitable for 
describing ECE regimes early in the transition period, but cannot account for progress (or lack 
thereof) in administrative reform beginning in the latter half of the 1990s. Meyer-Sahling 
concludes that new research should identify the mechanisms by which a given administrative 
legacy was maintained in ECE and for how long.  
Political corruption in ECE during the transition was widespread.  Rebuilding Leviathan:  
Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies by Grzymała-Busse 
(2007) examines corruption in ECE, and specifically corruption by political parties vying for 
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 Within Kitschelt’s et al. typology of socialist – era regimes, 1) the bureaucratic-authoritarian model included 
Czechoslovakia (and the successor states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and the former East Germany, 2) the 
national-accommodative type included Hungary and Poland, and 3) the patrimonial communism type included 
Bulgaria and Romania.  The bureaucratic-authoritarian and national-accommodative models are further explained 
below in footnotes 8 and 9 respectively. 
18
 According to Kitschelt (1999), the bureaucratic – authoritarian model was characterized by a rigid (centralized), 
relatively efficient state apparatus which was completely subordinated to the ruling Party.  The regimes were unable 
to reform and “imploded” following the revolutions in 1989.  There was no direct successor party to the former 
ruling Socialist parties in the new political order, although former members of the defunct parties would eventually 
reconstitute more democratic versions of their old parties.  In both the cases of the territories of the former East 
Germany as well as Bohemia (a historical region of the Czech Republic), the regions both were industrialized long 
before the rest of ECE. 
19
 According to Kitschelt (1999), the national-accommodative model was characterized by governments which 
began reforms long before the end of state socialism.  The old regime was negotiated to an end by the government 
and the opposition.  The former ruling socialist parties were transformed into social democratic parties which would 
remain influential as the opposition in the new order.  The old state apparatus was never a very capable 
administration, the legacy of which continues to be felt today.  Both Hungary and Poland were far more agricultural 
and less industrialized than the Czechs or Germans prior to the beginnings of state socialism. 
20
 An interesting note:  patrimonial-communist systems, found in Bulgaria and Romania, were characterized by 
prolific corruption to the point of state capture, with the nature of this typology lending credence to Ganev’s (2007) 
state-centered approach to the problems of the transition in Bulgaria. 
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control of the state in order to extract resources.  Anna Grzymała-Busse contends that robust 
competition between the parties for control of the state is an effective restraint on state capture.  
She also sees competition as a mechanism of restraint along with criticism and formal constraints 
used by a ruling party that would limit the ability of political opponents to inflict damage on their 
party when replacing the ruling party in office following an election.   Rasma Karklins in The 
System Made Me Do It:  Corruption in Post-Communist Societies (2005) describes the role of 
institutions in combating corruption in the following four ways:  1) properly functioning 
institutions, 2) controlling decision making by de-monopolizing it from the control of any one 
person and limiting personal discretion, 3) strengthening accountability, and 4) anti-corruption 
measures specifically tailored to individual countries. (see Ch. 7, The System Made Me Do It, 
2005).  There is ample evidence that patterns of bureaucratic politicization were prolonged by 
party competition and the need for ruling parties (or coalitions of parties) to impose their 
programs and reward their supporters.  O’Dwyer (2004) and Grzymała-Busse (2007) 
demonstrate how administrative reform was guided by the electoral needs of the ruling parties 
during the transition, which would of course suggest potential corruption.  The subsection below 
will address the work of Jan-Henrik Meyer-Sahling, perhaps the most prominent international 
scholar on administrative reform in East-Central Europe.  Meyer-Sahling’s scholarship on the 
subject provides a needed foundation for the further study of this topic. 
 
2.2.1 Meyer-Sahling’s Agenda for Studying Administrative Reform in ECE 
Owing to the fact that the events of 1989 are watershed moments in the economic, 
political, and social histories of the countries of East-Central Europe, it becomes easy to see why 
they may be perceived to represent a decisive and, more importantly, immediate break with the 
past.  The expectation that institutions could be refashioned or simply developed from scratch 
revealed a belief that a tabula rasa actually existed.  As could be expected, the institutions for a 
democratic state and market economy had to be built upon the foundations of the old socialist 
order, while the foundations for these new arrangements were being built parallel to the 
structures of the state.  While political institutions such as a new constitution could be developed 
independently of the constitution then in force, new government administration could not simply 
be built without working with the structures inherited from late state socialism.  An examination 
of how, when, and why the structures inherited from state socialism have had an impact on the 
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current form of government bodies charged with national roads infrastructure policy in Poland is 
thus necessary and justified. 
The starting point for any analysis of an administrative legacy is naturally the description 
of the previous political and administrative state within a given country.  Following Meyer-
Sahling (2009b), one cannot proceed with the assumption that all government administrations in 
ECE during state socialism were identical.  There was not only internal diversity within the 
Eastern Bloc at any given time, but there was also diversity within a given country’s government 
administration both at any given time and across different time periods during the entire duration 
of communism.  For the purposes of this research, the analysis will concentrate on one time 
period within one country.  The period during communism of greatest relevance for 
understanding the outcomes of administrative reform in the ECE countries the period is known 
as “late communism” or “late state-socialism."  Of the three typologies (bureaucratic-
authoritarian, national-accommodative, and patrimonial) developed by Kitschelt et al. (1999), 
Poland belongs to the national-accommodative type, while also possessing some attributes of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime type.  Briefly recounted, a national-accommodative regime 
type (of which Hungary and Poland were representatives), found in late communism, and was 
characterized by the following attributes:  1) some separation existed between the ruling party 
and the government administration. A closely interrelated point is that some administrative 
reforms were initiated prior to 1989. 2)  There was some professionalism among government 
employees as well as expertise. 3) The ruling regime was negotiated to an end between 
representatives of the regime and the opposition.  Thus even after the “end of communism”, at 
least initially, many high-ranking government from the previous regime officials remained in 
place, and the ruling party of the previous regime was transformed into a social-democratic party 
of the left.   Although Poland was classified as a national-accommodative regime, it did share 
some characteristics with bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, such as a history of violently 
repressing the opposition before negotiations began to transform the regime.  
 
2.2.2 What Constitutes an Administrative Legacy? 
 Although the preceding review has focused on one type of politico-administrative regime 
in the Eastern Bloc prior to 1989, there are thought to be some overarching commonalities 
between all administration types that are still found to varying degrees within current 
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government administrations throughout the region.  Meyer-Sahling (2009b) listed these as: 1) a 
tendency of governments or government employees to not follow the formal rules and 
procedures, 2) weak political institutions and a “preference for personalistic and discretionary 
governance” and 3) party politicization of the government administration, especially in regards 
to personnel.  Corruption among public officials must also be included as a legacy of 
communism or state socialism.  Although corruption can manifest itself in many different forms, 
the most common cause of corruption was the prospect for easy financial gain, abetted by the 
common deficiencies in the politico-administrative systems in ECE described by Meyer-Sahling 
above.  Furthermore, corruption among public officials also offered no incentive to pursue and 
implement administrative reforms.   
The implementation of government economic and social policies during late state 
socialism required that a large and disciplined administrative apparatus exist with many 
specialized branches and bureaus, whilst accepting direction from a massive communist party 
apparatus that mirrored the hierarchy of the administration.  It is well understood that in the 
absence of a concerted effort to coordinate the activities of very specialized branches of an 
overall bureaucracy, these numerous specialized branches will tend to have difficulties in 
cooperating with each other on specific policy issues.  “Under communism, institutional 
fragmentation was to some extent overcome by the integrative capacity of the party bureaucracy 
as a parallel pillar of administration.  This coordination channel has ceased to exist” (Goetz and 
Margetts 1999, 443). The void left by the disappearance of this function has not yet been filled.  
While the government administration was quite capable in implementing policies, it was 
generally not capable of developing policy.  This function was fulfilled by the parallel hierarchy 
of the communist party.  Because the political leadership relied upon the “Party” to coordinate 
these activities instead of the upper levels of the administration, one can clearly describe the 
administration of that era as heavily politicized.  Excessive party control of the administration is 
one kind of politicization identified by Rouban (2012), the other two being types of politicization 
on the part of those employed within an administration (partisan development of policy within 
the administration and the involvement of employees in party politics). 
As already noted, these regime typologies developed by Kitschelt et al. (1999) served as a 
point of departure for Meyer-Sahling (2009b) in seeking to lay out a future research agenda for 
studying the effects of communist-era legacies on the current administrative reform outcomes in 
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ECE.  If one subscribes to path dependency in whole or merely in part, then given some of the 
broad similarities between the administrative characteristics of the national-accommodative 
regime type and those of a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy within more or less democratic 
government, it would be expected that Hungary and Poland would still be leaders among the 
group of ECE countries in terms of progress in the reform of their government administrations.  
However, this does not hold true today; other countries have surpassed the early progress by 
Poland and Hungary.   
Meyer-Sahling (2009b) suggested that the regimes types developed by Kitschelt et al. 
(1999) have the most explanatory power early on in the transition.  He suggests four alternatives 
to a legacy explanation of current reform outcomes:  
1) the ending of communist legacy effects  early in the transition,  
2) impact of the conditionality placed on ECE countries during the accession process,  
3) borrowing from mostly Western administrative/ civil service systems,  
4) the influence of party competition upon the administration.  
Whereas Meyer-Sahling offered alternatives to a legacy explanation without judgment on either 
their positive or negative effects on reform outcomes, Verheijen (2012) offers four reasons why 
administrative reforms have not met the intended success. These include:  
1) lack of political consensus,  
2) problem of reform designs,  
3) the changing and often contradictory signals of external organizations,  
4) a genuine belief political belief that continental European models of civil 
service are not appropriate for states undergoing rapid change (Verheijen 2012, 
pg. 598).   
Meyer-Sahling suggests that any attempt to find a legacy explanation will necessarily involve 
identifying the mechanisms that have reproduced the past legacies as well as determining how 
legacies work among other explanations.  He proposed that two possible mechanisms could be 
found in rational-historical institutionalism and social-constructivist institutionalism.  
Rational-historical institutionalism is synthesis of the two older and more established 
schools of rational choice intuitionalism and historical institutionalism produced by Hicks 
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(2009)
21. Hicks believed that historical institutionalism needed accommodate a “much greater 
role for rational actors”, arguing, “…policy-makers will have the foresight and the ability to 
rationally select policies that have implications for both the effectiveness and the durability of 
those policies. In essence… politicians can rationally employ path dependence” (2009, 14).  
Social-constructivist institutionalism holds that the reality faced by an individual in an institution 
is a social construct.  Inquiry utilizing a social-constructivist institutionalism approach examines 
internal processes over emphasizing outside influences.  In discussing the concept of social-
constructivist institutionalism, Ioannedes and Nielsen (2007) write, “Institutional change is seen 
as a process of isomorphism or diffusion through mechanisms such as legitimacy pressures or 
normative schemes embedded in training and practice” (pg. 93).  The mechanisms that might 
reproduce an administrative legacy are thus crucial to identifying a legacy.  The next section 
concerns the idea of a European Administrative Space, which highlights the influence of 
international organizations, an alternative to a simple legacy explanation. 
 
2.3 The European Union and the Idea of a European Administrative Space 
The idea of a European Administrative Space (EAS) articulated by legal and 
administrative scholars over the last decade has great potential application for scholarship of the 
European Union among other disciplines.  This section discusses the conceptualization of 
administrative practices, norms, and ideals (albeit very vague) favored by the EU as constituting 
an administrative space that is closely linked to but distinct from the other spaces of the EU and 
its member states.   The implications of a fully constituted European Administrative Space is that 
it would offer a model towards which member states could strive on the one hand, and 
harmonize the various national administrations on the other. 
Of particular interest here is the integration of the national administration of Poland into 
the European Union.  Great strides have been made in this direction, but the process has been far 
from simple.  As is repeatedly made clear, there is no single European model for administration, 
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 He writes, “… both RCI and HI have important deficiencies. The former has tended to use an overly narrow 
definition of structure that largely focuses on formal institutions and has been surprisingly limited in its 
consideration of issues relating to time. The latter faces an internal anomaly in which its main theoretical constructs 
are seen to be of limited use in an explanatory sense. A synthesis of the two – one that employs the best features of 
both approaches - offers the prospect of alleviating these problems and rejuvenating our understanding of why 
institutions are formed in particular ways” (Hicks 2009, 14). 
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and in fact the EU did not have even the basics of a model in place when the accession process 
for these two countries began in the early 1990s.  Nevertheless, the European Union with help 
from other international organizations, namely the OECD, developed guidelines for the applicant 
countries from East-Central Europe as the 1990s progressed.  As with other areas of European 
integration, a major goal of administrative integration is the convergence of norms and values of 
member states, in this case with regards to the practice of government administration.  Since a 
European Administrative Space would have common values and practices underpinning it, as 
well as a breadth covering the whole of the member states, this potential convergence offers an 
excellent opportunity to examine this space from within the academic traditions of geography.  
The emphasis on the study of abstract space allows for the conceptualization of many attributes 
that would not normally find expressible significance in a discipline traditionally concerned with 
physical features on the earth’s surface or populations.  Government administration forms a 
space which, although intangible, largely corresponds to a delineated physical space in which 
other major processes occur. And it is with a framework of administrative space that a better 
understanding of the interaction between administration and society might be achieved. 
 
2.3.1 Concept of the European Administrative Space 
If we conceptualize collective administrative norms in the EU as a European 
Administrative Space (EAS), we must also be conscious of what lies within this space.  That will 
be the task dealt with later, but for the moment we will now turn our attention to describing the 
EAS.  The literature directly addressing the concept of a European Administrative Space 
(Heibredder 2009, Hofmann 2008, Levi-Faur 2011, Olsen 2003, Jordan and Schout 2008) 
generally holds that national administrations throughout the EU are not homogenous and even 
that the term EAS may be misleading because it implies more similarity among national 
administration along lines proscribed by the EU than is actually the case (Heibredder 2009). The 
question is where to place the degree of convergence along the continuum between 
administrative divergence and administrative convergence.  Heibredder (2009, 7) writes that a 
“European administrative space is indeed emerging; yet not as a process of convergence but in 
great part as coordinated divergence”.   Coordinated divergence is an interesting concept insofar 
that it allows for diversity within the EAS while maintaining overall connections between the 
national administrative systems and the EAS.  Heibredder states that, “shared administrative 
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space worked precisely because it preserves state-sensitive diversity”, solidifying her position 
that the EAS is not as homogenous as might be assumed.     
Hofmann (2008) examines the development of an integrated administration between 
member states and the European Union from a largely legal point of view, including how vertical 
and horizontal relations between administrations can lead to integrated administration.  Vertical 
relations between the European Union and nation states in an administrative context meant that 
nation states were expected to adopt EU law, which meant that it “became part of the member 
states’ ‘legal heritage” (Hofmann 2008, 664).  Hofmann’s discussion of the horizontal relations 
was perhaps the most interesting because he explains how ‘EU case law from the 1970s onwards 
encouraged member states to recognize administrative and political decisions made by one 
another’.  Vertical and horizontal administrative relations together contributed to the realization 
of networks among administrations in EU member states.  Although Hofmann does not mention 
it explicitly, his description of administrative integration shows signs of diagonal relationships as 
well, where laws and practices of a member state are adopted at the supranational level and then 
transposed into the domestic laws of other member states (see Hofmann 2008, 669).  Based on 
these directional relations it is clear that the creation of a European Administrative Space is not 
only a top-down process, but one in which concepts, practices, and laws may originate anywhere 
among the constituent members of EAS and spread to the rest. 
 
2.3.2 EU Administrative Norms, Practices and Ideals 
The European Union as a supranational project is naturally concerned with issues of good 
governance.  The democratic criteria that must be met by countries acceding to the Union are 
very expansive and signify, among other things, that stable democratic government has been in 
place for some time and that governments represent the interests of their citizens.  Concerns over 
administrative norms did not truly arise until the EU was faced with the future membership of 
the countries in East-Central Europe
22
 (Heibredder 2009, 6), whose history under communism 
had radically distorted their government administrations into tools of their once dominant 
communist parties.  Although there is clear heterogeneity among the administrative legacies 
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 In fact, the EU did not have developed criteria for what good government administration should look like. The EU 
had to develop such criteria and norms when it was confronted with the accession process of the 10 countries from 
East – Central Europe.   
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among Western European states, there were still quite discernible commonalities.  The EU then 
had to formulate norms out of the amorphous sum of their member states’ administrative 
traditions for the candidate countries to fulfill.  Olsen writes, “No unitary model has emerged and 
convergence has often involved discovering and codifying what member states’ administrations 
already had in common” (2003, 522). The EU, desiring to have some form of guidance for the 
applicant states without having first articulated the norms, turned to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The OECD as a grouping of the advanced industrialized democracies, the majority of 
which are found in Europe, has been very active in guiding former Eastern Bloc countries during 
their transition to democracy and market economics.  The Council of Europe, a non-EU 
organization (not to be confused with the Council of the European Union) has also offered 
guidance to transition countries.  These organizations promoted bureaucracy (that is the 
organization, procedures, and norms within an administration) which assumed the basic contours 
articulated by the German sociologist Max Weber (see section 2.5.2.1). In light of the discussion 
in the previous two sections on administrative legacies and the role of the EU and other 
international organizations, the next section will articulate a synthesis of Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) 
four alternatives to a legacy explanation that will be used in Chapter 5. 
 
2.4 Developing a Model Synthesizing Influences on Administrative Reform Outcomes in Poland 
The preceding discussion on an administrative legacy (including its alternatives) and the 
role of the European Union and the EAS have provided sufficient context for proposing how 
alternatives to a legacy explanation can be synthesized with a legacy explanation.  It proposes a 
common dominator in politicization, which validates each alternative within a specific situational 
context. Following the description of this synthesizing model, specific features of public 
administration will be discussed that will serve as a basis for analyzing data in the results 
chapters. The model that is developed demonstrates how a legacy explanation is paralleled by an 
ordered progression of the four non-legacy explanations mentioned by Meyer-Sahling (2009b).  
Circumstances found within Poland will be used to justify the structure of this model. The said 
circumstances will have largely been identified in secondhand sources, mainly scholarly works. 
The basic structure of this model (see Figure 2.1 below) can be described thusly: from a 
beginning point of the change of regime in 1989, the first plausible explanation is that the legacy 
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of communism ended rather quickly in the early 1990s
23
. However this end cannot be assigned 
an absolute boundary. Next begins the influence of the European Union upon the reform process 
of Polish government administration, which theoretically continues to this day. From the 
beginning of the transition in 1989 through the present, these core explanations of an early end to 
a legacy of communism and the influence of the European Union are bounded by parallel or 
contemporaneous explanations of a search abroad for reform inspirations on the one hand, and 
the effect of party competition on the administration on the other. A pure legacy cause begins 
before 1989 and continues to the present day parallel to all other structures.  Once the basic 
structure of this chronological model has been convincingly demonstrated, a more thorough 
description of the mechanisms of reproduction of the past legacy will be explained. After a more 
thorough explanation of the mechanisms of reproduction, this model, which is based upon the 
general experience of the entire government administration in Poland, will be scrutinized against 
the specificities of the cases of the Polish ministries and other government structures responsible 
for transportation policy in the subsequent section. 
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 Of course, it has to be determined what constitutes this legacy in comparison with what Meyer-Sahling generally 
held administrative legacies in the ECE to entail.  This initial overcoming of the legacy was observed by Hesse in 
the mid-1990s.  Obviously, Meyer-Sahling could not accept that the totality of the administrative legacy of 
communism was overcome in the first years of the transition, because it would render his current research a moot 
point. 
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Figure 2.1: Proposed Synthesis of Multiple Explanations of Administrative Reform Outcomes in ECE 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the primary attributes of a national – accommodative regime 
was the existence of some degree of separation between the government administration and the 
ruling party.  This degree of separation between administration and party is the result of some 
consciousness of the functional and legal difference between non-government and government 
workers
24
.  In Poland, the limited degree of differentiation between workers in the government 
administration and workers from outside of the government was enabled both by historical 
tradition (i.e. the continuing validity of the law on government employees from the interwar 
period), and by a law describing the rights and duties of government employees in 1982.  
Another feature that demonstrated some redeeming qualities of the political system was the 
existence of the Supreme Auditors Chamber or NIK whose task it was to control and supervise 
activity of all government agencies independently of the Cabinet, a task that it largely fulfilled 
(Izdebski 2001). As is common in other one-party systems, both those employed in the 
government administration and those employed in the parallel party bureaucracy tended to have 
both technocratic and political credentials. A defining feature of the system was the hierarchy of 
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 This does not include the military and other security services, such as the police. 
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the ruling party, which mirrored the hierarchy of the government administration and could 
therefore ensure loyalty and the fulfillment of party policy at every level of the administration. 
The United Polish Workers Party served as the primary creator and developer of policy within 
the government system of that time with the actual government administration having little 
policy capacity of its own.  Despite these intertwined party and administrative structures, there 
was a formal legal separation of both entities.  And finally, following the national-
accommodative regime typology, the government of the People’s Republic of Poland negotiated 
an end to communism with members of the opposition. 
Following the change of regime in 1989, Poland began the transition to democracy and to 
a market economy. The transition also witnessed the reform of Poland’s administrative structures. 
When the Solidarity-led opposition assumed power in 1989, high-ranking officials within the 
ministries were largely replaced within the first year and a half by former members of the 
opposition. If we accept that government administration was largely an implementation body 
instead of a policy developer, then the disappearance of the parallel party structures and the 
replacement of top leaders in the early 1990s support the idea that any cohesive group which 
could influence the performance of the ministries would have been dissolved early on. In 
speculating as to what the possible motives of communist officials in the administration could be 
for resisting potential reforms, it is hard to think of any real incentive that these high-ranking 
officials would have had to obstruct new policies for the sake of communist ideology or for the 
sake of opposing capitalist ideology.  It must be assumed here that only government officials 
with some certain seniority or higher rank (often both) would have had enough influence to steer 
the direction of the ministries during reform. And it was in fact mostly high-ranking officials 
who were replaced at the outset of the transition. 
 Early on in the transition, the major administrative reforms were centered on the creation 
of the gminy, which had been abolished in the previous decades under communism. The gminy 
were newly created local governments that were fully independent of central government, As 
such, they were entitled to their own finances, and additionally, there were designated services 
that they were obligated to provide.  This territorial reorganization of Poland encompassed nearly 
the entire agenda of administrative reform at the time, a fact which precluded the formulation of 
any coherent long-term policy of administrative reform within personnel and ministerial 
structures. These circumstances lend support to the notion that the lack of consensus of 
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directions of reform has impeded reform efforts in the Polish government administration.  This is 
made all the more unsurprising by the fact that Poland experienced many fractious government 
coalitions (see Table 2.1 below) in the years after one-party rule during State socialism. Large, 
unwieldy and short-lived coalitions are very difficult places to develop longer-term policies.   
 
Government  Beginning of 
Government  
End of 
Government 
Number of Days 
in Power 
Coalition 
Composition 
Mazowiecki, 
Tadeusz 
August 24, 1989 November 25, 
1990 
458 Solidarity, ZSL, 
PZPR, SD 
Bielecki, Krzystrzof January 12, 1991 December 5, 
1991 
692 KLD, ZChN, 
PC, SD 
Olszewski, Jan December 23, 1991 June 5, 1992 165 PC, ZChN, PSL-
PL 
Pawlak, Waldemar June 5, 1992 July 7, 1992 32 PSL 
Suchocka, Hanna July 11, 1992 October 18, 
1993 
464 UD, KLD, 
ZChN, PChD, 
PPPP, PSL-PL 
Pawlak, Waldemar October 26, 1993 March 1, 1995 506 SLD, PSL, 
BBWR 
Oleski, Jozef March 6, 1995 January 26, 
1996 
326 SLD, PSL 
Cimoszewicz, 
Włodzimierz 
February 7, 1996 October 17, 
1997 
618 SLD, PSL 
Buzek, Jerzy October 31, 1997 October 19, 
2001 
1449 AWS, UW 
Miller, Leszek October 19, 2001 May 2, 2004 926 SLD, UP, PSL 
Belka, Marek May 2, 2004 May 19, 2004 17 SLD, UP 
Belka, Marek June 11, 2004 October 19, 
2005 
495 SLD, UP 
Marcinkiewicz, 
Kazimierz 
October 31, 2005 July 10, 2006 252 PiS, 
Samoobrona, 
LPR 
Kaczyński, 
Jarosław 
July 14, 2006 November 5, 
2007 
479 PiS, 
Samoobrona, 
LPR 
Tusk, Donald November 16, 2007 November 18, 
2011 
1463 PO, PSL 
Tusk, Donald November 18, 2011 present   PO, PSL 
      
   Table 2.1: Chronology of Polish Governments after 1989 
 
The demise of a so-called communist legacy as a factor that could influence the outcomes 
of the administrative reform process would have allowed for the accession process to the 
European Union and the conditionality that accompanied it to become the next major impetus for 
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reform. The EU required many administrative reforms so that the new member states would be 
prepared to utilize structural funds efficiently and in a legal and predictable manner. Thus, while 
an absence of political consensus on the nature and direction of administrative reforms existed in 
the wake of communism, there was the desire to see the government administration reformed in 
order to benefit from EU assistance. In one sense, there may not have been agreement as to what 
kind of administrative reforms to pursue, but there was agreement that Poland wanted to be part 
of the European Union and would therefore have to instigate some kind of reforms. However, the 
European Union’s expectations of what an end state of administrative reforms might look like 
were never entirely clear. This also constituted another impediment to reform, that of mixed 
signals from the European Union that helped neither the accession process, nor the reform 
process from the point of view of Poland. Finally, in Poland’s reaction to the model of Western 
public administration espoused by the EU, there may be some legitimate concerns that these 
institutional designs are not appropriate for the context in which Poland or other Eastern 
European countries currently find themselves.  
The search for reform inspirations abroad has been running parallel to the two phases of 
the initial replacement of the ministerial leadership
25
 and the beginnings of EU conditionality’s 
effect on Polish administration during the accession process. Even during communism, Polish 
scholars of public administration were generally very aware of foreign (i.e. Western) models of 
administration. Early in the transition there was enough political support
26
 to create a national 
school of public administration in Warsaw modeled off of the prestigious French École nationale 
d'administration (ENA).  Some in the Polish academic community apparently had a high regard 
for the elite cadre of highly trained French officials who came out of ENA.  French officials 
would often be elected to office after serving in the state administration. The French model 
allows for a closer relationship between politics and administration than would be found in the 
British Civil Service or in a classical Weberian-type of administration, for example.  
Politicization by means of political appointments to the government administration in France are 
more common than in Britain; however, these officials must be chosen from a select group of 
civil servants who had graduated from ENA.  Thus, while they are political appointments, they 
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 This in fact may be a more suitable clarification as to what this initial legacy was meant to entail. 
26
 This is a surprising event considering the fractious nature of politics at the time and lack of realistic chances of 
developing major policy directions in the early 1990s. 
37 
 
are indeed highly qualified for their positions based upon merit, a rare occurrence in cases of 
more strongly politicized public administrations.  Of course, foreign influence did not end here. 
Reformers in Poland have sought out other inspirations from abroad, with the EU providing 
many ideas albeit with the caveats described in the previous paragraph. 
Another cause running parallel to the ones described above is that of party competition. 
The idea behind party competition is that political parties reward supporters by appointing large 
numbers of people to lower ranks of the bureaucracy. This serves two purposes, the first being to 
gain supporters for the elections, and the second to have more control of the government 
administration through loyal employees. It is theorized by some (Grzymała-Busse 2007, 
O’Dwyer 2004) that a cure for this ailment would be robust party competition wherein the 
parties are competitive enough against each other that a stable and independent government 
administration would have to develop and evolve so as to be able to govern regardless of which 
party came into power.  Robust party competition would mean that any given party in power 
would know that it could likely be defeated in the next election cycle and would therefore have 
less incentive to allow for changes to be made by the opposition party should it win.  Parties 
would in theory be drawn to creating much more stable structures within the government 
administration. 
The last element that could describe reform outcomes is that of an administrative legacy 
or legacy explanation. Like the search for reform inspirations abroad and party competition, 
which both exist alongside the temporal progression of an early end to communist legacy and 
subsequent influence from the EU accession process, the idea of the administrative legacy would 
also run parallel to these structures.  However, it is important to understand what can constitute a 
legacy explanation.  In keeping with Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) observations, it can be said here 
that there are three broad legacies of government administration from state socialism in East-
Central Europe: 1) the existence of formal rules and procedures that are often not followed, 2) 
the prevalence of institutional instability and personal discretion in the execution of 
administrative duties, 3) the influence of political parties on personnel within the government 
administration.  All three of these broad legacies are potentially connected with politicization, a 
topic that will be directly addressed in Chapter 5.  
An essential part of the reform effort had to be the establishing of a civil service by 
parliamentary act. The first such act was the Law on the Civil Service of 1996 (Dz. U. z 1996 r. 
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Nr 89, poz. 402). Bach-Golecka (2011) writes, “While technically one may consider CSA (civil 
service act) of 1996 a proper piece of legislation, nevertheless it was deprived of its legitimacy 
due to the instrumental, political use of its initiators. Moreover, some provisions, i.e. norms 
stating the required years of work experience, were explicitly designed for the benefit of public 
officials of the communist regime and to the detriment of the candidates who started work in 
state institutions after 1989” (9). The center-right government elected shortly after the passage of 
the 1996 Law on the Civil Service disliked the provisions which favored former communist 
officials and quickly repealed the law.  They replaced it with a new Law on the Civil Service (Dz. 
U. z 1999 r. Nr 49, poz. 483) enacted in 1998 and taking effect in 1999.  The New Law on the 
Civil Service formally established a civil service and sought to insulate civil servants from 
politicization through greater job security while encouraging greater professionalism. 
Professionalization entailed both education in the field of public administration and expertise in 
the field of one’s employment. Other attributes included high ethical standards and a career civil 
service. Also important was the manner in which individuals could become civil servants, there 
being two distinct career tracks. Without the protections afforded by civil service laws, 
government administration is at risk of rampant politicization in terms of personnel.  The theme 
of politicization is common to the four alternatives offered by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) and thus 
affords the opportunity to synthesize the different alternatives into one flexible model.    
Politicization is an embedded theme in the four alternatives offered by Meyer-Sahling. 
Politicization as a mechanism would have been used to remove some officials immediately after 
the transition began in 1989-1990.  The conditionality exercised by the EU during the accession 
process in part sought to curtail the worst effects of politicization of the administration in 
candidate countries.  The search for foreign models of administration also was concerned finding 
a suitable between political control of the administration and a career civil service.  Finally, party 
competition over the control of the administration was possible because the mechanism of 
politicization would allow parties that won the election to reward its supporters with positions in 
the government without strong barriers to this occurring.  Having described this synthesis, the 
next section will focus on the fundamental elements of public administration necessary for an 
analysis of administrative legacy and alternative explanations of reform outcomes. 
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2.5 Administrative Organization 
Understanding the fundamentals of administrative organization is essential for 
performing a theoretically informed analysis of an administrative legacy in ECE.  There will be 
an introduction to the rationality of administration before proceeding to the work of Weber and 
more contemporary theorists of public administration.  The ideas of rationality described by 
Diesing (1962) will also be useful in understanding transportation planning and policy 
decisions
27
 in the results chapters.  However, the focus at present is simply the rationality of 
administration. 
 
2.5.1 Rationality 
Max Weber identified two kinds of rationality relating to economics in the sphere of 
economics:  substantive rationality and formal rationality.  Substantive rationality in economics 
refers to justifying economic action based upon non-economic goals, such as social equity, 
justice etc…  The concept of substantive rationality is useful when attempting to identify what 
ultimate considerations an actor takes into account before pursuing a given course of action.  
Formal rationality in economic activity is an appraisal of how to attain a goal in the most 
efficient and cost-effective way.  Weber’s concept of formal rationality is related to the types of 
rationality introduced below. 
Hartwig’s (1983) study of rationality and administrative responsibility within the 
Colombian Ministry of Public Works drew heavily from the little known work of Paul Diesing, 
who first in 1962 published a book titled Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and the 
Social Conditions.  Beginning with Mannheim’s distinction between separate aspects of 
rationality—functional28 and substantial29—Diesing adds a third aspect of rationality, that of 
principles.  Using Hartwig’s explanation of Diesing’s proposed principle rationality, Diesing 
                                                 
27
 It will be seen how the necessity of implementing one kind of rationality (economic rationality-economizing 
resources with regard to the scope of the motorway and expressway network) by the political orders of the 
responsible ministries necessitates using a creative rationality to enhance the existing policy capacity to choose 
between alternative ends. 
28
 Diesing writes, “An organization is functionally rational, let us say, when it is so structured as to produce, or 
increase, or preserve, some good in a consistent, dependable fashion” (1962,4). 
29
 Diesing writes, “A decision or action is substantially rational when it takes account of the possibilities and 
limitations of a given situation and reorganizes it so as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good. This 
definition includes two points: the decision must be an effective response to the situation in that it produces some 
possible good, and the effectiveness must be based on intelligent insight rather than on luck” (1962, 4). 
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holds that, “…since decisions are made according to principles, and organized structures employ 
principles of order, principles can be thought of as rational” (1983, 21).   Diesing identifies five 
kinds of rationality: technical, economic, social, legal, and political. These also have 
corresponding types of order, since order is held by Diesing to define functional rationality (1962, 
Ch. 6).  Technical rationality seeks the most effective (and sometimes efficient) means of 
achieving a single, defined goal.  Economic rationality is the selection and achieving of 
designated ends in the most cost-effective way possible.  An important aspect of economic 
rationality is economizing, being described by Diesing thusly:  
Economizing is a rational process, because when one must choose among ends 
that are genuinely alternative, it is reasonable to choose in such a way as to get the 
most out of them. This is, in a way, an extension of technical rationality — when 
ends are alternative, they are all parts of a larger end, and it is this larger end 
which is to be maximized. It is reasonable to achieve the larger end as far as 
possible, in turn, because that is what it means to have an end.  Thus 
alternativeness of ends is dependent on two other conditions, namely the existence 
of unlimited ends and the existence of common means. (Diesing 1962, Ch. 2). 
 
Social rationality is described as a type of order that arises out of interaction between people 
and regulators the relations between them.  Legal rationality consists of the proper way in 
which resources and actions are assigned to people and organizations.  Political rationality 
creates an order to the process of deliberations between various parties or within an organization 
with the goal of reaching a decision through consultation and that is accepted by all. 
For Diesing, economic and legal rationality exist outside of temporal boundaries.  They 
are non-temporal.  “The nontemporal (sic) orders are valuational, consisting either of a rank 
ordering of values or a distribution pattern of norms. The temporal orders deal with action; they 
make action either productive, or expressive and evocative, or governing” (Diesing 1962, Ch.6). 
The temporal orders include the technical, social, and political. 
Order exists insofar as the parts of a system are arranged according to some 
principle. In the non-temporal, valuational orders it is the position of the elements 
which is determined by principle, so that each element belongs just where it is and 
no place else. In the temporal action systems the function of each part is 
determined by principle, so that all the parts work together in some characteristic 
way. Once the principle governing a system has been discovered, the system 
becomes intelligible. That is, it becomes possible to understand why each part is 
where it is and does what it does, and to predict what changes will occur in it. 
Further, the system can then be explained and justified, to someone questioning it. 
(Diesing 1962, Ch. 6). 
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These five kinds of rationality constituting five equivalent kinds of order arrange the 
relationships between entities that can be described within that order.  They are not end states but 
consistent systems performing functions consistently and coherently.  Thus they are functional 
rationalities because these systems function according to a certain order.  But how are these 
orders achieved? At this point, we can return to Mannheim’s substantial rationality.  Diesing 
writes that, “substantial rationality can most simply be conceived as the making of order, or 
creativity” (Diesing 1962, Ch. 6).  Thus he equates creative rationality to substantial rationality.  
Creative rationality
30
 is not an order, but a means of achieving it. 
Regarding Plato’s account of Reason versus Necessity, Diesing interpreted that through 
the means of persuasion, (creative) reason gives shape and structure to the morass of diverse 
forces of necessity.  However, Diesing finds this account to be too simplistic, because it does not 
address how reason develops.  Diesing’s theory clearly sees a “circular relation between reason 
as order and reason as creativity”, as existing, with, “each producing the other” (Diesing 1962, 
Ch. 6).  While it is obvious from above how reason as creativity affects reason as order, the 
opposite may not be as immediately clear. According to Diesing, this reason as order affects 
reason as creativity in two ways, 1) preexisting order acts as the material with which creative 
reason creates new order, and 2) preexisting order in decision-making structures such as 
bureaucracies (political rationality/ order) shape the “creative process” which must operate from 
within these structures (Diesing 1962, Ch. 6).  The discussion now moves to the theoretical 
forms of administrative organization. The preceding introduction to various kinds of rationality 
will be useful when using these concepts in the discussion sections of the results chapters 
(Chapters 5-8).  If government administration attempts to be rational be its nature, than including 
the concepts of rationality in analyzing administration is necessary. 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Diesing writes, “The conception of reason as creativity is one of the three major conceptions of practical reason in 
the history of philosophy. The other two are the conception of reason as the discovery and application of rules to 
cases, and the conception of reason as calculating, literally adding and subtracting. Reason appears as creativity in 
some of the works of Plato, Hegel, and Whitehead, among others; it appears as the application of rules in the natural 
law theorists, such as Aquinas, Locke, and Kant; and it appears as calculation in Hobbes, Bentham, and the 
utilitarians” (Diesing 1962). 
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2.5.2 Forms of Administrative Organization 
A time-honored point of departure for beginning the discussion of modern public 
administration is by addressing the most common types of administrative organization in the 
developed world today.  Familiarity with the fundamental forms of administrative organization is 
essential to understanding the tasks and performance of public administration in contemporary 
society.  The most relevant theoretical types of administrative organization for studying the 
reform direction of national roads policy in contemporary Poland are Weberian Bureaucracy and 
New Public Management.  Of course, the form and structure of socialist administration is also 
pertinent to any discussion on the current state of public administration in Poland.  However, it 
does not form a proper third category of administration for our purposes here, owing to the fact 
that the actual forms and structure of government administration during “real socialism” were 
not that dissimilar to their counterparts in Western capitalist countries (Izdebski 2001).  Real 
socialist administration in Poland will be discussed in a later section, with the competition 
between the Weberian and NPM models of administration occupying our attention at least 
initially.   
 
2.5.2.1 Weberian Bureaucracy and Wilsonian Public Administration 
Bureaucracy is a particular form of organization characterized by a hierarchical division of 
labor in the form of offices through which the state exercises its sovereignty.  The root elements 
of the term allude to the powerful position these offices assume in the role of maintaining the 
countless complexities that are the modern state.  Those working in these offices are quite 
powerful in the sense that they can individually focus on important issues or policy areas 
whereas the ruling elite at the top of the state structures are too few in number to be fully 
acquainted with all tasks of state.  The core elite must delegate power and authority down to 
subordinates, ideally in a constant and predictable hierarchy.  The most well-known theorist of 
bureaucratic organization, the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), developed a model 
of bureaucracy in his posthumously published work Economy and Society (1922) which to this 
day remains the standard against which many government administrations are measured.  The 
following are two excerpts from Max Weber: an Intellectual Portrait (1962) in which Reinhard 
Bendix articulates Weber’s ideal characteristics firstly of bureaucratic organizations, and 
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secondly of those officials employed in a bureaucracy.  In describing the former, bureaucratic 
organizations ideally display the following characteristics: 
 
1) Official business is conducted on a continuous basis. 
2) It is conducted in accordance with stipulated rules in an administrative agency 
characterized by three interrelated attributes: (a) the duty of each official to do 
certain types of work is delimited in terms of impersonal criteria; (b) the official is 
given the authority necessary to carry out his assigned functions; (c) the means of 
compulsion at his disposal are strictly limited, and the conditions under which 
their employment is legitimate are clearly defined. 
3) Every official’s responsibilities and authority are part of a hierarchy of authority.  
Higher offices are assigned the duty of supervision, lower offices: the right of 
appeal.  However, the extent of supervision and the conditions of legitimate 
appeal may vary. 
4) Officials and other administrative employees do not own the resources necessary 
for the performance of their assigned functions but they are accountable for their 
use of these resources.  Official business and private affairs, official revenue and 
private income are strictly separated. 
5) Offices cannot be appropriated by their incumbents in the sense of private 
property that can be sold and inherited.  (This does not preclude various rights 
such as pension claims, regulated conditions of discipline and dismissal, etc., but 
such rights serve, in principle at least, as incentives for the better performance of 
duties.  They are not property rights.) 
6) Official business is conducted on the basis of written documents.  (Bendix 1962, 
424). 
 
It is important to discuss these points (summaries written by Bendix of Weber’s concepts 
of bureaucracy) because they illuminate the contours of the modern shape of government 
administration in much of the world today.  The first characteristic of modern bureaucracy 
stipulated by Weber is that the work of government administration is permanent.  This concept 
both reflects reality and implies that stability and regularity are important and necessary 
attributes of the business of government.  Full-time employees should be employed in policy 
areas where they have and will further develop expertise.  The second characteristic is that work 
is conducted according to strict rules, which allows for greater predictability.  If political leaders 
can have reasonable confidence that the government administration will handle issues in a 
certain manner, they can rely upon the administration to fulfill its functions.  The rules must be 
impartial and equally applicable to all situations and all members of the public affected by the 
tasks of a particular administrative entity. The leadership will then allocate the needed amount of 
authority to administrators so that they can perform their duties; however, an administrator’s 
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personal powers and latitude in fulfilling assignments are strictly circumscribed to prevent abuse 
of one’s office as well as contributing to the uniformity of work performed by all administrators 
within a given entity.  The third characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy is a strict and orderly 
hierarchy in which officials of various rank find themselves.  A pyramid-like hierarchy is 
perhaps the most efficient means for the distribution of authority from the political leadership 
down to the lowest level of bureaucrats.  It greatly aids supervision and control of the lower 
echelons by those at the top.  The fourth characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy is that all 
resources needed to execute a given task are the property of the state, not the individual official.  
In Weber’s time, this had gradually emerged as routine in response to the older traditions of 
nobles fulfilling an administrative function in the name of the king with their own resources.  
Offices were given as rewards, along with resources necessary to fulfill the task of the same 
office.  The fifth characteristic builds upon the fourth.  It holds that offices in a bureaucracy are 
not hereditary and are awarded on the basis of merit.  A departing bureaucrat may not bequeath 
his or her office to another, because the office is not property to be given or taken by an 
individual.   The sixth characteristic of bureaucracy is that business is conducted by means of 
written documents, a stipulation facilitating legality and record keeping within administrative 
activity.  While these characteristics of bureaucracy are largely taken for granted today, they 
were in fact novel and quite different from past practices at the time.  This description of 
bureaucracy was clearly in keeping with a modernizing vision of the state in turn of the century 
Europe. 
  Weber not only theorized the optimal form and structure of bureaucracy itself, he also 
described the ideal conditions in which a person should be employed in government 
administration.  Weber’s ideal characteristics of public officials are nowadays considered key 
tenets of an effective and proper civil service (the concept of a civil service will be discussed in 
greater detail later).  According to Weber’s theory, the office and person of an official employed 
in a bureaucracy can be ideally described as follows: 
 
1) He is personally free and appointed to his position on the basis of contract. 
2) He exercises the authority delegated to him in accordance with impersonal 
rules, and his loyalty is enlisted on behalf of the faithful execution of his 
duties. 
3) His appointment and job placement are dependent upon his technical 
qualifications. 
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4) His administrative work is his full-time occupation. 
5) His work is rewarded by a regular salary and by prospects of regular 
advancement in a lifetime career. (Bendix 1962, 426). 
 
The ideal characteristics of a government official’s employment as described by Weber 
are formative elements in most countries’ administrative systems today.  The first characteristic 
of employment indicates that the individual is hired as a free individual into the service of the 
state, similarly to how a free individual can be hired into the service of a private company.  The 
contractual nature of employment clearly outlines the expectations of both parties.   The second 
characteristic is that government officials exercise their functions strictly according to the 
authority accorded to them and within the established rules and procedures.  This promotes 
neutrality in the exercise of one’s duties as a government official.  The third characteristic 
stresses the personal qualifications of individual applicants to the government service.  Hiring 
should be made on the basis of merit and not any other criteria such as political connections.  
The fourth characteristic is that officials are employed fulltime in the government bureaucracy, 
as this ensures that this work holds their primary loyalty.  The fifth characteristic of employment 
is a regular salary and the opportunity to advance within the hierarchy throughout one’s career, 
which reinforces the notion of merit. 
 
2.5.2.2. The Politics-Administration Dichotomy 
The genesis of the academic field of public administration (at least in the United States) 
has been widely attributed to the writings of Woodrow Wilson who, in his 1887 article “The 
Study of Administration” in The Political Science Quarterly, advocated that administration and 
politics should be separated, officials should be selected based upon merit, and duties should be 
carried out in a business-like manner.  These characteristics of administration are very similar to 
those of Max Weber and his ideal-type of bureaucracy.  Although Wilson and Weber were 
contemporaries, there is no evidence of the works of one inspiring the works of the other.  The 
commonalities of their writings on the subject appear to stem from an awareness of the Hegelian 
tradition of public administrative theory (see Sager and Rosser 2009).  Thus, while Wilson and 
Weber developed their theories independently, they are both seen as part of a similar tradition by 
most in the field of public administration.  The politics-administration dichotomy which grew out 
of Wilson’s treatment of government administration came to dominate thought on public 
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administration in the United States until the middle of the 20
th
 Century.  It was bolstered by the 
movement known as Taylorism
31
 which advocated the application of scientific knowledge and 
principles to the everyday tasks of workers in business.  Scientific principles and decisions 
informed by scientific knowledge were held to be the best possible solution to a given problem, 
and thus created a barrier between the execution of duties and politics.  The application of such 
scientific principles in government administration could create a solid justification for the 
separation of politics from the business of running government.   
The politics-administration dichotomy began to be challenged in the mid-20
th
 Century as 
many scholars and observers noted that no such dichotomy actually existed in the form 
prescribed by Wilson.  Dwight Waldo in his now famous The Administrative State:  A Study in 
the Political Theory of American Public Administration (1948, also republished in 1984, and 
2006) criticized the idea that scientific management of a bureaucracy is actually apolitical, as 
scientific rationality could easily be deployed to achieve political ends.  Waldo’s well-articulated 
criticism of scientific management in government administration (which underpinned the 
politics-administration dichotomy) precipitated a steady barrage of criticism and outright 
rejection of the Wilsonian dichotomy from scholars of public administration which continues to 
this day.  Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954) also challenged the notion of 
value-free management in business, with clear implications for government administration. With 
the functions, form, and nature of government administration as heretofore understood being 
challenged, other models of organization could be considered.  It was in this vacuum that the 
beginnings of New Public Management could be found in the 1960s.  
 
2.5.2.3 New Public Management 
Proponents of NPM wanted to restrict the autonomy of government administration in order to 
more quickly implement their policy goals of market liberalization.  NPM as a coherent theory of 
organization has been difficult to define, however, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, pg. 10) write that, 
“NPM is a bundle of specific concepts and practices” which they describe as: 
 
                                                 
31
 Name given to the practices and theory developed by the American engineer, Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-
1915) in The Principles of Scientific Management (1911). 
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1) Greater emphasis on ‘performance’, especially through the measurement of 
outputs 
2) A preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational forms 
over large, multi-functional forms 
3) A widespread substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations as the principle 
coordinating device 
4) A widespread injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including 
competitive tendering, public sector league tables, and performance-related pay 
5) An emphasis of treating service users as ‘customers’ and on the application of 
generic quality improvement techniques such as Total Quality Management 
(TQM)… (pg. 10). 
 
The differences between the Weberian model that stresses legality and process and the NPM 
model which stresses efficiency and results is relatively straight forward.  NPM arose in reaction 
to the perceived inefficiency of the hierarchical and rules-based bureaucratic administrations that 
preceded it.  Proponents of NPM believe that a reorganized government administration (in the 
mold of business) would be a more effective (and less intrusive) regulator of economic activity.  
However, there have been many detractors of NPM both inside and especially outside of the 
Anglophone world. 
The rise of neoliberalism beginning in the 1980s sought to limit the role of the state in the 
affairs of people and in the economy.  Neoliberal ideology lionizes the culture and practices of 
business, and accordingly holds that the implementation of business practices within government 
administration would have the effect of producing a more efficient, more customer-friendly, and 
more flexible government. NPM was the resulting model promoted by neoliberal reformers. 
NPM emerged in the Anglo-American world as an alternative to the strict hierarchy and 
perceived inefficiency of the traditional “Weberian” model in the 1980s.  NPM envisions a 
hierarchically flattened administration that is better able to respond nimbly to varied needs 
arising from the public.  It promotes a mindset in which citizens are seen as customers 
demanding the delivery of a service.  This conception of citizens as customers having choice and 
being able to wield consumer demand on government services would seem contrary to the long-
held notions of the Rechtstaat
32
 where an extensive corpus of laws governs the behavior of 
people and institutions for the greater public good.  And yet another area where the idea of NPM 
                                                 
32
 Although obviously a concept devised over the centuries by Austro-German jurists, this legal and administrative 
rationale spread to other countries in Central Europe, particularly if they fell within the borders of the German or 
Hapsburg empires.  These administrative traditions predated communism and understandably continued to hold 
some sway, if limited, during the communist era. 
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has caused discomfort for states is its emphasis on greater autonomy for subordinate branches of 
government agencies.  Greater autonomy diminishes the coordinating capacity of central 
administrative agencies and leads to further decentralization, which many unitary states seek to 
avoid.  Even in the Anglophone countries where NPM and, by extension, neoliberalism have had 
the greatest success, there is increasing unease with how much it has altered the traditional 
functioning of government administration. Academic treatment of administration in the US and 
UK generally espouses greater responsiveness to the needs of the public along with greater 
efficiency, while expressing some reservations as to the success of NPM as it has been 
implemented.   
Although such policy goals were onerous in the view of many post-positivistic academics, 
they too in principle supported a transformed administration that would be more immediately 
responsive to social needs without the lengthy processes associated with producing action in a 
stifling hierarchy.  A further refutation of the politics-administrative dichotomy could be found 
in Page and Jenkins (2005) Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a Cast of Thousands, wherein 
it is argued that since mid- and high-level civil servants in the UK actively and willingly develop 
policies preferable to their government ministers (politicians who are elected to office), the 
bureaucracy of which they are a part is not truly neutral in a strict sense
33
.  Their argument, 
however, primarily centers on bureaucrats who develop policy instead of implementing it.  Thus, 
while Policy Bureaucracy is extremely insightful into the world of policymaking at the higher 
levels of the British civil service, and indeed convincing in its argument pertaining to this 
activity, it does not offer a suitable explanation as to at least the veneer of bureaucratic neutrality 
in those parts of the administration that implement policy. 
Despite the rejections of the politics-administration dichotomy, no suitable replacement 
for this theory regarding the proper arrangements of political activities and government 
administration has yet been developed.  In light of this reality, there is a clear need to reconcile 
how public administrators can maintain their autonomy in the face of great pressures of 
politicization.  Gregory Huber in his work, The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and 
Influence of Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety (2007) argues that there exists a 
                                                 
33
 However, it is the duty of civil servants to develop such policies as would be acceptable to ministers from any 
party in power. 
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concept of “strategic neutrality” within governmental administrations. “Strategic neutrality” is 
essentially the agency choosing to appear politically neutral (by means of performing its duties in 
a neutral fashion) in order to gain political support and subvert potential political threats.  Huber 
writes:  
In sum, “strategic neutrality” is an implementation practice which simultaneously 
serves agency leaders’ management and political needs.  It helps guide public 
policy toward desired ends while minimizing the likelihood that outsiders will 
gain sufficient political strength to overrule agency decisions.  Strategic neutrality 
therefore allows unelected agency officials to become limited, but important, 
independent political actors capable of shaping policy and subsequent political 
conflict. (pgs. 1-2). 
 
This attempt at explaining how a politics-administration dichotomy may exist, rather than simply 
stating that it should exist (as in the case of Wilson and Weber), will prove very important in 
examining how administrative reform has played out in East-Central Europe, given the highly 
politicized government administrations inherited from the communist era.  Despite the 
inadequacies of an absolute dichotomy between politics and administration, there may well be a 
place for it along the continuum between blind acceptance and flat rejection. 
The ideal of Weberian bureaucracy remains very popular in continental Europe as 
opposed to the Anglophone countries which moved towards other organizational forms 
beginning as early as the 1960s.  The Weberian model of bureaucracy has proven more popular 
than other alternatives in East-Central Europe in the wake of the political and economic 
transition beginning in 1989 as many in these countries felt that Weber’s ideal model better 
suited their socio-political systems.  The strong vertical hierarchy of the Weberian model is 
considered to be ideal for enforcing accountability within administration, the topic of the next 
section. 
 
2.6 Accountability 
Accountability is fundamental for the proper functioning of the government 
administration.  Structures of accountability also facilitate political control over bureaucracy and 
thus are essential for understanding how an administrative legacy and/or alternative explanations 
can influence the course of reform. The focus of democratic accountability is often on the 
political figures in a given government.  This is understandable as politicians, by virtue of being 
elected to their offices, have the most visible restraints attached to their behavior.  The public can 
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remove them from office in the next election if their actions or beliefs to do not correspond to the 
desires of the people
34
.  However, the part of government with which the people have the most 
contact is with the government administration.  How government administration best represents 
the interest of the people is more complex to determine.  Ideally, government administration will 
act in the best interest of the people based on personal democratic and representative convictions 
of those employed in the administration as well as directives from elected officials whose own 
democratic and representative convictions mirror those of the larger society.  In practice there are 
a myriad of other considerations for public administrators.  Although public administration has 
been a necessary part of every complex government in history, it is only in the last century that it 
has grown to such proportions as seen in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries.    Here we will 
examine the subject of administrative accountability. The Politics of Bureaucracy: An 
introduction to comparative public administration by Guy Peters (2010b) discusses the issues of 
administrative accountability at length
35
.     
   Accountability is the obligation of a government administration to give an account of its 
actions to an independent body.  The nature of the external organization (usually having political 
legitimacy) being answered to determines the content of what must be accounted for. In 
explaining Responsibility, Peters writes that Bureaucracies must follow internal ethical rules as 
well as the norms acquired during the training they received as civil servants.  Additionally, they 
must follow laws governing public policy implementation, whether specific or general.  Civil 
servants must act in accordance with the law as they understand it.  The fact that civil servants 
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 Representation of the people’s interests is held as a fundamental tenet of democracy.  The relationship between 
democracy and representation has been explored repeatedly in political science and other disciplines with the goal of 
better understanding this relationship on the one hand, and establishing what the mechanisms are which ensure 
popular representation in a democracy on the other.  Political accountability is thought to ensure popular 
representation in a given government; however, many forms of government have few or no mechanisms of 
accountability available to the people.  Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) explore these issues in their 
monumental work, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation.  In the introduction to their book, they make 
clear that the central question of their book is: do elected governments, by virtue of being elected, “act in a 
representative manner”?  Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes point out that while the meaning of representation has 
vacillated greatly, the ways in which it is realized or negated have remained relatively constant.  The authors write 
that there are four reasons why a government is likely to represent the interests of the people: 1) public servants 
often embrace the ideal of public service and will likely not abuse their power, 2) citizens choose to elect candidates 
whose interests are similar to their own or who continue to embrace the ideal of public service, 3) the threat of being 
voted out of office by an angry citizenry, and 4) by design, separation of powers within a government tend to result 
in governments representing the interests of the people (1999, 3).  Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes offer a basic 
structure for looking at representation in democracies, and using this structure, it is possible to continue forward 
examining representation in policy making as well as administration. 
35
 See Chapter 8, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An introduction to comparative public administration (2010). 
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must interpret the law and further elaborate upon it with specific regulations so that it can be 
implemented is a source of potential conflict between bureaucrats and the political leaders 
having authority over them.  Responsiveness is the idea that government should respond to the 
needs and the demands of the public, especially the “clients”36 of a particular program.  The 
realization of this concept is perhaps the most difficult as the act of satisfying the “clients” of a 
given program may well be opposed to the wishes of current political leaders or even society as a 
whole.  For civil servants, there is no way out of this potential conundrum.  Responsiveness is 
the idea that government agencies should try and meet the needs of the public, although given 
the diverse and even conflicting needs of citizens, this can be impossible to implement fairly.  
These general concepts are important to remember before beginning to look at mechanisms of 
administrative accountability.  
Peters and others stress that internal controls, which Peters terms organizational 
methods, within an administration are in theory the best means for maintaining accountability.  
These controls may range from professional norms to strict supervision.  Peters names publicity 
as an organizational control insofar that, “publicity itself carries little or no direct sanction.  
Rather, the mechanism depends largely upon the organization to correct any errors brought to 
light” (Peters 2010b, pg. 271). Failure of the organization to take corrective action within its own 
ranks will result in outside interference from the elected officials.  Publicity is also known as 
transparency, which can entail unrestricted public scrutiny of administrative operations.  Another 
control is internal discipline, which is essentially internal policing. This method of control is cost 
effective and avoids the wrath of the elected leaders in being able to settle matters quickly and 
from the inside.  However, there can be a number of problems with this, not least of which is the 
fact that disciplining other than legal punishment may not be effective in all cases.   
Another variety of controls involves competition either within the government by various 
different agencies or competition with the private sector for the provision of a given service.  
These market and external controls exercise control over the public administration almost on 
their own, but are limited to gauging efficiency.  But as Peters explains, efficiency is very limited 
in its utility to measure the performance of public administration:  
                                                 
36
 Peters uses this word frequently to designate the intended recipients of a given program, which are often a group 
differentiated by a particular need or demand from the rest of society. 
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Efficiency is certainly an important value but it is by no means the only one.  
Further, if a public program maximizes economic efficiency, it may minimize 
other important values such as service to clients and thoroughness in investigating 
complaints.  Controlling the public sector is generally a matter of balancing 
numerous values, but relying on the market permits attention to only a single, 
rather limited, set of signals about government performance. (2010b, pg. 277). 
 
This highlights some of the possible problems with the claim that government “should be run 
like a business."  This is not to deny that there is virtue in market discipline; however, it does 
bring attention to the fact that the work of government and the work of businesses are quite 
different by their nature. Group and public pressures also form a control over public 
administration by direct petition and submission of grievances by citizens’ groups.  Public 
hearings by government agencies provide the opportunity for citizens to have at least some input 
into the decision making process. 
The strongest controls over the administration are political.  Political methods of control 
come from three areas: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.  Often, the executive may 
appoint the senior heads of administration in addition to the heads of the responsible cabinet 
ministries or departments.  This can be a form of control, but it can also present the opportunity 
for the politicization of the bureaucracy which would run contrary to long-held Weberian norms. 
Furthermore, most of those employed in the public administration are professionals who have 
made a career of their service, and thus it is very likely that they will outlast an elected executive 
upon the conclusion of the executive’s term limits.  It is worth remembering that the executive is 
dependent upon the bureaucracy for most of the information that it would need to judge the job 
performance of the bureaucracy.  The most powerful tool available to the executive is the power 
to completely reorganize an agency; that being said, it is difficult to predict whether such 
reorganization will have negative consequences in the future, and thus there is generally a 
pronounced hesitation on the part of the executive to pursue such a course of action.    
Legislatures may exercise control over bureaucracies through ministerial responsibility, 
control of the budget, investigation, constituency service, review of secondary legislation, and 
finally by means of a post-audit.  Legislatures are often overburdened with legislative work and 
thus enacted laws tend to be very general in nature, and the administration is expected to 
elaborate upon the law to ensure that it can be implemented (secondary legislation).  Legislatures 
with such workloads often find it difficult to pursue control of bureaucracy, unless of course, it is 
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for political self-aggrandizement.  The judiciary may rule that administrative actions are not 
within the law, and may therefore cause an agency to change course or reassess its own actions.  
Administrative courts in part facilitate this function. Finally, normative control of 
administrations is exercised by norms and values held by administrators and society as a whole.  
Professional norms adopted during one’s training as a civil servant are also relevant to this 
method of control. 
Peters reminds us that there are limits to the controlling of public administration.  Such 
limits include norms particular to specific professions conflicting with the norms and 
requirements of the civil service, autonomous agencies being beyond the direct control of the 
executive hierarchy, services contracted to private companies (public-private partnerships, PPPs) 
as well as quasi non-governmental organizations (QUANGOS), accord between government 
agencies and public unions, political structure, and finally political culture. In the next section, an 
important discussion of centralization occurs, which will complement the discussion of 
accountability. 
 
2.7 Centralization vs. Decentralization 
The centralization of government powers is an important factor that influences the 
accountability discussed in the previous section in addition to the nature of bureaucratic 
structures themselves. Furthermore, centralization of government power is an important topic in 
the discussion of legacies from state socialism.  In theory, a more centralized government 
demands greater accountability from all other levels of government. This rationale guided the 
trend of centralization beginning in the Enlightenment. The need for coordinated action and, 
perhaps more importantly, the ambitions of absolutist monarchs has led to a concentration of 
power into the hands of central governments.  The emergence of countries such as Germany and 
Italy out of many small states in the mid-19
th
 Century also contributed to centralization.  
However, the biggest expansion of central/ federal government occurred in most countries after 
the Second World War as a result of new and expansive social entitlement programs (Peters 
2010b). The concentration of these activities into the hands of the central government was a 
result of a belief among many that sub-national units of government were not capable of 
delivering the social entitlement services needed by the citizenry.  This trend towards further 
centralization gradually began to be seen as having gone too far, and a trend toward 
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decentralization began to emerge.  Decentralization then is the deconcentrating of powers away 
from the central government into subnational units of government. Decentralization enjoys broad 
support in much of the world today, and as such, it is quite common to find government 
programs of decentralization in most countries. Political and administrative decentralization are 
attractive because they theoretically bring government closer to the citizenry. Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999) identify three underlying dimensions to decentralization: actors, types of powers to be 
decentralized, and accountability. Empowered local politicians and local government 
administrations are thought to better understand the needs of their community as well as 
important issues that are particular to their community.  The distinction between political 
decentralization and administrative decentralization is an important one, because political 
decentralization is a more fundamental government restructuring where greater political power is 
vested in a local citizenry (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).  Administrative decentralization generally 
retains political power at the center but delegates responsibility for government functions to 
lower levels of government.   
Decentralization is often associated with the spread of neoliberalism in the Western mind.  
Neoliberalism advocates free markets with little government intervention, particularly from the 
national level.  In keeping with this world view, national level governments have gradually 
allocated more responsibilities for the provision of services to sub-national units of government, 
often divesting themselves of the financial burden as well.  The rationale is that sub-national 
levels of government can more efficiently administer programs as they are more accessible to the 
citizenry as distinct from the removed, monolithic state which is oblivious to the everyday needs 
of persons.  
A foundational principle of decentralization is the concept of subsidiarity. The principle 
of subsidiarity holds that government responsibility for any given policy area should be 
delegated to the lowest possible level of government where the consequences of such delegation 
would not negatively affect the other levels of government or society in general.  Henkel (2002) 
writes that the promotion of the principle of subsidiarity was an effort by the EU to prevent 
further distance between itself and its citizens while recognizing cultural differences.  The 
European Union would desire to maintain responsibility at the EU-level only if it were beneficial 
to do so.  Giuranno (2010) explains that the subsidiarity principle in the EU “implies a benefit 
criterion stating that the EU provision of policies must bring value over and above what could be 
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achieved by individual governments acting alone." Decentralization enjoys broad support in 
much of the world today, and as such, it is quite common to find government programs of 
decentralization in most countries. Political and administrative decentralization is attractive 
because theoretically it brings government closer to the citizenry.  Empowered local politicians 
and local government administrations are thought to better understand the needs of their 
community as well as important issues that may face that are particular to their community.  The 
needs of a given local community may well differ from the needs of a neighboring community 
and certainly from the needs of other more distant communities within the same country.  
Empowered local governments and local administrations can develop policies and responses 
specifically for their community, in contrast to a central government that must develop policies 
and responses that apply to the whole country.  Relative to scale, local government is thought to 
be the most efficient.  Decentralization also is less costly for the central government, as the costs 
for addressing issues is shifted to regional and local governments thereby at least giving the 
appearance of reducing spending.  
However, decentralization is not immune from criticism.  As mentioned above, central 
governments create policies and responses that generally must apply to the country.  Furthermore, 
it can be argued that is some instances this is the appropriate scale for action.  If a nation-wide 
policy or response is needed from a particular area of competency, and that competency has been 
decentralized, then formulating a solution at the national level will be very difficult.  If the 
burden of a particular program or responsibility is shifted away from the central government, 
society is not actually relieved of the costs of that responsibility as the cost is simply placed on 
regional and local governments and by extension the tax bases of these governments.  If 
government powers are decentralized, such as was the case in Poland regarding spatial planning 
in the early 1990s, this can have a pronounced effect on the ability of the central government 
administration to formulate and implement policy and otherwise govern, a topic which will be 
addressed in Chapter 7.  Before this review of the relevant literatures on public administration 
and the political transition in ECE is complete, however, it is necessary to examine those 
capacities associated with public administration. 
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2.8 Capacities of Governance and Public Administration 
Government capacity is at the center of the ability to function and perform its duties.  It is 
an indispensable component of any research on an administrative legacy as well having a 
mutually influencing relationship with accountability, centralization and decentralization, as well 
as bureaucratic structure.  This section will examine various capacities of governance which will 
serve as useful topics of discussion in the results chapters if not integral components of analysis. 
Here, a definition of the word ‘capacity’ is needed in order to provide some structure to the 
discussion to follow.  A relevant definition of capacity is set out in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, with capacity being defined as, “the ability or power to do, experience, or understand 
something."  The Oxford English Dictionary offers another definition of capacity, describing it 
as “the amount that something can produce."  It would seem logical that administrative capacity, 
broadly speaking, is some form of the capacities described by the OED in the context of public 
administration (or administration within a business for that matter).  However, a precise 
definition of ‘administrative capacity’ is not simply a contextualized version of the definition for 
‘capacity’.  This dispute related to what elements can be said to form administrative capacity.  
Addison (2009) wrote that administrative capacity is an inherently latent concept, meaning that 
its existence must be deduced from its component parts, while it can never be directly observed 
itself.   
Administrative and governance capacities are very important when seeking to understand 
how a bureaucracy is formed and how it performs, as well as how these may reform 
administration.  Farazmand’s (2009) attempt to unpack the meaning of administrative capacity 
led him to identifying five “functionally instrumental capacities” of government administration, 
including governing capacity, institutional capacity, policy capacity, political capacity, and 
finally administrative capacity.  For Farazmand (ibid.), administrative capacity served both as 
one of the five “functionally instrumental capacities” of government and its own category (see 
Table 2.2 below). 
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Functionally Instrumental Capacities 
 
Institutional 
Organizational 
Policy 
Political 
                                       Administration                                   →            11 Administrative Capacities 
 
Structural  
Process  
Cultural or Normative  
Institutional or Organizational  
Learning and Leadership  
Strategic Human Resources  
Financial Resources  
Cognitive  
Technological  
Democratic Representation, Responsiveness, and 
Fairness 
Developmental Capacity 
 
Table 2.2:  Functionally Instrumental and Administrative Capacities (Farazmand 2009). 
 
The first functionally instrumental capacity is known as institutional capacity.  Institutional 
capacity could be described as established structures as well as ideas and norms that form a 
precedent within an area.  Bureaucracies, free enterprise, non-governmental organizations, and 
organizations are part of material instrumentality.  Ideas and rules of conduct, and procedures are 
part of conceptual instrumentality.  These components of institutional capacity are very relevant 
to understanding the broad architecture of a legacy explanation (discussed in greater detail in the 
next section). 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Functionally Instrumental 
Capacity 
Aspects of Capacity Capacity Categories 
Institutional Capacity 
Material Instrumentality 
Institutionalization of the Government 
Bureaucracies 
Institutionalization of the Market 
Corporations 
Institutionalization of NGOs 
Institutionalization of Organizations` 
Conceptual Instrumentality 
Institutionalization of Ideas 
Institutionalization of Rules of Conduct 
Institutionalization of Procedures 
 
Table 2.3:  Institutional Capacity (Farazmand 2009). 
 
The second functionally instrumental capacity is called ‘organizational capacity’.  Organizational 
capacity as described by Farazmand (2009) chiefly concerns the structures and procedures 
through which tasks are organized and resources distributed.   It involves the ability to organize 
the activities of government (see Table 2.4).  Organizational capacity could be used as an 
analytical tool with which to study the process of finding a proper equilibrium between 
decentralization and centralization.   
 
Functionally Instrumental 
Capacity 
Aspects of Capacity Capacity Categories 
Organizational Capacity (No Divisions) 
Organizing of the Economy, Society, and 
State into Manageable Sectors 
Organizing of Structures 
Organizing of Processes 
Organizing of Values or Norms 
Organizing of Necessary Resources 
 
Table 2.4:  Organizational Capacity (Farazmand 2009).    
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Policy capacity is perhaps the most intriguing of the functionally instrumental capacities 
described by Farazmand (2009).   Policy capacity is the collective ability at different scales to 
coordinate the administrative activities of government through informed and competent 
policymaking (see Table 2.5).  It must be able to answer the classic questions of who, what, when, 
where, why, how, and how much as these relate to policy.  Answering these questions is the first 
aspect of policy capacity, the second capacity being evaluative and concerned with the ability to 
review policy choices that have already been made so any problems can be identified and 
corrections made.  The possession of policy capacity is in fact a fundamental requirement of 
modern civil services.  It is difficult to overstate its importance in the absence of another 
coherent organization capable of developing policy at all levels of administration. Often, such 
alternative policymaking bodies of comparable size were the ruling parties of East Bloc countries 
during the era of state socialism.  Since democracies cannot allow for such a dominating role of a 
political party (even if duly elected), it is necessary that the public administration itself be 
capable of developing at least the finer details of policy while political advisers may develop the 
broad contours of policy. 
 
Functionally 
Instrumental Capacity 
Aspects of Capacity Capacity Categories Capacity Sub-
Categories  
Policy Capacity 
Answering Questions 
Governing and Policy Actors Who? 
Short- and Long -term Policy 
Directions 
What? 
Strategic Choices and Guidance When? 
Why? 
How?  
How much? 
Evaluation 
 Institutions for Policy 
Review 
Arrangements for 
Policy Review 
 
Table 2.5:  Policy Capacity (Farazmand 2009). 
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The last functionally instrumental capacity (see Table 2.6) described by Farazmand was ‘politics 
as capacity’.  Farazmand explained that politics as capacity stands at the core of policy capacity.  
It is in effect the ability of the elected government (Presidents, Prime Ministers, the Cabinet, 
Courts and Legislature) to control the actions of the government administration. Accountability 
is a major component of this capacity as well as the proper exercise of control by the political 
leadership.  Politics as capacities requires that the elected leadership be stable enough to create 
policy initiatives and to reach consensus as to which policy directions must be pursued.  It 
requires that the political leadership be competent and knowledgeable enough to make informed 
decisions based in fact and not blind ideology.  Farazmand highlights the importance of the flow 
of information in ‘politics as capacity’ as can be seen above.   
 
Functionally Instrumental 
Capacity 
Aspects of Capacity  Capacity Categories / Substantive 
Examples 
Politics as Capacity 
Stake Holders 
Political Parties 
Government 
Industry 
Citizenry 
Ability to of Elected 
Government to "Govern" 
Bureaucracy in the Public 
Interest 
Accountability 
Good Political Control 
 
Table 2.6:  Politics as Capacity (Farazmand 2009). 
 
The capacities of governance and administrative capacities described in the work of Farazmand 
provide excellent tools of analysis for examining the research questions in this dissertation.  
They are in a sense idealistic. However, like Weber’s theories of bureaucracy, they make 
respectable points of reference for measuring the qualities of government administration.  The 
final section examines and critiques a model of administrative reform.  The content of this 
section as well as all previous sections contribute to the critique, which will serve as the basis for 
an improved model with use in later in this dissertation. 
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2.9 Pollitt and Bouckaert’s Model of Public Management Reform 
In light of the discussion of the literatures on public administration and the political 
transition in ECE in the previous sections, an important and informative model describing the 
reform process in public administrations will be examined and critiqued.  A revision of this 
model will figure prominently into the analysis found in Chapter 8, which will address all four 
research questions.  The revision will be detailed in within Chapter 4 on methods.  Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s (2011) Model of Public Management Reform is designed to trace the elements that 
have influence on the process of administrative reform in modern Western governments. 
Whereas the model synthesizing alternative explanations to a legacy explanation in Figure 2.1 
was concerned with causes of reform outcomes, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model is concerned with 
the structural process of reform (see Figure 2.2).  It is an especially adept model for examining 
reform in the direction of more contemporary conceptions of governance and public 
administration.  The model distinguishes four broad groupings of actors or influences:  
socioeconomic, political, elite, and administrative.  Box A, representing socioeconomics, 
contained the influences of global economic forces and socioeconomic change that jointly 
influence socioeconomic policies. These in turn collectively influence the elite and the political 
system. In the political system, new public management ideas as well as group in public 
pressures influence the party politics, which collectively influence the political elite.  Chance 
natural disasters or events form a fifth box that both influences the elite and citizens who can 
exert pressure on the political system.  The box for administration (Box K) contains elements to 
be found in the reform process. 
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Figure 2.2: Reproduction of Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) Model of Public Management Reform 
 
2.9.1 Critique of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s Model of Public Management Reform for the Polish and 
ECE Context  
The model described above is useful for describing public management reform in modern, 
advanced industrial societies. In fact, no former members of the Eastern bloc were included in 
the analysis conducted by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) that used this model.  The above model 
(Figure 2.2.) is lacking when it comes to accounting for the forces that shape administrative 
reform in East-Central Europe today, especially in the years since 1989.  As will be shown, there 
  
 
  
B. Global 
Economic Forces 
H. Party Political 
Ideas  
C. Socio-
Economic Change 
F. New 
Management 
Ideas 
G. Pressure from 
Citizens 
D. Socio-Economic 
Policies  
J. Elite Decision-Making 
What is… 
1) desirable 
2) feasible? 
  
I. Chance Events: 
Scandals, disasters 
A. Socio-Economic Forces E. Political System 
K. Administrative System 
L. Content of Reform Package 
N. Results Achieved 
M. Implementation Process 
63 
 
are two primary factors that should be included in the above model so that it would more 
accurately represent administrative reform in the countries of East Central Europe, and in 
particular Poland. These two factors include: 1) international institutions (especially the EU) to 
which government administration is accountable, and 2) the influence of Weberian bureaucracy
37
.  
I will argue also that there are a few instances where certain directions of influence are not 
depicted in the above model, but ought to be.  One important dimension of the two factors 
mentioned above is a temporal one. This will also be described below. 
First, we will begin by describing Peters’ mechanisms of accountability and where they 
fit in with the above model in Figure 2.2.  Organizational methods as described by Peters best 
correspond to Box K, or the Administrative System. Normative methods would also belong to 
the administrative system. Market and external controls as well as group and public pressures 
belong to Box A, socio-economic forces.  And of course, the political methods of control belong 
to Box E, the political system.  The political methods of control also correspond to Box J, which 
depicts elite decision-making. 
Peters’ mechanisms of accountability are of little use if there are no institutions or 
government bodies identified to which the public administration is accountable.  Within Table 
2.7 Peters’ mechanisms of accountability have been operationalized, facilitating easier 
comparison. Under organizational methods, internal discipline within a government unit as 
well as its reactions and preemptive actions to public scrutiny are included by Peters.  For the 
purposes of this study, organizational methods will be considered broadly as an internal handling 
of issues. While this would naturally be correlated with Box K or administrative systems, there 
would have to be aligned influence from the public and/or business sector directly to the 
administration. Furthermore, this line would have to demonstrate that this direction of influence 
can at times be tenuous and unpredictable, as ultimately true lines of pressure and authority 
descend upon government administration directly from the core executive, especially in this case 
study given Poland’s traditionally unitary state structure. It must also be kept in mind that public 
                                                 
37
 Although these changes could arguably make the model more suitable for Western European democracies, they 
are especially needed for East-Central European countries which are still in the process of reshaping their 
government administrations.  In particular, the EU holds greater sway in these countries by virtue of the fact that the 
EU can withhold financial assistance, which although not as effective as pre-accession conditionality, cannot be 
easily ignored by countried dependent upon redistributive aid from Brussels.  This mechanism at the EU’s disposal 
is not as effective in the old member states, where countries are not as dependent on EU assistance and are often net 
contributors instead of net recipients. 
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administration did not have to be immediately responsive to public pressures following the end 
of communism in 1989. Instead, it developed gradually in the 1990s. Normative methods 
should also correspond to this box as professional norms and the standards of the Civil Service 
are important to ensuring proper behavior among individuals employed within the administration. 
However, these are not mentioned in the model.  There is also a temporal aspect to the civil 
service, as the civil service was not established until 1996 in Poland with modifications to the 
law in 1998 and 2006.  Therefore while the consideration of professional and civil service norms 
is indeed a vital part of any administrative reform effort, this is not the case in Poland for the first 
seven years of the transition.  An appropriate model would do well to adjust with time giving it 
greater explanatory power over a longer period of time. 
 Corresponding to Box A, market and external controls are quite applicable for 
government administrations which provide a service comparable in nature to a service provided 
by a private company, or that could be provided by a private company. Naturally, this was not a 
stable source of pressure in the early transition as the private economy had not yet fully 
developed.  At the same time, the knowledge that the private markets could offer competition for 
government-provided services did lead to a massive decentralization and privatization campaign 
in the early 1990s.  Group in public pressures would also generally correspond to Box A as 
well as to Box G within the political system.  These developed in strength after the transition 
began in 1989 as newly won freedoms enabled the public to become a recognized and serious 
actor vis-à-vis the state. Interestingly, as this grew, so did the ability of scrutiny from groups and 
in the public to cause public administration to react and change preemptively (an organizational 
method of accountability). Public pressure can simply refer to the public whereas group 
pressures could also include potential clientele for a given administration, or industrial lobbies. 
Civil society organizations can also be included under this label. 
Finally, the political methods of controlling public administration must be further 
elaborated upon and reflected in any model of administrative reform.  In Poland, for the purposes 
of this case study, the central government has prerogative over national transportation policies, 
especially those that concern the construction of the motorways and expressways, which are 
classified as national roads.  For this case study, political methods of control could first be 
divided into three distinct categories corresponding to various levels of government involved in 
Polish transportation policy, including the central government, Polish self-governments, and the 
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European Union. While central government and self-government can be subsumed under Box E 
for the political system, role of the EU as a major political factor seems inadequately 
incorporated into this model. The EU must be considered as more than simply policy ideas or 
recommendations for the Political Parties in Box H or a source of new public management ideas 
from Box F, because the EU does employ many formal and quite effective mechanisms for 
ensuring that its decisions and many of its preferences are adopted by the member states. A 
hypothetical example relevant to this research would be the withholding of Cohesion Funds upon 
repeated violations of the rules and procedures that the Polish government was supposed to 
follow during the motorway construction program. 
 
Peters’ Mechanisms of 
Accountability 
Proposed Examples 
within Case 
Subdivisions of Examples How do these groups 
wield influence? 
Organizational Methods 
(Publicity/ Internal 
Discipline) 
Internal Handling of 
Issues 
 Internal Control, 
Reaction and Preemption 
Market and External 
Controls (A creature of 
NPM) 
Market Pressures 
 
 Promotes Efficiency 
Group and Public Pressures 
 
Public  Political (Influences 
Government) 
Clientele Domestic/Foreign Market (Influences 
Government) 
Political Methods of 
Control 
Central Government Executive/Parliament/ Judicial Political, Structural, 
Legal 
Polish Self 
Governments  
Voivodships, Powiaty, Gminy Indirect Political 
European Union  Political, Financial, 
Economic, Legal 
Normative Methods 
 
Professions and 
Education 
Professional Norms and 
Standards, Civil Service 
Internalizes Good 
Behavior 
 
Table 2.7: Case Examples Derived From Peters’ (2010b) Mechanisms of Accountability 
 
Polish self-governments can lobby the responsible ministries as well as a national 
government for policies preferable to them. However, it is ultimately the central government that 
is in charge of this very centralized policy area. Thus it is important to see which mechanisms the 
central government has to employ that can ensure accountability on the part of government 
administration.  A variety of government bodies and agencies function as supervisors to the rest 
of the government administration ensuring legality of actions, good practice, and outcomes.  
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Jagielski’s (2012) book Kontrola Administracji Publicznej (English: Control of Public 
Administration) explores a variety of mechanisms of control of the bureaucracy employed by the 
Polish government (see Table 2.8).  He divides them into two large categories based on their 
origin, that is, whether they come from within or outside of the ‘executive branch’38 of 
government.  There is a third category of control coming from within the administrative body in 
question itself (as such it would also correspond to Box K), although this is technically of 
internal origin.  The external controls consist of the Parliament (including autonomous but 
attached bodies such as the Supreme Audit Chamber NIK, the Ombudsman etc…) and the 
Judiciary, which includes public prosecutors as well as administrative courts and the 
Constitutional Tribunal. The internal controls mostly consist of accountability to the Cabinet and 
Prime Minister, and offices attached to the Cabinet.  The highest level of a ministry (the political 
level) is also responsible for some internal discipline and oversight.   
 
Origin of Control Government Entities for Control and Oversight 
External 
 
Parliamentary Control 
Control by the State Tribunal and Constitutional Tribunal 
Control by Ombudsman 
Control by the NIK 
Judicial Control 
Control by the State Inspector of Work and General Inspector of Personal Data Protection 
Citizen and Social Control 
Control by the Public Prosecutor 
Internal Controls Control by the Cabinet 
Control by Government Department 
Control by the Regional Central Administration 
Control by Specialized Inspectorates 
Control by Central Anticorruption Bureau 
Internal Controls of Individual Units 
 
Table 2.8: Types of Polish Government Controls on Administration Described by Jagielski (2012)                                                                                                     
 
                                                 
38
 In parliamentary systems of government, such as Poland, the legislative and executive branches are in fact fused 
owing to the fact that the prime minister and cabinet ministers are usually sitting members of parliament 
representing the majority party.  If they are members of parliament, they continue to hold their seats and represent 
their districts.  Functionally speaking, however, because of the inherently different tasks of legislating and 
implementation, one can speak of legislative and executive branches. 
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Internal controls within specific government units, such as the GDDKiA, for a third category, 
nearly separate from the previous internal controls as they may be used separately from them.  
These do not require altering Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model of public management reform; rather 
they serve as an excellent illustration of how the government can control its own administration, 
and thus how a government can ensure that a chosen reform is being satisfactorily implemented. 
The second shortcoming of the model presented in Figure 2.2 is that while it allows for 
input of NPM ideas it does not include input from traditional ideas of Weberian bureaucracy. 
While this may be appropriate for industrially advanced Western democracies, most of which 
have already built Weberian style bureaucracies, this is not wholly fitting for the study of 
transition countries.  Administrative reform in Poland after 1989 would have to contend with the 
many voices calling for a return to pre-World War II patterns of administration, which rightly or 
wrongly, are considered by many in the region to have characteristics similar to, or approaching 
a Weberian bureaucracy. In the case of Poland, there were many scholars of public 
administration from the interwar period and shortly thereafter who extensively theorized on the 
ideal form that public administration in Poland should take. Some might argue that traditional 
Weberian bureaucracy is more appropriate model for Continental European countries with the 
tradition of the Rechtstaat or, in Polonized form, stan prawa. The inclusion of an option for 
Weberian influence would better reflect  the reality currently in place in Poland and East-Central 
Europe, as there is great distrust of New Public Management and some aspects of neoliberal 
statecraft among both the elites and the public in the region. 
A third criticism that can be leveled at the Model of Public Management Reform in 
Figure 2.2 is that it does not provide sufficient agency for the administrative system. While some 
degree of agency may indeed be implied, simply understood, or taken for granted, it should be 
explicitly shown that over time public administration in Poland became partly capable of 
directing their own programs of administrative reform, often proposing specific reforms 
themselves. This capability was created in part by the establishment of the civil service in 1996
39
, 
the founding of the national school for public administration in 1992, and the increase in policy 
and administrative capacities of the organizations themselves.  Actively including elements in 
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 The legal basis of the civil service has been changed many times in Poland.  The 1996 law was repealed by the 
center-right government that was voted into power shortly after the enactment of the law.  The new government 
replaced the 1996 law with their own in 1998.  Further changes were made in 2006 and 2008. 
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the model that could explain and allow for participation of civil servants in the development of 
reforms would be very important for both countries in East-Central Europe and those countries 
for which Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model was originally intended. 
To summarize, when utilizing Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model of public management 
reform for the transition process in ECE countries, there are several deficiencies in the model 
that obstruct its applicability to those countries. These include: 1) a lack of lines indicating 
influence between the citizenry and industry on the one hand, and the public administration on 
the other, 2) a lack of clearly displayed agency on the part of public administration, 3) the 
absence of an influence from Weberian style bureaucracy, and 4) the absence of a clearly defined 
role for the European Union regarding the process of administrative reform within the new 
member states.  However, these deficiencies can be easily remedied by fashioning a revised 
model suitable for examining administrative reform in the countries of East-Central Europe, 
including Poland, which constitutes one of the main contributions of this dissertation.   
 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
 The literature on post-1989 East-Central Europe would, generally speaking, be supportive 
of the idea of an ongoing legacy of the past.  However, the significance of such a legacy for the 
present as well as for different areas of society and government remains in question.  It is 
difficult to determine with any certainly exactly how a past legacy affects the present owing to 
the fact that the word “legacy” itself in this usage is difficult to define.  That aside, few in the 
area of public administration dispute that some kind of legacy exists of the past exists.  As 
Meyer-Sahling (2009b) wrote, it is important to determine what constitutes a legacy, when its 
significance subsided (if at all), and its importance relative to other causal explanations of 
administrative reform outcomes.  There are too many potential aspects of this problem for it to 
be answered as one question; therefore, it must be broken down into smaller questions dealing 
with component issues. Theoretical issues from this chapter will be reiterated in the context of 
the case study below.   
An important theoretical issue was the existence of mechanisms reproducing the past 
legacy. How did the past maintain some influence over the present course of reform?  Meyer-
Sahling (2009b) argued that finding the mechanism that reproduced the past legacy would be 
sufficient to answer this question as well as serving as a promising direction of research in the 
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study of post-communist administrative reforms.  Meyer-Sahling did not propose any tangible 
mechanisms; however, he did suggest guiding analysis in the theoretical mechanisms of rational-
historical institutionalism and/or social-constructivist institutionalism. Determining whether 
these approaches (rational-historical and social-constructivist institutionalism) have better 
explanatory power is significant because it would also help explain what caused a past legacy to 
be superseded by some other cause of reform outcomes.  The issue of mechanisms of 
reproduction is addressed in Chapter 5. 
Another important issue is that of accountability. Reform must be instigated by some 
party in a powerful enough position to do so.  But what gives these actors and institutions power 
over the administration?  If the administration is accountable to them, it would mean that they 
would likely also be the instigators of reform efforts.  Of particular interest is the ability of the 
central government and of the European Union to instigate reform in the Ministry of Transport, 
Construction, and Maritime Economy (including the GDDKiA) and the Ministry of Regional 
Development.  What controls constitute this power over the ministries and the GDDKiA?  
Peter’s (2010) mechanisms of accountability as well as Jagielski’s (2012) descriptions of 
institutional controls will serve as guides in this instance.  Accountability within the MTBiGM, 
GDDKiA, and MRR is examined in Chapter 6. 
Decentralization was one of the major components of administrative reform.  However, 
in Poland, some recentralization has occurred.  This calls for examining the logic of 
centralization as well as what tangible benefits there are to self-governments in even limited 
decentralization.  Diesing’s (1962) writings on legal and political rationality will be useful for 
understanding the dynamics of decentralization and recentralization in the highway infrastructure 
policy sector.  It must be asked why decentralization of some powers was counterproductive and 
while recentralizing them to the ministries was necessary in order to effectively implement 
policy related to the highway infrastructure program.  Organizational capacity as articulated by 
Farazmand (2009) will also be an important feature of analyzing this question. Decentralization 
is the topic of Chapter 7. 
The presence of a strong capacity for policy making is thought to help subvert 
politicization of a government administration by the political leadership.  Assuming the validity 
of this contention, it would be insightful to observe whether or not increasing policy capacity 
within the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy (including the GDDKiA) 
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and the Ministry of Regional Development has acted to further diminish the legacy of state-
socialism, represented most tangibly in the form of politicization for the purposes of control.  
Farazmand’s (2009) articulation of policy capacity and a revised version of Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s (2011) model of public management reform will play a key role in the analysis of 
this question. Policy capacity will be examined in Chapter 8. 
The theoretical issues explored in this chapter serve to frame the analysis conducted in 
this dissertation. The chapter began by examining the most relevant themes of public 
administration, which will be useful when considering further information presented in Chapter 3, 
which examines transport geography as well as the institutional settings where transportation 
policy is made in Poland.  Research for this dissertation is primarily concerned with 
transportation policy as opposed to transportation in and of itself.  Therefore, themes from public 
administration will guide the inquiry of transportation policy issues throughout this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON TRANSPORTATION GEOGRAPHY AND 
BACKGROUND ON ROAD TRANSPORT IN POLAND 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of the growth of transportation networks and administrative reform in 
East-Central Europe is a topic that needs greater attention in the academic community.  It is 
important to understand how dynamics within government administration affect the outcomes of 
policy development and implementation in transportation. Administration and bureaucracy are 
all too often either viewed as a monolith or a collection of disaggregated individuals and 
impulses within a formal institution, which is little more than a misleading façade.  A sober 
analysis of the role of public administration in producing transportation policy would remedy 
this situation.  Components of this topic draw from well-established literatures; however, as a 
unified subject of inquiry they have received considerably less attention.  These components in 
the context of East-Central Europe include transportation geography, decentralization, and public 
administration.  Their scope is such that only the most basic ideas of each can be discussed here 
before focusing on the transition in ECE since 1989.  Two other interdisciplinary literatures, on 
the political transition in ECE and on European integration within the EU, serve as integral 
themes and a context for transportation geography, decentralization, and public administration.  
To that extent, sections highlighting the fundamentals of transportation geography, 
decentralization, and public administration will also explore these subjects within the context of 
the ECE transition and EU integration, providing important background for the dissertation. 
 
3.2 Transport 
Walter Christaller (1933) observed a link between transport costs and the spatial 
distribution of economic activity and then developed the idea of an urban hierarchy that led to 
the articulation of Central Place Theory.  This provided a theoretical foundation for the 
beginning of the association between transportation geography and the spatial sciences within 
geography once the quantitative revolution in the 1960s and 70s took hold of the discipline. The 
association between the geography of transportation and the disciplines of economics and spatial 
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sciences clearly demonstrated the inherent spatiality of transportation in quantified terms, but it 
neglected the equally important spatial impacts of transportation on society. 
 
3.2.1 Spatial Characteristics of Transport Geography 
Transportation is a phenomenon in which concepts of space inherently play a large role. 
Although the spatial effects of transportation are often discussed, the spaces of transportation 
themselves are less often articulated explicitly.  A useful point of departure is transportation 
infrastructure, then progressing to transportation networks.  The spatial reach of transportation 
infrastructure and networks will then be discussed followed by noting the spatially unifying 
qualities largely inherent to transportation systems.   
The concept of space is multifaceted.  Space can have varied meanings in many different 
contexts and even multiple meanings in the same context.  Space can be concrete or abstract, 
with concrete space being physical space on the earth, and abstract space having few conceptual 
limits.  Spaces do, however, have boundaries, whether defined or nebulous.  Within the 
boundaries of a physical space there may be heterogeneity of objects with no unifying 
characteristics, the temptation in this instance possibly being to deem the boundaries as arbitrary.  
Space as a framework is eminently useful, its potential scope vast: 
 
Space is an essential framework of all modes of thought.  From physics to 
aesthetics, from myth and magic to common everyday life, space in conjunction 
with time, provides a fundamental ordering system interlacing every facet of 
thought…The problem of analyzing space is compounded because whatever may 
be said of space at the level of theoretical physics and philosophy, at the terrestrial 
level, geographical space is not empty.  It is filled with matter and energy, or 
substance.  The fact that people discuss this space, describe it, and analyse it, 
means that they are conceptually – not actually- isolating and separating space 
from substance (Sack 1980, 4). 
 
An abstract space on the other hand should have a unifying characteristic common to its contents.   
But how can abstract space be conceptualized and described?  Nyusten (1968) identifies three 
features of a spatial point of view within abstract space: 1) directional orientation, 2) distance, 
and 3) connectiveness.  In clarifying connectiveness, Nyusten writes, “Connections need not be 
adjacent boundaries or physical links. They may be defined as functional associations.  
Functional associations of spatially separate elements are best revealed by exchanges that take 
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place between elements.  The exchanges may often be measured by the flows of people, goods, 
or communications” (Nyusten 1968, 39)40. Using Nyusten’s three features of a spatial point of 
view within an abstract space, it becomes possible to study and describe phenomena using the 
spatial framework.   
An interesting and rather detailed description of the spaces associated with transport 
geography was written by Kamil Skrbek, a Czechoslovak scholar, in the 1970s.  Skrbek (1977) 
identified several different types of spaces associated with transportation and relevant to 
transportation geography.  What follows is an attempt to translate these terms from the original 
Czech, and describe Srkbek’s meaning.  A space of movement (prostor pobyhu) denotes an area 
over which people can move with a given means of transportation.  Such a space can be located 
anywhere on the globe, even in areas considered remote and with little human traffic.  A space of 
transportation (dopravní prostor), on the other hand, refers to an area that witnesses frequent 
human traffic by a dependable and dedicated mode of transportation.  A structural transportation 
space (strukturální dopravní prostor)is a more specific kind of ‘space of transportation’, being 
defined by a single mode of transportation, or a combination of modes that form a single 
transportation network in a given area.  Skrbek sought to draw a careful distinction between 
generic “transportation spaces” and so-called areas of transportation (dopravní oblastí).  It can 
be inferred that an ‘area of transportation’ is an analytical tool that should be used to delineate 
the geographical extent of specific a location within a given transportation case study.  A 
transportation corridor (zone) (dopravní pásmo (zóna)) is a deliberately organized and managed 
linear space with dense and frequent traffic.  The movement of people and goods sometimes 
must be channeled through transportation gateways (dopravní brany), as these locations afford 
access to a desired destination. Finally, transportation landscapes (dopravní krajiny) exist, 
wherein “transportation equipment there is accumulated so much that it determines the 
physiognomy of the whole landscape, and are the crucial and defining element in its 
creation."  In more concrete terms, the transportation infrastructure, vehicles, and facilities are 
found in such density in a given location as to be the predominant features of the landscape.  
Large rail yards and port facilities would be examples of such transportation landscapes.  These 
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 For a more detailed treatment of spatial theory, see Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human 
Geography since 1945, Johnston (2004, 116).. 
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spaces described by Skrbek have some value insofar as they provoke thought about the shape of 
transportation on the surface of the earth.  Although they are a coherent set of descriptors for 
spaces associated with transportation, they are certainly not the most commonly held notions in 
the United States.  A more familiar understanding of the spatial characteristics of transportation 
follows below. 
Fixed infrastructure, particularly sidewalks, roads, rail, and waterways constitute linear 
spaces.  Nearly all of the necessary supporting services (such as refueling), are found 
immediately adjacent to these linear transportation spaces.  The immediate spaces of these types 
of infrastructure most readily define them.  A second spatial property held by all transportation 
infrastructure is that it is highly nodal.  Airports, seaports, rail and highway junctions, even 
highway interchanges and street intersections are all examples of nodes within a larger 
transportation network.  A mental image can be formed of lines connected to nodal points in an 
elaborate web.  At this point we can begin to discuss the spaces of transportation networks, 
which are constituted by linear and nodal spaces of transportation infrastructure but then begin to 
take on additional properties.  Networks encompass a given geographic expanse. Note that it is 
not meant that they “surround” an entire geographic expanse.  The areas lying between the linear 
infrastructure connected by nodes often becomes “covered” by the network, though not all points 
within that area have equal access.  Some types of infrastructure are given precedence over 
others, even within the same category, i.e. highways vs. roads.  Highways and rail will see the 
heaviest traffic and as such will service a larger area.  Smaller roads will then branch off into the 
spaces in between the major trunk roads and thereby increase the density of the transportation 
network.   
The spatial reach of transportation infrastructure describes the extent of its spatial impacts.  
These impacts may fall into many different categories simultaneously, including economic, 
political, and social.  The spatial reach of transportation infrastructure is not uniform across all 
modes, or even across the same modes of transportation in all locations.  Areas adjacent to 
highways, for example, may receive little direct benefit from the presence of the highway owing 
to the “tunnel effect."  The tunnel effect can be most often observed in rural locations, where 
despite the presence of supporting services such as gas stations, restaurants, and even overnight 
accommodations, most traffic simply passes through the location without ever leaving the 
highway.  However, even if the tunnel effect can be observed in these rural areas, these same 
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areas remain connected to the overall network of major transportation corridors.   Large 
infrastructure projects have played an unmistakable role in effectively unifying spatially 
disparate locations across a given territory, providing greater economic, political, and social 
cohesion.  Examples include the Trans-Continental Railroad and Interstate Highway System in 
the USA, construction of the Malaysian expressway (see Williamson 2003), the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad in Russia, and recently the newly constructed railroad connecting Alice Springs in the 
Australian interior to the northern port of Darwin (see Bishop 2002).  The spatial impacts of 
transportation discussed in the preceding paragraphs form the basis of transportation geography, 
which will be discussed in more concrete terms below. 
 
3.2.2 General Economic Characteristics of Transport Geography 
There seems to be near universal agreement that transportation has a very strong link with 
economic activity.  Proponents of transportation infrastructure projects often justify their support 
by invoking the economic benefit that should “surely” follow.  While it is undeniable that 
transportation and economic activity are linked, but this does not necessarily point to a causal 
relationship where the simple provision of infrastructure will create rapid economic growth 
(Black 2001).  Banister and Berechman’s extended treatment of the relationship between 
investment in transportation and economic growth in their book, Transport Investment and 
Economic Development (2000) finds no universal and direct relationship between transportation 
and economic development, in agreement with Black’s observation.  However, where conditions 
allow, the building of new transportation infrastructure can have a profound impact on the 
economic and social development of a given area.  Rydzkowski (2009) sees transportation as 
performing three supporting functions for the economic system.  These include: 1) providing 
transport services to meet transport needs, 2) creating conditions conducive to economic activity, 
stimulating the economy etc… and thereby increasing the need for production, 3) acting as a 
means of integration for state and society (pg. 2).  MacKinnon, Pirie, and Gather (2008) 
emphasize the importance of transportation infrastructure for developing economies while at the 
same time noting the smaller influence of new infrastructure on advanced economies.   
For many Polish observers, the link between transport and economic growth is seen as so critical 
that it is nearly impossible to deny the need of the national roads policy program currently in 
place in Poland.  Komornicki (2012) asserts…  
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The need for the construction of new roads, the modernization of rail lines, and 
the opening of airports is self-evident.  The scale of delays related to 
infrastructure in Poland is so large that it is difficult for us to question the 
significance of the size of the proposed investments.  Indeed, the deficiencies 
within the transportation network became a barrier to economic development in 
the first decade of this century
41
 (pg. 23). 
 
Rydzkowski (2009) makes the case for this view in more specific terms, writing: 
 It can be concluded that, due to transport, the growing national economy is 
confronting an ever larger task, resulting from the increasing of production 
volume and the increasing level of specialization and cooperation in production. 
On the other hand, without the development of transport, a further increase in 
production and an increase in the social division of labor could not occur. These 
facts point to the reflexive nature of the relationship between transport and its 
surroundings. This interdependent relationship is very important because placing 
the transport development at a lower level in the hierarchy of the economic 
objectives, the non-recognition of the principle which holds that transport should 
outpace growth in other economic sectors, and thereby attributing to transport 
secondary characteristics in relation to the needs of other economic sectors, and 
finally ignoring the creative role of transport in economic growth process, can 
cause deep under-investment in transport. As a result, transportation can become a 
barrier that hinders economic growth  (pg. 3). 
 
These sentiments are representative of the view commonly held throughout academic and policy-
making circles in Poland.  For Poland, it is necessary to build new transportation infrastructure, 
especially highway infrastructure, in order to secure a better economic future and even to secure 
its place in an economically integrated Europe.   
 
3.2.3 Social Characteristics of Transport Geography 
Although transportation geography has traditionally been strongly associated with 
economic geography, there is a growing literature on the social implications of transportation 
(see Taylor 1980a and 1980b, Knowles 1993, Knowles 1994, Hanson and Giuliano 2004, 
Stevens 2004, Sheller and Urry 2006, Urry 2007, Hanson and Kwan 2008, Knowles et al. 2008, 
Adey 2010).  Zbigniew Taylor (1980a and 1980b), a professor at the Institute of Geography and 
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 Translated from the original Polish text, “Potrzeby budowy nowych dróg, modernizacji linii kolejowych, 
otwierania lotnisk wydają się oczywiste.  Skala opóźnień infrastrukturalnych w Polsce jest tak duża, że trudno nam 
kwestionować znaczenie większości postulowanych inwestycji.  Rzeczywiście braki w sieciach transportowych stały 
się barierą dla rozwoju gospodarczego pierwszej dekady obecnego wieku.” 
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Spatial Organization of the Polish Academy of Sciences,  has termed this study of transportation 
in a social context as social transportation geography, a useful categorical distinction, albeit one 
that never caught on under that name.  Transportation enables and facilitates human mobility.  
But as we will see, mobility is much more than the study of how people travel between two 
points.  The focus shifts to people instead of structures. Thus the human element in 
transportation geography leads us into the study of mobilities, a new and dynamic body of 
literature. 
Understanding the social implications of transportation involves the elaboration of the 
definition of transportation beyond economic activity.  Inherent in transportation are the concepts 
of access and mobility. Holl (2007) broadly describes access as “the extent to which spatial 
separation can be overcome."  Access in transportation geography has two major meanings: the 
first is access to a destination, and the second is access to the infrastructure (for example a 
highway or rail line) that leads to a destination.  This second meaning is tied to Hanson’s 
observation on the access possessed by people (Hanson and Giuliano 2004, 5), which could be 
likened to personal mobility over space.  Much effort has been devoted to the deconstruction of 
mobility as a concept, including by Sheller and Urry (2006), Urry (2007), and Adey (2010).  
Their work highlights the vital significance of mobility for personal well-being and social life.  
The work of Adey, Sheller, and Urry has served as the foundation of the mobilities studies 
paradigm since its inception in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
3.3 Mobilities Literature and the Politics of Mobility 
The importance of mobility as an influential factor in the spatial organization of society is 
no longer in doubt. The unique perspective of mobilities-related phenomena in accounting for 
societal processes has led to the establishment of a new paradigm within academia, the mobilities 
paradigm.  The mobility of people and goods are underpinned by the existence of advanced 
systems and networks of transportation infrastructure that enable mobility.  Transportation 
geography largely concerns itself with the structures and institutions that enable movement of 
people and goods. This movement is known as mobility. The idea of mobility can be inclusive of 
so many different processes that Adey (2006) voiced concern that the concept would lose its 
value as an analytical tool unless a more restrictive definition was produced.  That challenge still 
remains, but for the purposes of this paper, we will focus on the governance of mobility and limit 
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the content of the term mobility mostly to the idea of freedom of movement. The politics of 
mobility as described by Adey (2010) functions as a broad framework in which to examine the 
actions of government in formulating transportation policy that can affect access and the degree 
to which people can be. The “politics” implies a debate in which views representing group or 
personal interests are voiced and where these views become the policy of the government.  The 
implementation of policy is not emphasized as important in its own right by Adey.  Many of the 
functions of government fall outside of direct policy formulation and instead take the form of 
government administration.  Government administration is the means through which social 
activities are governed by the state. For the purposes of this study, governance
42
 shapes the 
spatial impacts of infrastructure as well as human mobility through policy formulation and 
implementation.  
Politics in this context refers to any actor which can “contest, deliberate and oppose” 
(Adey 2010) or otherwise regulate. The politics associated with mobility demonstrate the 
centrality of mobility in social life.  Adey (2010) examined the role of politics in mobility in 
depth, devoting an entire lengthy chapter to it in his larger study Mobility.  The content of this 
chapter is thought-provoking and worth elaboration.  I will begin with a passage from the 
introduction of the chapter: 
Political engagement, discussion, participation and decision making, set and 
define the roads we drive on and the laws we must abide by.  At the same time, 
politics means that the possibility of particular roads and laws we abide by, or the 
kind of car we might choose to drive, may be contested and opposed. It is politics 
that makes car travel possible while it also regulates it, shape it, and may work to 
halt or change it.  Moreover, mobility provides a space for a politics and renders 
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 Governance has often had a very broad and inclusive definition, in that it involves discouraging or encouraging, 
preventing or facilitating, and punishing or rewarding human actions.  The definition has been equally inclusive of 
those who could wield governance, everyone from politicians and government officials to businesses and people.   It 
is further complicated in democratic societies as the state, which governs in the name of and is accountable to a 
sovereign citizenry, nevertheless governs the very same citizenry (as well as others within its territory) to whom it is 
ultimately responsible.   It is implied in that democratically elected governments may act contrary to the wishes of 
the electorate and/or may not even act in their interests.  For the purposes of this paper, however, governance is 
attached to the government.  Beyond the sometimes rancorous ordeal of deliberating and creating legislation, 
government also implements the said legislation through rules and regulations devised by the government 
administration.  The government administration is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the government.  The 
routine administration of transportation infrastructure and by extension human mobility on the part of the 
government could well be argued to be more consequential a thick description of the politics of mobility than 
politicians crafting legislation. 
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our ability to be political by shaping one’s capacity to contest, deliberate and 
oppose (Adey, 2010, 84). 
 
The dense passage above highlights many ways in which politics can influence mobility while 
also stating that mobility constitutes an arena in which politics can be played out. Furthermore, it 
shows that mobility enables people to engage in politics.   The key focus of the passage is on the 
interaction between politics and mobility.  One can simultaneously create and be otherwise 
maintained or influenced by the other.  
Although Adey does not specifically mention regulation, it is nonetheless obvious that regulation 
is a fundamental part of the politics of mobility.  In the absence of regulation by government 
authority there would not be much to contest.  That being said, Adey seeks an inclusive 
definition of the actors involved in the politics of mobility, a definition moving beyond 
traditional conceptions of power relations: 
To move is to be political.  Mobilities are underscored by political decision 
making and ideological meanings that arranged mobility and the possibility of 
mobility – motility – in particular ways to relations of society and power.  
Understood conceptually, mobility is placed within a complex geometry of 
influence as it shapes and forces and is shaped and forced by other actors and 
constraints.  A politics of mobility thus demands an attentiveness to wider 
ideological assumptions about mobility as a social object and who or what should 
have access to it.  It compels analysis of those who are cast in particular and 
unequal differential and hierarchical relations to mobility….some may be in 
charge of mobility, while others are left behind or swept along by it. 
 
The binaries of domination and resistance hold little water in this analysis as 
relations of power and control are enacted in much more plural and complex ways.  
Understanding mobility within the geometries of power it is formed through and 
comes to effect allows us to begin to visualize the often convoluted political 
relations it is involved in.  From the simple access to services and the enabling of 
one’s rights as a citizen, to the complicated blurring of belonging by post-
nationals...the politics of mobility is clearly multifaceted and incredibly 
contingent (Adey 2010, 131). 
 
As can be seen in the passage above, Adey claims that there are a multitude of potential actors in 
the politics of mobility, some of whom may not be obvious.  There are actors in society who will 
debate the question of who can access what.  These actors could as easily be those with powerful 
industrial interests, politicians, and government officials as they could be parents deciding where 
their children can go and not go.  It is entirely dependent on the context of the situation in which 
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these actors find themselves as well as what kind of mobility (or access) is being discussed.  
However, in the case of the relatively powerful actors deciding who can have access to a given 
resource, it is natural to inquire as to who might possibly be disadvantaged by elite decision 
making. This is where the discussion of the politics of mobility raises issues of social justice.   
The theme of social justice as a central element of the politics of mobility is 
commonplace in the mobilities literature as well as transportation geography. There is a logic to 
this other than current academic fashion: disadvantaged groups often are affected by the 
decisions made by other actors contesting policies among themselves. Whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, the disadvantaged are often negatively affected.  However, as we begin to make 
the transition from politics of mobility to a governance of mobility in this paper, it must be 
realized that framing the analysis of the governance of mobility through highway programs in 
Poland will likely not be a useful approach (more about this later).  It seems that mobilities 
research focusing on social justice often conflates every actor other than the disadvantaged, with 
the possible exception of the researchers themselves.  To be sure, there are certainly 
disadvantaged groups in society, but the conflation of nearly all the other actors in a debate 
engaging in the politics of mobility would be too simplistic.  Adey cautioned against seeing too 
much explanatory power being attributed to the “binaries of domination and resistance”, because 
“power” is “enacted in much more plural and complex ways” within the mobilities paradigm.  
Adey’s statement could be taken to mean that we should be wary of viewing all power as being 
concentrated in the hands of the state specifically, but it could also be seen as cautioning against 
conflating actors into one monolithic category for the sake of convenience when studying the 
relationship of these various actors to the disadvantaged.  The actors emphasized in much of the 
mobilities literature tend to be of a smaller scale than a whole government.  They are more often 
than not people who must negotiate their environment and seek to participate in the politics of 
mobility in order to realize their (often legitimate) self-interests.  This aspect of the literature 
offers a broad range of possibilities for the directions of future research.  The danger in this is 
that research may ignore or significantly downplay the role of the state in creating and shaping 
human mobility.   
The influence of government on the mobility of people, goods, and even diseases (see 
Law 2006) has been central in the work of such scholars as Raje (2007), Kale and Little (2007), 
Burrel (2008), and Martin (2010).  These analyses provide evidence for the manifestation of 
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government control over various mobilities. Cresswell (2006) writes that flows are bounded by 
governance and thus created.  That is, movement of a mass indeterminately over an expanse 
must be constrained into movement along a given path so that a proper flow is created.  Giving 
order to movement becomes the task of government administration, in which there can be many 
actors, both state and non-state.  Despite the multitude of actors involved, governance remains 
anchored by government, as no other entity is capable of regulating the movement of people and 
goods on such a comprehensive basis.   
 
3.4 Background on Transport and Mobilities in Poland and ECE 
Beyond a purely local level, mobility and access at regional, national and international 
levels are seen as indispensable to continued economic and social prosperity in Europe.  The 
European Union has promoted personal access and mobility through policy as well as 
coordinated infrastructure projects that seek to connect the continent in a Trans-European 
Network of transportation corridors as well as communication linkages (see Banister et al. 2000, 
Baur 2004, and Stevens 2004).  Inclusion in these linkages is a key goal of countries in East-
Central Europe (ECE) as they emerge from a difficult transition away from central economic 
planning and authoritarianism to market economies and democracy.  For the countries of ECE, 
improving domestic transportation infrastructures has been an important goal during the 
transition, although one that remains elusive.  Decades of central-planning and impractical 
allocation of resources (from a market standpoint) have not been kind to the creation of 
transportation networks that could be on par with those of the developed West.  Historically, 
Poland has relied heavily on rail transport for facilitating the mobility of people and goods.  Rail 
was heavily favored by communist authorities after their rise to power in 1947 as it was both a 
more collective form of transportation and more efficient than private passenger cars. Many 
roads were built in Poland in what are the same general corridors as the planned network of 
Motorways and Expressways in contemporary Poland (see Figure 3.1).  However, these roads 
were often of poor quality and not suitable for heavy traffic.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
there was awareness among experts that some type of modern network of highways should be 
built, but there was neither the funding nor the political will to initiate a construction program.   
The 1970s saw some construction on short segments of roadways capable of handling 
high-speed traffic.  The most famous of which was the “Gierkówka”, named after its patron, First 
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Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Edward Gierek.  The “Gierkówka” was a highway 
from Warsaw to Katowice that was completed in 1976. Although building a highway from 
Warsaw to Katowice was indeed an achievement, it was not built to the same standards as 
modern highways.  Lack of funding for maintenance in the 1980s as a result of the economic 
crisis led to the road being in a state of disrepair after the transition began in 1989.  The 1980s 
did not witness a great deal of progress in building new highways.  The economic crisis made 
major projects infeasible and the government’s attention was focused elsewhere.  However, a 
number of studies were conducted which more clearly defined what the government believed a 
national network should look like.  In 1985, the government of Zbigniew Messner endorsed a 
plan that would have built a network very similar to the network currently under construction.  A 
few segments from Kraków to Katowice, Wrocáw towards Legnica, between Konin and Poznań, 
and a bypass around Piotryków Trybunalski were built but ultimately plans were suspended as 
the political situation deteriorated. 
The plethora of problems facing Poland in the transport sector after 1989 could only be 
addressed slowly. Hall (1993) discusses the transportation issues facing governments in ECE at 
length, from the early stages of the transition before many modernization projects in the region 
could begin, and later in (2010) after many projects had been completed. Various EU and 
national reports also detail the difficulties faced by transition countries as they strove to improve 
their dilapidated transportation networks.  The challenges faced by Poland in modernizing its 
transportation infrastructure have been detailed by Taylor (1993), Lijewski (1994), Kormonicki 
(1995), Taylor (1998), Judge (2000), Judge, Werpachowski, and Wishardt (2004), Taylor (2004), 
and Bański (2010). Francis Harvey (2009) examined reform in the cadastral laws of Poland, 
something with great bearing on the government’s ability to purchase land needed for 
transportation infrastructure.  
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3.4.1 Policy Actors and Background 
This section will more closely examine the administrative actors who are involved in the 
national highway policy-making process.  It will include background information in the form of 
tables as well as organizational descriptions of the relevant departments within these government 
bodies that are directly involved in the process of managing these highway programs. It serves as 
a reference point for the later analyses in Chapters 5 through 8. 
The identification of the major policy actors who contribute towards the policy capacity 
of the Polish government in the area of infrastructure policy concerning expressways and 
motorways is relatively straightforward.  Aside from politicians, the other major actors are the 
government administrative bodies that are connected to the realization of the current system.  
The Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy (MTBiGM) and its subordinate 
the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA) are the institutional 
actors who are dedicated to the realization and maintenance of the future system.  The Ministry 
of Regional Development (MRR) is also a key institutional actor as it coordinates the spatial 
policies of which the motorway infrastructure policy is a part, as well as managing the EU funds 
which in part pay for this large undertaking.  However, government ministries and government 
agencies are very large entities and not all of the organizational components belonging to them 
are charged with policy development or contribution towards policy development.  This section 
will examine the organizational units within these government bodies that enable them to 
contribute towards governmental policy capacity in this policy area in Poland. 
The most recent manifestation of the government ministry holding the transport portfolio 
(including expressways and motorways) is the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy (for a reference to previous ministries, as well as ministers holding the 
transport portfolio since 1989, please see Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below).  The MTBiGM is a very 
large ministry with a broad range of responsibilities across various modes of transportation as 
well as in monitoring the commercial building construction practices around the country.  The 
Ministry must regulate railways, aviation, and maritime traffic in addition to road traffic. Road 
traffic must further be differentiated into general roads and high-speed roads (expressways, 
motorways).  As is apparent, not all of the departments and bureaus of the MTBiGM are 
particularly relevant to a discussion on expressways and motorways; thus, what follows below is 
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a discussion on the various units of the MTBiGM that do contribute quite directly to high-speed 
national roads policy or are otherwise vital to it.  
 
Year 
Created 
Year 
Liquidated 
Polish Name English Translation 
1919 1924 Ministerstwo Kolei Żelaznych Ministry of Railways 
1924 1926 Ministerstwo Kolei    Ministry of Railways 
1926 1939 Ministerstwo Komunikacji Ministry of Communications 
1944 1944 Resort Komunikacji, Poczt i Telegrafów Department of Communication, Post, and 
Telegraphs 
1944 1945 Resort Komunikacji  Department of Communications 
1945 1951 Ministerstwo Komunikacji Ministry of Communications 
1951 1957 Ministerstwo Kolei Ministry of Railways 
1957 1957 Ministerstwo Transportu Drogowego i 
Lotniczego 
Ministry of Road and Air Transport 
1957 1958 Ministerstwo Łączności Ministry of Communications 
1957 1987 Ministerstwo Komunikacji Ministry of Communications 
1987 1989 Ministerstwo Transportu, Żeglugi i 
Łączności 
Ministry of Transport, Maritime Shipping, 
and Communications 
1989 2001 Ministerstwo Transportu i Gospodarki 
Morskiej 
Ministry of Transport and Maritime 
Economy 
2001 2005 Ministerstwo Infrastruktury Ministry of Infrastructure 
2005 2006 Ministerstwo Transportu i Budownictwa Ministry of Transport and Construction 
2006 2007 Ministerstwo Transportu Ministry of Transport 
2007 2011 Ministerstwo Infrastruktury Ministry of Infrastructure 
2011 2013 Ministerstwo Transportu, Budownictwa i 
Gospodarki Morskiej 
Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy 
2013 Present Ministerswo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Development 
 
Table 3.1: Chronology of Ministries Possessing Transport Portfolio. 
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Name of Ministry Minister Party Beginning 
Date 
End Date 
Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy Wielądek, 
Franciszek 
PZPR, 
SdRP 
December 20, 
1989 
July 6, 1990 
Waligórski, 
Ewaryst 
 July 6, 1990 June 5, 1992 
Jaworski, 
Zbigniew 
ZChN June 11, 1992 October 26, 
1993 
Liberadzki, 
Bogusław 
SLD October 26, 
1993 
October 31, 
1997 
Morawski, 
Eugeniusz 
UW October 31, 
1997 
December 
8, 1998 
Syryjczyk, 
Tadeusz 
UW June 20, 1998 June 12, 
2000 
Widzyk, Jerzy AWS June 12, 2000  October 12, 
2001 
Ministry of Infrastructure Pol, Marek UP October 19, 
2001 
May 4, 2004 
Opawski, 
Krzysztof 
 May 2, 2004 October 31, 
2005 
Ministry of Transport and Construction Polaczek, Jerzy PiS October 31, 
2005 
May 5, 2006 
Ministry of Transport Polaczek, Jerzy PiS May 5, 2006 September 
7, 2007 
Polaczek, Jerzy PiS September 12, 
2007 
November 
16, 2007 
Ministry of Infrastructure Grabarczyk, 
Cezary 
PO November 16, 
2007 
November 
7, 2011 
Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy 
Nowak, 
Sławomir 
PO November 18, 
2011 
November 
27, 2013 
 
Table 3.2: Chronology of Ministers Possessing Transport Portfolio. 
 
3.4.1.1 Relevant Departments and Units 
There is an Undersecretary of State responsible for two departments, the Department of 
EU Funds and the Department of Budget and Finances. It should be remembered that the 
Undersecretary of State is an appointed position and that the department heads are nominated 
civil servants, that is, career government officials.  The Department of EU Funds is responsible 
for most matters pertaining to the use of European cohesion funds, including the funds that the 
European Union allocates towards high-speed road construction.  This department plays a very 
important role in coordinating the efforts of the Polish government with the European 
Commission in this policy area. In the past it has been the primary coordinator of EU assistance 
programs that have contributed towards the realization of a new expressway and motorway 
network.  This department strives to ensure that all documentation and programs meet the 
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stringent EU criteria.  The Department of Budget and Finances plays a very important role in the 
keeping of accounts related to the usage of EU funds. This department handles nearly all 
financial transactions related to proposed projects and those currently being implemented. 
A second Undersecretary of State oversees the Department of Transportation Policy and 
International Cooperation and the Legal – Legislative Department.  The Department of 
Transportation Policy and International Cooperation develops the overall transportation policy of 
the MTBiGM, of which national roads and motorways policy is a central part.  This department 
engages in a great deal of direct cooperation with European bodies that are involved with the EU 
cohesion policy. It could be said that this department conducts the ministry’s external relations 
with the European Union.  
The Legal – Legislative Department oversees the legal aspects of the implementation of 
the motorway policy. It renders legal advice to the minister, represents the ministry in courts of 
law, and ensures that EU regulations are efficiently adopted into Polish law by recommending 
changes to the Polish parliament. In view of the fact that the actions of Polish ministries have 
their basis in law, it is an indispensable element of policy capacity that a Department exists that 
can recommend changes to the basic law governing a ministry based on  accumulated experience 
over time in response to changing circumstances. 
The Director-General of the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy 
is the highest-ranking civil servant within the ministry. The Director-General is nominated to his 
position although he or she must come from a pool of qualified civil servants.  The Office of the 
Director-General naturally assists the director general in the execution of his tasks. The Budget 
and Administration Bureau oversees the internal finances of the ministry. The Bureau for Crisis 
Management and Protection of Classified Data performs an essential function in ensuring the 
protection of all types of data employed by the ministry in the performance of the range of its 
responsibilities. Although these offices and bureaus under the Director General perform purely 
administrative tasks, these are nonetheless essential for the proper functioning of those 
departments and offices that are directly involved in the policy process concerning expressways 
and motorways. It is difficult to overstate their importance, certainly for the employees of the 
ministry. 
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Under Secretary of State "A"
43
 
MTBiGM 
Under Secretary of State "B" 
MTBiGM 
Director General of MTBiGM 
Department of EU Funds Department of Transport Policy 
and International Cooperation 
Office of the Director General 
Department of Budget and 
Finances 
Legal-Legislative Department Budget and Administration Bureau 
  Bureau for Crisis Management and 
Protection of Classified Data 
 
 Table 3.3: Pertinent Departments and Bureaus of MTBiGM 
 
In Poland, a government minister is usually, although not necessarily, a member of parliament. 
Any minister is classified as a political appointment and serves at the pleasure of the Prime 
Minister.  The minister stands at the head of the political leadership in a ministry, which 
ultimately decides on policy and manages the activities of the ministry.  A minister is assisted by 
a political cabinet (residing outside of the ministerial hierarchy), which helps the minister 
develop policies compatible with the governing coalition’s political program. This cabinet is 
staffed by political appointments who are employed for the length of the minister’s tenure in the 
ministry.  The office of the minister is staffed by civil servants who help coordinate the 
immediate tasks of the minister.   A minister may also directly supervise ministerial departments, 
without the mediation of a secretary of state, undersecretary of state, or director-general (see 
Table 3.4). 
 
Minister of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy 
 
Secretary of State MTBiGM 
Political Cabinet of the Minister Department of Roads and Motorways 
Office of the Minister General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways 
Department of Control Chief  Inspectorate of Road Transport 
 
Table 3.4: Relevant Units in MTBiGM 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Please note that the various undersecretaries of state are not designated with an “A”, “B”, or “C” etc…; this is 
merely being used as a means of clear differentiation. 
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3.4.1.2 Units Responsible Directly to the Minister 
Government ministries in Poland are organized along largely classical Weberian lines, in 
so far as they are hierarchical and place a strong emphasis on vertical accountability to the 
Minister, who is then responsible to the Prime Minister and Parliament for the operation of the 
ministry.  The Minister of Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy is assisted by the 
Political Cabinet of the Minister.  The Political Cabinet seeks to manage the political 
implications of the minister’s policy area. This includes a supervisory role in the drafting of 
policy documents, which can involve a political evaluation of the texts.  Importantly, the cabinet 
“keeps in touch with political parties in [Poland] and abroad, and trade union and opinion-
forming circles” (Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy 2011).  The 
importance of this office within the MTBiGM to its policy capacity is immediately apparent as it 
acts as the intermediary between the expertise of the career civil servants specialized in 
transportation-related fields who can help develop policy, and the “political sphere” of activity 
within the Polish government.  In fact, this office also can serve as a link from the public 
administration and closely attached policy capacity to the realm of political capacity, a 
discussion that must wait for a subsequent chapter. 
The Office of the Minister is staffed by civil servants who work to organize and manage 
the minister’s official activities and communications with other government bodies, including the 
Parliament and the Prime Minister’s Office, other ministries, international bodies such as the EU, 
etc. This office also manages the minister’s activities with officials from within the ministry 
(Secretary of State, Undersecretaries of State, Director-General, and the heads of the various 
departments or subordinates entities (e.g. GDDKiA).  This office thus has a powerful role in 
agenda setting and policy coordination. 
The Department of Control is responsible directly to the Minister.  This department 
supervises all units within the ministry.  It conducts internal audits and cooperates with external 
audits of the ministry.  Importantly, it reviews the progress of major construction projects funded 
from both the state budget and the EU. 
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3.4.1.3 Units Directly Responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy. 
The Secretary of State is a political appointment made by the Prime Minister on the 
advice of the Minister of Transport.  The Secretary of State is the highest ranking official within 
the Ministry, in essence the second-in-charge. In an arrangement that clearly demonstrates the 
present Polish government’s policy priorities, the Secretary of State of MTBiGM directly 
oversees the two units most closely tied to the current expressway and motorway program, the 
Department of Roads and Motorways, and the General Directorate of National Roads and 
Motorways (GDDKiA).  The Secretary of State also oversees the Chief Inspectorate of Road 
Traffic (Polish acronym: GITD) (see Table 3.4), which currently has a less significant role in this 
policy area. Because the GDDKiA and the departments comprising it, will be discussed in detail 
in the next section, here a short description will be made of the Department of Roads and 
Motorways. 
The Department of Roads and Motorways is largely responsible for creating national 
policies relating to the emerging network of expressways and motorways.  Additionally, it 
supervises the GDDKiA on behalf of the Minister.  Section 4 of the description given on the 
Ministry’s website offers a very detailed and clear understanding of this department’s policy-
related responsibilities. 
These prescribed duties definitively place this department at the center of the national 
roads and motorway policy in Poland.  Although it is not surprising that it would be in such a 
position (being the department responsible for such roads within the nation’s transportation 
ministry), it is worth taking a few lines to reflect about what attributes make this department so 
central to this policy area. That it designs long-term policies and programs relating to the 
ongoing construction of an as-yet incomplete national expressway and motorway network, and 
cooperates with the sources of funding these projects, including all three major sources: the state 
budget, EU Cohesion Funds, and other financial institutions that provide loans for public-private 
partnerships, clearly demonstrates the absolute importance of this department in the policy 
process.  The work of this office is essential to creating government capacity in the area of 
highway and expressway policy. 
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3.4.2 General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways 
The GDDKiA is an agency subordinate to the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy which is chiefly responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of 
the emerging national network of highways.  The General Director is named by the Prime 
Minister on the advice of the minister of transport.  The General Director should be a nominated 
civil servant, coming from the pool of civil servants having attended courses at the National 
School for Public Administration.  The General Director is represented by three deputy directors, 
and he also oversees the Director-General, who oversees most of the administrative tasks of the 
General Directorate.  The only departments with an explicit policy role include the Department 
of the Environment and the Department of Investment Preparation.  The Department of the EU 
Projects and Monitoring, the Department of Planning, and the Department of Public-Private 
Partnerships have significant implied roles in the broader policy process. In interviews conducted 
with civil servants in the General Directorate, it was clearly stated that they felt that they were 
implementers and not policymakers.    However, it would be hard to imagine that the views and 
experiences of the civil servants of the General Directorate would be ignored in any policy 
review or policy formulation process within the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy as the GDDKiA has a reputation for being staffed by skilled technocrats. 
 
Government Body Years Active 
General Directorate for Public Roads 1986-2002 
Agency for the Construction of Motorways Ads. BA 1993-1994 
Autostrady Polskie S.A.  1993-1993 
Agency for the Construction of Motorways (ABA) 1994-1994 
Rady do spraw Autostrad 1994-Present 
Agencja Budowy i Eksploatacji Autostrad (ABiEA) 1994-2002 
General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways  (GDDKiA) 2002-Present 
 
Table 3.5:  Chronology of Specialized Government Entities Dealing with Highway Transportation Policy 
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General Director 
 
Deputy Director Deputy Director  Director- General of 
the Office 
Deputy Director  
Department of 
Planning 
Department of 
Road and Bridge 
Management 
Bureau of 
Organization and 
Administration 
Department of 
Investment 
Preparation 
Office of the General 
Director 
Department of EU 
Projects and 
Monitoring 
Department of 
Traffic 
Management 
Bureau of Internal 
Control 
Department of 
Tender Procedures 
Bureau of Economy 
and Finances 
Department of 
Public-Private 
Partnerships 
Department of 
Crisis 
Management and 
Defensive 
Preparations 
Office for Safety and 
Workplace Hygiene 
Department of 
Investment 
Realization 
Department of the 
Environment 
  Office for Road 
Safety Audit 
Department of 
Technology 
Legal Bureau 
   Department of 
Technology 
Bureau of Internal 
Audits 
   Department of 
Information and 
Informatics 
Office of the 
Protection of 
Classified Information 
    Office for Quality 
Management Systems 
    Administrator of 
Information Security 
 
Table 3.6:  Departments and Bureaus of GDDKiA 
 
3.4.3 The Ministry of Regional Development 
The Ministry of Regional Development was created by law in 2005 as a result of a 
requirement from the European Union that a government ministry exist that can coordinate the 
use of EU funds. The ministry has a similar structure to all other Polish ministries, including the 
presence of the minister Secretary of State, several undersecretaries of state, and a director 
general in charge of the ministry's day-to-day business. The Minister of Regional Development 
is served by the Political Cabinet of the Ministry Regional Development and the Office of the 
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Minister. As in the case of the ministry of transport, the political cabinet is comprised of those 
political advisers who serve at the pleasure of the minister. The office of the minister has the 
same agenda setting and activity-coordinating functions as are described in the case of the Office 
of the Minister of Transport. The Minister of Regional Development also directly oversees the 
Center for European Projects, which plays an important role in public awareness of the beneficial 
assistance funds provided by EU membership.   
The Secretary of State for Regional Development oversees several departments that could 
be important in the national roads and motorway policy process.  These include the Department 
of Infrastructure Programs Coordination, the Department of Infrastructure Program Support, and 
the Department of Public-Private Partnerships.  
 
Minister of Regional Development Secretary of State for Regional Development 
Political Cabinet of the Minister of Regional 
Development 
Department of Infrastructure Programs Coordination 
Office of the Minister Department of Infrastructure Programs Support 
Center for European Projects Department of Public-Private Partnerships 
 Department of Information, Promotion, and Training 
 Department of Territorial Cooperation 
 
Table 3.7:  Pertinent Units in MRR 
 
One Undersecretary of State oversees the Department for Coordination of Regional 
Programs and Digitalization, as well as a Department of European Cohesion Funds. The second 
Undersecretary of State oversees the Department of the European Union and International 
Cooperation.  A third Undersecretary of State oversees the Department of Structural Policy 
Coordination, Department of Coordination of the Implementation of European Union Funds, the 
Department of Spatial Policy, and the Department of Legal Affairs.  The Director-General sees 
to the day-to-day business of the ministry. The Director-General of the MRR directly supervises 
the Office of the Director-General, the Department of Economics and Finance, the Department 
of Institutional Certification, the Administrative Office, the Department of Informatics and the 
Office of Human Resources Management.  
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 Having discussed the organizational descriptions of the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR, 
we can now turn our attention to the national roads and related policies that they implement.  The 
current plan of the future network of motorways and expressways will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
3.5 Progress towards a Planned Motorway Network in Poland 
 Although there have been a number of documents recommending the extent of the 
national network of motorways and expressways in Poland over the years, it was only in the mid-
1990s that more concrete plans for such a network were developed.  It was in 2004 that the 
network now taking shape was determined (see Figure 3.1).  Three main corridors traversing the 
entirety of Poland were designated for the construction of motorways (the highest technical 
standard of roadway as defined by the Polish government).  These corridors include two east-
west routes, the Autostrada A2 and the Autostrada A4, as well as one north-south route known as 
the Autostrada A1. The route of the Autostrada A2 begins at the border crossing with Germany 
in Świecko, Poland across the Oder River from Frankfurt an der Oder.  It continues eastwards 
towards the major city of Poznań, then on to Łódź, Warsaw, and then to the border with Belarus.  
It is the more northerly of the two east-west motorways (autostrady).  The route of the A4 begins 
at the German border in the twin cities of Zgorzelec, Poland and Görlitz, Germany. It runs first to 
Legnica, then to the major city of Wrocław, continuing on to the vicinity of the industrial city of 
Katowice, then to Kraków, Rzeszów, and finally the border with Ukraine.  This route is heavily 
travelled by commercial traffic connected with heavy industry in southern Poland. The route of 
the Autostrada A1 begins near the port city of Gdańsk in northern Poland, runs south towards 
Toruń, then to Łódź, the popular pilgrimage destination of Częstochowa, Katowice, and finally 
the border with the Czech Republic.  Together, the three main motorways will have a total length 
of 1859 km (A1 at 565km, A2 at 622km, and A4 at 672km).  Over two-thirds of the total length 
of 1859km has been completed, with central portions of the A1 and eastern segments of the A2 
and A4 still under construction or in preparation for construction.  In the cases of the A2 and A4, 
both motorways are in operation between the German border and Warsaw (A2) and Kraków 
(A4).  
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While construction of various segments of the three motorways above is still in progress 
(see Figure 3.2), expressways (drogi ekspresowe or ekspresówki) are being constructed as well.  
It is important to understand that motorways may be tolled whereas expressways are not.   These   
connect cities within Poland more frequently than the big three motorways intended for 
international commerce.  Some of the more important planned expressways
44
 include: The 
Ekspresówka S3 beginning in Świnoujście on the northeastern border with Germany, running 
through Szczecin, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Zielona Góra, Legnica, and ending at Lubawka on the 
southern border with the Czech Republic with a total projected length of about 470 km.  The 
Ekspresówka S5 in west-central Poland runs from Grudziądz through Bydgoszcz, Poznań and 
ends near Wrocław at a total length of about 370 km.  The Ekspresówka S7, the longest 
expressway at over 700 km, begins in Gdańsk on the northern coast and runs through Elbląg, 
Warsaw, Radom, Kielce, Kraków and ends in Rabka close to the Slovak border in the south.  
The Ekspresówka S8, at over 550 km, will begin in Wrocław and run through Łódź, Warsaw, 
and end in Białystok in the northeast of Poland.  The Ekspresówka S17, at over 300km, begins in 
Warsaw and runs southeast through Lublin and then to the eastern border with Ukraine.  The 
Ekspresówka S19, at about 570km, is eastern Poland’s major north-south highway. It begins at 
the northeastern border with Belarus and runs south through Białystok, Lublin, and Rzeszów, 
and then crosses into Slovakia in the south.  The Ekspresówka S69, at less than 50 km, will 
branch off from the S1
45
 at Bielsko-Biała and travel the short distance the Slovak border.  As can 
be seen by the routes taken by the expressways, many more small and medium sized cities are 
connected to the road network than is the case with motorways.   
                                                 
44
These expressways or specific segments thereof received prioritization in the planning documents National Roads 
Construction Program 2008-2012 and National Roads Construction Program 2011-2015.  However, expressways 
have taken longer to complete than motorways due to the fact that they must be financed without the inclusion of 
private capital as is the case with motorway, where private capital helps to finance the construction of the 
motorways in exchange for the privilege of collecting tolls along the segments constructed.  
45
 The Ekspresówka S1 will begin near Katowice and travel south to the Czech border.  Much of its 120 km length 
has already been constructed, although a substantial middle portion has yet to be completed.  
95 
 
 
                Figure 3.1: Network of Planned Motorways and Expressways (Image Source:  GDDKiA,   
http://www.gddkia.gov.pl/pl/926/autostrady). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Map of Existing National Roads:  Completion Status as of Jan. 1, 2014.   
(Image Source:  GDDKiA,  http://www.gddkia.gov.pl/pl/927/drogi-krajowe). 
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3.6 Conclusion  
Much progress has been made in updating the national network of motorways and 
expressways in Poland since the early 2000s.  The network is intended to serve both Poland’s 
domestic needs as well as international transit, the prime reason for Poland receiving financial 
assistance from the EU for this undertaking.  Section 3.5 illustrated the task at hand for the 
MTBiGM and GDDKiA.  The role of the MRR was that of spatial planning, which involved the 
coordination of infrastructure programs with other economic planning.  The MRR also played a 
vital role in coordinating these projects with the European Union.  Together, these three Polish 
government entities were the essential actors in national roads infrastructure policy in Poland 
charged with creating a modern network of motorways and expressways complementing socio-
economic needs. The policy directions pursued by the Polish government has been conscious of 
the economic benefits and limitations of transportation, such as have been introduced in this 
literature review.  Transportation infrastructure does indeed provide an economic benefit in the 
form of greater mobility for people and goods; however, this benefit is limited by the constraints 
of real and projected demand for new infrastructure.  The literature on transportation has shown 
that there is progressively less economic benefit resulting from new infrastructure when an 
extensive network of adequate infrastructure already exists (see Black 2001).  Infrastructure and 
the corresponding mobility that it provides are also limited by the economic status of individuals 
who may not be able to afford personal automobiles or charges for using certain infrastructure.  
A further limitation regarding access can be the location of major arterial transportation corridors, 
especially if rural residents have poor access due to inadequate roadway connections to major 
national roads in Poland.  These considerations have weighed in policy debates about the extent 
of the emerging network in Poland.  This research contributes to the literature on transportation 
and mobilities by examining the administrative reform processes that affect the development of 
policy.  Transportation geography and the mobilities literature would be well served by including 
the study of government bodies responsible for transportation policy, which is an underlying goal 
of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODS 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic structure of this chapter is as follows: 1) a few brief remarks about the 
evolution of this research project and how I finally arrived at the four research questions, 2) data 
sources and the research design employed, 3) the interview component of this research, 4) a 
description of data management and IRB requirements, 4) the process for discourse analysis in 
government documents, 5) the formal research questions and corresponding hypotheses, 6) the 
proposed model of public management reform, and 7) the operationalization of the four research 
questions.  
 
4.2 Evolution of General Research Questions  
This research project began with the goal of examining the role of administration in the 
transportation policy process in Poland.  Both the literatures on transportation in Poland and the 
political and administrative transition after 1989 clearly indicate the fundamental changes over 
the last two decades.   The existent literature on the European Union and specifically on 
European integration also points to the influence and effect of the European Union on the reform 
process in the countries of East-Central Europe. Intuitively, there appeared to be some 
relationship among the three different literatures. This was the initial motivation for beginning to 
research these issues. A preliminary investigation explored the topic of the financial assistance 
being offered to the new member states of East-Central Europe as motivating them to implement 
administrative reforms. The rationale behind this was that Poland, like other countries in the 
region, was badly in need of economic assistance, including assistance for the construction of 
new high-speed roadway infrastructure, and would therefore pursue reforms in order to qualify 
for EU membership and the accompanying financial assistance.  Additionally, it appeared as if 
the EU might be using such assistance to entice the new member states into reform programs in 
order to consolidate a pan-European space, known as a European Administrative Space. This 
initial speculation, however, seemed to be lacking after further library research. Several 
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academic works questioned the idea of a true convergence of administrative practices among EU 
member states (see Section 2.3, Chapter 2). Furthermore, it became more apparent that many 
reform directions were heavily influenced by the past.  From here, the issue of administrative 
legacies became pertinent to the study of administration of roadway infrastructure in Poland.  
Meyer-Sahling’sconcept of administrative reform in East-Central Europe became central to this 
developing research project. It became obvious that administrative reform as well as 
administrative legacies in East-Central Europe needed to be discussed in the context of other 
phenomena. Among these phenomena, the concept of administrative capacity became especially 
appealing. Administrative accountability as well as the degree of decentralization within an 
administration also seemed to be particularly relevant.   
One manifestation of these questions was developed in a version of a dissertation 
proposal in January 2013.  The questions were the following:  1) Has decentralization had a 
meaningful impact on highway transportation policy in Poland and the Czech Republic?  2) Have 
reformed organizational structures and procedures played a deciding role in the capacity of the 
Polish GDDKiA and Czech ŘSD to formulate and implement highway policies and construction 
programs?  3) Are the actors and institutions to which the Polish GDDKiA and Czech ŘSD are 
accountable also the sources of pressure towards administrative reform?  4) By which 
mechanisms have (or had) the particular past legacies of administrative traditions during 
Communism been reproduced and sustained in government policymaking and implementation in 
realm of transportation?  The first major change to the nature of these questions was downsizing 
the case study to simply the case of Poland instead of the Czech Republic.  This was a result of 
the difficulty in making contacts with Czech academics while conducting the primary field 
research in Poland.  A second issue was that nearly every interview participant in Poland flatly 
denied both the presence of decentralization in national roads policy and that there was a 
continuing legacy in the government administration responsible for transportation that could be a 
source of problems for current realization efforts.  This immediate and surprising rejection by 
nearly all interview participants was cause for reevaluating the original questions to see if they 
were indeed appropriate (This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9: Discussion and 
Conclusion).  It was found that while these questions (corresponding to hypotheses that expected 
positive answers) were not confirmed, the grounds for their rejection provide very interesting 
points of discussion that may in fact be more consequential than if the hypotheses were true.  A 
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third issue was the order in which the questions appeared.  As it became clear that the question 
themselves might have to change, the logic of their order also came into question.  A fourth issue 
was that at least three of the questions were too broad to truly be productive research questions in 
light of initial analysis of interviews as well as additional library resources first encountered 
while in Poland.  A specific issue with Question 2 was that the data gathered was not complete 
enough to demonstrate the presence or absence of all administrative capacities without careful 
long-term observation of administrative activity. Furthermore, “organizational structures and 
procedures” were addressed in other research questions, albeit less directly.  Therefore, it was 
prudent to limit the inquiry to a specific kind of capacity.  Perhaps the most interesting one was 
policy capacity, as it stressed the ability of bureaucrats to independently develop policy which 
they would then propose to the political leadership.   
It was eventually decided that the question of an administrative legacy within the 
government entities responsible for transportation policy was the central topic of the research 
project.  This general question seeks to understand the role played by a legacy explanation 
alongside other causal factors, as many alternatives have been offered. An attempt to suggest a 
possible answer to the overall question of the place of administrative legacy explanation among 
other alternatives arises out of the four hypotheses to be discussed in a Chapter 5. The four 
research questions relate back to the central question in the following ways:  1) Question 1 seeks 
to determine which mechanisms could have reproduced the past legacy after the beginning of the 
transition in 1989.  Answering this question will go a long way towards determining the relative 
importance of a legacy explanation among the rest of the plausible competing or complementary 
explanations of reform outcomes.  2) Is there a connection between mechanisms of 
accountability (wielded by those with some power over an administration) and the ability of 
those in charge to instigate reform efforts?  In other words, is the administration actively 
responsible to those who seek to reform it?  3) Have the regional self-governments in Poland 
(voivodships) been empowered to some degree in the area of national roads policy?  4)  Has the 
administration developed policy capacity in order to negotiate the requirements of choosing 
policy alternatives and crafting plans in the absence of a hegemonic policy-coordinating 
apparatus which was the Polish United Workers’ Party during State socialism?  All four of these 
questions will involve looking at various capacities of governance articulated by Farazmand 
(2009), as well as the six types of rationality described by Diesing (1962). 
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 4.3 Data Sources and Research Design 
Here I will briefly describe the type of data sources used in the analysis for this 
dissertation as well as the process for analysis. Descriptions of the type of data utilized will be 
presented first, followed by the research design,  
 
4.3.1. Government Documents 
Relevant government documents include both transport plans and documents on the 
internal organization of ministries. Excerpts from the reports will be used as a data source.  Many 
of the relevant excerpts are simply a section or perhaps a chapter that deals exclusively with road 
transport or program administration. Some of these reports were available in English, and 
therefore most of my analysis is based on the English versions, if available.  In the event that the 
wording in the original Polish text has particular bearing on the analysis, this will be noted and 
explained. 
Beyond government reports or transportation plans, documents obtained from the 
MTBiGM and MRR websites as well as from the website of the GDDKiA shed light on the 
internal structure of these government administrations, including the responsibilities of the 
individual departments. The roles and functions of some relevant departments are described in 
the analysis. The third kind of government texts used in this analysis includes laws, statutes, 
rulings, and ordinances.  Given Poland’s civil law tradition, the text of laws, statutes, rulings, and 
other ordinances are very detailed and specific in nature
46
 and are helpful in the analysis of 
motorway and expressway infrastructure policy. 
 
4.3.2 Data from In-Person Interviews 
Interviews were conducted in Poland during February and March 2013 with the guidance 
of a general list of broad questions. In all, 19 government officials and Polish academics were 
interviewed during the course of my two-month stay in Poland.  All interviews were conducted 
in English, although some terms or names of government bodies had to be translated into English 
from Polish. The purpose of these interviews was to gain some insight from those most closely 
associated with developing and critiquing national roads’ infrastructure policy in Poland.  
                                                 
46
 These administrative traditions predating communism may also be viewed as administrative legacies.  However, 
since they were not inherited from state socialism, they will not be addressed in great detail in this dissertation. 
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Having my research and analysis informed by their perspectives has been essential for providing 
a proper overview of the current progress being made in roadway construction. 
  
4.3.3 Public Intellectual Discourse 
Samples of public intellectual discourse are taken largely from a few well-respected 
public policy journals and Poland, in particular from the Pomorski Przegląd Gospodarczy 
(Pomeranian Economic Review). A smaller amount of data was collected from scholarly works 
on the topic of motorways and expressways or public administration in Poland. Some opinions 
and analyses from academics and experts were also taken from government documents that were 
initiated as reviews of government policy documents. It is difficult to downplay the significance 
of these expert opinions by the academic authorities on these subjects in Poland. For this reason, 
other scholarly work may be cited as evidence as well. 
 
4.3.4 General Research Design 
The research design employed in this research project (see Table 4.1 below) was first 
developed by Jones (1996) and included in the handbook, Research Methods in Public 
Administration and Non-Profit Management: Qualitative and Qualitative Approaches by 
McNabb (2002).  This process for analyzing qualitative data is well suited for this particular 
research project because it requires several rounds of coding that would be more than sufficient 
for synthesizing large amounts of diverse data found in semi-structured interviews and analysis 
of specific parts of government documents.  This research process is both rigorous and flexible, 
as it allows for adjustments to be made in the direction of the research.    The process is divided 
into two parts. Part 1 concerns the preparation with part 2 concerning the analysis and reporting 
of results.  Step 1 is defining the research problem, which, although done initially, had to be 
revisited when analysis began in step 7.  Step 2 was also revisited as a result of step 7.  Step 3 
saw the initial library research and is a continuous process.  Step 4 involved designing a 
questionnaire that would serve as a proper source of data for analysis.  Steps 5 and 6 were 
accomplished by making contact with the various individuals whom I would later interview.  
Step 7 involved making observations of the field research. Step 8 seeks out broad patterns in the 
data and simply identifies them.  Step 9 is a further search for patterns in the data or interpretive 
codes.  Step 10 or third-level analysis seeks out explanatory codes that collectively form themes 
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for analysis.  Step 11 involves creating description of the events involved in the gathering and 
analysis of data.  Step 12 is preparing a report in which the results of research are presented. 
 
Jones’ (1996) Twelve Step Process for Analyzing Qualitative Data 
 
Part 1: Preparing for Qualitative Research 
 
1.       Define Research Problem 
2.       Establish Research Objectives 
3.       Do Your Homework 
4.       Plan the Data Gathering Process 
5.       Gain Entry into the Group 
6.       Become Immersed in the Setting 
 
Part 2:  Analyzing and Reporting 
 
7.       Take Extensive Field Notes; Transcribe Notes 
8.       Complete First-Level Coding and Grouping of Data  
9.       Complete Second-Level Coding and Grouping of Data 
10.    Complete Third-Level Coding and Grouping of Data 
11.    Generate Final Constructs and Theories 
12.    Prepare Final Report and Present Findings 
 
Table 4.1:  Jone’s (1996) Twelve Step Process for Analyzing Qualitative Data 
 
4.3.5 Goals of Interviews 
It was originally intended to employ the narrative inquiry approach in the construction 
and implementation of the interviews as described by Czarniawska (1997) and Luton (2010).  
Narrative inquiry seeks to gain insight into particular phenomena as relayed through the 
narratives of the interview participants.  Questionnaires typically pose very broad questions to 
the participant so that the participant may answer in a lengthy and detailed manner, emphasizing 
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those details that he or she finds the most important.  This technique is especially effective in 
identifying the relationships of various phenomena both as understood by the participant and as 
deduced by the interviewer.  Luton (2010, 64) cautions, however, that there are “design 
challenges” unique to narrative inquiry, including 1) the choice of the researcher to clearly ask 
for a story, 2) and if that if a story is told, how much “guidance” to give, 3) or if it is not told, 
how to ‘identify stories within responses’.  Participants were asked to relay their experiences as a 
“story” with some guidance in order to ensure that specific questions were answered and that all 
topics were addressed, unless a participant refused to address a particular question.  Identifying 
narratives both within and outside of responses given as “stories” was a major task of the 
analysis to follow the collection of interview data.  Participants were asked if they agreed to have 
their interviews digitally recorded for the sake of accuracy, although interviews could have been 
conducted without the use of recording devices.  During the process of interviews, participants 
answered the questions more succinctly than expected, and thus some of the intended strengths 
of a narrative inquiry style of interviewing were negated by the smaller amount of information 
conveyed.  The digitally (sound) recorded interviews were instead transcribed into print and 
analyzed using procedures recommended by Peräkylä (2005). 
Interviews were preferably conducted in the participants’ place of work, although 
interviews were also conducted elsewhere if the need arose. The interview questionnaires 
consisted of nine questions that participants were asked to address in their personal narrative.  
These questions were intended to provide insight into the issues described in the four research 
questions of this dissertation project.  The narrative inquiry interviews differed slightly for 
participants who are academics on the one hand, and government officials on the other.  
Participants were asked to address among other issues the effect of organizational structure and 
procedure on the handling of EU Structural Funds, the existence (or lack thereof) of an 
administrative legacy from communism, the accountability of the motorway agencies and what 
sources of reform pressures, the influence of the EU, and finally whether or not they felt that 
government administration of transportation is unique compared to government administration in 
other areas of the state.   Academics were specifically asked about their opinion on the success of 
reforms in the motorway agencies and ministries of transportation as well as the representation of 
Poles on these issues in the international scholarly discourse in these subject fields.   Government 
officials were asked how their specific education and professional norms as an engineer, policy 
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analysts, etc., shape their experiences working in a government administration.  Officials were 
also asked to comment on whether or not they believed that the specific challenges that their 
countries face in developing a new network of highways as well as other transportation policies 
are understood by policy-makers in the EU and elsewhere. 
 
4.3.6 Participant Selection 
Interview participants in Poland fall into two broad categories: 1) academics, and 2) 
government officials working in the Polish GDDKiA, MTBiGM, or MRR.  Academics were 
selected based on their expertise in transportation geography, transportation policy, regional 
development, and/or public administration or by referal.   Some government officials were 
identified through an internet search of the websites for the Polish GDDKiA.  Other government 
officials were identified by referral of academics, and by approaching government agencies and 
inquiring as to which employees would be most suitable for interviews.  Below is a table with the 
aliases of those interviewed for this research project. 
 
Government Academia NGO 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 Academic 1 SISKOM Volunteer 1 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2 Academic 2 SISKOM Volunteer 2 
MRR Civil Servant 1 Academic 3  
MRR Civil Servant 2 Academic 4  
MRR Civil Servant 3 Academic 5  
GDDKiA Civil Servant 1 Academic 6  
GDDKiA Civil Servant 2 Academic 7  
GDDKiA Civil Servant 3   
GITD Civil Servant 1   
 
Table 4.2:  Interview Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
4.3.7 Analysis of Interview Data 
Having conducted interviews with officials and academics in Poland, I transcribed their 
accounts from audio into written format using Dragon Speech Recognition Software, which 
greatly expedited the process.  The next step was annotating these transcriptions with notes taken 
during the interview, followed by analysis of the prepared texts as described in Steps 8 through 
10 of the research design. Luton (2010) identified two of four types of analysis named by 
Riessman (2008)
47
 as being suitable for research in public administration: thematic analysis and 
structural analysis. Luton (2010, 67) writes, “Thematic analysis categorizes the content of 
stories based on themes the researcher is interested in.  The object of interest is what was told, 
not the manner of telling.  Structural analysis is also concerned with content but, in addition, 
attends to the form or structure of the narratives, usually to add a different kind of insight into the 
narratives."   I employed both types of analysis in order to maximize the insight to be gained 
from the interviews.  The rationale behind this decision is most clearly demonstrated in the case 
of identifying measurements of accountability described by Peters (2010b). While thematic 
analysis may well establish the presence of a given instrument of accountability, for example 
normative control
48
, structural analysis of the interview may more clearly illustrate the 
significance of that same instrument of accountability both for the interviewee and the 
administration as a whole.  Although I will approach the interviews in search of specific themes, 
i.e. instruments of accountability, which falls within thematic analysis, I have consciously sought 
for the nuances to be derived through structural analysis.  Heeding the concerns of Clandinin and 
Collins (2000), I sought to maintain a balance between the voice of the interviewees, my 
authorial signature, and the needs and expectation of the audience in the narrative form used in 
writing my dissertation.  Transcribed interviews were edited for grammar mistakes, sentence 
structure, and clarity in some cases owing to the fact that the interview participants were not 
native speakers of English.  Changes were made simply for the sake of readability.  During this 
process, I was very conscious of not altering the original intent behind interviewees’ responses. 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Riessmann (2008), quoted in Luton (2010, 67), named thematic, structural, dialogic/ performance, and visual 
types of analysis as methods in narrative approaches to human activity. 
48
 Internal rules and expectations within an administration, as well as professional norms. 
106 
4.3.8 Data Management and IRB Issues 
All survey and interview answers will remain anonymous.  Survey participants were 
identified prior to being sent the survey; however, their answers are anonymous to both the 
researcher and the public because of the online nature of the responses.  Interview participants 
are not named in the final dissertation and their identities are safely kept confidential.  
Identifying information has been removed from the transcripts of the interviews. Records of the 
interviews will be safely stored in a locked office where they will not be accessible to anyone but 
the researcher. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign was confirmed and granted in December of 2012 with an extension granted in 
November 2013. 
 
4.3.9 Document Data and Analysis 
A discourse analysis was conducted on government documents, which could help support 
arguments that interviews alone could not answer. Relevant documents, or sections thereof, were 
located and examined for content presented in the rubric below.  Useful content was then noted 
and included the analysis where appropriate.  For example the excerpts of policy documents used 
in Chapter 7 contained many key words and phrases (i.e. “a rationalization of the process”) that 
demonstrated the Polish government’s position on the recentralization of powers.   The use of 
government documents as evidence has nicely complemented the use of interviews. 
 
Activity Coding-Type Examples 
Cooperation with EU Direct cooperation with the EU Commission 
Policy Design & Implementation Developing policy which meets EU requirements 
 Implementing EU policy 
Implementing programs resulting from EU policies 
Documentation & Accounting Review of funding applications for beneficiaries 
Submission of payment applications  
General accounting of projects 
Rules, Procedures & Scrutiny Developing and refining rules and procedures for 
implementation and payments 
Scrutinizing projects on behalf of the EU 
Harmonization Ensuring harmony between domestic rules and regulations and 
those of the EU 
 
Table 4.3: Document Analysis Rubric 
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In sum, the aim of carefully considering data sources and appropriate steps for analysis is 
to ensure accuracy and robustness in the research process.  Several sources of data were 
identified that were capable of answering the research questions posed.  The analytical methods 
chosen have been proven over time as effective investigative tools.  The next section will 
introduce a new reform model developed for this dissertation. It will also restate the research 
questions serving as the basis of this dissertation and then operationalize them as a precursor to 
analysis in the results chapters. 
 
4.4 Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses   
 This section first introduces the Improved Model of Public Management Reform for ECE 
and then restates the research questions posed in the introductory chapter to this dissertation.  It 
will also operationalize the research questions, which is necessary for proper analysis. The 
overall question driving this research has been “How would the administrative legacy from 
communism have shaped the institutional change within government administrative entities 
responsible for national roads transportation policy in Poland? Is there a plausible legacy 
explanation?" 
 
4.4.1. Improved Model of Public Management Reform 
Efforts in adapting Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) Model of Public Management Reform 
(see Section 2.9, Chapter 2) into one appropriate for East-Central Europe have resulted in a 
model (see Figure 4.1) that not only should be able to satisfactorily explain administrative reform 
in the context of transportation in Poland but also other policy areas within Poland and other 
countries of the region.  This model was developed during the course of research for this 
dissertation for the purposes of analysis in the context of Poland and ECE and is intended as a 
contribution of this dissertation towards the literature.  The three core features added to the 
model include: 1) a prominent place for the European Union, 2) an administrative system 
endowed with some agency, and 3) the inclusion of Weberian bureaucratic theory as a 
competitor to public management ideas.  It is very difficult to deny the importance of the 
European Union to the process of administrative reform within its member states.  Although the 
EU cannot effectively dictate fine details of administrative reform within member states, it can 
provide rather specific guidelines to what is considered desirable.  The EU does this by the 
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myriad of incentives it can offer to its member states, particularly in the form of financial 
assistance for development projects. The EU’s power to coerce reform was the strongest during 
the accession process and was known as conditionality. However after accession was complete 
for most member states, one might anticipate that the EU’s influence possibly waned. To some 
extent, this is the case. Nevertheless, the EU still retains considerable influence where it holds 
the power of the purse or in areas where it has clear authority to sanction member states (see 
Żubek 2005, and Sedelmeier 2008). Having these capabilities relayed in a model is essential for 
understanding the reform process in ECE since 1989. It is also important to include the influence 
from other international organizations aside from the EU, because these organizations often have 
great influence in very specific policy areas. 
A more active administrative system is also able to react to socio-economic forces as well 
as pressure from citizens in a preemptive way, so that the desired changes will not be imposed 
upon them by the political system or the elite, but instead adopted in a more advantageous way. 
However, it should be conceded that these lines of influence (the dashed lines) are not entirely 
consistent or regular. That being said, it would be a mistake to omit them completely. Boxes O, P, 
and Q represent some of the components of administrative agency that enable government 
administration to both implement policy and develop policy in interactions with the political 
leadership.  And finally the inclusion of Weberian bureaucratic theory in Box F-1 allows for the 
fact that New Management ideas do indeed have competition in in this part of Europe. It also 
highlights that government administrations in ECE were being reformed under the influence of 
Weberian ideals of bureaucracy after 1989, which would indicate the strength of convictions 
within the public administration community that interwar traditions, being held up as Weberian, 
were considered key for realizing a better form of public administration within their countries.   
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Figure 4.1:  Revised Model of Public Management Reform based on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) Original. 
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C. Socio-
Economic Change 
F. New 
Management 
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J. Elite Decision-Making 
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2) feasible? 
  
I. Chance Events: 
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A. Socio-Economic Forces E.  Political System 
K. Administrative 
L. Content of Reform Package 
N. Results Achieved 
M. Implementation Process 
 
S. European 
Union 
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F-1) Weberian 
Bureaucratic 
Theory 
O. Civil Service Institutions 
P.  Professionalism 
Q.  Policy Capacity 
R. EU and International  
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4.4.2 Research Question 1  
Which mechanisms reproduced the administrative legacy of state-socialism in the 
national roads policy area in Poland after 1989?  Answering this question will involve the 
identification of the organizational structures (found in answering Research Question 1), and 
actors who played a role in motorway policy from the end of communism in 1989 through the 
point of major reform initiatives. Organizational traditions (and culture) will also play an 
important role in this question.  It is predicted that the research will show that these actors and 
institutions had tremendous “staying power” until electoral politics and government policies 
were able to impose reform on the “old” organizations charged with motorway policymaking. 
This question was directly addressed in the interview questionnaire (see Appendix C).  Analysis 
should reveal who these actors and institutions were, their personal motivations for maintaining 
the previous order, and how they accomplished this until major reform could no longer be 
resisted.  In addition to examining this issue as part of the transition literature (see Meyer-
Sahling 2009b), this would be an excellent place to look for evidence of Huber’s (2007) theory 
of “strategic neutrality” in that members of the old order could have employed this tactic to 
prolong their careers within the new political and administrative realities. A combination of 
library, internet research, and interview data should lend support to the stated hypothesis.  
 
4.4.3 Research Question 2 
Have mechanisms of accountability successfully compelled the Polish administration to 
undertake reforms? Interviews should be able to shed more light on the relationship between the 
directions of accountability and the directions from which reform emanates in the cases of the 
Polish MTBiGM (including the GDDKiA) and MRR.  Peters’ mechanisms of accountability 
(2010b) (see Table 4.4) provide an excellent direction for identifying actors and institutions. The 
case study examples identified in accordance with these mechanisms of accountability can then 
be analyzed within the model developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), which explains the 
process of reform for government administrations.  While it may seem obvious that there is a 
link between the directions of accountability and the directions from which reform pressures 
originate, it is worth testing this relationship in the context of motorway agencies in Poland due 
to the fact some types of accountability may simply be superficial.  Nevertheless, it is 
hypothesized that both Peters’ mechanisms of accountability and Pollitt and Bouckaert’s Model 
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of Public Management Reform will correspond in this case, meaning that those to whom the 
Polish civil servants are responsible have also have pressured them to reform. 
 
Peters’ Mechanisms of 
Accountability 
Proposed Examples 
within Case 
Subdivisions of 
Examples 
How do these groups 
wield influence? 
Organizational Methods 
(Publicity/ Internal Discipline) 
Internal Handling of 
Issues 
  
Market and External Controls (A 
creature of NPM) 
Market Pressures 
 
 Promotes Efficiency 
Group and Public Pressures 
 
Public  Political (Influences 
Government) 
Clientele Domestic/Foreign Market (Influences 
Government) 
Political Methods of Control Central Government Executive/Parliament Political, Structural, 
Voivodship 
Government 
  
European Union  Political, Financial 
Normative Methods 
 
Professions and 
Education 
  
 
Table 4.4:  Peter’s (2010b) Mechanisms of Accountability 
 
4.4.4 Research Question 3 
Has decentralization empowered self-governments in Poland to fully participate in the 
policy process of national roads?  This question could be addressed by identifying the actors, 
powers to be decentralized, and measures of accountability discussed by Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999). The primary relevant actors for this study were the Polish central government on the one 
hand, and the regional governments (voivodships) on the other.  This picture is complicated by 
the fact that the Polish MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR were central government entities and 
therefore regional branches were under the direct control of the center.  Significant powers do 
not seem to have been truly decentralized in Poland. Regional governments do however have 
some policy input, but the extent of this is difficult to determine and was clarified in the 
interviews.  Analysis of the interviews as well as library and internet research identified the 
extent to which any downward accountability has existed regarding motorway policies. 
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4.4.5 Research Question 4 
Have the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Regional Development nurtured internal 
policy capacity in response to the need for coordination?  Organizational structure as well as 
organizational rules and procedures were considered to be administrative capacities by 
Farazmand (2009).  They existed alongside nine other administrative capacities and four 
“functionally instrumental capacities.” Given the EU’s large allocation of Structural Funds to the 
Polish motorway and expressway program, analysis proceeded with the assumption that they 
largely have the financial resources in place (hence the financial capacity) to implement these 
programs.  Although only two of Farazmand’s (2009) eleven sub-capacities were the focus of 
this research question, the presence or absence as well as the relative importance of these 
capacities had to be established by means of preliminary research and interviews before 
proceeding with any analysis.  A basic understanding of the organizational structure of the Polish 
GDDKiA could be gained from information provided on its website.  A closer study of these 
agencies and a comparison to the Weberian and NPM models of organization would elaborate on 
this by suggesting a possible format of the rules and procedures based on the hierarchy provided.  
Interviews clarified the importance of organizational structure and rules and procedures in the 
administrative process.  An operationalization of the role of organizational structure and rules 
and procedures as part of the research question would produce the following sub-questions:  
How were the organizational structures and rules and procedures of the Polish GDDKiA and/or 
its predecessors different prior to any reforms?  Which processes did the previous structures and 
procedures most emphasize (legality, policymaking, implementation of party directives etc…)?  
How have the organizational structures and rules and procedures changed?  Which processes do 
the new organizational structures and rules and procedures seek to emphasize the most?  By 
asking these questions in the analysis of interview data, it will be more apparent as to the role of 
organizational structure and rules and procedures in present policymaking and implementation 
and the handling of EU Structural Funds. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined the research structure of this dissertation.  It described the evolution 
of thought behind this research as time progressed.  Some original aims, such as a comparison 
between government administration charged with transportation policy in Poland and the Czech 
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Republic became untenable in the absence of contacts with academic institutions in the Czech 
Republic.  The chapter then described the nature of potential data sources to be used in analysis 
in the results chapters of the dissertation.  Methods for analyzing these data were then discussed.  
Finally, the Revised Model of Public Management Reform based on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2011) original was introduced followed by an operationalization of the four main research 
questions.  The dissertation up to this point has prepared the groundwork for the results chapters, 
the first of which, Chapter 5, begins the process of analysis and testing of hypotheses or claims. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MECHANISMS OF LEGACY REPRODUCTION  
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The legacy of communism in contemporary East-Central Europe is a recurring theme 
across a broad spectrum of academic disciplines that engage with this region.  The small body of 
work that concerns a communist legacy in public administration in ECE is certainly part of this 
larger trend.  However, very little research has been conducted on the topic of transport policy 
and administrative reform in ECE.  This chapter sets out to summarize and discuss results from 
research in Poland.  The events of 1989 are watershed moments in the economic, political, and 
social histories of the countries of East-Central Europe. Thus, it is understandable why they may 
be perceived to represent a decisive and, more importantly, immediate break with the past.  The 
expectation that institutions could be refashioned or simply developed from scratch is rooted in a 
belief that a tabula rasa actually existed.  While political institutions such as a new constitution 
could be developed independently of the constitution then in force, new government 
administration could not simply be built without incorporating the structures inherited from late 
state socialism.  Thus, it is apparent why an examination of how, when, and why the structures 
inherited from communism have had an impact on the current shape of government 
administration is important for contemporary transportation policy in Poland.   
The existence of administrative legacy as a consequential factor in reform outcomes has 
been debated among politicians, the public, and academics since the end of communism in 1989.   
It is generally accepted that some remnants of a past legacy continue to vex reformers, but what 
exactly constitutes a past legacy, let alone the mechanisms by which a legacy is reproduced, has 
not been settled.  Building upon the proposed direction of research described by Meyer-Sahling 
(2009b), this research has investigated mechanisms by which the administrative legacy of the 
past has been (less-and-less) preserved.   The research question guiding this chapter is:  Which 
mechanisms reproduced the administrative legacy of state-socialism in the national roads policy 
sector in Poland after 1989?  The hypothesis developed reads:  The central element of a legacy 
explanation, politicization, was largely maintained by a lack of a good civil service law until 
1998 and elite hostility to their control over the administration being circumscribed. This 
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hypothesis differs from the understanding of an administrative legacy from state socialism as 
consisting of a residual of corrupt cadre of officials from the previous regime who have little 
regard for the democratic process and who utilize their positions for their own enrichment. After 
over two decades have passed since the end of state socialism in 1989, it does not seem realistic 
to expect that the presence of such a cadre would have been tolerated for that long. Politicization, 
on the other hand, is a legacy that one can still reasonably expect to find today, albeit not as 
widespread as it once was. This assumption is predicated on the numerous administrative 
reforms undertaken in Poland, especially the passage of several civil service laws that initiated 
legal protections for government employees. This chapter will demonstrate that the proposed 
hypothesis is supported by the evidence available.  Politicization of the government 
administration served as the mechanism by which past practices were reproduced at all levels of 
the administration until policization of the middle and lower levels of the government 
administration was curtailed by a civil service law in 1998.  Although high-ranking positions in 
the administration would be repoliticized by two civil service laws in 2006, the integrity of 
middle and lower positions was retained, with a partial restoration of the provisions of the 1998 
law occurring in 2008. It should be noted that politicization is still present within the government 
administration in Poland, most strongly affecting the high-ranking positions. Even if confined to 
higher levels of the administrative hierarchy, politicization is an administrative legacy inherited 
from state socialism that remains a salient topic, in contrast to a residual cadre, which is no 
longer a significant legacy of state socialism.  
An administrative legacy from state socialism (or any other period) is a label used to 
designate the origin or associations of various institutions (structures) and practices that seem 
resistant to change.  Thus, policization can be designated as an administrative legacy just as the 
troublesome presence of a cadre of older officials from the previous regime.  In the case of the 
residual cadre of officials, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that they are no longer a factor 
in policy implementation outcomes.  From time to time, however, politicians have instigated 
public campaigns designed to sensationalize the spectre of such a cadre causing problems in the 
current government.  Although this tactical political maneuvering plays well in some quarters of 
the public, it does not address the actual problems facing public administration in Poland.  While 
the same problems cannot all be attributed to politicization, politicization offers a far more 
satisfactory explanation. 
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5.2 Brief Literature Review 
Meyer-Sahling (2009b) suggested that the regime types developed by Kitschelt et al. 
(1999) have the most explanatory power early on in the transition; however they fail to explain 
outcomes thereafter.   Four alternatives to the ability of a continuing legacy alone to explain 
current reform outcomes were mentioned: 1) an early end to any legacy of communism in the 
transition, 2) the conditionality placed on ECE countries during the accession process, 3) a 
search for inspiration from mostly Western administrative/civil service systems by domestic 
reformers, 4) the influence of party competition upon the administration. Meyer-Sahling suggests 
that any attempt to find a legacy explanation will necessarily involve identifying the mechanisms 
that have reproduced the past legacies as well as determining how legacies work among other 
explanations.  He proposed that two possible mechanisms could be found in rational-historical 
institutionalism and social constructivist institutionalism.  Majcherkiewicz (2008) noted the the 
role of politicization in creating a path dependency that influenced administrative reform efforts 
in Poland throughout the 1990s. In fact, politicization of the government administration by the 
political leadership is the most solid example of a trait that transcends most possible explanations.  
In theory, it could both serve as the mechanism reproducing the past legacy and be derived from 
the said legacy.   
 
5.3 A Methodological Note 
In order to approach an answer to the question of which mechanisms have perpetuated an 
administrative legacy, the possible causes of administrative reform will be examined with the use 
of the synthesizing model introduced in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1). However, particular 
emphasis will be put on the influence of the communist legacy, as the other possible influences 
will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters. Information gained from interviews 
conducted in Poland during the spring of 2013 will indicate which areas or topics to search for or 
address in any conclusions or analysis. Following the summary and overview of the interviews 
conducted, a reasoned explanation will be given as to why the stated hypothesis is supported. 
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5. 4 Results and Analysis: Administrative Legacy within the Transport Sector 
A difficulty involving the scholarly study of the impact of an administrative legacy on a 
specific ministry or collection of ministries is that the literature on administrative legacy 
addresses government administration in general and not the specific case of a “Ministry of 
Transportation” or a “Ministry of Regional Development." Government administrations that deal 
with transportation are generally very specialized bodies comprised of individuals with highly 
developed technical skills. They could be described as very technocratic organizations
49
, as has 
been noted in the Polish literature.   
   Another important factor to consider in the reform program of ministries within a 
particular policy area is that the needs of the policy developed by the politicians may have 
heavily influenced the track of reform on which a given government ministry or agency was 
placed. It goes without saying that administrative reform throughout the entire government of 
Poland has been an uneven process with some ministries displaying very different characteristics 
than others and there even being great internal differentiation within ministries themselves. As 
will be demonstrated in the following analysis of the ministries for transportation policy, the 
needs of policy implementation have very much guided the reform process.    
The second ministry of interest in this research, the Ministry of Regional Development, 
was not affected by the past in the same way as the current Ministry of Transport, Construction, 
and Maritime Economy, as it was only created in 2005 after pressure from the European Union. 
It was in fact an EU requirement that caused Poland to create this ministry in order to utilize 
European funds
50
.  Although it is expected that practices from other ministries influenced the 
MRR as it was being formed, increased oversight from the EU would have likely precluded any 
serious digressions from EU norms in the area of accountability and performance.  The success 
                                                 
49
 As was mentioned earlier, Taylorism was considered an ideal of socialist administration. Socialist administration 
was to be the apex of rational organization and management using scientific methods in order to achieve the desired 
goals of the state.  In practice, of course, the day-to-day functioning of the government administration responsible 
for transportation during the People’s Republic of Poland was not necessarily always efficient nor could it be 
considered the apex of scientific management. 
50
 The EU expected that new member states either had or would create national coordinating bodies for the 
management of Structural and Cohesion Funds.  Poland chose to create a ministry for this function and delegated 
some responsibilities from the then Ministry of the Economy and Labour (Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Pracy).  
Whole departments were transferred from the Ministry of the Economy and Labour to the new MRR. 
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of the MRR in fulfilling its function of allocating EU funds
51
 also insulated it from excessive 
political interference. 
 
5.4.1 Interview Results 
The civil servants and academics interviewed were asked whether or not they believed 
that there was any lingering influence of communist administration on the current 
implementation of national roads infrastructure policy or on the ministries themselves.  The 
question posed was very broad and thus was intended to allow for a variety of different opinions 
or observations from the interview participants.  Addressing the issue of an administrative legacy 
in this research cannot be effectively separated from the related issues of administrative 
accountability, centralization and decentralization, and burgeoning policy capacity, which will 
contribute to analysis in this chapter but also be analyzed individually in subsequent chapters.  
The interconnectedness of these issues is reflected in the fact that they would overlap in the 
responses of the interview participants.   
Participants’ understanding of the course of recent history regarding the evolution of 
national roads infrastructure policy and its implementing government bodies is also relevant to a 
discussion of administrative legacy as it provides a frame of reference from which they view and 
understand current events and trends.  An excerpt from the interview with Academic 7 describes 
the general arc of events in the transport policy sector after 1989: 
What I can tell you is that if you want to look at those last 20 years, you can 
divide them into three sub-periods
52
.  [The first period] would be…more or less 
from 1989 to 1997.  It was a time when the democracy was stabilizing, you know, 
a little bit.  And the infrastructure projects were not very common, but they had 
[been] started.  It was [at that] time that three big motorway projects were 
prepared.  And in 1997 the minister for transport signed three concessions. So we 
can say that this allowed the creation of the first vision of transportation 
infrastructure in Poland. But the main problem then was with the lack of money. 
                                                 
51
 A number of sources can attest to the MRR’s ability to successfully allocate EU funds, which is no easy task 
considering the procedures and documentation involved.  For example, Academic 2 empatically stated, “they are 
spending this money”. The Polish government, especially Minister of Regional Development, Elzbieta Bienkowska, 
has repeatedly made this claim. According to the European Commission (2014), Poland has received payments for 
70.8% of the 67,185,550,000 Euros that it was allocated for the 2007-2013 program period.  This is the highest 
absorption rate among the new member states, with the exception of Estonia and Lithuania with 84.5% and 78.8% 
absorption rates respectively.  However, considering the large allocation to Poland (the largest in the EU), Poland 
has been very successful at utilizing these funds. 
52
 Academic 7 later qualified this by saying that they were not very sharp divisions. 
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So even if the government wanted, they could not do much. Because, you know, 
beginning in the early democracy, in the emerging economy, there were a lot of 
other issues to finance. Another period is from 1997 to 2004. And you can say the 
government was stabilized…It was also when we restarted receiving some 
European money, i.e. pre-accession funds such as PHARE
53
.  There were other 
funds, but [they were] not related to transport infrastructure. For example, for 
agriculture, there was SAPARD
54
.  And, as I said, in this time, Poland started to 
receive some money.  And they managed to start to build a little bit of transport 
infrastructure, but not much.   And the third period started in 2004 when Poland 
joined the EU and we received [a great deal of] money for transport infrastructure 
and the investments started to grow. 
 
The development of national roads infrastructure in the early 1990s was hindered for two main 
reasons, 1) a lack of political emphasis at the time, and 2) a lack of funding.  These conditions 
were, of course, mostly unrelated to any influence from an administrative legacy; however, the 
capabilities of the then Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy were not tested by the 
demands of a construction program that had not yet begun. The pre-accession phase of Poland’s 
journey towards EU membership witnessed some financial assistance from the EU in relation to 
infrastructure development, but it was not sufficient to begin undertaking a comprehensive 
program to construct a nation-wide network of motorways and expressways.  It was only with 
accession to the EU in May 2004 that sufficient funding became available for accelerating the 
project.  Whereas the quotation from Academic 7 described the policy environment of the 
transition, a quote from MRR Civil Servant 2 illustrates the changes in the civil service over the 
years:  
I began working in 2004. I have almost been here nine years. My duties are 
transport and the implementation of transport projects. Firstly, under the previous 
financial perspective of the cohesion funds, I worked in the Ministry of (omitted) 
and then I worked in the Ministry of Regional Development. So, yeah, I think that 
we are taking part in the process of changing our administration. And the civil 
service is constantly evolving. And I think it is going to improve and it is going to 
be better. And we have a lot of contacts and ethical standards. I think… well, if 
you were in Poland maybe ten years ago or fifteen years ago, you would meet 
completely different people and a completely different atmosphere in the 
ministries. So, I think we are professionals. It’s not as if we are civil servants who 
are simply receiving pay for all the time at work and drinking coffee. I don’t see 
                                                 
53
 PHARE:  Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies, an assistance program which began 
in the early 1990s for former Eastern Bloc countries. 
54
 SAPARD:  Special Assistance Program for Agricultural and Rural Development. 
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any difference between us and the private sector… [regarding] our department, 
and in our ministry. 
 
The reflections of MRR Civil Servant 1 on the changing civil service are an interesting 
illustration of the changed environment in which the MRR found itself up to that point in time.  
It could arguably be reflective of the experiences of civil servants in other ministries or agencies, 
such as the MTBiGM and GDDKiA.  There is a very optimistic tone in MRR Civil Servant 1’s 
thoughts, directly referencing a growing professionalism within the Polish civil service and with 
connotations of a growing sense of public duty, the lack of which was noted by other interview 
participants (especially the academics).  The reflections of both Academic 7 and MRR Civil 
Servant 1 provide a backdrop against which interview excerpts from both civil servants and 
academics can be viewed.   
 
5.4.2 Responses of Civil Servants to Question of Administrative Legacy 
The question of the existence of an administrative legacy was posed to participants 
during the interviews for this research: In your opinion, does there exist or has there existed an 
influence from communist times on the contemporary Polish transportation policies? In what 
ways would it have had influence on the GDDKiA or the ministries? Who or what preserved 
these influences? People? Structures?   The responses to this question provided some insight into 
what the reform process may have been like. These responses served as points of departure for a 
more in-depth reasoning on central questions surrounding a legacy explanation, as exemplified in 
the following interview excerpts (Figures 5.1-5.4).    
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Figure 5.1:  Excerpt of Interview at MTBiGM 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Excerpt of Interview at GDDKiA 
 
 
Interviewer: By this question I do not mean that there is some small conspiracy to return to communism. But 
was there something from the old system… a way of doing things that got carried over into the administration 
after 1989?  And it may well have disappeared years ago. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  I think it's difficult to say because I've only been working here for five years.  
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2:  But for sure there is something. Because it is not enough time, in my opinion, 20 
years. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: That is difficult to say for us. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2: It is difficult to specify. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  Maybe there are some technical units in the regions where the old engineers are.  
There might be some old habits (in those units). But this is old administration.  Also the case in the central 
administration, all of the staff is quite young. They are people who are in their 30s and 40s. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think it would've been a case of mentality, mostly? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: I think that for now it is not a very big problem because all the staff with 
responsibilities are in their 40s. [That means] they were finishing their education in about the early 90s.  But as I 
said, maybe in the regions, in the technical departments, the old engineers in the voivodships.  But the staff of 
the central administration is quite new. 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 1:  And it is difficult for us to answer such a question because, as I said from the 
beginning, we have been working here for (only) four or five years. So maybe it would be better to ask someone 
who has been engaged in it and working here for a longer time. 
Interviewer:  If I could have a quick question to add to that, when the GDDKiA was formed in 2002 out of the 
Agency for the Construction of Motorways, was the new organizational structure completely different than the 
previous one or were the two agencies simply combined? 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 3:  It is hard to say, I mean the General Directorate for Public Roads was subordinate to 
the Director when the agency was focused on the construction of motorways. So (it was) a kind of joint venture 
with different types of roads.  And the added value, I would say, for the road directorate was the new thing with 
the tolling on roads. But at that time most of toll roads were under the concession. People (the employees) have 
changed completely so it is hard to say how difficult it was. It is usually difficult when you are joining different 
organizations. 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 2:  On the other hand, especially in the case of the motorways network, we are actually 
now implementing decisions which were sometimes taken sometimes, for example, in the 70s or in the 80s. 
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Figure 5.3: Excerpt of Interview at GITD 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Excerpt of Interview with MRR Civil Servants 
GITD Civil Servant: Generally, I think that we can't say that there is a group of people who remember very 
well and were in the government during such times. There is… I think that there is not such an influence. So if 
we're talking about people, the answer is no. There is the influence of some people that but if you're talking 
about some sort of thinking which was typical to this time, there is some thinking from this time. People are not 
used to (new procedures) and were not taught by the professionals who know exactly how to manage the 
projects and how to use the money in a proper way. I think that maybe the thinking and the corruption which is 
probably in Ukraine and Russia and if we go farther to the east the level of corruption is higher. I think that [it 
is] something…which can be connected with a way of thinking. Of course, behavior is also counted in this 
discussion. But I think we can't say that there is a special group of people which is organized. No, no, no I think 
we just need more time to get used to these new conditions.  
Interviewer: Do you think the actual administrative structures…the hierarchy… do those look very different 
than they did 20 years ago? Of course, I know that the Ministry of Transportation was reorganized several 
different times and given different names and that the Ministry of Regional Development was only created 10 
years ago, for example. Did the same basic structures exist?  
GITD Civil Servant: Honestly speaking, I cannot say that the structures were the same. I don't know what the 
structures were 20 or 30 years ago. Of course, it must have changed because most of the new responsibilities 
were transferred to another ministry or branch of the government. But I think that we should [say that] what is 
new in the administration of the current times, [is] that there is a decentralization of the power (when compared 
to) the past.  I think that it was quite a number. There were only the ministers, the head of the ministry, and there 
were some departments. … We got a structure which was going down. Now we have departments, offices, and 
then some section teams. So, I think that the responsibility is much more clear.  And so everybody is responsible 
for the group of people or workers for whom he is the supervisor or manager and the responsibility I think is 
clear because everything that is going on in your team or section or office you are responsible for. Yes, you 
have got much more, how to say, freedom, I don't know this is good, but you can decide on your own, of course, 
in your range of responsibilities are subject responsibilities. But you can decide and you can work without the 
division of your boss.  
MRR Civil Servant 2: (In response to question on administrative legacy) This is a very difficult question…. 
MRR Civil Servant 1:  I think that in the case of the GDDKiA, 10 or 15 years ago it was different, it was an 
agency.  Right now the structure the structure is more professional.  I would not say it’s ideal, but it is going to 
be better.  It will improve the capacity.  There are a lot of professionals.  But if you are too professional, you go 
to the private sector. So there are people within the GDDKiA who started their careers 20 years ago or longer 
during communism, but right now the human resources are constantly being exchanged.  There are more and 
more professionals. I mean if we could discuss the management structures and that GDDKiA, they are 
professional.  They have many high standards of work.  Of course, there are many problems considered 
concerning public tenders and environmental issues.  But I think if we compare ourselves with other countries 
which have joined the EU at the same time (2004), I do not think we are the worst.  And you have to remember 
the scale, because we are the largest country that join the European Union among the new member states.  I think 
structures are evolving…. There are some people who are quite elderly.  But I think it’s going to get quite better.  
Interviewer:  Do you think when the GDDKiA was formed out of the Agencja Budowy Autostrad and the other 
agency for national roads, that that was an attempt to consolidate it and make it more efficient, at that time when 
they formed the directorate that the reorganization of the government sector which dealt with transportation was 
an attempt to deal with this issue?  Or was it primarily meant to make it more efficient? 
MRR Civil Servant 1:  I think it was mainly done to make it more efficient. 
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As can be seen in the responses of MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 (Figure 5.1), any old habits 
or ways of doing things from the old system are naturally associated with older public servants. 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 goes on to say that those in the central administration are very young 
in comparison. This suggests that a strong communist legacy no longer exists in the Ministry, 
when legacy is defined as individuals.  If, as MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 speculates, there are 
some older engineers in regional branches of the central administration, perhaps they were 
relegated to these assignments to make way for the new cadre of employees in the center.  At the 
very least, it suggests that administrative reform is more advanced in the central government than 
in the regional governments.  MTBiGM Civil Servant 2 comments that not enough time has 
passed to completely erase any past practices, but does not elaborate what these practices are. 
The passive comments by MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 about the habits of “older engineers” in the 
voivodships seems to hint at informal practices, outlooks, or a mentality that has not been 
swayed by a sense of public duty inherent in a functioning civil service that has been stressed in 
the last ten to fifteen years.  One can interpret that MTBiGM Civil Servant 2 is referring to such 
a mentality falling outside of the refashioned formal institutions of the civil service, ministerial 
rules and procedures, and division of labor; however, it cannot be concluded with absolute 
certainty that this was the intended meaning. This uncertainty notwithstanding, it is clear that the 
MTBiGM (and its predecessors) has undergone many changes over the decades. 
The excerpt from the interview with GDDKiA civil servants shown in Figure 5.2. echoes 
the feeling that it is difficult to ascertain the existence of an administrative legacy within the 
government administration concerning transport policy.  The fact that this feeling or sentiment 
was voiced in nearly every interview response points to a minimal significance of the communist 
legacy in the administration in-and-of itself. However, as a methodological precaution, it cannot 
be completely ruled out that interview participants may have downplayed the effects of an 
administrative legacy if they found it to be in the best interests of their organization. Furthermore, 
interview participants may not be fully conscious of a potential administrative legacy beyond one 
centered on an older cadre of officials that are mostly no longer working in GDDKiA or the 
ministries. Nevertheless, the research proceeds under the assumption that interview participants 
were forthright in their responses. Again it is mentioned here that there has nearly been a 
complete turnover of employees at this point.  However, it is suggested by GDDKiA Civil 
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Servant 2 that there is indeed an inheritance as it regards transportation policy, although this is 
of course different from an administrative legacy. 
The GITD Civil Servant (Figure 5.3) also did not think that there was a meaningful group 
of people who held on to the ways of the past.  The GITD Civil Servant allows for some kind of 
residual ‘mentality’.  The GITD Civil Servant believes that much of what could be construed as 
corrupt ways from the past are in effect poorly trained civil servants, who are unfamiliar with the 
proper rules and procedures.  Time is needed to accustom the current group of employees to the 
rules and procedures employed in the infrastructure policy process.   
While the MRR civil servants (Figure 5.4) could not reflect at length on an administrative 
legacy in the MRR (it was only created in 2004), they did offer some thoughts on the GDDKiA.  
They noted its growing professionalism and expertise in the implementation of national roads 
policy.  MRR Civil Servant 1 notes the high standards to which GDDKiA employees are held, as 
well as their employability in the private sector, which does siphon off some of the talent within 
that government body.  The primary concern voiced was that of the process of managing tenders 
(bids) on contracts for projects.  Issues with management of contract tenders is a real source of 
delay and frustration for the whole of the policy implementation process (see Chapters 6 and 8).  
Delays associated with disputes at this initial stage of the projects are not connected with any 
legacy from state socialism; rather, they are results both of stringent laws enacted during the 
transition and a hyper-cautiousness on the part of civil servants in avoiding any action that might 
be considered improper. 
 
5.4.3 Responses of Academics to Question of Administrative Legacy 
 The same question that was posed to the Polish civil servants was posed to Polish 
academics as well.  Not being employees of the ministries or the GDDKiA, the academics had a 
different vantage point than the civil servants.  For example, it was not expected that they would 
be as reticent to discuss the issue of a potential administrative legacy as the civil servants. 
However, it is also possible that Polish academics may have not wanted to present an unflattering 
image of their own country, either.  The academics interviewed did not believe that an 
administrative legacy from state socialism was still a major factor in current policy outcomes.  
They all offered a quick and rather emphatic “no” to the question of whether an administrative 
125 
legacy from state socialism continues to be influential.  Below are excerpts from several 
interviews.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Excerpt of Interview with Academic 2. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Excerpt of Interview with Academic 5. 
Interviewer:  And that's actually very lead-in to the next question which is "do you think that the employees or 
the institutions or the structures are still have a great deal of influence from the time of communism or… 
 
Academic 2: After 22 years? No. 
 
Interviewer: So in your opinion, that sort of influence ended rather quickly. Do you think there is a particular 
time frame in which it ended? 
 
Academic 2: I am not sure. I think it was just a generational change. People who were active in the 70s or 80s - 
because only people who had taken important jobs could be influential, which means, at the end of the day, that 
they should have at least 15 or 20 years of experience - …they are already not working anymore. 
 
Interviewer: So you think that for some sort of influence from the past to endure it would have to be from a 
relatively high-ranking official? 
 
Academic 2: No. As I said, it was possible. But somebody in 1989, when the reform planners decided that, de 
facto, we don't have to change administration, we don't have to change people. It is a question of high-quality 
political control over these institutions. And as we know very well, it did not work extremely well.  
Academic 5: (In response to question) It is rather state of mind that you’re referring to… 
Interviewer: [I am also referring to] any of in the institutions or organizational arrangements which have been 
held onto from the past. And if there were some, but they have disappeared years ago… 
Academic 5: I think that in the 90s there was a fundamental change because completely new people came to the 
ministries. They (these new people) made many mistakes because they had no experience. There was a total 
change after the victory of Solidarity. There was a total change in the staff of the ministries. Of course, there are 
few people who have been there a very long time (since the communist times) but it is very surprising how 
people change their thinking.  Because one might think that there were no communists in Poland that all…. But 
it is to [a large] degree true. I believe that we have less remnants of communism than there are in France or 
Spain, for instance. In the economy and business we are very much free-market oriented, very much laissez-faire 
capitalism.  The ministries and all the governments even the left (-wing) governments believe in the free markets 
quite soundly. And there may be some problems which can be attributed to a very strong bureaucracy inherited 
from the communist times, which also impacts the way that the number of procedures for investments… you 
would need to go through many, many steps and you have many, many papers (forms in order to support your 
case (as an applicant). However, I would not say that there are some big structural similarities [between the 
present and] the past. 
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Figure 5.7:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 7. 
Academic 7: I don’t think that there is any influence concerning the location decisions or other things. I don’t 
think so. I think we had this discussion about the locations of motorways for example going on also in the 1990s 
with the democratic government and there was an open discussion among scientific peers.  So, it was very 
openly discussed. Of course, not everyone agreed with it. But it was openly discussed. So I don’t think … any 
influence from communist times can be seen there.  But for sure you can see some influence among the 
‘subcultures’ of those working in the public administration.  There can be problems with the way people work 
and the way people think about the work that they do. During the communist times, people who were working 
for the public sector were thinking [about] the status quo.  People didn’t think that they had to do anything good 
for the country because they didn’t really like the system, because they were under a foreign system.  So there 
was no such thing as public good. They were feeling that they were not working for the general welfare. And it 
takes time for them to change their minds.  [It takes time for those] working for public administration to start 
thinking that they should do something good for the society. And I think this is very important. 
Interviewer:  A sort of civic responsibility? 
Academic 7: …I think people working for public administration are not used to defending their opinion.  They 
are a little bit too afraid.  Still, the way of working is such that one does not show his personal opinion because it 
would have to be defended.   
Interviewer:  Yes, because they’re supposed to remain neutral in their work and they don’t want to appear to be 
taking sides…. 
Academic 7: Yeah, yeah. For sure, in recent years [since we have been in] the EU.   I worked for two years in 
one of the ministries in Poland.  Because new generations which have [began working] in the public 
administration in Poland have started to have a notion of public duty.  However, developing this will still take 
some years… 
Interviewer:  [Would] you say whether or not there was much encouragement of personal initiative? 
Academic 7: No, no. Not much. It was based on your bosses. It is changing. I think that in some places, there is 
this new way of thinking and encouraging people to think openly. But it is not too common. 
Interviewer:  Speaking of this new generation of young people entering the ministries (with a greater sense of 
public duty)…was this because of their professions, was it because of the civil service? Or was it the standards 
of the profession such as law etc…? 
Academic 7: No, I think it was a general change in the mind associated with new gains in education as well. 
Interviewer:  So education has changed since 1989?   
Academic 7: Yes, it is a new way of thinking. 
Interviewer:  Do you think people only feel responsibility vertically to those above them or do they feel some 
responsibility to society as a whole? 
Academic 7: This is the main problem, I don’t think they do.  They don’t feel responsible to the society but to 
their supervisors because they are dependent upon them.  But to feel the responsibility to society you need to be 
a really broad thinking person, understanding what the mission of public administration is. And I think this is 
very rare. 
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While the interview excerpts above deal directly with the question of an administrative legacy, 
there were other parts of parts of the interviews with Academic 5 that also have bearing on the 
issue of administrative legacy.  In particular, they highlight the institution of politicization and 
the capabilities of some of the “old guard”. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Excerpt of Interview with Academic 5. 
 
 
Academic 5: There is change in government when the new prime minister comes into office and the major goals 
change. Although there are some goals that were set, for long time we hadn't had a highway network so it was 
considered an important objective that each minister would assume these goals...  
Interviewer: Do you think that since the Tusk government was reelected (in October 2011, and this was the first 
reelection of a government in Poland since 1989) that there will be some continuity?   
Academic 5: Yes, there is continuity. But even then we had a change of the person who was minister responsible 
for transport and it was caused by the general public impression that the previous minister was not good enough 
or he was not up to the tasks.     
Interviewer: And now it's Mr. Nowak.   
Academic 5: Yes, he is quite efficient. But the question is whether or how it translates into solving 
transportation problems. He has only been in office for one year; so obviously it is too little time to tell. 
Interviewer: Yes, it has been too little time to tell. I understand that his background is in something other than 
transportation…. 
Academic 5: Yes, but the ministers’ posts are always political. It is more important who his deputies are. 
They’re responsible for different branches. There is much more continuity in departments, [for example] with the 
chiefs of the departments than in the political posts. 
Interviewer: Yes, it is always like that with administrations. Do you think that the top posts which are 
considered permanent (that are not consider political appointments)…, there is a great deal of continuity between 
them. But at the same time, as I understand, that the civil service has a pool of eligible candidates which had to 
pass the civil service exam. And there is a large group of them from which the government can select the leader 
of the GDDKiA, for example. 
Academic 5: In my opinion, this is one of the human resources that is not used commonly. More on the basis of 
the people who were with ministry long time, they have the knowledge of the procedures and have the 
knowledge of the legal framework and, [therefore], they are kept within the ministries. Maybe three or four years 
ago there was a discussion about those who have finished these administrative schools are not being used. They 
do not have job offers. So the quality…This is also an explanation for this thing.  Mostly, it is the practical 
competence from the people who were… many of them have been there since the beginning of 1990s…since the 
beginning of the transition…At the beginning of the 90s there was a big change in ministry staff and new people 
were introduced to the ministries. 
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Figure 5.9: Excerpt of Interview with Academic 5. 
 
Stating that an administrative legacy of state socialism (in the form of a residual cadre) 
has almost no influence in the ministries today, Academic 2 (Figure 5.5) observed that those who 
would have had a measure of influence to have shaped the organization would have had to have 
been themselves experienced workers with 15 or 20 years of experience at the outset of the 
transition. This would mean that they are already retired.  Academic 2 thinks that the 
shortcomings in policy implementation are more a result of the lack of “high-quality political 
control” on the part of the elected leadership.   Academic 5 (Figure 5.6) believed that many 
problems experienced by the ministries in question had to do with a lack of experience on the 
part of the new staff as older staff was replaced or moved on.  Academic 5 remarked that nearly 
everyone turned away from socialist principles, even older workers in the ministries.  Academic 
5 added that there may be some inheritance in the form of an overbearing bureaucracy, especially 
regarding many complex procedures for dealing with contracts.  This speculation on the part of 
Academic 5 may need to be treated with caution.  While an overbearing bureaucracy was a 
feature of state socialism, especially when it came to dealing with private business, this was the 
result of ideological convictions on the part of the ruling party. Distrust between the government 
and the private business sector does exist, but it is no longer fueled by an officially hostile party 
policy, as the PZPR has not been in power since 1990. This point can be interpreted in the 
following way.  Firstly, the MTBiGM and GDDKiA may have generally viewed contractors with 
Interviewer: Every organization is nearly always accountable politically to the elected politicians. And the case 
of those ministries in Poland in the transportation area. But how would you describe that they are accountable? 
Would you say that it’s mostly vertical accountability? 
Academic 5: Yes, mostly vertical accountability. And there are two different systems… Probably in every 
country’s political system there are those professionals who work in the ministries regardless of who is in power. 
The problem is that when this political group of seats (i.e. political positions) within the ministry is becoming so 
big that they have reduced the allotment for those who are professional. And it happened a number of times. On 
the plus side of it, I would say that in the case of the departments, the heads of the departments were the people 
with some transport background work. Even if they were politicians (i.e. political appointments), they had a 
transport background or an academic background in transport. One of the biggest problems is probably a strong 
reluctance to make decisions which are not well (i.e. clearly and explicitly) supported by law or regulation. For 
instance, the clerks within the ministry are quite afraid that they might be prosecuted for corruption. It has a very 
negative impact on our procedures for selecting or choosing the investors for the construction projects. So the 
lowest price is the only criteria because it is measurable. Quality is not a measurable entity… And if you choose 
the quality then someone could always say that it was a bad decision, because there is some corruption, because 
things are not clear and so on… and because of this, the choice is made on the criterion of the lowest price. 
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suspicion and therefore were somewhat adversarial towards contractors.  Secondly, civil servants 
fearing public scrutiny may have enacted these inflexible rules and procedures in attempt to 
assuage public fears of unethical practices in the awarding of contracts.  In other words, civil 
servants never wanted to appear as having paid more money to the contractors than was 
necessary (this being defined as the lowest bid), nor letting the contractors renegotiate any terms 
of a previously signed contract.   
Academic 7 (Figure 5.7) also did not believe that an administrative legacy still had any 
meaningful influence on policy implementation.  Again, the possibility of a residual mentality 
within some quarters of the government was offered as a legacy of the past.  Academic 7 then 
went on to discuss the lack of a sense of public duty among government workers during state 
socialism and how this has been gradually remedied, although much more progress is needed.  
The civil service has cultivated a sense of public duty, but in the end Academic 7 still feared that 
many of those employed in the ministries only felt responsible to their direct superior and not to 
society as a whole.   
In Figure 5.8, Academic 5 discusses the role of political control over the MTBiGM by 
means of the Prime Minister appointing the minister as well as officials such as deputy-ministers 
and some department heads.  When asked for an opinion on the national pool of qualified civil 
servants who could be appointed to high-ranking positions in government, Academic 5 
responded that this available resource was not used as commonly as it could be.  Academic 5 
suggested that one reason why the staffing pool for qualified civil service was not used often was 
that experienced high-ranking officials already working in the ministries were more familiar with 
the structures and procedures and were therefore retained in their positions instead of being 
replaced with appointees from the civil service.  In response to question about sitting officials not 
being able to pass the exam, Academic 5 stated: 
So, some people are saying of [those with an] older background, that they may 
have a problem with passing some of the exams. There were two procedures (for 
becoming a civil servant). But I would not dismiss them on the spot because they 
have a lot of experience with sorting out practical problems, which is also very 
important. Of all of the agencies which are under the ‘Ministry of Transportation’ 
probably the General Directorate of National Road and Motorways is likely the 
most efficient. 
The implied problem of familiarity with the structures, rules and procedures of the ministries was 
also mentioned by Academic 5 in Figure 5.9.  It was noted that at least the department heads 
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usually had a background in transportation, although they were political appointees at various 
times as the civil service law was changed. The issue of civil servants fearing undue scrutiny for 
decisions, in which they may have not appeared to act impartially, has in practice caused them to 
always choose the lowest bidder for projects.   This is another example of a non-legacy cause of 
current difficulties in implementing policy in the transport sector, lending more credibility to the 
assertion that an administrative legacy (in the form of an undesirable cadre of officials lingering 
on from the previous regime) is no longer as relevant for outcomes.  However, politicization as a 
legacy my have some explanatory power in this case.  Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2008) 
noted that policization within the higher reaches of the Polish bureaucracy has led to high 
turnover rates, which have in turn prevented a continuity of specialized knowledge and skills 
concerning policy-making.  Politicizaton in the MTBiGM and GDDKiA (and their predecessors) 
could arguably hinder the development of institutionalized knowledge regarding rules and 
procedures as well. 
 
5.4.4 Evidence Derived from Interviews 
 From the interviews it is possible to distill three main points relating to a possible 
administrative legacy from state socialism within the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and (to a lesser 
extent) the MRR as well as the mechanisms by which a legacy would be reproduced over time.  
Together with other evidence presented below, they will be used to test the claim around which 
this chapter is built.  The main points to take away from the interviews are the following: 
1) While an administrative legacy does not play any significant part in major difficulties 
with current implementation of national roads infrastructure policy, there is widespread 
acknowledgement of a residual mentality within some quarters of the workforce in the 
MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and possibly the MRR.  Although the civil servants, with the 
exception of GITD Civil Servant 1, did not address the existence of a legacy in detail, 
they did concede the existence of a residual mentality, with academics echoing this 
notion.  It is possible that the civil servants preferred not to discuss administrative legacy 
as it can easily be an emotionally-charged public issue.  A final note:  a residual mentality 
as part of an administrative legacy, like most other features of a legacy, centers on people. 
 
2) If an administrative legacy is closely associated with individuals of authority who 
actively perpetuated past practices, this would have eroded in past years as there was 
large turnover in the ministry of transport after the transition began in 1989.  Retirements 
and removal completely changed the upper echelons of predecessors of the MTBiGM and 
GDDKiA.  Academics were strongest in this assertion.  This constant turnover in the 
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responsible ministries has led to instances where new civil servants lack the appropriate 
experience and knowledge of the organizations, thus creating problems.  
 
3) Other problems, particularly regarding the implementation of rules and procedures 
relating to the management of the tendering process, have been a more salient reason for 
delays and difficulties in the current implementation of policy.  This point was strongly 
argued by several academics.  Problems with inherited knowledge (or lack thereof) of 
rules and procedures are at least partly attributable to turnover caused by politicization. 
 
Importantly, what should be taken away from these interview excerpts is that participants largely 
believed that any influence would have died out long ago, except for a lingering mentality among 
some employees.  They point to other factors as responsible for the current trajectory and pace of 
reform in the government administration concerned with transport policy. These other factors 
include training, policy needs, and political control.   
 Exactly what constitutes a “residual mentality” is unclear.  One plausible explanation 
may be found in the comments of Academic 7 (Figure 5.7) who said that there is not a sense of 
responsibility to the public.  Certainly during state socialism, there was less of a sense of public 
responsibility or public duty because a government official was ultimately responsible for the 
realization of the PZPR’s ideology.  Although the official ideology was at least nominally in the 
public’s interest, it was ultimately detached from reality.  This was likely reinforced by the 
technocrats’ belief that they knew best.  In post-socialist Poland, this mentality as discussed by 
the interview participants manifests itself as a lack of a sense of responsibility to the public 
because the immediate and most pressing sense of responsibility felt be civil servants is 
responsibility to their superiors within their organization.  It is possible that civil servants (being 
privy to much more relevant information than the general public) would also feel that they know 
best.  A vague notion of a lingering mentality could also be used by observers as an additional 
factor explaining outcomes when other factors are not entirely satisfactory.   
A lingering mentality or state of mind (a legacy of the past) points to people (employees 
in the ministries and the GDDKiA) as a mechanism by which it was reproduced.  A lingering 
mentality is not conveyed by formal institutions; rather it is conveyed informally in the attitudes 
held by some employees.  Thus, it corresponds most closely to the social-constructivist 
institutionalism suggested by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) as an approach to locating a mechanism. 
While an approach based on social-constructivist institutionalism can begin to explain a lingering 
mentality, it cannot fully explain changes made to formal structures over time. The formal 
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structures in question are those that affect institutional stability and politicization of the 
government administration.  The effect of an administrative legacy on these structures will be 
analyzed in the next section. 
 
5.4.5 Legacies within Formal Institutions 
 Formal institutions must be addressed in order to speak to much of the scholarship within 
the transition literature.  Sections 5.4.5.1 and 5.4.5.2 will analyze factors contributing to 
institutional instability and politicization.  In contrast to a lingering mentality as a legacy of state 
socialism within government administration, institutional (ministerial) instability and institutions 
connected with politicization lend themselves to the suggestion of a rational-historical 
institutionalist approach offered by Meyer-Sahling (2009b). Section 5.4.5.1 concerns the 
reorganizations of the ministry of transport and the creation of the GDDKiA, highlighting the 
often short lifespans of institutions suggestive of institutional instability.  Section 5.4.5.2 
addresses politicization as an administrative legacy of state socialism, synthesizing the 
alternatives offered by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) referencing the scheme described in section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1). Together with the three main points taken from the interviews, the 
evidence from these sections will be used to test the hypothesis. 
 
5.4.5.1 Transformations of the “Ministry of Transport” and the Creation of the GDDKiA 
There have been seventeen reorganizations of the government body that has held 
responsibility for transportation since the creation of the first such ministry in 1919, six of which 
took place post-1989.  If nothing else, this fact strongly suggests that a dynamic policy situation 
or environment would have a great effect on the organization and structure of the government 
ministry that exists to develop and implement it
55
. There was no major infrastructure program 
concerning transport in the early 1990s that would have warranted major bureaucratic 
reorganization for the purpose of implementing it. The ministry at the time was concerned with 
privatization of state-owned companies in the transport sector as well as devolving some 
responsibilities to the newly formed municipalities and county governments. Also during this 
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 Other ministries represented within the Polish Council of Ministers were reorganized many times as well.  
However, the ministry with the transport portfolio faced many more reorganizations than most. 
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time a series of reports and studies were being conducted by the ministry in order to study the 
feasibility of implementing a motorway building plan. 
 
Name of Ministry Minister Party Beginning 
Date 
End Date 
Ministry of Transport and Maritime 
Economy 
Wielądek, 
Franciszek 
PZPR, 
SdRP 
December 20, 
1989 
July 6, 1990 
Waligórski, 
Ewaryst 
Solidarity July 6, 1990 June 5, 1992 
Jaworski, 
Zbigniew 
ZChN June 11, 1992 October 26, 
1993 
Liberadzki, 
Bogusław 
SLD October 26, 
1993 
October 31, 
1997 
Morawski, 
Eugeniusz 
UW October 31, 
1997 
December 8, 
1998 
Syryjczyk, 
Tadeusz 
UW December 
1998 
June 12, 2001 
Widzyk, Jerzy AWS June 12, 2000  October 12, 
2001 
Ministry of Infrastructure Pol, Marek UP October 19, 
2001 
May 4, 2004 
Opawski, 
Krzysztof 
 May 2, 2004 October 31, 
2005 
Ministry of Transport and Construction Polaczek, Jerzy PiS October 31, 
2005 
May 5, 2006 
Ministry of Transport Polaczek, Jerzy PiS May 5, 2006 September 7, 
2007 
Polaczek, Jerzy PiS September 12, 
2007 
November 16, 
2007 
Ministry of Infrastructure Grabarczyk, 
Cezary 
PO November 16, 
2007 
November 7, 
2011 
Ministry of Transport, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy 
Nowak, 
Sławomir 
PO November 18, 
2011 
October 20, 
2013 
Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Development 
Bieńkowska, 
Elżbieta 
PO November 27, 
2013 
Present 
   
Table 5.1: Chronology of Ministerial Reorganizations and Ministers 
 
The General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways was established in 2002 by 
combining the Motorway Construction Agency (Agencja Budowy i Exploatacji Autostrad ABiEA) 
and the General Directorate for Public Roads (Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg Publicznych GDDP). 
The General Directorate for Public Roads was created in 1986, a decade that saw little progress 
towards the realization of the motorway network in Poland.  This directorate was to have 
responsibility for the construction of national roads in Poland and was subordinate to the 
ministry responsible for transport.  In 1992 a proposal was made for the creation of an Agency 
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for the Construction of Motorways (A ds. BA), which would focus on the construction of 
motorways specifically.  
 
Government Body Years Active 
General Directorate for Public Roads 1986-2002 
Agency for the Construction of Motorways               (A ds. BA) 1993-1994 
Autostrady Polskie S.A.  1993-1993 
Agency for the Construction of Motorways (ABA) 1994-1994 
Rady do spraw Autostrad (R ds. A) 1994-Present 
Agencja Budowy i Eksploatacji Autostrad 1994-2002 
GDDKiA 2002-Present 
 
Table 5.2:  Government Bodies Responsible for National Roads since 1989 
 
 It would be created in 1993 along with Autostrady Polskie S.A., a state-owned company that 
would build and operate the network of motorways and national roads.  The purpose of having a 
state-owned company operate such a network was to be able to gather together financing for its 
operations outside of the state budget.   However, this calculus on the part of the Polish 
government did not prove to be fruitful. It was soon realized that a system would have to be 
developed that would allow private companies to participate in the construction and operation of 
the future motorway network.  The year 1994 witnessed a final attempt at salvaging the A ds. BA 
with its transformation into the Agency for the Construction of Motorways (ABA) that ended 
with its replacement by the longer-lived Agency for the Construction and Exploitation of 
Motorways (ABiEA) the same year.  Finally, in 2002 the GDDKiA was formed in order to better 
coordinate the activity of constructing motorways and expressways and Poland. Although the 
reorganizations of the predecessors of the MTBiGM and GDDKiA were pursued for reasons of 
consolidation and efficiency, it does contribute to the instability of institutions that provides an 
environment conducive to politicization, which will be discussed below. 
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5.4.5.2 Politicization as an Administrative Legacy from State Socialism  
This section examines politicization as part of an administrative legacy explanation.  
Politicization as a theme can synthesize the alternatives to a legacy explanation offered by 
Meyer-Sahling (2009b).  The analysis below is constructed along the lines of the synthesis of 
alternative explanations proposed in Figure 2.1.  Politicization is closely tied to control of people 
as a human resource within a government ministry. Institutional changes regarding politicization 
affected people as a human resource.  
The perception among academics in section 5.4.3 that an administrative legacy from state 
socialism is largely tied to people (i.e. an administrative legacy is no longer influential because 
the personnel have largely been replaced) is lent support by the fact that, generally speaking, 
ministerial structures in countries pursuing real socialism were largely similar to those in 
capitalist countries (Izdebski 2001, 201) and therefore not requiring a drastic reimagining of the 
fundamental structure of a government ministry.  If people were the primary mechanisms of 
reproduction for a socialist legacy, in order to have had influence over the direction of the then 
Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy (1989-2001), these people would have had to have 
been experienced in the organization and of middle or higher rank.  The amount of time that it 
would have taken for these officials to achieve a middle- or high-ranking status within the 
predecessor ministry would probably have been ten to fifteen years. This cadre of officials
56
 
from the previous regime would have been considered a relic of the past and it would have been 
desirable to replace them in the new regime. If these employees began working in the late 1970s, 
they would already be retired by Polish standards.  Ten to fifteen years of experience as a 
criterion for influence significantly limits the size of the group of people under consideration.  
Turnover and dismissal would have been able to replace this group within a few years of the 
beginning of the transition had they been deemed incorrigible by the new government. 
However, the real power over ministries during the era of state socialism lay not within 
the ministries themselves, nor even within the direct political leadership, but within the parallel 
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 This cadre of officials came from the less ideological technocrats of late socialism.  Party membership was often a 
formality when compared to enthusiastic former revolutionaries of the cadre that had preceded them.  In fact, it has 
been argued that the technocrats were among the strongest supporters of ending state socialism as they believed that 
it was no longer functioning (see King and Szelényi 2004).  However, these technocrats were still part of the older 
regime and therefore conflated with the cadre of socialist ideologues by the newly emergent political elite in Poland 
after 1989.   
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hierarchy of the ruling party.  This being the case, the source of power and influence of the party 
bureaucrats would have dispersed nearly immediately with the fall of the PZPR as the official 
ruling party of government in 1989.  Although the PZPR may have lost its position of power 
within the state administration, its method of wielding power through complete politicization has 
left a legacy of excessive politicization in Polish administration, though with a much smaller 
degree of intensity. The end of the PZPR’s monopoly and the subsequent replacement of 
politicized officials from the previous regime in the early 1990s fits with the alternative that a 
legacy ended quickly (see Figure 2.1). 
As the influence of the communist past would have been rapidly eroding in the early 
years of the 1990s, the influence of other alternatives to a legacy explanation have been growing. 
Chief amongst these would have been the growing influence of ideas of administration from 
abroad (see Figure 2.1).  The National School for Public Administration founded in 1992 was 
modeled on the prestigious French institution ENA.  Inspiration was also taken from Sweden and 
Japan.  The models that often inspired public administration in Poland were those which 
produced a professional civil service competent enough in policy-making role that it would deter 
politicization. The greatest single source of influence, however, was the European Union (see 
Figure 2.1).  Poland began intensive contacts with the EU in 1989. In 1990, they began 
negotiations for an association agreement that was successful and came into force in 1994. In 
1993 the EU agreed that central European states including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and the future Slovakia would be able to join the European Union if they so desired and if they 
met strict criteria, which became known as the Copenhagen criteria.  With this agreement, the 
EU’s most potent mechanism of ensuring the compliance of other countries with its own norms 
and policy objectives was activated, the mechanism of conditionality.  The Polish political elite 
as well as the administrative elite were well aware of the benefits to them of joining the 
European Union, which gave them good reason to implement reforms to the EU’s liking as 
conditionality would have allowed the EU to withhold membership if certain criteria were not 
met.  The EU developed many criteria for what were considered good public administration as 
well as good transport practices that it expected the new member states to adopt. As part of the 
acquis communautaire, these changes were obligatory. These changes largely consisted of new 
regulations concerning environmental, technical, safety, and carrier competition standards.  
Regulatory capabilities of government bodies were also considered important (European 
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Commission 2004).  All criteria had to be met before Poland’s accession in 2004.  While the 
EU’s power to transform administration in applicant states was not absolute, as even the most 
detailed required changes can only serve as a general framework, it would be a mistake to 
overlook the influence of the EU and the reform process. 
Even before joining the European Union in 2004, assistance programs such as PHARE 
provided some funds for Poland to begin improving its infrastructure in preparation for joining 
the European Union (and thus the single market).  This financial assistance was given on the 
condition that strict rules and procedures were followed to ensure that these funds were properly 
used.  This touches upon the issue of financing motorway projects, which had always been a 
major hindrance to any program of motorway construction since studies had begun to be 
conducted in the 1950s and 60s.  The various manifestations of an agency or body responsible 
for motorways throughout the 1990s as seen in Table 5.2 also indicate that policy reasons were 
behind the multiple reorganizations of the “motorway agency."  While the Polish government 
was struggling in the early 1990s to decide how it could finance the construction of a motorways 
network, the various attempts at finding solutions for this involved creating new institutional 
arrangements.  It is known from Peters (2010b) that reorganization is the most powerful tool at 
the disposal of any political leadership vis-à-vis its subordinate administration. Thus it is 
extremely unlikely that the major and cohesive group perpetuating past practices in line with the 
deposed ideology could have survived the number of reorganizations seen throughout the 1990s 
in both the predecessors to the current Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime 
Economy or General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways.  
Party competition and patronage could have acted as a major force in shaping the 
administration throughout the early 1990s until a series of civil service laws were enacted 
beginning in 1996. Parties would reward their supporters with positions in the government 
administration, a situation enabled by a system wherein excessive politicization of the 
bureaucracy was the norm. In the aftermath of the 1998 law on the civil service, a functioning 
civil service went a long way towards addressing the issue of rampant politicization. This would 
have combated both party political influence as well as beginning the process of instilling greater 
professionalism and a sense of public duty, both hallmarks of a civil service, into new employees 
in the ministerial predecessors of the MTBiGM and GDDKiA. The existence of a new civil 
service would in this way address two of the chief legacies of the communist past, politicization 
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and a subtle lingering mentality.  Of these two, politicization is the most consequential to the 
analysis found in subsequent chapters in this dissertation.  Reasons will be formulated below for 
supporting the claim made in the hypothesis for this chapter. 
 
5.4.6 Reason 1:  Politicization Plays an Important Role in Most Explanations  
Most explanations feature politicization either explicitly or implicitly in their narrative of 
the current reform trajectory of government administration in Poland.  The most prominent 
feature of the system under state socialism was the complete control of the ruling Polish United 
Workers’ Party over the government administration.  The remedy of robust party competition put 
forth by Grzymała-Busse (2007) and O’Dwyer (2004) seeks to address the spoils system of 
awarding political offices to party loyalists.  Foreign influences of reform and the influence of 
the EU both prominently feature in strengthening a capable and independent civil service that 
would not be subject to excessive political interference.  Three of Verheijen’s (2012) reasons for 
unsuccessful reform efforts are 1) a lack of consensus, 2) problematic reform designs, and 3) 
perceived inapplicability of Western ‘models of civil service’. All contain obvious implications 
of a desire to maintain strong control over the government administration by politicians.   
 
5.4.7 Reason 2: Politicization as a Constant Issue 
Even if the PZPR was dethroned at the head of the ministries relatively quickly
57
, and 
thereby ending any direct legacy of state socialism (represented by senior personnel) early on, 
parties that succeeded the PZPR in power were intent on quickly subordinating the state 
apparatus to their will.  One method that both achieved this goal and shored up support among 
party members was the awarding of positions in the administration to supporters.  The absence of 
an effective civil service law allowed for this.  The 1996 Law on the Civil Service was enacted 
by a center-left government that sought to selectively implement parts of the law which would 
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 Franciszek Wielądek (PZPR) led the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy from 1989 to 1990, when he 
was replaced by Ewaryst Waligórski (Solidarity).  Bogusław Liberadzki (SLD), a former member of the PZPR, was 
Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry from 1989 to 1993, when he became Minister. Liberadzki was 
exceptionally well qualified for his position, having been a Fullbright Scholar to the Univeristy of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign in the 1980s as an engineering student.  His experience in the West and technocratic skill made him 
desirable to retain. However, Liberadzki, like other former members of the PZPR in government, changed their 
political affiliations.  As technocrats, they had not likely been party ideologues during state socialism, a fact that 
offered them some legitimacy in the eyes of the new government.  For all practical purposes, after 1990 communist 
ideology was no longer a major political force in government. 
139 
protect the employment of officials who had been employed in the previous regime and were 
most often supporters of the center-left government.  The 1998 Law on the Civil Service 
replaced the 1996 law as the new center-right government was opposed to protecting the 
employment of former communist officials.  The 1998 law formed the basis of the current civil 
service in Poland.  The Kaczyński government sought to re-politicize some positions within the 
govnerment, and introduced two laws in 2006 to that effect.  In 2008, the effects of the 2006 
laws were repealed and the civil service once again reflected most of the provisions of the 1998 
law
58
. The number of political appointments allowed and their placement deep down into the 
hierarchy were the issues that fueled debate among reformers in the parliament and government.  
Pressure from the EU and other international organizations was only partially successful in 
containing and suppressing politicization within the government administration in Poland.   
The case of Lech Witecki, the former General Director of National Roads of Motorways, 
provides some interesting points for discussing the theme of politicization and shortcoming 
associated with the implementation of the civil service laws.  Although the General Director of 
National Roads and Motorways is appointed by the Prime Minister on the advice of the minister 
responsible for transportation, the post of the General Director is supposed to be filled by an 
open competition of nominated civil servants (mianowanie) who had passed the civil service 
exam required for high-ranking positions.  In this manner, the fact that the General Director is 
politically appointed is mitigated by the candidates’ qualifications as a senior civil servant. Adam 
Grzeszak (2012) of the magazine Polityka alleges that the previous head of the GDDKiA, Janusz 
Koper, was dismissed from his post in 2008 because he questioned whether the construction 
program and its completion timeline were realistic. Koper was an engineer and knew how to 
build roads, but his reservations about the political program of the government resulted in his 
dismissal and replacement by a non-specialist. Lech Witecki had been employed in the Supreme 
Audit Chamber (Najwyżsa Izba Kontroli, NIK), specializing in the auditing of EU funds, before 
becoming the General Director of the GDDKiA.  Witecki was not an engineer and had no prior 
experience in constructing roads, however, he was appointed as head of the GDDKiA because of 
belief that he would strictly oversee the use of EU and national funds allocated to construction 
companies for building the network of motorways and expressways.  Grzeszak (2012) writes, 
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 For a fuller elaboration on the debates surrounding the civil service laws, see Bach-Golecka (2011). 
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“The choice of a person without a background in road construction came from the prime 
minister’s belief that a road builders’ scheme existed.  In other words, it was a conspiracy of 
construction firms planning to fatten themselves on the billions allocated by Poland and the EU’s 
for infrastructure projects. Witecki was supposed to break up this scheme and closely monitor 
the road construction firms.  He was experienced in this area because earlier he had earlier been 
an auditor of EU funds at the NIK”. Witecki’s position became very powerful and he was mostly 
beyond reproach within the government.   
Witecki had accomplished his rise to General Director in spite of the fact that he failed 
the civil service exam twice, embarrassing the Tusk government in the process. Despite 
Witecki’s inability to fulfill the criteria necessary for being a senior civil servant, Tusk retained 
him as acting head of the GDDKiA.  In a further demonstration of the circumvention of civil 
service principles, when a competition was held for the position of the General Director, Witecki 
was the only candidate.  Aside from the issue of Witecki’s qualifications for the senior civil 
service, there was discontent with the extremely poor relations between the GDDKiA and the 
road construction sector.  This would eventually cause Witecki’s downfall as General Director in 
February 2014
59
.   This episode illustrates that a firm and lasting commitment to the ideal of a 
politically neutral and professional civil service has not yet taken hold in Poland, although the 
restrictions placed on the politicization of most personnel since the introduction of the 1998 Law 
on the Civil Service have improved the situation.  Even if there were legitimate reasons for 
keeping Witecki as the head of the GDDKiA, it still evident that some principles of a 
professional civil service were conveniently ignored by the Tusk government which generally 
favors depoliticization when compared to its predecessors.  This episode confirms the existence 
of politicization as a legacy from the past that has not been fully repudiated. 
 
5.4.8 Hypothesis Tested 
The hypothesis that politicization (arguably the main feature of a legacy explanation) was 
allowed to continue due to the lack of a civil service law until 1998 constituted the main 
mechanism by which past practices could continue is supported by both a careful reading of the 
literature and the interviews conducted in Poland.  While civil servants and academics in Poland 
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nearly all agreed that a direct legacy from state socialism was no longer a major factor in reform 
outcomes or ministerial performance today, their rationale was that the old cadre had been 
replaced early on.  Although this cadre would have risen to their positions in part because of the 
blessing of the PZPR during the previous regime, their technical expertice afforded them some 
legitimacy.  As a result, some were allowed to stay on but others would have been quickly 
removed by reformers.  Even among those who remained in the ministry, there was relatively 
high turnover in the next few years. Undoubtedly, some willingly left for the private sector and 
higher wages while others were dismissed as the new government found suitable replacements. 
The ability of the new regime to quickly dismiss or retain government employees was aided by 
the politicized nature of government positions inherited from the previous regime. The literature 
reveals that this mechanism was convenient for reformers and not to be easily surrendered to a 
civil service law that would have prevented such forced turnover on a large scale.  This 
mechanism is an institutional design and can thus be placed within the category of institutional 
reasons proposed by Meyer-Sahling (2009b). 
 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
As is clear from the examples above, an incorrigable cadre of officials from the previous 
regime cannot explain the current path on which Poland’s transport policy ministries find 
themselves.  This is in keeping with Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) own argument, as he believed that 
this type of legacy explanation alone could not explain the current trajectories of reform.  Rather, 
politicization as an administrative legacy possesses more explanatory power.  Politicization was 
strategically employed by successive governments in an effort to control the government 
administration and to enforce desired policy directions.  Civil service laws began to limit the 
effect of politicization on the lower levels of the government administration, but it continued to 
have a tremendous impact on the higher levels of the administration. Thus politicization is 
present on the smaller scale of the ministerial leadership, but less noticeable on the 
comparatively larger scale of the lower levels of administration.  Politicization has been both a 
means and an end. Echoing the observation of Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2008), 
politicization served, perhaps unintentionally, as a mechanism that hindered the lasting 
accumulation of expertise within ministries owing to the forced turnover in personnel it enabled. 
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It is argued that the maintaining of politicization as a mechansism is reflective of rational-
historical instititutionalism, a possible candidate proposed by Meyer-Sahling (2009b). 
A contribution of this finding to the transition literature on administrative reforms in ECE 
is that it demonstrates that issue of politicization within government administration synthesizes 
alternatives to the commonly proposed administrative legacy defined as a residual cadre of 
officials from the previous regime with ideological loyalties to socialism. According to Meyer-
Sahling (2009b), alternative explanations to the (cadre) legacy still having influence on the 
course of reform include 1) an early end to the (cadre) legacy’s influence, 2) EU conditionality, 3) 
foreign models of administration, and 4) party competition over the administration.  The issue of 
politicization is found at the core of these alternatives for the following reasons: 1) Politicization 
was used as a mechanism to remove the old cadre early on, 2) EU conditionality sought to 
minimize politicization as part of its recommended reforms, 3) foreign models of administration 
restraining excessive politicization were sought, and 4) party competition over control of the 
administration was enabled by the prospect of utilizing the politicized structures of the 
administration for rewarding supporters.   
Another phenomenon which could be labled an administrative legacy is the residual 
mentality mentioned by several interview participants. It is unclear what comprises this mentality 
or how influential it is, although was not considered to be influential by the civil servants.  It is 
possible that this mentality is a manifestation of a lack of a public service ethic or a disregard for 
public opinion in technical matters.  A public service ethic is gradually developing among new 
generations, but more time is needed.   The phenomenon of a residual mentality as an 
administrative legacy requires further investigation before it could result in any definite 
contribution to the transition literature. It appears that a residual mentality, being maintained by 
people, is reflective of the social-constructivist intistitutionalism proposed by Meyer-Sahling 
(2009b). 
In addition to legacy explanation centering on politicization and a residualy mentatility, 
there are other causes that arguably influence reform outcomes in the transport sector.  The 
important role of the European Union in the reform process is unmistakable. And while 
Verheijen (2012) argues that EU conditionality may no longer have the effect of keeping ECE 
countries on the path of reform after accession, the conditions imposed for financial assistance 
for the activities of MRR and MTBiGM do a great deal towards ensuring constraining behavior.  
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Although this might not be the EU administrative space originally theorized, it does demonstrate 
the EU’s continued ability to effect change or certain standards of administration in given 
circumstances.  These processes give rise to questions as to the link between responsibility to a 
body and that same body’s ability to push for administrative reform. This extends not just to the 
European Union but also to the Polish government itself.  Examining this question in the next 
chapter (Chapter 6) will help determine the relative importance of the EU to other causal 
mechanisms of influence excluding a direct communist legacy. 
Another legacy of communism was a strong centralization of state institutions, although 
this was shattered by the earlier decentralizations of 1991. The Polish government has been 
struggling with rectifying the situation ever since as it has proven extremely difficult to 
implement effective spatial planning on a national scale in the overly decentralized atmosphere. 
Thus centralization and decentralization will be addressed in Chapter 7. Finally, a very 
interesting point is that reforms may have been largely shaped around policy needs. In other 
words, government administrations will be shaped around the needs of implementing a particular 
policy program in a relatively efficient and accountable way (from the standpoint of the 
government in power).  This will be the topic of Chapter 8.  Thus, while the communist legacy 
was not confirmed as a significant influence on contemporary ministerial reform, its minimized 
significance offers the opportunity to look for causes in other vital and interesting areas. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As we saw in the previous chapter, seeking an answer to whether a past legacy continues 
to be influential on the reform outcomes of the present in government administration in Poland 
involves looking at those actors and institutions that could demand reform of the administration.  
The reform effort depended upon the commitment of the political elite to realizing the ideals 
common to most public administrations in the industrially advanced Western democracies today.  
Accountability is a common concern in any discussion on public administration, especially 
regarding the legality of the actions of government officials.  Since democratic governments 
require the confidence of the public in the ability of the government to govern as a precondition 
for being voted into power, there must be some level of trust between elected officials and the 
public on the one hand, and the implementers of policy or the public administration on the other.  
There must be confidence that the government administration is responsibly managing resources 
and implementing policy, that it is truthfully informing the elected government of progress being 
made on policy implementation as well as policy alternatives and likely outcomes of various 
policy proposals.  This heavy but necessary burden on the government administration is 
complemented by the obligation and responsibility of the elected government to be capable of 
leading on various policy issues and, importantly, of possessing enough competence to both 
know when to be unsatisfied with and expect more from administrators and to know when to 
accept advice given to them by the same administrators.  These are but some of the most 
important elements of administrative and political accountability.    
A simple and relatively straight forward question arises from the forgoing discussion.  It 
seeks the existence of a link between authorities with the power to supervise and authorities with 
the power to govern.  The research question around which this chapter is built is the following:  
Are the actors and institutions to which the Polish Ministry of Transport (including the GDDKiA) 
and the Ministry of Regional Development are accountable also the sources of pressure towards 
administrative reform? A simple confirmation or negation of the question is not sufficient; more 
detail is needed than a “yes” or a “no."  It is the complex context that causes the difficulty.    
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With these considerations in mind, it was hypothesized that:  Those actors and institutions to 
which the Polish Ministry of Transport (including the GDDKiA) and the Ministry of Regional 
Development are accountable are indeed also the sources of pressure to implement 
administrative reforms.  The research conducted does indeed confirm the hypothesis with the 
specific annotations that accountability is primarily vertical in nature, i.e. through the elected 
government and not to the public or business community directly, and that both the elected 
Polish government and the European Union represent display a political capacity that enables 
them to effectively manage the implementation process as performed by the relevant Polish 
ministries. 
To briefly recount the place of this question within the overall framework of the 
dissertation:  Administrative reform as conceptualized in any attempt at an explanation is a 
process and an end state.  The question explored in Chapter 5 sought to ascertain the role of the 
past legacy of socialist administration on the current outcomes of reform.  More specifically, it 
sought to articulate its importance as a contributing factor relative to many others.  However, 
causes need a mechanism in order to effect any manner of change.  This is where the issue of 
administrative accountability to political authority and its connection to the introduction of 
reform efforts comes to the fore.  The explanation produced here as to how both kinds of 
authority are linked and the context within which this occurs strengthens the conclusions reached 
in Chapter 5.  Chapter 7 explores the role of decentralization within the policy area of national 
roads infrastructure.  This importantly begins a closer look at which structural reforms were 
mandated by the political elite.  Chapter 8 examines how the ministries were able to influence 
and guide some of these reforms themselves and to anticipate changes that need to be made in 
the name of greater effectiveness in the fulfillment of their functions.  Thus, the question of 
administrative accountability addressed in this chapter is vital to establishing a link between a 
very broad conceptual level of institutional causes of administrative reform in Chapter 5 and the 
more conceptually confined levels of structural reform (decentralization) and of policy capacity 
found in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively.  Below begins the articulation of the necessary 
conceptual bridge. 
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6.2 Relevant Literature 
Two key tenets of Weber’s concept of bureaucracy were that 1) a bureaucrat with 
sufficient yet circumscribed powers would conduct business according to written rules in an 
impersonal manner and 2) the bureaucrat is part of a defined hierarchy of officials leading all the 
way up to the elected government (Bendix 1962).  The obligatory impartiality is in line with the 
theory of the politics-administration dichotomy advanced by Wilson (1887) and strengthened by 
Taylor’s (1911) writings on scientific management, which allowed for a separation of politics 
and administration because administration could be based on politically neutral scientific facts.  
Once given a directive from elected officials, civil servants in the administration could 
impartially carry these out because a scientific appraisal of best methods supposedly did not 
allow for the interference of petty politics.  The downfall of this contention is that politicians are 
rarely experts in all fields in which a government must operate and therefore have to rely on the 
expertise of career civil servants.  Civil servants will then develop policies for selection and 
endorsement by their political masters and implement them subsequently.  Criticisms of the 
veneer of absolute political neutrality on the part of civil servants began with Waldo (1948) and 
Gouldner (1954) and continue into the present. New Public Management has sought to reshape 
the civil service and make it more responsive to the policy goals of the elected officials, who 
would likely want economic reforms implemented without haste.  Even the many critics of NPM 
still do not advocate a completely neutral civil service as they see the institution as serving or 
potentially serving their own policy wishes.  Page and Jenkins (2005) demonstrated that civil 
servants wishing to coexist with their political masters would preempt orders by developing 
policies that they thought would be favored by the political leadership, a fact which Page and 
Jenkins point out as negating the idea of political neutrality among bureaucrats.  Huber (2007) 
showed how bureaucrats can be selectively neutral when they desire to demonstrate good will to 
political officials who might otherwise circumscribe the agency’s duties and powers if they 
perceived as harmful the ideological interests of those same politicians
60
.  The above examples, 
especially those of Weber, Wilson, and Taylor demonstrate the importance of centralized and 
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the wrath of politicians who might be incensed by aggressive labor safety inspections in business which support 
them politically. 
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vertical authority for the traditional models of administration, which despite many reforms along 
the lines of NPM, remain essentially intact. 
In The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration 
(2010b), Guy Peters provides a very clear and insightful introduction to public administration, 
describing at length the various instruments of accountability that can be used to control the 
actions of the administration.  Peters (2010b, 265) names three important concepts in 
administrative accountability: accountability, responsibility, and responsiveness. From these 
three concepts, Peters develops instruments of accountability, including organizational methods, 
normative control, group and public pressures, political methods of control, and market and 
external controls.   
Jagielski (2012) examined the institutions of government supervision in the public 
administration in Poland his book Kontrola Administracji Publicznej. The Polish word kontrola 
is more accurately defined with words such as supervision and oversight vs. mere accountability.  
It reflects and emphasizes the power of the institutions to which an administration is accountable.   
Since Kontrola Administracji Publicznej not only reflects on the concept of supervision and 
oversight, but is in fact a treatise on actual existing institutions, this work can also serve as 
ancillary evidence later on in the analysis. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) develop a model of public management reform in which the 
relationships between the actors and institutions that exert pressure to reform in a given 
administration are described.  A central place is accorded to the political elites who are 
influenced by socio-economic forces and the political system, and who can then exert their will 
to reform on a government administration.  The elites are also influenced by the administrative 
system of a given state.  The relationship between the above described entities is complex, 
although a brilliant depiction of the power relationships between them as well.  The actors and 
institutions within Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model correspond to the instruments of accountability 
described by Peters (2010b), an intriguing observation that led to the development of the 
research question for this dissertation project to test whether or not there is a demonstrable 
relationship between Peters’ mechanisms of accountability and the actors and institutions in 
Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model of public management reform in the context of Polish government 
administration and motorway infrastructure policy. 
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The idea of politics as capacity articulated by Farazmand (2009) is useful in this 
discussion because it focuses on the requisite abilities of the political leadership in effectively 
managing and leading the government administration entrusted to them by voters.  Politics as 
capacity is comprised of 1) stakeholders such as the elected government, political parties, 
business and industry, and citizens on the one hand, and on the other hand 2) the ability of the 
elected government to manage the bureaucracy in the public interest, which is enabled by 
accountability and good political control.  As will be later discussed, the elected government 
possessing politics capacity is essential to maintaining effective control over the administration.  
An administration led by competent political leadership will be more effective in fulfilling its 
tasks as well as preparing for future contingencies that must be addressed politically and not just 
administratively.   Diesing’s (1962) conceptions of legal and political rationality will be added to 
this discussion in order to elucidate the logic by which these institutional arrangements are made 
for ensuring better political control. 
And finally, there will be some discussion of the effectiveness of the EU in realizing its 
reform policy ambitions in Poland preceding and following its accession in 2004.  Although the 
conditionality that applied to Poland as a candidate country is no longer enforceable, financial 
assistance to Poland does come with the condition that it be properly utilized.  Strict accounting 
is in place not only for the sake of detecting corruption, but also for assuring that no funds are 
needlessly wasted on avoidable expenses.  There is a minor literature that focuses on the 
influence of the EU by means of its structural and cohesion funds on reform efforts that will be 
used in the discussion at the end of the chapter. 
 
6.3 Methods 
A combination of interviews, government documents, and ancillary materials were used 
to answer the research question posed.  The interviews of academics and civil servants were 
conducted in Poland during February and March of 2013, relevant excerpts of which will be 
presented below as introductory evidence.  Government documents that describe the duties and 
responsibilities of ministries, agencies, and departments within them will be used to further 
substantiate the claims made in the interviews.  Finally, ancillary sources such as histories and 
treatises on various aspects of administration such as Jagielski’s (2012) Kontrola Administracji 
Publicznej will be used to as evidence with which to construct the argument that accountability 
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and pressures of reform have been associated with the same authorities in Poland in the case of 
the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and the MRR. 
Analysis will ultimately demonstrate that Peters' mechanisms of accountability 
complement the Model of Public Management Reform presented by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011).  
The method of conducting this analysis begins with the identification of 1) examples of 
mechanisms of accountability from the case study (see Table 6.1) and 2) the identification of 
examples of inputs to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model (see Table 6.2).  It can then be justified 
based on the identified correspondences from the case that the mechanism of accountability and 
the model of public management reform are in fact intrinsically connected. 
 
Peters’ Mechanisms of 
Accountability 
Proposed Examples 
within Cases 
Subdivisions of 
Examples 
How do these groups wield 
influence? 
Organizational Methods 
(Publicity/ Internal Discipline) 
Internal Handling of 
Issues 
 Internal Reviews, Internal 
Disciplinary Measures 
Market and External Controls (A 
creature of NPM) 
Market Pressures 
 
 Promotes Efficiency 
Group and Public Pressures 
 
Public  Political (Influences 
Government) 
Clientele Domestic/Foreign Market (Influences 
Government) 
Political Methods of Control Central Government Executive/Parliament Political, Structural, 
Voivodship 
Government 
 Political 
European Union  Political, Financial 
Normative Methods 
 
Professions and 
Education 
 Norms, Professional 
Standards 
 
Table 6.1:  Mechanisms of Accountability from Peters (2010b) and Examples for this Case Study 
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Table 6.2:  Forces of Administrative Change from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and Possible Examples for 
this Case Study 
 
6.4 Results and Analysis 
The results and analysis presented will lead to the evaluation of the hypothesis as stated 
at the beginning of the chapter. Evidence will be presented in the following order:  1) interview 
excerpts on accountability within the Polish government followed by a brief summary, 2) 
interview excerpts on accountability towards the European Union followed by a brief summary,  
3) a summary of evidence of accountability from government documents,  4) indications of the 
importance of the EU, 5) analysis of preceding evidence and a reasoned explanation of how these 
relate to the order of actors and institutions that decree reform,  and finally, 6) confirmation of 
the hypothesis.  This section will then be followed by a discussion and conclusion. 
 
6.4.1 Interview Excerpts and Summaries 
The interview with the GITD Civil Servant shed light on the types of accountability 
(which translates into Polish as the same word for responsibility) to which government 
administration in Poland is subjected.  The GITD Civil Servant confirmed the relevance of 
vertical responsibility directly to the minister, and by extension, to the Prime Minister and 
Sphere Components within Spheres Inputs Identified 
Socio-Economic Forces Global Economic Change Globalization 
Socio-demographic Change Decline in Birth Rates, Urbanization, Automobilization 
Socio-economic Policies Market Liberalization, Privatization, Regional Economic 
and Social Development, Development of Viable Social 
Safety Net 
Political System NPM Ideas Decentralization, De-bureaucratization, Performance 
Measurement,  
Pressure from Citizens Faster Results at Least Possible Cost 
Party Political Ideas Finish the Network, Represent Constituents’ Interests 
Elites Politicians  Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Mandarins/ Civil Servants Stability of Civil Service, Professionalization, 
Preservation of Ministries 
Administrative System Content of Reform Package  
Implementation  
Results Achieved  
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cabinet.  Accountability towards the law by means of courts is also mentioned.  Lobbying is 
mentioned, but the GITD Civil Servant indicates that this happens in the stage where legislation 
is being drafted in parliament before it becomes law.  What would be considered “watch dog” 
groups also play a role in accountability.  Professional and personal ethics were important as 
many occasions arise when the law or regulation issued in support thereof does not specifically 
prescribe a certain course of action in response to some occurrence.  The civil servant must then 
use personal discretion informed by professional and personal standards and ethics in exercising 
authority.   
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Excerpt of Interview at MTBiGM 
Interviewer:  In every organization there are different kinds of controls, and that is how the politically elected 
government manages to control the machinery of government. What sort of controls are in place for your 
ministry? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  This is quite obvious because the minister is a political post and we as the officer of 
the ministers are hundred percent dependent on his decisions and the political decisions made by government. 
But of course there are some areas which are excluded, for example, the areas which are in the EU directives etc. 
etc. but the whole administration within the ministry, within the GDDKiA is.... 
 
Interviewer: So it is vertical responsibility? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: […vertical responsibility it to] the minister, and secretaries and undersecretaries of 
state, the directors and so on... 
 
Interviewer: Does the public or do the industrial local lobbies ever try to complain or pressure directly or do 
they do it through politicians?   
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: Rather through politicians. We have a lot of influences made by local politicians, 
local governments which for example try to get EU money for their projects. 
 
Interviewer: And those want to come to you directly? But the others try to work through politicians... 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: The local government …politicians converse with the vice ministers directly but I 
think that the lobbies and the industries try to get to us through politicians or through Parliament.... 
152 
  
Interviewer: So to begin with, could you discuss your role in the process of regional development or transport 
infrastructural development. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: Our department, this is a Department for EU funds. It is the so-called intermediate 
party and this is the organization with responsibilities for managing a specific branch of regional development 
which is transport. And we as a ministry are also responsible for accepting the applications and accepting 
funding agreements, and also managing the whole process within the Ministry of Transport. 
 
Interviewer: And when the EU transfers funds do they go first to the Ministry of Finance? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: Yes, this is the case. 
 
Interviewer: And then the Ministry of finance will transfer them to... 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: In the road sector we have a specific fund which is situated in the state owned bank. 
This this is the national road fund. And the EU transfers go to the state budget and the state budget is re-rerouted 
to the national roads fund which is the source of paying the invoices by the GDDKiA. This is the process. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2:  This is just about the money because the planning of EU funds is not for the 
ministry of finance. We are in charge of the process, not them. 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2: And then one: this is just the cash flow. 
 
Interviewer: Right, I knew that would be a minor question, but I just wanted to make sure of that. Now, in... 
This is the Department for EU funds. So, you help coordinate with the European Union for these projects, at 
least with the funding. Is that, how, what is that process like? Is that a very bureaucratic process? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: Our experience is that all of the companies with the European Commission is 
pushed into many procedures, many formal procedures. The whole process is way too much bureaucratic, this is 
my opinion. I think that this is some kind of snowball, year-by-year their new procedures a new formal rules 
etc… and thereby all the simple decisions, the simple acts, the procedures last for about one year or half a year. 
 
Interviewer: That is a long time. Is it because of the procedures which the EU has?  Are there procedures which 
do not quite replace older procedures completely, and then it becomes is more of a tangled mess? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  I suppose that this is something different because European officials are trying to 
describe within the procedures all the possible events, all the possible cases etc. etc. but life is always richer than 
the procedures. And of course, this is, I feel that this is something like the English system of law, the president 
the one but in the European commission, although minor cases become a new procedure. 
 
Interviewer: So it is precedent, each incident is a precedent for a future one.  
Figure 6.2: Excerpt of Interview at MTBiGM. 
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Figure 6.3:  Excerpt of Interview at MTBiGM. 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Excerpt of Interview at GDDKiA. 
 
The interview at the Ministry of Transport (Figure 6.1) heavily stressed the centrality of 
vertical accountability between the MTBiGM and the Ministry, and eventually the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet.  Even lobbying, for which Peters created a separate category in his 
mechanisms of accountability, ultimately affects the Ministry in a vertical manner.  Lobbyists 
Interviewer:  Do you think that the organizational structures and procedures of the GDDKiA or the Ministry of 
Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy or, additionally, the Ministry Regional Development, have 
made the use of European funds easier or more difficult over time?  And in what way? 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 1: Using European funds is always difficult and [it] should always be secured by 
special procedures and guidelines. So it is quite normal that we have such institutions which are preparing such 
guidelines for bids and… for beneficiaries, which for example we are. So it is very open. 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 2: However, this system, the whole system of demanding European funded programs 
turns sometimes to be, in some way, a system which is working only itself. So you are not being focused on the 
implementation, but the system is focusing on the system. Not on the final effect, but on the process. [The 
process] is, of course, important. But if you put the focus only on the process, you are actually not interested in 
the final effect. [Ideally, a focus on achieving original purpose should still be the primary goal].  
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: In the sector of infrastructural projects which are funded by the European 
commission, the European funds, I think that the division is related to the place in the system where people 
are. Because the closer to the project to the building site you are, you are the more realistic you are. I would 
say that people working in the European Commission all the coordinating bodies are not quite walking on the 
ground.… I think people working in that GDDKiA and the project units for example in the Ministry of 
transport are much closer to the problems met on the other side. 
 
Interviewer: So the European Union would be unlikely to understand some of the finer details of what is 
preventing a project from progressing… 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2: A real problem 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: Yes, we have a problem with eligibility of the expenses.  For example, this is the 
most vivid case, on the site you sometimes have to, the engineers, you have to conduct some additional works. 
This is the Polish term, additional works. And this is something normal. All the engineers, all the workers 
would say that this is something normal. Because you're not able to predict all of the conditions while 
building. And from the point of view of the Commission, additional works are not eligible. And this is a split 
between engineers and officers. 
 
Interviewer: And the EU might view this is a very mechanical process, something that works once it is set in 
motion? 
 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: I think that in the European Commission, the voice of auditors is very audible 
but, and they see, for example, as a way to get some additional money. 
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will consult politicians who will then in turn pressure the elected government to demand the 
Ministry address one issue or another. MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 did mention that local 
politicians will often appeal to the Deputy Ministers directly in order to influence decisions on 
the prioritization of planned projects.  The responses clearly demonstrate the presence of group 
and public pressures, political methods (the state and self-governments), and the professional 
norms as mechanisms of accountability that can be found in the Polish political system.  This is 
not surprising as these same mechanisms of accountability are widespread, being found in nearly 
all democratic systems, and even in some non-democratic systems.   Organizational methods as 
well as market pressures were not mentioned, but their presence can be deduced by other means.   
The GDDKiA Civil Servants (Figure 6.4) explained that the use of EU funds for the building of 
infrastructure naturally requires many special procedures.  Importantly, GDDKiA Civil Servant 1 
said that “…we have such institutions which are preparing such guidelines for bids."  GDDKiA 
Civil Servant 2 remarks how the process can at times be so complicated that it loses sight of the 
end goal and instead focuses on the process of implementation.  MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 
(Figure 6.2) regards the procedures imposed by the requirements of the EU as overly 
bureaucratic in part because they seek to regulate every possible situation when this is obviously 
impossible.  The European Union also has difficulties understanding the precise issues affecting 
any given project owing to its distance from the day-to-day implementation of the project (Figure 
6.3).  Perhaps it is understandable that the EU would treat any request for additional funds to 
cover unforeseen “additional works” with suspicion, but it undoubtedly makes project 
management difficult for the MTBiGM and GDDKiA when additional works are necessary.  
These interview excerpts demonstrate that the EU does continue to wield influence over the 
public administration in Poland, especially when its own funds are involved.  The sheer amount 
of Cohesion Funds transferred to Poland, 11,747,856,611 Euros (European Commission 2007), 
for the purposes of realizing the national roads network warrants strict accounting and 
justification on the part of the government entities involved.   
 
6.4.2 Supporting Evidence  
Evidence of accountability can be found in multiple government documents detailing the 
exact functions of each government ministry.  It is often explicitly written to whom individual 
departments are responsible as well as what options supervising parties have to put disciplinary 
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action. There are whole departments dedicated to internal supervision within ministries, 
performing all types of supervision and auditing. This speaks to the capability of ministries and 
agencies such as the GDDKiA to regulate their own activity in addition to the accountability 
which is directed towards the elected government and society as a whole.  Descriptions of 
accountability in government documents are particularly relevant because they are in essence a 
public pronouncement of which policies and institutions can be brought to bear for the purpose 
of properly supervising and controlling government administration.  
Additionally, we know from the same government documents that reform efforts must be 
promulgated from certain quarters. Reforms can only be officially initiated by either the ministry 
or agency itself, or, in the form of law, or as directed from the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  Thus, 
while it is known that the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR are indeed accountable to the public 
and the industry, this accountability only affects them when it reaches into the vertical structures 
emanating from the elected government. Therefore, accountability to the public and to the 
industry has only an indirect effect on the work of these entities.   
Examples of the mechanisms of accountability at work can be seen in the recent 
dismissals of Lech Witecki and Sławomir Nowak, the head of the GDDKiA and the Minister of 
Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy respectively.  Although both men were 
dismissed for different reasons, their departure has strengthened accountability in the 
government transport sector.  Lech Witecki was named head of the GDDKiA in 2008.  Although 
he had no background in transportation, it was argued that he would strictly manage the highway 
construction process, ensuring that EU and Polish funds were not spent excessively.  Lech 
Witecki’s tenure at the helm of the GDDKiA was marked by an adversarial relationship with the 
major construction firms involved in building the network in Poland.  In keeping with his 
background as an auditor at the Supreme Audit Chamber, Witecki intended to hold the 
contractors accountable for their performance.  In a blistering criticism of Witecki in Rynek 
Infrastruktury, Henryk Klimkiewicz (2014) wrote, “Cleverly, step by step, he built the image of 
the knight who fights for the public penny against the greedy construction companies and made 
hostages of ministers in his game. His position became so strong that he set and evaluated goals 
himself without any actual any political supervision from above”.  Witecki was not well liked by 
the construction sector because his excessive rigidity in dealing with completion deadlines and 
above all else prices charged by the contractors was seen as having led to the collapse of several 
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companies.  Companies were struck with rapidly increasing prices of construction materials and 
could not increase the amount of money charged to the GDDKiA for their services.  Under the 
leadership of Witecki, the GDDKiA would not renegotiate contracts.  For example when pressed 
by journalist Adam Grzeszak on whether the GDDKiA’s policies towards contractors were a 
cause of delays, Witecki protested and blamed EU environmental regulations which had to be 
met (Grzeszak 2012).  After several years, the protests of industry leaders and the slowing pace 
of progress in building major sections of motorways and expressways finally led the to Witecki’s 
dismissal in February 2014.  The MTBiGM and MRR were combined to create the new Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Development led by Elżbieta Bieńkowska (former head of the MRR), who 
recommended to the Prime Minister that Witecki be dismissed from the government.  This 
episode illustrates the problems of excessively rigid accountability expected from contractors, 
but not from the leadership of the GDDKiA itself.  Furthermore it demonstrates that there was 
not sufficient accountability in the form of group and public pressures.  Industry complained that 
they seldom if ever were able to hold meetings with the GDDKiA leadership, thereby not 
allowing for the creation of a sustainable dialogue.  It was only when it became clear to the 
political leadership that the concerns of industry leaders were at least in part substantiated that 
action was taken.  This reaffirms the supremacy of political accountability among the other types 
described by Peter’s (2010). 
The case of Sławomir Nowak’s resignation as Minister of Transport, Construction and 
Maritime Economy in October 2013 was illegal behavior and potentially corruption.  Nowak had 
failed to disclose his possession of a wristwatch worth PLN 20,500 or USD 6,600 (Goettig 2013).  
The value of the watch was greater the minimum value of property, which as a Member of 
Parliament and minister, Nowak was required to declare.  Because Nowak did not disclose his 
watch to Parliament and because it was not clear how he obtained it, prosecutors informed the 
Parliament that his actions were potentially illegal.  Nowak’s resignation was accepted by Prime 
Minister Tusk.  Sławomir Nowak was held accountable for his personal actions by the Prime 
Minister and so this demonstrates vertical political accountability within the Polish government.  
However, industry leaders were also unsatisfied with his performance as minister.  In an opinion 
piece for Rynek Infrastruktury, Rafał Bałdys, the Vice President of the Polish Association of 
Construction Industry Employers (Polski Związek Pracodawców Budownictwa), wrote “It is 
easier for it to come to the dismissal of a minister with the help of photograph of a watch, than 
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with the help of expert publications and analysis demonstrating the horrible state of the 
infrastructure construction sector” (2013).  Bałdys echoed the commonly held concerns 
throughout the construction industry that the government was not engaging in a meaningful 
dialogue with construction companies and were therefore ignorant of their plight.  This indicates 
to a lack of accountability to its colleagues in the business sector on the part of the MTBiGM.  It 
is difficult to tell whether or not the difficulties of the construction sector allegedly caused by the 
MTBiGM and its subordinate, the GDDKiA, were influential in the Prime Minister’s decision to 
accept Nowak’s resignation.  As Academic 5 (Figure 5.8) commented, Nowak was considered 
very efficient in the performance of his duties.  There is no doubt that many projects were 
completed during Nowak’s tenure as minister, a fact which was widely recognized.  However, 
the problems to which Bałdys alluded were not as readily seen by the wider public and therefore 
did not play a large role in shaping the public perception of him.  Nevertheless, the ongoing 
issues associated with the tense relationship between the Polish government and the road 
construction industry certainly did not help the prime minister’s evaluation of Nowak in the 
aftermath of the watch scandal. 
Many examples of the EU’s influence can be given that would illustrate how the 
MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR are accountable to it not only for the use of funds but in their 
basic operations as these must at least nominally fit within EU criteria. It is understandable that 
the EU’s primary influence today nearly 10 years after accession is through its continued 
financial assistance to Poland.  A recent scandal highlighted the importance of maintaining the 
EU’s approval.  In late January 2013, the EU froze 900 million Euros in funds from the Polish 
government in light of an ongoing Polish investigation into price fixing among contractors.  The 
investigation had been launched in 2010, but the gravity of the potential fraudulent activity had 
only become public much later.  Ten persons from nine companies as well as a former Polish 
government official were charged with crime (Reuters 2013).  Polish officials, including the 
Minister of Regional Development, Elżbieta Bieńkowska, met with EU officials in order to 
address the issue.  The EU required and investigation and report on the matter, which the Polish 
government delivered several months later, leading to the restoration of EU funds.  This event 
involving the potential misuse of Cohesion Funds and the subsequent harsh reaction of the EU 
demonstrate the EU’s continued influence over this policy area and Poland, as the Polish 
government moved very quickly to attempt to rectify the situation.  These examples demonstrate 
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the purpose of accountability.  Accountability in the form of internal and external audits can 
identify problems with the design and implementation of a program.  Political (vertical) 
accountability (supported by accountability in the form of professional norms) can lead to the 
disciplining or removal of individuals responsible for problems or ethical failings.  Above all 
else, accountability seeks to ensure that the policy direction of the government, in this case the 
completion of the roadway infrastructure projects, are eventually completed.  
It is only logical that those actors and institutions to which the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and 
MRR are accountable and also capable of exerting pressure in fact do exert pressure for reform 
within these ministries and agencies. If the actors and institutions were not able to sanction the 
MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR, there would in fact be no real accountability.  But in addition to 
having the power to sanction these actors and institutions, they have the ability to promote and 
introduce reforms into the ministries in the agency as one option by which they could most 
effectively realize their own goals.  In other words, the goals of these actors and institutions are 
best realized when the responsible government ministries and agencies are fully capable of 
implementing the desired policies.    
 
6.4.3 Reason 1: Strong Vertical Accountability to Elected Government 
The strongest support for the claim that the existence of mechanisms of accountability 
have been successful in compelling the Polish government administration to undertake reforms 
in the area of transport infrastructure policy is that the presence of a system of pronounced 
vertical accountability provides the domestic political leadership with sufficient leverage over 
the administration to achieve the desired reforms and policy directions.  A warrant demonstrating 
the relevance of this reason to the claim can be articulated as follows: The Ministry of Transport, 
Construction and Maritime Economy, the General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways, 
and the Ministry of Regional Development and their civil servants answer most directly to their 
immediate superiors in the political leadership, an arrangement that means that the political 
leadership holds the most power over the administration(s) when compared to other potential 
sources of influence (interest groups, civil society, professional organizations, etc.).  Therefore, 
this leverage resulting from the strong vertical accountability is indispensable as a means for 
external forces shaping administration.  There are three sources of relevant evidence that lend 
credence to the notion of strong vertical accountability:  government documents, interviews 
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conducted with civil servants and academics, and, to a lesser extent, media sources.   Each type 
of supporting evidence will be discussed below. 
Government Documents:  In the Polish political and legal system, the most definitive 
government document that establishes arrangements of accountability within a given government 
entity is the law establishing the said entity.  Formal vertical structures of accountability within 
the MTBiGM, the GDDKiA, and the MRR are all described in broad terms within the respective 
acts of Parliament that created these government bodies.  The acts often detail the basic internal 
structures of each entity, as well as the responsibility of the head to the Prime Minister and 
Council of Ministers.  The details of the internal organization of the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and 
MRR are decided by the individual heads of these entities.  Descriptions of the internal structures 
taken from the websites of these entities provide some evidence of the strongly vertical nature of 
accountability within these two ministries and directorate.   
The MTBiGM
61
 is a very large ministry, encompassing many diverse transport policy 
areas.  Of interest here are those structures relevant to motorway and expressway infrastructure 
policy.  The Department of Control (Departament Kontroli) is directly subordinate to the 
Minister of Transport.  The Department of Control oversees the quality of work within the 
Ministry of Transport.  It also monitors the use of EU funds in programs administered by 
departments within the MTBiGM.  Given that a minister is always a political appointee, having 
unmediated command
62
 over the Department of Control is a powerful tool in the hands of the 
Minister to implement the wishes of his or her Prime Minister (and the Cabinet).  The Secretary 
of State of the MTBiGM answers directly to the Minister and is responsible for the Department 
of Road Transport (Departament Transportu Drogowego), the Department of Roads and 
Motorways (Departament Dróg i Autostrad), the Chief Inspector of Road Transport (GITD), and 
the General Director of National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA).  The Department of Roads 
and Motorways supervises the GITD (in matters of motorways) and the GDDKiA on behalf of 
the Minister.  It also develops policy in this area. There is an Undersecretary of State who 
oversees the Department of EU Funds (Departament Fundusze Europejskich) and the 
Department of the Budget (Departament Budżetu). There is another Undersecretary of State 
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 All descriptions found on Ministerial Website. 
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 This command would be mediated if it were in fact directly subordinate to a high-ranking deputy of the Minister, 
such as a Secretary of State or Director General, who would then in turn be directly responsible to the Minister.  In 
the case of the Department of Control, the head of the department answers directly to the Minister. 
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responsible for the Department of Transport Policy and International Cooperation (Departament 
Polityki Transportowej i Współpracy Międzynarodowej) and the Legal-legislative Department 
(Departament Prawny).  Both Undersecretaries of State are responsible directly to the Secretary 
of State, who in turn answers to the Minister. 
As a directorate, the GDDKiA’s structure differs from that found in a ministry.  There are 
neither secretaries nor undersecretaries of state.  The head of the GDDKiA, the General Director, 
is supposed to be a politically appointed civil servant drawn from the national human resources 
pool (see Chapter 5).  Thus, because the General Director is a political appointment (albeit from 
the civil service), the highest ranking career civil servant is the Director General (just as in most 
ministries).  There are several deputy directors fulfilling tasks similar to those of undersecretaries 
of state.  The General Director (head of the GDDKiA) directly supervises the Office of Internal 
Audit and the Legal Department, as well as the heads of the sixteen regional branches (located in 
each of the voivodships) of the GDDKiA.  The Director General (highest ranking career civil 
servant) oversees both the Office of Administration and the Department of Internal Control, both 
of which have competencies in the area of internal supervision and discipline.  One of the deputy 
directors is responsible for the Department of EU Projects and Monitoring, the Department of 
Public-Private Partnerships, and the Department of Planning.  These three departments ensure 
that government and EU policies are being implemented according to plan. 
The MRR has a central coordinating function as a ministry.  Nearly all of its departments 
have some type of monitoring and/or evaluating function.  Some relevant departments and 
offices include the Section of Control within the Department of Managing the EU Cohesion 
Fund, the Desks for Internal Audit and Control within the Office of the Director General, and the 
Section for Organization within the Office of the Minister.  Within the Department of Structural 
Policy Coordination (Departament Koordynacji Polityki Strukturalnej), for example, there is the 
Section for Evaluation (Krajowa Jednostka Oceny) (in Polish: Wydział Ewaluacji), which was 
responsible for evaluating projects based upon their economic merit and necessity. This activity 
was essential for determining which projects would be co-financed by the EU.   
Interviews:  The nine civil servants interviewed agreed that vertical accountability was 
the strongest among different possible types.  MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 remarked that outsiders 
(interest groups, civil society groups) could often only successfully lobby the MTBiGM through 
politicians.  However, local politicians were able to meet with the Minister or deputy-ministers in 
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order to discuss policy.  This same contention was reiterated in interviews with civil servants 
from the GDDKiA, GITD, and MRR. 
Nearly all of the academics interviewed concurred with the notion of the predominance 
of vertical accountability, allowing for other mechanisms of accountability to operate via 
politicians.  As could be expected, they pointed out greater problems.  A logical conclusion of 
Academic 2’s comments on the monopoly of information held by the bureaucrats in the 
government transport sector as well as the (in his opinion) skewed system of bonuses, is that the 
vertical system of accountability is damaged by such shortcomings.  Academic 2 was also 
concerned by the lack of clarity in laws, regulations, and procedures that governed the actions of 
civil servants, as such confusion would lead to a break-down in performance and, ultimately, an 
undermining of vertical control.  Academic 5 saw strong vertical accountability, although this 
perhaps leads to problems in the area of the tendering process (see discussion below).  Academic 
7 had many of the same concerns as Academic 5 in the area of tenders.  Academic 7 saw 
organizational specialization (such as can be found in the GDDKiA) as increasing efficiency, 
although also a possible cause of coordination problems. 
 
6.4.4 Reason 2: Vertical Accountability to EU 
If the presence of pronounced vertical accountability within the Polish administration 
concerned with transport infrastructure policy is the most prominent and fitting reason 
supporting the contention that the existence of mechanisms of accountability compels reform, 
then the general success of EU conditionality in achieving much of the policy goals desired by 
the EU Commission stands out as the next most important reason.  The vast majority of 
fundamental policies and regulations favored by the EU were adopted during the accession phase 
from the mid-1990s to May, 2004.  It was during this period that the greatest strides were made 
towards a reformed government administration, although these reform directions are certainly 
still works in progress.  Although leverage over new member states decreases somewhat in the 
wake of their accession, the remaining leverage at the EU Commission’s disposal centers around 
legal sanctioning by the European Court of Justice and especially by the Commission’s control 
over the allocation of Structural and Cohesion Funds for Economic and Regional Development 
in its member states.  This mechanism of controlling the funding tap for EU-assisted projects 
represents the EU’s greatest influence over areas of policy in the new member states.  This 
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accountability is vertical (or political in Peters’ terms) in nature, often mediated by the political 
government in Poland, but also enforced by direct cooperation with the responsible government 
ministries and agencies.   
 Government Documents:  Poland has been profoundly affected by accession to the 
European Union.  Direct influences of the EU can be observed in nearly every administrative 
body in the Polish government.  The MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR are no exception to this 
trend, arguably being among the entities most affected by EU membership.  The most indicative 
features of the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR reflecting the influence of the EU are the 
numerous departments within their organizational hierarchies that handle issues related to EU 
transport and regional development policies.  Influence of the EU can also be found in the rules 
and procedures that it saw implemented by the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR, as described 
below. 
The MTBiGM has been affected by Poland’s membership in the European Union both in 
regards to the requirements of the EU for using Cohesion Funds have necessitated a great deal 
more of oversight and new regulations to be enforced upon the Polish transport sector.  Briefly 
addressing the latter, the Department of Road Transport (Departament Transportu Drogowego) 
is responsible for ensuring that a whole new range of technical and professional standards are 
followed in the road transport sector in Poland.  As the implementation of these new standards 
was obligatory for receiving EU Cohesion Funds, the Department of Road Transport plays an 
important role in the process of the MTBiGM receiving the necessary funds for realizing the 
Polish government’s highway infrastructure policy.  The Department of Transport Policy and 
International Cooperation (Departament Polityki Transportowej i Współpracy Międzynarodowej) 
is closely involved with the implementing the EU’s policies in the transport sector, especially 
those regarding technical and professional standards.   
The Department of EU Funds (Departament Fundusze Europejskich) bears the most 
evident markings of the EU by virtue of the fact that it closely cooperates with the European 
Commission regarding the budget.  It appraises projects and determines their eligibility for 
funding. The description of the duties performed by the Department of EU Funds clearly 
indicates that it is responsible to the EU for its actions in addition to being responsible to the 
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Polish government
63
.  The Department of the Budget (Departament Budżetu) also performs 
similar functions regarding finances, although this is only part of the department’s 
responsibilities to the ministry.  The Department of Control (Departament Kontroli) ensures the 
proper use of EU funds as well. 
The GDDKiA contains units such as the Department of EU Projects and Monitoring 
(Departament Projektow Unijnych i Monitoringu) that help ensure EU standards in the work of 
realizing the motorway and expressway network.  However, most policy related connections to 
the EU are to be found within the GDDKiA’s superior ministry, the MTBIGM.  The GDDKIA is 
primarily a body that implements policy and does little to fundamentally develop it.  Therefore, it 
does not have as close of a connection to the EU as the MTBiGM does, by virtue of the fact that 
it does not make policy. 
Of the three government bodies under discussion, it is perhaps the Ministry of Regional 
Development (MRR) that had been most affected by the EU accession process.  Not only was the 
portfolio of regional development completely restructured at the behest of the European 
Commission (via the mechanism of conditionality) but an entirely new ministry was created, 
giving birth to the MRR in 2005.  Interestingly, many of the departments that coordinate policy 
with the European Union also serve as monitoring bodies for the EU, although this does not 
appear to be a conflict of interest in practice. The Section for Evaluation (Krajowa Jednostka 
Oceny) (in Polish: Wydział Ewaluacji) in the Department of Structural Policy Coordination 
(Departament Koordynacji Polityki Strukturalnej) has the task of ensuring cooperation and 
accuracy of reporting of the Polish government and to the EU.The Office of International 
Cooperation (Stanowisko do spraw Współpracy Międzynarodowej) helps to coordinate activities 
with international bodies.  However, the most influential in transport is the Section for 
Implementation Coordination 1 (Wydział Koordynacji Wdrażania 1).  This Section’s duties 
include: 1) monitoring the progress of transport projects financed in whole or in part by 
Cohesion Funds, 2) partaking in the preparation and updating of procedures used in the Cohesion 
Funds process, 3) preparing guidelines for the use of Cohesion Funds, 4) responsibility in the 
area of POIiŚ projects, 5) verification of applications of budget dispensing government units to 
the Ministry of Finance, 6) working with the Section of Supervision and Analysis on 
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The fact that the Department of EU Funds of the MTBiGM was answerable to both the Polish government and the 
EU does not seemed to have caused it significant problems in fulfilling its responsibilities to both entities. 
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coordinating the implementation of priorities in the transport sector, including large projects, 7) 
coordinating the procedures for competition in the transport sector, and 8) analysis of and giving 
opinions on legal acts, strategic documents, policies, plans, and programs in the context of 
implementing Cohesion Funds in the transport sector.  For a more detailed description, see the 
author’s translation of this Section’s duties in appendix.  The majority of the Section for 
Implementation Coordination 1’s duties is tied to satisfying requirements imposed by the EU on 
the use of Cohesion Funds.  This section is perhaps the most telling example of the power of the 
EU to transform a given bureaucracy. 
Interviews:  All interview participants confirmed that the European Union has had a 
major impact on the administrative activities of the government ministries and agencies in the 
transport sector.  For example, MRR Civil Servant 1 said, “European money is not easy money.  
From one side we have the Polish public administration and our internal procedures and from the 
other side there are procedures which we are forced to implement by the European Union in 
order to get money from the European Union."  The civil servants at the GDDKiA commented 
on how the receiving assistance from the EU required creating a special department for the 
management of EU projects.  At the Ministry of Transport, MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 related 
how perhaps the most noticeable change to the ministry’s organizational structure was the 
creation of two offices for the purposes of implementing EU regulations.  MTBiGM Civil 
Servant 1 also mentioned that the EU regulations that were absolutely obligatory were at times 
difficult to fulfill and could even be burdensome from the point of view of implementing 
motorway infrastructure projects.  Academics interviewed generally relayed their opinion that 
EU membership and Cohesion Funds have indeed impacted the responsible ministries and 
agencies; however, for them it was difficult to ascertain exactly to what extent this was the case.  
Nevertheless, they echoed the general contention that vertical accountability to the EU was a 
factor in the transformations of the responsible ministries and agencies. 
 
6.4.5 Reason 3:  Preemptive Response to Outside Pressures 
The act of preemptively responding to outside pressures is an important sign of a 
mechanism of accountability at work.  It demonstrates a given government organization’s ability 
to adapt to a fluid environment.  Evidence of the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR responding to 
outside pressure preemptively can be found in the same evidence that demonstrates vertical 
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accountability and the influence of the EU.  The MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR implemented 
new procedures in anticipation of the new EU requirements, which demonstrates both the 
influence of the EU and the ability to preemptive respond to a changing set of rules. Preempting 
scrutiny by the EU or Polish government bodies such as Council of Ministers or the Supreme 
Audit Chamber (connected to the parliament) was also a way for the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and 
MRR to maintain a degree of autonomy from outside pressures. 
Government Documents:  Those departments or sections within departments that work in 
the area of policymaking are often the most capable of preempting changes or reforms imposed 
from the outside.  This is the case because those employed in these offices are privy to the 
thinking of outside individuals or groups when compared to those employed in other departments 
within the same ministry.  Examples of these departments would include the Department of EU 
Funds (Departament Fundusze Europejskich), the Department of the Budget (Departament 
Budżetu),the Department of Transport Policy and International Cooperation (Departament 
Polityki Transportowej i Współpracy Międzynarodowej), and the Legal-legislative Department 
(Departament Prawny) within the MTBiGM.  Within the GDDKiA, the Department of EU 
Projects and Monitoring (Departament Projektow Unijnych i Monitoringu) would be in a similar 
position.  The Department of Structural Policy Coordination (Departament Koordynacji Polityki 
Strukturalnej) is home to this capability within the MRR. 
Interviews:  Generally speaking, interview participants from the government ministries 
and the GDDKiA confirmed that their government administrations acted in advance of new EU 
regulations by implementing rules and procedures that would fulfill the desired criteria of the EU 
Commission.   This was often held as a more desirable course of action as it allowed for more 
freedom of action on the part of the ministries vis-à-vis the EU commission and the political 
leadership in the Polish government. 
 
6.5 Analysis and Results 
Interviews with Polish civil servants clarified that vertical accountability was the most 
important type for their ministries.  On the national level, this is reinforced by the fact that other 
mechanisms of accountability described by Peters (2010b), including market and external 
controls as well as group and public pressures, affect the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and the MRR 
through the medium of the political leadership in Poland, to whom the ministries are vertically 
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accountable.  The respective offices of the minister
64
 in the MTBiGM and MRR are the usual 
venues for formal outside lobbying by politicians (including MPs, regional and local), business 
and industry, and civil society groups.  From Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) model of 
administrative reform, socio-economic forces (See Chapter 3) are felt by the political system, the 
actors within which then seek to make policy or organizational changes to the government 
administration accordingly.  For example, there is pressure on politicians (and the MTBiGM and 
MRR) from citizens to complete the network of motorways and expressways in the fastest 
amount of time possible with the least possible cost.  Politicians exert pressure on the 
government (in a parliamentary sense) to hasten the construction program.  Pressure to hasten the 
construction of a network of motorways and expressways since the 1990s has spawned various 
proposals and approaches as to how best to configure the “Ministry of Transport” and its 
appropriate subordinate entities for performing the task.  Individual proposals may or may not 
have been influenced by more strident New Public Management ideas; however, there was a 
general desire for seeing performance measurement implemented.  There is in fact clear evidence 
that performance management has been implemented because the detailed descriptions of the 
ministries’ responsibilities and duties reveal that many departments are charged with scrutinizing 
the work of their ministries for efficiency.  The ministerial government and mandarins 
corresponding to the elites then will direct the ministries to implement necessary changes in 
organization and policy.  The process described above does correspond to the political 
mechanism of accountability in the case of the domestic political system in Poland. 
On the international level, it can be observed that the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR are 
accountable to the EU for the implementation of the network of motorways and expressways, 
which are in part financed by the EU.  The principal mechanism by which the EU currently 
exerts reform pressure and policy directions is by controlling the allocation of financial resources.  
Although this direction of accountability is vertical (and often mediated by the Polish political 
leadership), there is direct cooperation between the EU Commission and the MTBiGM and MRR.  
This cooperation on matters of policy development and implementation serves as a mechanism 
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 Within the organizational structure of most ministries, the “Office of the Minister” exists to coordinate the 
political and management activities of the Minister.  Many of those working in the “Office of the Minister”, 
especially those attached to a minister’s political cabinet, are political appointments and not civil servants.  Although 
subordinate to the Prime Minister and Parliament, this office functions as the immediate political leadership of a 
Ministry.  
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of control by the EU.  To illustrate this point, it can be understood that the close interaction of 
some ministerial departments with the EU in matters of scrutinizing payment applications of 
beneficiaries
65
 constitutes both an opportunity for the EU to conduct an ongoing audit of the 
implementation process as well as shaping the accountable institutions it desires within the 
Polish MTBiGM and MRR.  Failure on the part of the MTBiGM and MRR to provide an 
accurate accounting report of a given project to the EU would be grounds for reviewing funding 
allocations for the said project as well as future ones.  The case of the EU is an extension of the 
political mechanism of accountability and corresponding reform process. 
 
6.5.1 Hypothesis Result 
In light of the evidence presented above, the hypothesis that those actors and institutions 
to which the Polish Ministry of Transport (including the GDDKiA) and the Ministry of Regional 
Development are accountable are indeed also the sources of pressure to implement 
administrative reforms is supported.  And although this connection may appear so intuitive that it 
did not need to be subjected it to academic inquiry, it will be shown in the forthcoming 
discussion section why the context in which this occurs is very important. Accountability to 
certain authority is linked to the same authority’s ability to either directly or indirectly introduce 
reform within an administration. The confirmation of this intrinsic connection offers a guide for 
the further study of the relations between public administration and elected government. 
 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
What is the significance of the fact that accountability and pressure for reforms do in fact 
coincide with one another? Why would articulating the seemingly obvious be a legitimate effort? 
It was by undertaking this inquiry that the central role of vertical accountability in Polish 
government administration was confirmed. This was an expected result, because the government 
administration in Poland operates within a unitary state and the continental European tradition of 
civil law. These circumstances are perhaps those best suited for the approximation of those 
structures deemed ideal within Weberian bureaucracy.  Weberian bureaucracy highly values a 
strictly defined division of labor within a stable hierarchy. However, this vertical responsibility 
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of government administration thrusts upon the elected government an obligation to be able to 
efficiently and effectively manage the state administration. Therefore, elected government itself 
must be capable of governing.  While the hypothesis results do not elaborate upon agency on the 
part of administration within the politics-administration dichotomy, they do reaffirm the 
dominance of political leadership over the Polish government administration.   
In line with Farazmand’s (2009) conception of politics of capacity, the political 
leadership of Poland, including political parties, cabinet members, ministers, and political 
appointees, as well as the public and business and industry, can be viewed as stakeholders in the 
outcomes of the policies implemented by the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR.  While even under 
communism, the Polish government was perfectly capable of being informed of the activities of 
the government ministries mainly via the parallel party apparatus, the transition has witnessed 
increased capabilities of private industry and civil society groups being capable of observing and 
comprehending what transpires within the government entities.  While private industry and civil 
society are now able to appraise the performance of the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR, these 
government bodies are only partially accountable to them directly.  The nature of the executive 
branch’s structure in Poland strongly favors strict vertical accountability with non-government 
entities only being able to effectively pressure the public administration through the medium of 
the political leadership.  Although private industry and, to a lesser extent, civil society may be 
able to influence policy, they do not significantly affect the manner in which policy is delivered. 
In recent years, undoubtedly, the capability of the government to manage the public 
administration, especially the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR, has increased the level of skill 
and education required of civil servants and has also become more widespread among the 
political classes. The need for the elected government to be capable of introducing reform into 
the government bodies that are accountable to them confirms the importance and usefulness of 
the concept of politics as capacity.   
The question explored in this chapter is also clearly related to legal rationality, for it takes 
a stable legal order to ensure that administrations are accountable to their political masters in a 
predictable and uniform manner. The political rationality described by Diesing is also applicable 
here as it seeks to explain the logical organization of decision-making structures. Although many 
of these actors and institutions to which the MTBiGM, GDDKiA, and MRR are accountable do 
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not themselves decide on policy, an organizational framework must exist in which these entities 
are capable of exercising influence over the ministries and agencies. 
This chapter further illustrates how the process of reform may have taken place given the 
legacy explanation examined in the previous chapter. It is an important step before proceeding 
with actual policies and restructurings such as decentralization, which will be explored in the 
next chapter, Chapter 7, and the capabilities of civil servants in the ministries and agencies in 
which they work to shape the policy process and react to changing circumstances on the ground, 
which will be explored in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF NATIONAL ROADS POLICY 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization (and the problems and benefits associated with it) has been a popular 
topic of discussion in recent decades.   The topic of decentralization as a phenomenon in 
government is so commonplace in the literature that it could be expected that signficicant 
elements of Polish motorway and expressway policy are decentralized.  A hasty glance at the 
literature could well leave the impression that decentralization, albeit in a reduced form, existed 
for regional governments (voivodships) in Poland. However, the reality may not conform to 
expectations. In an effort to approach both the spheres of public administration during the 
transition and transport policy, a research question was developed which sought to identify the 
role of decentralization and its consequences for the voivodships.  The question reads: Has 
decentralization empowered self-governments in Poland to fully participate in the policy process 
of national roads?  The expectation was that decentralization in this policy area would have been 
significant.  Thus the following hypothesis was developed:  Decentralization has indeed had an 
impact on highway transportation policy in Poland insofar as regional governments have 
greater policy input and implementation responsibilities; however, ultimate authority still lies 
with the central government.  Further research and interviews conducted in Poland concluded 
that the hypothesis stated above could not be supported.  Even the relatively wide latitude offered 
by the phrasing, “Decentralization has indeed had an impact on highway transportation policy in 
Poland insofar as regional governments have greater policy input and implementation 
responsibilities” cannot be supported, as the unstated expectation was that this would be a 
predictable and significant influence. Decentralization of powers and responsibilities to the 
regional governments is not a significant feature of motorway and expressway transport policy in 
Poland today. 
Interestingly, the reasons lending support to a rejection of the above-stated hypothesis 
provide the opportunity to explore the nature of decentralization and the rationale of rejecting it 
in the case of motorway and expressway transport policy.  The first reason is that self-
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governments are simply incapable of this kind of endeavor on their own and must lobby the 
central government for these projects.  The second reason is that the central government has 
actively sought to recentralize some powers that were initially devolved in the early transition.  
This second reason carries a great deal of significance for the transition literature as well as the 
literature on transport in Poland.  In brief, the idea that too many powers were decentralized at 
the beginning of the transition supports the contention that some supposed legacies of socialist 
governance in Poland may in fact be legacies of less-discussed failures
66
 of the transition.  The 
importance of this finding concerning decentralization will be seen in its relation to other 
research questions in this dissertation, particularly Question 1 on administrative legacy and 
Question 4 on policy capacity in Chapters 5 and 8, respectively. 
 
7.2 Review of Key Concepts 
The continuum between centralization and decentralization forms an important 
dimension of any discussion about administrative reform. If decentralization and centralization 
are a means to an end, if they are but fitting and conducive arrangements to different kinds of 
activities in politics and governance, then it is necessary to also reflect on those activities 
requiring such arrangements to be effective and productive.  However, in order to limit the vast 
scope of such a task, we will focus on the activity of spatial planning after our discussion of 
centralization and decentralization.   
In a most basic sense, decentralization is the dispersal of powers and resources from the 
center towards the periphery. The dispersal of powers and resources does not necessarily occur 
evenly around the center.  Decentralization, like any other concept, must be defined in a way that 
clarifies its conceptual boundaries. Agrawal and Ribot suggest three dimensions that dictate the 
shape and extent of (government) decentralization, including actors, types of powers to be 
decentralized, and accountability (1999). They put forward approximately five different kinds of 
decentralization: political, administrative, economic, fiscal, and environmental. Of these kinds of 
decentralization, political and administrative decentralization is most appropriate for discussion 
of their current structural arrangements in Poland.  The distinction between political 
decentralization and administrative decentralization is an important one, because political 
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decentralization is a more fundamental government restructuring where greater political power is 
vested in a local citizenry (Agrawal and Ribot 1999), whereas administrative decentralization 
generally retains political power at the center but delegates responsibility for government 
functions to lower levels of government, saving time and resources for the central government
67
. 
So what is the core logic of decentralization?  A foundational principle of 
decentralization is the concept of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity holds that 
government responsibility for any given policy area should be delegated to the lowest possible 
level of government where the consequences of such delegation would not negatively affect the 
other levels of government or society in general.   Following the concept of subsidiarity, 
“representative local governments” should be entrusted with authority over a given domain so 
long as this does not adversely affect society (Ribot 2003).  Generally speaking, the advantages 
of this type of structural arrangement of decentralized government are thought to be the 
following:  1) a more democratic arrangement, 2) more efficiency, 3) and greater equality.  The 
government and thus power are “closer to the people."  Empowered local politicians and local 
government administrations are thought to better understand the needs of their community as 
well as important issues that are particular to their community.   
The European Union has traditionally been a strong supporter of decentralization within 
government. However, the degree of decentralization to be achieved is always decided upon by 
national governments. In particular, the EU supports decentralization in the form of 
empowerment of regions, the process being known as regionalization.  The EU has encouraged 
sub-national regions, mostly although not necessarily corresponding to administrative divisions, 
to increase their economic competitiveness and social cohesion. New member states, including 
Poland, have been targeted by this initiative of Brussels (see Baun 2002, Grosse 2006, and Yoder 
2007).  It is thought that this regional focus will encourage lagging regions within member states 
to compete with more successful regions both within their own country as well as regions in 
other member states.  Regionalization has led to pressure for the establishment and 
empowerment of subnational regions corresponding to provinces.  If fully implemented, these 
transformations desired by the European Union would fundamentally alter the hierarchy through 
which a state can govern its citizens.  In theory, the hierarchy of government is altered because 
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 Decentralization also is less costly for the central government, as the costs for addressing issues is shifted to 
regional and local governments thereby at least giving the appearance of reducing spending. 
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the accountability of subnational governments to the state is weakened, as well as the 
strengthening of the capabilities to design and implement policies and carry out public services 
on the part of the subnational governments.  With this policy regionalization, its roots being 
found in decentralization and subsidiarity, the European Union hopes to achieve greater 
democracy, including greater democratic participation and efficiency of government among its 
member states and on the European continent as a whole. 
The EU has sought to abide by a consistent logic of decentralization and the principle of 
subsidiarity. This can be seen in the fact that the EU performs functions at the supranational level 
only when the same functions cannot be performed as efficiently or effectively at the national or 
subnational levels.  Giuranno (2010) explains that the subsidiarity principle in the EU “implies a 
benefit criterion stating that the EU provision of policies must bring value over and above what 
could be achieved by individual governments acting alone.”  This idea of value added in the 
delivery of a service or performing above function at a certain level of government is also 
imparted upon member states who were supposed to delegate more responsibility to 
(independent) local levels of government, which in some cases had to be created or reconstituted 
in order to achieve this goal.  For example, in the former Eastern Bloc states, local governments 
as separate legal entities from the central state did not exist under late state socialism. 
Despite this optimistic account of the benefits of decentralization and its various 
manifestations, there have been many concerns raised over time about some of the shortcomings 
of decentralization.   Among the most common and obvious criticisms of decentralization are 
that it hampers policy coordination at the center when such national policies must necessarily be 
developed and implemented at the national level.  At the level of an individual organization, 
decentralization runs counter to traditional Weberian structures, which have been known to 
government administration for over a century.   It is argued that this will lead to a lack of 
oversight, quality, and coordination.   As will be discussed later, this has been a repeated 
criticism of the early efforts at decentralization in Poland made by government ministries 
responsible for implementing national spatial and transport policies.  It has not only been a 
criticism made by central government ministries, as academic observers have also taken note of 
some of the difficulties that faced road transportation in Poland in the wake of decentralization 
(see Judge, Werpachowski, and Wishardt 2004).  Another criticism was made by Łętowski:  
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In general, self-government tends to be promoted and supported by central 
authorities when they seek to shed responsibility for problems with which they 
cannot cope themselves.  Self-government, in whatever form, is not an easier or 
more pleasant form of governance.  On the contrary, it is, in many respects, a 
much more complex, difficult and also troublesome way to govern.  In particular 
there is a natural tendency for self-governmental bodies to behave like pressure 
groups, the chief raison d’être of which is to extract more benefits from the 
government for their clientele, to gain a greater share in the ‘riches’ that are at the 
disposal of the centre, and to fight competing organizations. (1993, pg. 5). 
 
Recent years have seen several attempts made by the Polish government to recentralize some 
decision-making powers as the initial effect of decentralization was essentially chaos and 
disorder in the realm of spatial planning. In addition to a lack of funding in the 1990s, this lack 
of coordination and spatial planning adversely affected the ability of the government to proceed 
with a motorway building program.  As will be seen in the discussion later in this chapter, this 
desire on the part of the central government to recentralize some powers in the realm of spatial 
planning displays several the kinds of rationality described by Diesing (1962).  Chiefly, these 
include legal rationality as well as political rationality. 
 
7.3 Methods 
This chapter will seek to answer the question of whether decentralization has empowered 
the voivodships to fully participate in the highway infrastructure policy by identifying the actors, 
powers to be decentralized, and measures of accountability discussed by Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999). The primary relevant actors are the Polish central government on the one hand and the 
regional governments (voivodships) on the other.  This picture is complicated by the fact that the 
Polish GDDKiA is an agency of the central government, and therefore regional branches are 
under the direct control of the center.  Significant powers do not seem to have been truly 
decentralized in Poland.  Regional governments do however have some policy input.   
In re-evaluating
68
 a research question that asks if decentralization plays any significant 
role in the policy process of national roads and a hypothesis which, although designating the 
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 In the preparatory research for this dissertation project, the impression was developed that decentralization may 
have played a strong part in transportation policy involving national roads. This stemmed largely from the fact that 
the literature on the democratic transition (of which political and administrative decentralization were a major part) 
and the separate literature on transportation policy and transportation geography in Poland were being combined.  
Thus, while there was awareness that infrastructure policy regarding motorways and expressways in Poland was 
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State as the primary policymaker, allowed for significant influence of the voivodship 
governments, it occurred to me to view the unexpected answer to this question in light of the 
rationality the state would employ in order to justify recentralizing powers pertaining to, or 
affecting, national roads. As such, although the research question was formulated under mistaken 
assumptions
68
, and a hypothesis was proven to be false, discussing the results of the inquiry into 
this question itself reveals several interesting and significant observations about the rationality 
employed by the central government in Poland when asserting the need for recentralization. 
The data sources for this question included government reports (specifically: National 
Transportation Policy for 2006-2025 developed by the Ministry of Transport and the National 
Spatial Development Concept 2030 developed by the Ministry of Regional Development), 
government publications pertaining to the organizational structure of ministries, reference works, 
history books, and results from interviews conducted in Poland in February and March 2013.  
The following is the order in which the analysis shall occur:  Firstly, I will include some of the 
responses to this question asked in the interviews about decentralization. Without any major 
exceptions, respondents answered that this was a policymaking process in which there was very 
little decentralization to be found. Secondly, I will then present some evidence that supports their 
claims. Specifically, I will demonstrate by an analysis of organizational charts and descriptions 
from the regional branches of the GDDKiA how these branches largely implement policies 
dictated to them by the central offices in Warsaw (in addition to collecting some data and 
information and tending to administrative duties that have been delegated to them from the 
center). Thirdly, I will examine those sections of the policy documents that concern systemic 
changes in order to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and overall organization in order to 
ascertain the justifications put forth by the various ministries for recentralizing government 
power in their policy area.  
This will be where these arrangements will be discussed in light of the various kinds of 
rationality described by Diesing (1962).  Following the analysis, a more detailed discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                             
ultimately a function of the central government, it was believed that regional governments would have some amount 
of influence or input in the policymaking process.  It was fully expected to hear during the interviews that the 
voivodships were indeed influential in shaping this national policy. Therefore, it was quite surprising how quickly 
interview participants dismissed the notion of any significant role for the voivodships in the policymaking process. 
This of course warranted reevaluating this particular research question, with the realization that the question of 
whether or not decentralization plays a significant role in motorway policy in and of itself may be a non-issue. 
 
176 
the results will hopefully expound upon the themes of recentralization in government following a 
wave of decentralization, as well as the rationale for this process. It will also be suggested that 
while administrative decentralization in Poland exists, mostly through delegation, true political 
decentralization of decision making powers is not reflected. The political decentralization of 
some state authority witnessed in the creation of the gminy and powiaty and the reorganization 
of the larger voivodships contributed to the creation of stronger regional and local bases for 
lobbying, which may indirectly affect decision-making processes at the center. 
 
7.4 Results and Analysis 
 This section presents data available from both interviews and government documents 
concerning decentralization in the transport infrastrcucture policy-making process.  From the 
available data, reasons are formed and substantiated which will test the hypothesis that 
decentralization has empowered subnational governments in Poland to more fully participate in 
the policy-making process.  As will be shown, this assertion could not be supported given the 
weak evidence.  However, the same evidence also points to the important reasons why some 
powers are in fact being recentralized to the national level.  This will be discussed in the 
conclusion of the chapter.  
 
7.4.1 Interviews in Poland 
Generally speaking, the interview participants all stated that the national roads policy is 
very centralized, with some suggesting that is it more so than others.  Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that voivodships and local governments have some influence by means of lobbying the Ministry 
of Transport and the political actors who oversee the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of 
Regional Development.  Below are the excerpts. 
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Figure 7.1:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 2. 
 
 
Figure 7.2:  Excerpt of Interview at GDDKiA. 
Interviewer: Do you think that decentralization plays any role in the program of the autostrady or  
the national roads? 
 
Academic 2: No, it has nothing to do with it. Because this is the responsibility for the central government. 
 
Interviewer: Even indirectly? Even indirect influence? 
 
Academic 2: No, no. 
 
Interviewer: Would you possibly view the lobbying of the voivodship governments of the central government 
as a very vague form of decentralization in this case? 
 
Academic 2: No, because you know the construction of motorways is extremely expensive. And this is 
considered by every Polish region to be too expensive for them. So they're quite happy with the existing 
situation that somebody (else) is responsible. So all they can do is just lobby and all of them are (doing so). And 
frankly speaking, in most regions as usual, there are various political games, various oppositions, various 
leading parties, various alliances. In this case, they are always talking with one voice, “New motorways, new 
airports and new railways!." And then, you will not see any difference between opposition leaders and 
government leaders. 
Interviewer: Do you think decentralization has any major role in the implementation of policies regarding the 
Autostrady or the national roads? 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 2: In terms of management, as well as planning, the most important role is played by 
the Ministry (of Transport…) and the General Directorate. For the transport policy, the Ministry is responsible 
for transport policy. At lower levels of administration like, the voivodships, for example, if in a certain year a 
program is being prepared, it has to be publicly consulted. And on this level of voivodships, for example, might 
have some comments. But it is not like the voivodships have any decision power in this aspect. The voivodships 
are responsible in terms of strategy planning for the network of the voivodship roads. But for the national roads, 
motorways/expressways, the State is responsible. 
Interviewer: Is this public consultation you're speaking of common? Was that in relation to national roads, or to 
the Autostrady, or only to the voivodship roads? 
GDDKiA Civil Servant 2: If any strategy document is being prepared, it must be publicly consulted. If it 
concerns national roads, like for example, we have this national road building program for 2007 to 2015, it has to 
be publicly consulted. However, on the other hand… the motorway and expressway network is already 
determined by the regulation of the Council of Ministers. So the draft of the regulation is available on the Web. 
And it's always consulted within the government. [And it is consulted publicly in a certain manner]. And this… 
national road building program also has to [have been] consulted in that way. 
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Figure 7.3: Excerpt of Interview at MTBiGM. 
 
The position of Academic 2 (see Figure 7.1) was a flat denial of any decentralized power 
or authority for voivodships in the policy area of national roads.   However, there was 
recognition on the part of Academic 2 of the willingness of regional politicians of all stripes to 
lobby the State for motorway and expressway projects that they themselves are unable to finance 
or coordinate.  Notes taken from an interview with a transport geographer, designated here as 
Academic 1, recall how this geographer felt that the GDDKiA was a very centralized 
organization; however, there was an acceptance of the idea of decentralization having created a 
Interviewer:   I am aware that the highway construction program or the motorway construction program in 
Poland is essentially a centralized undertaking. But are there any ways in which to decentralize powers influence 
it? Perhaps, what you're speaking of is the regional and local politicians coming to the ministries? 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  Yeah, this is obvious. Our Minister and our ministry are responsible for the whole 
program. But since there is a shortage of money, the difficult choice is about which part, which section, which 
road are [to be] built within five years. And this is the area where all of the local marshals to speak to our 
Minister.  
Interviewer:   Because the voivodships were themselves as a result of decentralization in 1999, but in that sense, 
it is… Perhaps decentralization has an indirect role? 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  The voivodships are responsible for voivodship roads, not the highways. They do 
not have much influence on the whole program of national roads. They can persuade the Minister to choose one 
section instead of the other but they do not have any given responsibilities etc… 
Interviewer:   Right, so the only way they could influence processes by going to the Minister and appealing? 
But they have no formal authority… 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  No formal authority. 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2:  But they have formal authority because they were responsible for local response 
local roads for the national roads within the cities 
Interviewer:  So would the Masovian Voivodship be responsible for the Autostrada within the city? 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  No, the highways, the motorways, and expressways are always the responsibility of 
the State… the central administration. But the national roads, Drogi Krajowe, within a city, which is a powiat, 
are within the responsibility of the president of the city (mayor). 
Interviewer:   So cities with the status of the powiat, like Warsaw, would be responsible for a national road 
within the cities limits? 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  Warsaw, Poznan, Kraków. 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 2:  They have money to build roads and to maintain them. 
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regional political base from which the voivodship governments could lobby the State for 
prioritization of projects beneficial to their region
69
. 
The Civil Servant 2 at the GDDKiA (see Figure 7.2 above), the government agency 
charged with overseeing the realization of the network of motorways and expressways, 
confirmed that authority is centralized in the General Directorate and ultimately in the Ministry 
of Transport.  However, GDDKiA Civil Servant 2’s remarks also indicate that voivodship 
governments may have some input during the consultation stage, before a project is initiated.  All 
advanced policy proposals are required to be publically consulted, which means that there will be 
public information sessions at the sixteen regional branches of the GDDKiA in the voivodship 
capitols.  Any concerns or grievances should be addressed at this point in time before 
implementation commences.  However, the policy is already in effect by this stage because the 
adoption of a policy or plan by the Polish Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) has the force of law.  
This demonstrates that no authority is delegated to the voivodship governments in the matter of 
national roads of technical standard of motorway or expressways.  Some responsibilities are 
delegated to the regional branches of the GDDKiA, but these remain under the direct authority of 
the central offices of the GDDKiA in Warsaw. 
Civil Servant 1 at the Ministry of Transport (see Figure 7.3) echoes the statement made 
by GDDKiA Civil Servant 2, going as far as saying that it is “obvious” that the program of 
motorway (and expressway) construction is centralized.  However, MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 
more readily allows for the influence of a regional lobby in the form of a voivodship Marshal, 
the highest ranking elected official of the regional government
70
.  
The main points derived from the interview transcripts above are the following: 1) 
government activity concerning motorway policy was heavily centralized, 2) regional and local 
politicians could influence the policy by way of appealing to the central government, and 3) 
public consulting of projects serves more as an informative act rather than one centered on 
participatory policymaking.  Clearly, the interviews show that there is little room for 
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 This is particularly the case regarding the National Spatial Development Concept 2030 produced by the Ministry 
of Regional Development. Academic 1 did express serious doubts, however, about associating decentralization too 
closely with motorway and expressway policy.   
70
 This should not be confused with the voivode, who is an appointed representative of the central government in the 
voivodship overseeing all state functions carried out at the regional level.  This dual structure of authority in the 
voivodships is a clear illustration of the political dependence of the voivodships on the central government in 
contrast to the complete legal independence of local governments (gminy) in Poland. 
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decentralization within the motorway transport policy sector in Poland.  Below, more supporting 
evidence will be presented that would undercut any claims of decentralization. 
 
7.4.2 Structural Evidence Supporting Statements of Interviews 
As a means of illustrating the statements made by the interview participants above, the 
organizational structures of the regional branches of the GDDKiA can be briefly examined as 
evidence.  There is little variation in the formal structures of the regional branches of the 
GDDKiA across voivodships; thus, focusing our attention on one will not run the risk of 
prejudicing an analysis by the organizational idiosyncrasies of one particular branch.   
In brief, there are no departments within the Łódź branch of the GDDKiA that appear as if they 
could develop policy, let alone doing so independently of the central offices in Warsaw.  A 
survey of the departments shows many with important support functions, such as documentation, 
legal services, managing real estate, book-keeping, and technology support. These regional 
branches exist to collect information, manage construction projects within the boundaries of their 
voivodships (unless this is delegated to another branch), and provide supporting services to the 
main offices of the GDDKiA.  The presence of several technical departments lends currency to 
the conception of these branches as efficient implementers of centralized policy.  Thus there are 
delegated tasks and functions to be found in these regional branches.  These delegated tasks 
come with little policy authority and no political authority.  Technical rationality or order should 
ideally be predominant.   
The central offices of the GDDKiA only possess slightly more policy capacity than their 
regional branches.  This reflects the fact that the real capacity to develop and amend policy is 
found within the middle and upper echelons of the Ministry of Transportation, Construction, and 
Maritime Economy, to which the whole of the GDDKiA is ultimately subordinate.  GDDKiA 
Civil Servant 2 described such an arrangement in Figure 7.2.  From this information it would be 
logical to assume that legal and political orders as articulated by Diesing (1962) predominate in 
the departments of the MTBiGM dedicated to road transport. 
 
7.4.3 Supporting Evidence from Government Policy Documents 
The following supporting evidence is derived from two government plans published in 
both Polish and English from the Ministry of Transport (MTBiGM) and the Ministry of Regional 
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Development (MRR) respectively.  They shed light on the internal thinking of these ministries 
regarding the national implementation of their policies.  
 
7.4.3.1 National Transportation Plan 
 
Coordination and Supervision 
 
The bad condition of the road infrastructure in the context of growing motor vehicle traffic, including heavy 
vehicle traffic, justifies increased spending on infrastructure maintenance and repairs. It will be necessary to 
control an adequate allocation of funds for new investments, including investments in main transportation 
corridors, and for road maintenance and repairs. It will be necessary to make up for maintenance, negligence and 
backlogs. Allocation of funds for new investment and maintenance will be made, taking into consideration the 
economic viability of investments and repairs and their benefits in international, national, regional and local 
contexts. 
…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Co-operation of national and voivodship (regional) road authorities with municipal authorities on planning and 
investments is of special importance. Road traffic is the heaviest in cities and their surroundings, which means 
that the needs in terms of road network development and modernisation are the biggest there as well. Therefore, 
the principles of transport planning in urban areas, in connection with urban planning, will be changed. An 
obligation to conduct traffic surveys and prepare traffic forecasts as well and to use transport planning methods 
suitable for the character of the city will be imposed. 
 
The division of roads into four categories, connected with four levels of roads management, and the resultant 
lack of consistency of road network, hinders planning and management processes. It is necessary to improve the 
process by specifying the rules of co-operation between national roads management and local authorities of 
various levels, and to issue technical-construction regulations on roads maintenance and traffic management. The 
regulations should also specify the requirements for road management. It will lead to a better co-ordination of 
activities and to unifying the approach to technical, economic and organisational issues. Analysing the 
possibility of reducing the levels of road management to three is also planned. 
 
Elements of a manager system of administration/management will be introduced with the purpose of making the 
road sector a market sector, which will lead to a more efficient and more professional operation of the road 
network. It will consist in contracting out, following public procurement procedures, the actual maintenance and 
modernisation of road sections and technological supervision (road laboratories). Then the role of the 
administration will be limited to road network management by supervision over contract performance. And the 
actual operation, the risk of providing services in the conditions of uncertainty and the necessity to provide for 
uninterrupted traffic at an agreed level will be the responsibility of the private sector. 
 
With the given condition of the roads in terms of load bearing capacity of road pavements and the negative 
impact of heavy vehicles traffic, it will be necessary to intensify supervision and control over heavy vehicles for 
allowed axle load. Some funds should be allocated for more frequent vehicle weighing and law enforcement in 
this respect. 
Figure 7.4:  Excerpt of National Transportation Policy 2006-2025, pp. 16-17. 
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 Figure 7.5:  Excerpt from National Transportation Policy 2006-2025, pp. 31. 
 
The National Transportation Policy 2006-2025 (Polish:  Polityka Transportowa Państwa na lata 
2006-2025) sets out to create the conditions in which Poland can “reach the civilization 
development level and standard of living of Western European countries” (NTP 2006-2025, pg. 
2).  It envisions four key tasks:  1) updating the current “basic network”, 2) privatization and 
liberalization of transport markets, 3) creating effective cooperation between the national 
government and the so-called self-governments (samorządy), and 4) improving transport safety. 
The excerpts above were found in the description of the third key task, creating cooperation 
between the central governments and regional and local governments.  The first excerpt (Figure 
7.4) describes the coordination necessary for implementing the NTP 2006-2025.  It advocates for 
Implementation Instruments 
The following will be the instruments of transport policy implementation: 
 
_ the law, 
_ transport sector development planning and financing, 
_ activities of public administration of all levels. 
 
Competences of public administration bodies (distribution of tasks, organisation, co-ordination) is based on 
the assumption that it is the role of the State to respond only to those elements of the systems that cannot 
rationally function without such intervention. It refers to the cases in which market mechanisms are not sufficient 
to optimise behaviour of people and businesses. 
 
The role of State administration will consist in supporting local authorities by legislative initiatives, by 
formulating recommendations concerning transport policy principles at regional and local levels, technical 
assistance – including promoting innovative solutions, financing research and development works and, in 
selected cases, financial support using European funds and regional contracts. 
Legal solutions and organisation of transport sector will be significant tools of transport policy implementation. 
They refer to: (a) legal conditions that constitute barriers to effective implementation of investment programmes 
and functioning of the transport sector, (b) directions of organisational transformations at all levels, (c) adapting 
to European Union legislation. Despite the relatively long adaptation period, Poland must make considerable 
efforts to fully adapt to EU requirements and to eliminate many redundant limitations and corruption preventing 
regulations.  
 
System development planning: it is necessary to concentrate on strategic planning, on increase of efficiency of 
planning and implementation decision making, on providing equal opportunities on the market, following EU 
standards in this respect, and on taking into consideration social and environmental conditions. It is also 
necessary to considerably improve consistency and effectiveness of planning processes at national, regional and 
local level. The procedures concerning prioritisation of investments based on insightful analyses of social and 
economic effectiveness, of environmental impact and public finance management also need to be significantly 
improved. These activities do not actually require change of the legislation but only consistent and competent 
management and real control and supervision by authorised bodies. However, the process of preparing areas for 
future infrastructure investments, investments of strategic significance in particular, needs to be dealt with in 
more effective legislation. 
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making it mandatory for local and regional governments to conduct traffic surveys for the benefit 
of having accurate information in the planning process.  It is suggested that reducing the number 
of road classifications from 4 to 3 and carefully clarifying the responsibilities of each level of 
government responsible for a specific road classification would improve the overall management 
of the collective national transportation network in Poland.  Changes in management styles are 
advocated towards these ends as well.  The second excerpt (Figure 7.5) illustrates how the 
MTBiGM expects to see its policy implemented.  The instruments of implementation are 
discussed along with the role of government administration and strategic planning. Several 
themes can be found in these two excerpts that serve as evidence supporting the fact that political 
and administrative decentralization has only a limited role to play in the realm of Polish 
motorway and expressway infrastructure policy. 
The influence of New Public Management (NPM) can be seen in Figure 4.1 where the 
MTBiGM expresses its desire to see greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
transport services across all modes.  This is essentially privatization of heretofore government-
owned businesses that operated passenger services over sea, land, and air.  Construction and 
maintenance functions associated with roads should be contracted out to private companies while 
overall management remains with the GDDKiA.   
The NTP 2006-2025 expects that the self-governments (samorządy) are able to design, 
operate and maintain roads when they fall into a classification legally assigned to that level of 
government. This involves both research and planning requirements.  While the motorways and 
expressways are not the responsibility of the samorządy, other roads that provide access to these 
major arterial motorways often are.  Thus, these roads are ancillary but still vital to the success of 
the national system. They must complement the national system through coordinated planning 
and cooperation. 
The description of the instruments of implementation found within the NTP 2006-2025 
(see Figure 7.5) is particularly relevant for exploring the topic of centralization within the 
MTBiGM.  The document names the appropriate instruments as 1) the law, 2) planning and 
financing, and 3) government administration at all four levels.  The logic of “public intervention” 
in transportation employed in the document reflects both the notion of the state control in a 
natural monopoly considered a public good, and the principle of subsidiarity in that planning is a 
task of the central government because the self-governments in Poland would not be capable of 
184 
financing and coordinating an implementation effort collectively.   The plan envisions greater 
coordination of efforts at all levels, especially with regard to spatial planning that necessarily 
accompanies transportation planning.   
 
7.4.3.2 National Spatial Development Concept 2030: Objective 6 
 
 
Figure 7.6:  Excerpt from Objective 6 of National Spatial Development Plan (pg. 154) 
 
 
Figure 7.7:  Excerpt from Objective 6 of National Spatial Development Plan (pg. 153) 
 
Ensuring Coordination 
An important objective of the new integrated development policy planning system in Poland is to harmonise the 
territorial dimension at all management levels with measures in the socio-economic sphere. Full coordination of 
objectives and territory related measures with sectoral measures requires the reorganisation of the state 
management system and public finance system and the acquisition of strategic programming skills at all 
management levels to involve participants of the “game for space." 
 
Enhancing the ability to achieve development objectives requires appropriate coordination mechanisms and 
reduction of the costs of the sector-organised state. The most important planning instrument for implementation 
of public policies with territorial impact (including regional policy), taking into account their specific geographic 
and socio-economic conditions, is the territorial contract. The contract will define goals for territories, identify 
stakeholders, define their responsibilities and indicate necessary funding. 
Integrated (Hierarchical and Coordinated) System cont.… 
Cohesion of socio-economic and spatial planning at the regional level will be reflected in the requirement to 
harmonise the preparation procedure and contents of documents on socio-economic development (voivodeship 
development strategy) and spatial development (Voivodeship Spatial Development Plan). In this way, integrated 
regional development planning components will also comprise binding (statutory) guidelines for gminas. This 
requires changes in the preparation process of VSDPs to enable synchronisation of all projects (not only public 
purpose projects) in a given region and coordination of those projects with measures envisaged in national 
integrated and sectoral policies, as well as strategic and structural projects implemented by local authorities and 
other public and private entities. 
 
At the local level, some development areas of gminas will be selected for implementation of tasks laid down in 
national and regional socio-economic development documents. To this end, gminas must prepare strategic socio-
economic development documents (gmina/local development strategies) based on a realistic land demand and 
land use forecast taking into account specialist, in particular demographic, forecasts and studies. This entails the 
introduction of obligatory analyses and forecasts as the basis for gmina development policy. Local plans will be 
the basis of administrative decisions and will determine the location of investments. Public and non-public 
entities will be held financially responsible for results of spatial planning decisions. Local plans and other forms 
of spatial policy implementation at the local level (including location decisions, land divisions, trade in real 
estate) that will not follow higher level guidelines or otherwise fail to comply with VSDP will be repealed as 
legally flawed, in whole or in part, by way of a voivode’s decision. Such measures would require a change in the 
legal status of VSDPs. 
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Objective 6 of the National Spatial Development Concept 2030 (NSDC 2030) seeks to 
recentralize spatial planning powers into the hands of the central government, represented by the 
Ministry of Regional Development.  Part 1 of the chapter containing Objective 6 describes the 
problem of a lack of coordination of spatial planning activities resulting from a de facto 
decentralization of the appropriate powers.  Part 2 addressed which objectives were to be 
addressed by the measures presented in Part 3.  The objectives included 1) a reaffirmation of the 
public’s stake in the outcome of the national spatial planning project, 2) creating a reliable and 
rationalized institutional framework for spatial planning, 3) ensuring legality of planning 
activities, 4) “implementing basic, territorially varied economic instruments” in line with the 
6.3 Strengthen Institutions and Improve the Quality of Spatial Planning 
 
Strengthening of spatial planning requires institutional changes at all administrative levels and the 
introduction of a spatial development monitoring and on-going assessment system. Cooperation between 
planning offices and regional policy departments will be intensified. Strategic planning units will be 
strengthened in cooperation with the Government by, inter alia, the government training programme for 
local authorities on integrated spatial planning. The programme will provide spatial planners with a career 
development path and a competence improvement opportunity – including certification of acquired skills. 
Public administration staff involved in the development process of planning, including spatial planning, and 
in implementation of measures laid down in those plans, will take part in continuous learning programmes 
and will constantly improve their knowledge and competences in the area of space quality and spatial policy 
issues. It will enable, inter alia, to determine the appropriate position of the planner in the organisational 
structure of central and local government administration. 
 
Quality of planning will be improved also thanks to support provided at the national level to professional 
services involved in strategic planning and providing advice to regional and local planners. Standards will 
be defined for higher education programmes in spatial development treated as an interdisciplinary subject 
and offered by a wide array of higher education institutions (technical universities, universities and 
economic universities). Scope of the programme will be extended and the number of students will increase. 
Public administration units will be able to entrust spatial development to educated professionals. Post-
graduate study programmes in planning will be introduced and the employees of local government 
institutions dealing with spatial and regional planning will have an obligation to complete such programmes. 
Scientific research on Poland’s space will take into account the issues of spatial values, heritage and spatial 
order. 
 
Spatial culture promotion will include civic education and popularisation of urbanised environment issues, 
in particular of active public participation in planning processes. Enhancing the interest of the public in the 
quality of their surroundings, planning and design will lead to effective moderation of conflicts in planning 
processes. Civic education will build a common belief that Poland’s space, construed as a natural asset and 
cultural heritage, is developing in line with the sustainability principle and that spatial order is a public 
asset. Space-related subjects will find an appropriate place in the general education programme. 
Figure 7.8:  Excerpt from the National Spatial Development Concept (pg. 158) 
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development policy, and 5) promoting economic growth by reconfiguring the spatial layout of 
social and economic activity in Poland.  The measures proposed in Part 3 include:  
 
1) [introducing] an integrated (coherent and hierarchical) socio-economic and 
spatial planning system capable of effective coordination of activities by public 
authorities and of the most important public policies for spatial development at 
different government levels, 
2) [reorganizing] regulations ensuring efficiency and universality of spatial 
planning system,  
3) [strengthening] institutions and [improving] quality of spatial planning   
(NSDC 2030 pg. 152). 
 
The first excerpt (Figure 7.6) concerns greater cooperation in the spatial planning process.  The 
second excerpt (Figure 7.7) lays out the parameters of what the MRR would consider a workable 
system and administrative order to the planning system.  The third excerpt (Figure 7.8) describes 
how the institutions of spatial planning should be strengthened by deliberate action. 
From the three excerpts above, it is evident that the MRR believes that achieving better 
coordination of planning activities necessitates structural change within the whole system of 
spatial planning in Poland.  This “change” means the actual recentralization of many powers of 
spatial planning that were devolved to the gminy after their reestablishment in the early 1990s.  
Existing hierarchies with the central government need to be reinforced and rules and procedures 
created that would ensure the efficient implementation of nationally devised spatial policy. 
According to Figure 7.7, the responsibilities of the self-governments should be clarified and 
enforced as part of the large spatial planning effort taking place at the level of national 
government.  Self-governments should be expected to produce their own spatial plans, which are 
attentive to their specific regional and local needs; however, these must not work against the 
policy coming from the MRR at the national level.  Spatial planning at all levels of government 
should complement and support plans made at other levels of government. 
 
7.4.4 Evidence Regarding the Claim 
In response to Research Question 3, Has decentralization empowered self-governments in 
Poland to fully participate in the policy process of national roads?, the hypothesis put forth was 
that decentralization has indeed had an impact on highway transportation policy in Poland 
insofar as regional governments have greater policy input and implementation responsibilities; 
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however, ultimate authority still lies with the central government.  Despite the expectation that 
some meaningful form of decentralization in the area of motorway and expressway policy had 
indeed occurred in the aftermath of 1989 and continues through the present, further research and 
the results of the interviews with government officials and Polish academics has thus far clearly 
demonstrated that no significant decentralization exists in this specific policy area. What follows 
next before the final analysis and negation of the hypothesis are two main reasons that support 
the opposite of the original hypothesis, that is to say that they offer proof that significant 
decentralization does not exist within the highway (National Roads) transport policy sector in 
Poland. 
 
7.4.4.1 Reason 1:  Lack of Capability on the Part of the Self-Governments and their Lobbying of 
the State 
The Self-Governments (Samorząd), that is, the voivodships, powiaty, and gminy are not 
capable of planning, financing, and executing this policy area on their own.  No meaningful 
powers and accompanying responsibility (accountability) was allocated to them in national 
motorway and expressway policy.  Therefore, they must lobby the central government for 
projects, or prioritization of existing projects.  While this lobbying does constitute influence, it is 
not institutionalized in the same way as if the central government were obligated to obtain the 
consent of the voivodships (and/or gminy) in policy matters.  The evidence for this is found most 
apparently in the interviews with Polish civil servants and academics.  The fact that the little 
influence possessed by the voivodships and gminy is manifested by informal means reinforces 
the argument that they are not the beneficiaries of true administrative decentralization.   This is 
relevant to the original hypothesis because it directly disproves the implied understanding that 
significant powers had been decentralized. 
 
7.4.4.2 Reason 2:  Efforts of Polish Government to Recentralize Planning Powers 
The Polish government, in the form of the MTBiGM and MRR, is actively seeking to 
recentralize those limited powers (i.e. local and regional spatial planning powers relevant to 
national roads) that were decentralized at the beginning of the transition in the 1990s.  This 
constitutes an active policy against further decentralization as well as the arrangements currently 
found in the area of spatial planning related to motorway and expressway infrastructure policy.  
Policymaking and planning associated with motorways and expressways in the MTBiGM’s 
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National Transportation Policy 2006-2025 already enjoy a more centralized status in law and in 
practice than spatial planning, with the purview of the MRR in the National Spatial Development 
Concept 2030 with its all-important activities essential to the success of the National 
Transportation Policy.  The self-governments (Samorząd), that is, the voivodships, powiaty, and 
gminy, were all empowered by decentralization in the 1990s, especially in the case of the gminy.  
Their legal independence from the national government put them in a position where they can 
impede cooperation with the national government in the area of spatial planning.  As a result of 
the need to rationalize the planning process, the MRR in particular has actively sought to 
recentralize spatial planning powers ancillary to motorway and expressway infrastructure policy.  
This reason is relevant to the hypothesis that significant decentralization does in fact exist, 
because it disproves that gminy and voivodships actually have meaningful input into national 
motorway and expressway infrastructure policy with decentralized powers. 
 
7.4.4.3 Hypothesis Tested 
The hypothesis regarding the role played by decentralization in national roads policy 
states that while this policy area is ultimately centralized, voivodships do have real and active 
influence within the policy process.  The expectation was implied, but not stated, that some kind 
of institutional framework would exist to facilitate this influence.  And while consultations are 
held, they do not surpass the threshold of regular and predictable influence on the part of the 
voivodships on the policy process.  A voivodship’s influence varied from issue to issue and from 
appeal to appeal.  Therefore, the information gathered from the insight of civil servants and 
academics involved in national road planning as well as illustrative evidence do not support the 
hypothesis as written.  Administrative decentralization plays a negligible role in national roads 
policy in Poland.  This claim is strongly supported by the reasons that 1) voivodships and gminy 
are incapable of independent action in this policy area and therefore must lobby the central 
government, and 2) the central government has actively sought to recentralize the few powers 
that were decentralized early in the transition period for this policy area. 
This conclusion, however, is only a starting point from which to examine the dimension 
of decentralization-centralization more closely.  It is not sufficient to merely know that the policy 
process is not decentralized, but why it is centralized.  What is the rationale behind a very 
centralized approach by the Polish state to national roads policy?  What does the centralization of 
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National Roads policy in Poland hope to achieve?  Why does the Ministry of Regional 
Development hope to recentralize spatial planning, of which a National Roads Plan is a part? In 
seeking the answer to these questions, the real value of exploring the topic of decentralization in 
motorway and expressway policy might well be found. 
 
7.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Why is policy-making not decentralized? The concise answers immediately given to such 
a question reveal a greater body of logic and reasoning.  The rationale for centralization can be 
explained not only in terms of optimal transportation economics, but also in terms of 
traditionally held views on the optimal dimensions of bureaucracy. The centralization of policy-
making abilities into the structures of the ministries begins to blur the distinction between 
politics and administration, as policymaking even among civil servants is not value free.  While 
this is problematic for the politics-administration dichotomy, it does indicate that the central 
government in Poland (both politicians and bureaucrats) wishes to see a policymaking based on 
what they deem to be objective criteria.  Finally, the centralization of powers can be discussed in 
terms of administrative capacities that enable the state to function in this given policy area. 
Discussed in light of Diesing’s concepts of rationality and the accompanying systems of 
order, the centralized nature of national roads policy in the Ministry of Transport, Construction, 
and Maritime Economy (and also in the subordinate General Directorate of National Roads and 
Motorways) displays elements of technical, economic, and legal rationality.  The MTBiGM and 
GDDKiA display each kind of the above-mentioned rationalities in different respects.  The 
discussion below will examine these three kinds of rationality applied to the institutional 
arrangements manifested in the MTBiGM and GDDKiA. 
 It is arguably quite rational that a single, designated entity should be chiefly responsible 
for the task of planning, operating, and maintaining the physical network of national roads.  
These specific functions require technical skill and expertise, as well as competence.  The 
decisions made and the organization constituted for the management of national roads are both 
outgrowths of a rational calculus that determines how to best realize the task of constructing and 
managing national roads with given means (at this point in the discussion, “given means” refers 
to tools, structures, techniques, etc., not financial means).  Diesing (1962) writes, “Both technical 
decisions and technically rational organizations embody the same rational principle. The 
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principle, stated in imperative terms, is ‘choose means adapted to ends’ or, more generally when 
means are also modifiable, ‘adapt means to ends’. A more exact version would be ‘maximize the 
output/input ratio’."  The entity that most embodies the forgoing description is the GDDKiA.  It 
was no coincidence that interview respondents outside of the GDDKiA frequently described it as 
very professional and capable.    Broadly speaking, the GDDKiA is a technically rational 
organization because it serves as a means for the Polish government via the MTBiGM to 
efficiently and effectively implement national roads policy that it devises.  Efficient and effective 
implementation is used here in a relative sense, being as a technically rational process ends can 
be achieved more economically than if a less efficient form of organization in the policy process 
existed.  This less efficient form could surely be imagined as sixteen independent voivodship 
motorway agencies charged with creating a national network of motorways and expressways by 
means of voluntary but not binding cooperation, without any central direction.   
The centralized policy making structures of the MTBiGM are economically rational 
because they seek coordinate activity at a cost lower than it could be coordinated amongst 
several regional agencies without higher direction. In the very least, economic rationality is an 
argument made for the specific institutional arrangements that one finds in the ministry of 
transport’s place in the policy process.  The ministry is legally rational because it seeks to 
distribute goods and services according to a consistent logic: the limited number of resources 
available must be distributed to where they are most needed for the sake of the national and local 
economy and social cohesion while fitting into the greater network of European motorways. 
This combination of technical and legal rationality forms the basis for the capacities 
needed to organize government agencies that perform these functions.  The connection can be 
made here between the technical and legal rationality as described by Diesing (1962) in the 
organizational capacity articulated by Farazmand (2009). As discussed in the literature review, 
organizational capacity entails the ability to 1) organize the economy, society, and government 
into manageable sectors, 2) organize internal structures of government organizations, 3) organize 
procedures that these government organizations follow, 4) organize norms and values that 
underlie the work of those employed in these government organizations, and 5) organize the 
necessary resources for achieving policy goals.  Although Farazmand appears to apply 
organizational capacity along with the other functionally instrumental capacities to government 
as a whole, it can also arguably be applied relevantly to single organizations.  The state has 
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successfully organized the transportation policy sector of government into the MTBiGM and its 
subordinate entities such as GDDKiA, GITD, and PKP.  Through legislation, the state seeks to 
organize the ministry and the directorates in optimal ways for the fulfillment of their assigned 
tasks. The ministry and directorates also have extensive powers to organize themselves internally 
as well for better performance. These regulations issued by the ministry or the directorates apply 
to the rules and procedures followed internally. Norms and values were organized most 
forcefully by the establishment of the civil service and also that of professional organizations. 
The very active task from the point of view of organizational capacity is the organizing of 
necessary resources for the achievement of desired policy goals.   
The organizing of necessary resources most directly reflects the principles of legal 
rationality that informed by economic rationality forms the basis of the functions of a given 
government entity in of political and legal system such as that of Poland. This organization 
position of necessary resources in fact is best represented by the idea of economizing, a concept 
closely attached to economic rationality that is described by Diesing in Rationality and Society.  
Diesing writes:  
Economizing occurs in a market setting; bargaining, in a setting of social relations 
and cultural norms. Economizing is impersonal, dealing with subject matter made 
impersonal by a market; bargaining is personal, on subject matter given 
personality and character by cultural institutions. The forms of economizing 
depend on the condition of the market and the commodities created by it; the 
forms of bargaining depend on the types of control made available by a culture" 
(Diesing 1962). 
 
As can be seen from the quotation above, there does exist a need within the activity of 
economizing in deciding where and to whom resources must be allocated, to determine which 
projects are most in need of investment and prioritization. This need in fact requires the capacity 
of an informed and capable group of officials to decide upon the policy matters relevant to the 
allocation prioritization projects. This capacity was described by Farazmand (2009) as policy 
capacity, which will be explored in the next chapter.  As we will see, policy capacity as posited 
Farazmand (2009) seems to display the creative rationalities articulated by Diesing (1962).  The 
resemblance is convincing enough that these two articulations of policy capacity and rationality 
respectively should be discussed together. 
While the MTBiGM and GDDKiA have established structures and the authorities 
stemming from technical, economic, and legal rational orders, the status of the Ministry of 
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Regional Developments activities is still evolving.  The MRR has sought to establish order to 
coordinate spatial planning among the various levels of self-government in Poland as well as the 
development and coordination of a national spatial plan, which it produced in 2011.  As some of 
the excerpts from the text of the National Spatial Development Concept 2030 indicated, the 
MRR saw a severe and pressing problem in the lack of coordination among self-governments in 
Poland as well as the lack of a coherent national plan.   The MRR is actively seeking an 
expansion of the powers granted to it by the spatial planning act of 2003, which would greatly 
increase its abilities to manage spatial development across the country.  In view of the case of the 
MTBiGM and GDDKiA, this can be seen as a clear attempt at fostering organizational capacity 
of the spatial development sector so important to the success of the national transportation policy 
by means of developing technical, economic, and legal rational orders.  
Taken together, these two processes described above are reflective of Żubek’s (2008) 
hypothesis of the Polish government having a slowly consolidating center since the initial 
decentralization in the 1990s.  Some policy sectors were, of course, more decentralized than 
others in the wake of 1989.  National transportation policy remained relatively centralized 
although some of the key ancillary activities were markedly decentralized, which lead to major 
problems in the implementation of a national network of roads and motorways even when greater 
funding became available. The “democratically” centralized administrative apparatus of state 
socialism was heavily decentralized in the process of democratization. Although this seemed to 
serve the ends of democratization, after sometime, it also proved to be cumbersome and an 
obstruction to progress. Therefore, the reform itself was in need of reform. The experiences of 
Poland can clearly be used to argue that the decentralization favored in many neoliberal circles is 
not conducive to the realization of nationwide projects and policies.  
Motorway infrastructure policy in Poland was not decentralized because it would not 
have been rational to decentralize this to voivodships, and certainly not to the gminy.  And 
although there was some expectation of a greater role for decentralization within this process, the 
fact that it is indeed centralized raises more important questions which can be explored and 
further researched, primarily centering on the rationality of recentralization.  Perhaps this 
expectation of decentralization within the transport policy sector arose because the topic of 
decentralization arose so frequently in the transition literature. The transition literature would not 
be as interesting as it were not for sweeping topics which had to be addressed in some detail and 
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applied universally across countries and policy sectors in Central and Eastern Europe. However 
insightful this literature may be, in the case of motorway infrastructure policy in Poland, it must 
be tempered with the insight of other disciplines and subject areas. The fact that centralization 
exists in part of the sector and is consolidating or developing in the other demonstrates the power 
that the center should have over this policy area. The next logical step in this research is to 
examine how policy is made within the existing structures and the central government. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
POLICY CAPACITY AND RATIONALITY 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Poland, the constraints of resources (even when including EU Cohesion Funds) has 
forced governments over the last fifteen years to prioritize and reprioritize projects for 
implementation.  Since the desire to “act within one’s means” is considered a rational behavior 
(admittedly a major assumption), then a question arises:  Does rationality (or the desire for it) 
beget policy capacity?  Prioritizing and reprioritizing ideally results from constant reevaluation 
of the program (the construction program is still underway) by experts who determine the 
necessity of projects through studies.  The feedback of both internal and external experts would 
lead to a management much more capable of making informed policy choices and coordinating 
decisions both within their own ministry and with outside actors (other ministries, Polish 
government, EU, etc.).  It is hypothesized that rationality and the need for better coordination of 
activities does nurture policy capacity.   
It will be demonstrated that the hypothesis is supported by the evidence available.  There 
is ample evidence to conclusively show that policy capacity has been nurtured by the MTBiGM 
and MRR in response to difficulties they have faced in performing their functions as government 
ministries involved in transportation policy.  Beginning with their desire to see more planning 
powers centralized in order to better manage the processes of transportation and spatial planning, 
these ministries have actively sought to develop the human and institutional resources necessary 
for this undertaking.   
 
8.2 Literature 
Max Weber’s articulation of instrumental rationality has had a profound impact on the 
study of bureaucracy in public administration.  Broadly speaking, instrumental rationality can be 
thought of as the identification of the means to achieve a certain end efficiently.  Weber found 
that bureaucracy was the most rational and conceptually advanced form of organization in 
existence because it both rationally identified the means to desired ends and sought to rationalize 
the process of decision-making.  Instrumental rationality has few constraints, and this is been one 
195 
criticism of the theory.  Weber also articulated the idea of substantive rationality, or rationality 
which is informed by one’s ultimate values and goals instead of efficiency.  One alternative was 
found in Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality highlights the 
constraints of information quality, ability to synthesize information, and time upon an individual 
seeking to make an informed decision. Simon (1997) recognized that circumstances would not 
always allow for ideally rational decisions, reflecting the complexity in which policy-makers 
find themselves.  Whereas Weber and Simon address administrative rationality in general, the 
more specific kinds of rationality employed in administration will be described below. 
 
8.2.1 Diesing’s Rationality 
Hartwig’s (1983) study of rationality and administrative responsibility within the 
Colombian Ministry of Public Works drew heavily from the little known work of Paul Diesing, 
who first in 1962 published a book titled Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and the 
Social Conditions.  Beginning with Mannheim’s distinction between separate aspects of 
rationality—functional71 and substantial72—Diesing adds a third aspect of rationality, that of 
principles.  Using Hartwig’s explanation of Diesing’s proposed principle rationality, Diesing 
holds that, “…since decisions are made according to principles, and organized structures employ 
principles of order, principles can be thought of as rational” (1983, 21).   Diesing identifies five 
kinds of rationality: technical, economic, social, legal, and political. These also have 
corresponding types of order, since order is held by Diesing to define functional rationality (1962, 
Ch. 6)   Technical rationality seeks the most effective (and sometimes efficient) means of 
achieving a single, defined goal.  Economic rationality is the selection and achieving of 
designated ends in the most cost-effective way possible.  An important aspect of economic 
rationality is economizing, being described by Diesing thusly:  
Economizing is a rational process, because when one must choose among ends 
that are genuinely alternative, it is reasonable to choose in such a way as to get the 
most out of them. This is, in a way, an extension of technical rationality — when 
                                                 
71
 Diesing writes, “An organization is functionally rational, let us say, when it is so structured as to produce, or 
increase, or preserve, some good in a consistent, dependable fashion” (1962, 4). 
72
 Diesing writes, “A decision or action is substantially rational when it takes account of the possibilities and 
limitations of a given situation and reorganizes it so as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good. This 
definition includes two points: the decision must be an effective response to the situation in that it produces some 
possible good, and the effectiveness must be based on intelligent insight rather than on luck” (1962, 4). 
196 
ends are alternative, they are all parts of a larger end, and it is this larger end 
which is to be maximized. It is reasonable to achieve the larger end as far as 
possible, in turn, because that is what it means to have an end.  Thus 
alternativeness of ends is dependent on two other conditions, namely the existence 
of unlimited ends and the existence of common means (Diesing 1962, Ch. 2). 
Social rationality is described as a type of order which arises out of interaction between people 
and regulates the relations between them.  Legal rationality consists of the proper way in which 
resources and actions are assigned to people and organizations.  Political rationality creates an 
order to the process of deliberations between various parties or within an organization with the 
goal of reaching a decision through consultation and which is accepted by all. 
For Diesing, economic and legal rationality exist outside of temporal boundaries.  They 
are non-temporal.  “The nontemporal (sic) orders are valuational, consisting either of a rank 
ordering of values or a distribution pattern of norms. The temporal orders deal with action; they 
make action either productive, or expressive and evocative, or governing” (Diesing 1962, Ch. 6). 
The temporal orders include: technical, social, and political. 
Order exists insofar as the parts of a system are arranged according to some 
principle. In the non-temporal, valuational orders it is the position of the elements 
which is determined by principle, so that each element belongs just where it is and 
no place else. In the temporal action systems the function of each part is 
determined by principle, so that all the parts work together in some characteristic 
way. Once the principle governing a system has been discovered, the system 
becomes intelligible. That is, it becomes possible to understand why each part is 
where it is and does what it does, and to predict what changes will occur in it. 
Further, the system can then be explained and justified, to someone questioning it. 
(Diesing 1962, Ch. 6). 
 
These five kinds of rationality constituting five equivalent kinds of order arrange the 
relationships between entities, which can be described within that order.  They are not end states 
but consistent systems performing functions consistently and coherently.  Thus they are 
functional rationalities because these systems function according to a certain order.  But how are 
these orders achieved? At this point, we can return to Mannheim’s substantial rationality.  
Diesing writes that, “substantially rationality can most simply be conceived as the making of 
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order, or creativity” (Diesing 1962, Ch. 6).  Thus equates creative rationality to substantial 
rationality.  Creative rationality
73
 is not an order, but a means of achieving it. 
Regarding Plato’s account of Reason versus Necessity, Diesing interpreted that through 
the means of persuasion, (creative) reason gives shape and structure to the morass of diverse 
forces of necessity.  However, Diesing finds this account to be too simplistic, because it does not 
address how reason develops.  Diesing’s theory clearly sees a “circular relation between reason 
as order and reason as creativity”, as existing, with, “each producing the other” (Diesing 1962, 
Ch. 6).  While it is obvious from above how reason as creativity affects reason as order, the 
opposite may not be as immediately clear. According to Diesing, this reason as order affects 
reason as creativity in two ways: 1) preexisting order acts as the material with which creative 
reason creates new order, and 2) preexisting order in decision-making structures such as 
bureaucracies (political rationality/ order) shapes the “creative process”, which must operate 
from within these structures (Diesing 1962, Ch. 6).   
At this point we can begin to transition to the next topic in the literature review, 
policymaking in government bureaucracies and the concomitant ability known as policy capacity.  
This topic lends itself to analysis using the ideas of rationality described by Diesing, and as such 
will be the contribution of this chapter to knowledge.  We will see how the necessity of 
implementing one kind of rationality (economic rationality or economizing resources with regard 
to the scope of the motorway and expressway network) by the political orders of the responsible 
ministries necessitates using a creative rationality to enhance the existing policy capacity to 
choose between alternative ends. 
 
8.2.2 Policy Capacity 
    The role of a government bureaucracy as a policy-maker is by now an extensively 
researched area within the study of public administration.  There are many important works on 
this topic that demonstrate how bureaucrats involved in policymaking in effect must make 
                                                 
73
 The conception of reason as creativity is one of the three major conceptions of practical reason in the history of 
philosophy. The other two are the conception of reason as the discovery and application of rules to cases, and the 
conception of reason as calculating, literally adding and subtracting. Reason appears as creativity in some of the 
works of Plato, Hegel, and Whitehead, among others; it appears as the application of rules in the natural law 
theorists, such as Aquinas, Locke, and Kant; and it appears as calculation in Hobbes, Bentham, and the utilitarians. 
(Diesing). 
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political decisions either during the conceptual stage, having in mind to please the minister (Page 
and Jenkins 2005), or during the stage of implementation when the general framework of laws 
must be turned into specific regulations so that the law may actually have an effect.  Ham and 
Hill (1993) analyzed the policy process in the governments of modern market economies, which 
now may be an appropriate source of guidance as Poland’s economic transition is largely 
complete.  Page (2012) examines the perceived growing power of bureaucracies as policy-
makers, whereas Painter and Pierre (2005) examine the challenges facing policy capacity of 
national governments in recent decades.  As any “administrative capacity” such as policy 
capacity is a rather vague concept, it is important to attempt to define it, and only then could it be 
used as a useful analytical tool. 
Farazmand (2009) included policy capacity as one of his functionally instrumental 
capacities of governance.  Policy capacity is a means of coordinating the activities of 
administration that correspond to the desired policies of the elected government. Policy capacity 
also involves the ability of civil servants and political appointees to cooperate and use their 
knowledge and expertise to formulate ever better policies. A table illustrating Farazmand’s 
conception of policy capacity is found below (Table 8.1).  According to Farazmand, the classic 
questions of inquiry—who, what, when, why, how, and how much—play a very important role 
in demonstrating policy capacity. Evaluation is also central policy capacity. 
 
Functionally Instrumental 
Capacity 
Aspects of 
Capacity 
Capacity Categories Capacity Sub-
Categories  
Policy Capacity 
Answering 
Questions 
Governing and Policy Actors 
Who? 
Short- and Long -term Policy 
Directions 
What? 
Strategic Choices and 
Guidance 
When? 
Why? 
How?  
How much? 
Evaluation 
 
Institutions for Policy 
Review 
Arrangements for Policy 
Review 
 
Table 8.1:  Farazmand’s (2009) Description of Policy Capacity 
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8.3 Methods  
Before proceeding to the results of this chapter it is necessary to briefly review the 
methods being employed to approach this research question.  This chapter examines the 
relationship between policymaking and rationality. The research question for this chapter is the 
following:  Does the need for greater rationalization within motorway and Expressway 
infrastructure policy in Poland lead to a strengthening of policy capacity in order to achieve the 
greater rationalization?  The hypothesized answer for this research question is that the need for 
greater rationalization within infrastructure policy has indeed strengthened policy capacity in 
Poland. 
This is accomplished by looking at two different aspects of a rational state of 
policymaking. The first aspect of this research question examines how the policymakers 
responded to the need by the relevant ministries to economize resources by means of scaling 
back some of the original plans made for the network of motorways and expressways. In order to 
respond to the need of economizing resources, the ministry of transport and the ministry of 
regional development have had to begin prioritizing various projects.  
 
8.3.1 Process of Analysis 
To begin with, there will be an identification of the administrative and institutional actors 
that contribute to national policy in Poland on motorway and expressway infrastructure.  Both 
the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Regional Development, along with the relevant 
departments within these ministries as well as the GDDKiA, which is subordinate to the Ministry 
of Transport, are the largest and most important administrative and institutional actors in this 
policy area.  The main duties of each ministry as they relate to road transport policy in different 
infrastructure policy will be described in some detail, along with a detailed description of the 
departments within these ministries that are most related to their policy production in the area of 
motorways and expressways.  
Next, government transportation plans relating to the network of motorways and 
expressways will be examined in an effort to identify the criteria of what, when, where, why, 
how, and how much.  These criteria are most directly related to the policies themselves. Here 
some guidance will be given as to the short- and long-term policy goals, as well as strategic 
choices. This comparison will be achieved by careful examination of the relevant policies laid 
200 
out in each government policy plan.  It will have to be established which form of rationality (see 
Table 8.2) is most applicable to each of these categories within given government reports. 
 
Substantial Rationality Functional Rationality  Temporality 
Creative 
Political 
Temporal Social 
Technical 
Economic 
Non-Temporal 
Legal 
 
Table 8.2:  Representation of Diesing's (1962) Various Kinds of Rationality. 
 
It will then be established by looking at the evaluation process how these policies were reviewed 
and adjusted as necessary.  Furthermore, there will be a discussion as to which type of rationality 
instigated the need for review. The next task will be a general discussion of rationality in the 
policy process related to motorways and expressways policy in Poland. Insight and advice will 
be included from both commentary and public policy journals and the interviews.  
 
8.4 Evidence and Analysis 
The evidence presented below proceeds from the positions of the Ministry of Transport 
and the Ministry of Regional Development as declared in their respective policy documents that 
a rationalized policy-making process for the motorway and expressway program is necessary in 
view of current institutional arrangements in Poland.  The ministries’ position on the necessity of 
rationalization (i.e., greater centralization of powers as well as improving capabilities) serves as 
the first piece of evidence in a sequence.  The second sequence of evidence is derived from 
interviews conducted with both civil servants and academics in Poland.  This second sequence of 
evidence both provides more information illustrating the necessity for greater rationalization and 
points to some current manifestations of burgeoning policy capacity in the Ministry of Transport 
and the Ministry of Regional Development.  The third sequence of evidence is comprised of 
organizational descriptions of the MTBiGM and the MRR that demonstrate the existence of 
policy capacity.  Following the presentation of evidence for the both the existence of the need for 
rationalization and the existence of (developing) policy capacity, they will be analyzed using the 
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proposed revised model for public management reform.  This analysis will demonstrate and 
elaborate upon the link between the need for rationality and the development of policy capacity 
within a government bureaucracy.  After the short analysis, four reasons will be formulated that 
will support the claim that the need for rationality begets policy capacity.   
 
8.4.1 First Sequence of Evidence 
The need for a rationalized policy-making process can be seen in the generally slow pace 
of progress being made in the realization of the national roads program.  Poland’s experience in 
this area has been beset with difficulties, many of which could be remedied by administrative 
reforms.  This fact was recognized by policy-makers within the predecessors of the MTBiGM 
and MRR.  Their recognition of this in official policy documents that were later endorsed by the 
full cabinet serve as evidence of the need for rationalization of the policy-making process. The 
MTBiGM’s National Transportation Policy 2006-2025 envisions a more streamlined process for 
managing national roads transportation policy including reforms of the style of 
administration/management found in the ministry at the time of drafting the policy document 
(see Figures 7.5 and 7.6).  The MRR’s National Spatial Development Concept 2030 lays out in 
Objective 6 why the spatial planning process must be rationalized through professionalization 
and above all recentralization.  Objective 6 explains both the origins of the current problems 
concerning the MRR’s spatial planning capabilities and the proposed remedies (see Figures 7.7 
and 7.8). 
 
8.4.2 Second Sequence of Evidence 
Evidence derived from interviews will now be used to both elaborate on the need for 
increased rationality and policy capacity and to lend support to claims of existing or developing 
policy capacity within the MTBiGM and MRR.  Evidence from the interviews conducted with 
the Polish academics will be presented first, because these interviews generally brought 
shortcomings in the current system to light illustrating how increased rationality in the policy-
making process is needed.  This will be followed by evidence from interviews with Polish civil 
servants who generally focused on the capabilities of the current system, which is more helpful 
for describing the current level of policy capacity both in the MTBiGM and MRR.   
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Figure 8.2 Excerpt of Interveiw with Academic 2 
Interviewer: Have the bureaucratic structures of those ministries or major agencies or directorates responsible 
for motorway programs either developing policy or implementing them, have they made it any easier to 
implement these programs to design them along with the use of the EU funds? Or do you actually think these 
have complicated the issue? 
Academic 2:  It is more complicated because when we started to receive EU funds for motorway construction or 
for the strategic investments, we had a certain administrative structure which for investment was very clear, but 
it turned out that it didn't work we've so we changed the administrative structure, we move the responsibility to 
another ministry we created another minister and so on and so on. I would say in general, that this is mostly due 
to an institutional system which is not very good. They are not efficient. To some extent and because of the fact 
that the system is not efficient, they can play with that. They also learn how to avoid responsibility, how to 
avoid, you know, any problems with implementation.  And they are always able to find somebody guilty. But 
after some years,  I also believe that the employees of these institutions should just be taken out as soon as 
possible because they are just simply taught how to behave within this regulatory framework and instead of 
constructing motorways they are just quite often playing with the system. Sometimes, I think we should just start 
from the very beginning, just from scratch with the institutions and employ new people and train them so quickly 
and probably … I don't know but I hope that this would be better. 
Interviewer: Are there any general remarks that you would make about the theme of spatial planning or 
regional development programs centering on the construction of highways and government administration? 
 
Academic 2:  Well the general opinion or a general remark would be that we have a problem with that.  We 
have a problem with the law on physical planning.  We have a problem with coordination.  … For instance, we 
build... and… construct motorways, but these motorways are not well connected to the area … outside.  And as 
a result, this is something painful.  I can get [by] motorway from Warsaw to Łódź which is some 120km, I can 
do that by motorway in 40 minutes but it will take me another 40 minutes to get 10km to the city.  Because 
somebody forgot to modernize the road which is narrow, which is poor quality, outdated and [furthermore] 
there is a [a great deal of] traffic.  So you know all the benefits from having motorway access to Łódź are 
totally somehow reduced by the fact that somebody just forgot to modernize a little piece of simple road 
connecting the motorway with the city.  
 
Interviewer: The city itself was separated by this road to the Autostrada by about… you said 10 km or so…? 
 
Academic 2: Maybe 12km, not more than that. 
 
Academic 2:  So everyone is speaking of officially … “Yeah, you can get to Łódź within 40 minutes, 45 
minutes maximum." But it’s not true. 
……………..................... 
 
Academic 2:  Yes this is a de facto problem with access to the motorways. It is only a symptom. But there is a 
much deeper reason, there the lack of coordination of activities. Normally, you build motorways and you think 
about and how somebody has to come to this motorway in order to use it. 
 
Interviewer: Otherwise, it is not very useful… 
 
Academic 2: Otherwise, as you said, it is not very useful. We have that problem that very often these motorways 
are disconnected from the area which they go through. So from this point of view, the usefulness of such 
motorways is below my expectations and probably below the expectations of most of the population living along 
the motorways, with a few exceptions, of course. 
Figure 8.1:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 2 
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Figure 8.3:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 5 
 
Interviewer: What is your opinion of the administrative reforms in the transport sector in the last two decades? 
 
Academic 5: First of all, the first thing is that we changed the transport policy.  There was less change after the 
transition because the central planning was moved to a market economy and the infrastructure was a field in 
which the private developers were welcome to participate and our plans for building these motorways was to 
attract the private sector.  This was not very successful as only three concessions were granted. There was a 
second policy stage which was forced by the accession to the European Union.  And if we think about the 
administrative side reforms, we also headed the same times of the beginning of the 1990s we had a full change of 
the administrative division of the country.  Voivodships, which are like regions in other countries, were 
[reorganized].  Beforehand, there were for almost 50; now there are just 16 of them. And obviously, some of 
them were strengthened. Some, especially the (Transport) Ministry and agencies like the General Directorate for 
National Roads, had to be adjusted to fit to the new administrative structure the country.  What’s more, the very 
same ministry had very different competencies during this time. Sometimes it was just the Ministry of 
Transportation but other times it was just a Ministry of Infrastructure. [The list has also included] 
communication, not only transport not but also building (construction). And now, the ministry is the Ministry of 
Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy. The good thing is that these core transport departments have 
[some internal] continuity so the core [has remained stable].  
 
……………………… 
 
Academic 5: The fact that the Ministry, the generic term the Ministry of Transport, has changed every couple of 
years because different parts are being attached or taken away. At the beginning of the transition, there was no 
possibility to change the composition of the ministries. But then in the middle of the 1990s there was a new law 
which allowed the Prime Minister to allocate different portfolios between different ministries.  Each [change in 
government] witnesses a different type of thinking. Some ministers believe that the infrastructure is everything 
and should be viewed in a holistic way (in which all things are connected), and some believe that it should be 
spread out into different ministries, and that the transport ministry, for instance, should only [concern itself with] 
transport infrastructure. While, for instance the Maritime Ministry, for a time there was also a maritime ministry 
which was focused solely on and maritime transport.  Later its functions were transferred to different ministries.  
So it is more an issue of differences between people than governments, because the same governments, when 
they came to power a few years later, or the people from the same party, they formed a government with 
ministries which had different compositions. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that in these organizations…. have the organizational structures and procedures been 
simplified or made it easier to use the Cohesion Funds from the European Union? 
 
Academic 5: Yes and no at the same time. Yes, because the ministries had to adapt and were conditioned to 
utilize the European Union funds.  They had to create new departments and new procedures. And I would say 
that they managed to do this. Especially the Ministry of Regional Development which is responsible for their 
division of EU funds was re-created and rebuilt and now it is like a hub for all EU funds. The Transport Ministry 
[was affected to a lesser degree, primarily in] the many specialized bodies within this ministry. There are certain 
departments within the Ministry, not counting the General Directorate, that are responsible for the EU money.  
This responsibility for investments was transferred from the Ministry to these specialized agencies. That is one 
aspect and the other aspect is that the procedures became quite complicated from the beneficiaries’ point of 
view. So many documents, many requirements and the people had to learn [all of them]. But if we look at the 
absorption levels, than it does not show up. We probably have the best absorption level in the EU history. So we 
have we are using all the money that is allocated to us. And even more because in the EU there is a special fund 
for those which are best at allocating normal funds. So we can even use these funds which are left over from the 
former perspective which was the Sectorial Operational Program 2004-2006 (we used 100% of these funds). 
And now, since the current perspective is ending in 2013, it looks like we have very good ratios. 
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Figure 8.5:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 7 
 
  
Academic 5:  I think - yes. [Having read] those questions [about] transportation policy’s impact on the country's 
economy, I would say that transportation policy is [treated somewhat] separately. It is not really integrated in the 
overall economic policy, but, of course, is considered an important part of our economic policy. The general 
influences [which came to mind] are that everybody knows that a good transportation system improves the 
economy, and that we are transit country and this that having these West-East links.  However, there are no 
wider economic benefits calculated anywhere (in the general conception of economic policy).   
 
Interviewer: Even within the more recent efforts to establish a ‘national spatial plan’?   
 
Academic 5: There are some answers in transport policy.  There are some links. There are some connections.  
But I think all policies are somewhat fragmented. For instance, our transport policy has so many goals that it is 
very difficult to say which one is the most important. 
 
Interviewer:  Of course, there are always such things as political considerations…   
 
Academic 5: As well. There is change in government when the new prime minister comes into office and the 
major goals change. Although there are some goals that were set, for long time we hadn't had a highway network 
so it was considered an important objective that each minister would assume these goals...   
Interviewer:  Do you think there might be more pressure on the transport-related ministries in Poland to perform 
than on other ministries from society? 
Academic 7: So do you mean compared to other countries or other ministries? 
Interviewer:  I mean in the case of the ministries… 
Academic 7:  The problem in Poland is now that we have a lack of infrastructure. The infrastructure is not 
following economic growth. So we really need an improvement in a lot of corridors. Everyone who’s driving a 
car or who is traveling by car is angry. And, of course, the pressure from society on the ministry is much higher 
than on other ministries. I actually think it is the highest. They say being a Transport Minister in Poland is like 
committing political suicide because you will never meet the expectations of society. 
Interviewer:  So, is there is there any concern that the Minister Nowak might not last very long? 
Academic 7: No, currently there is a very strong government… 
Interviewer:  Yes, I know it is the first government to be reelected since 1989. 
Academic 7: So they are mature enough to be strong and to not to make their decisions as a result of short-term 
social pressure. So they are strong enough not to do this. But of course, if there [would] be a political need, I 
don’t think that the prime minister would hesitate to change the minister. 
Figure 8.4:  Excerpt of Interview with Academic 5. 
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Figure 8.6:  Excerpt of Interview with MRR Civil Servants 
 
Interviewer:  How have formal rules and procedures changed over time, or have they changed all? Were they 
more formal?  Was there greater hierarchy? 
MRR Civil Servant 1:  European money is not easy money.  From one side we have the Polish public 
administration and our internal procedures and from the other side there are procedures which we are forced to 
implement by the European Union in order to get money from the European Union.   
Interviewer: You’re speaking of the acquis communautaire? 
MRR Civil Servant 1:  Yes.  Our work is very formal.  We have books full of binding procedures… checklists 
etc… For example, if we take part in the process of verifying applications for co-financing, we need to fill in 
these lists and then we must enter all the data into the system (shared with the EU Commission).  So we have a 
lot of rules and procedures and sometimes we feel that we are overregulated. 
Interviewer: By the European Union or by your own administrative rules? 
MRR Civil Servant 1: By our own procedures… Because you see we have double checking of our tasks and 
so… We are our ministry is being controlled by the Polish control bodies by the NIK… We have an internal 
audit of our ministry.  And from the other side we have the European court of auditors.  We are constantly being 
controlled by others. And I don’t think there is a very good solution to the situation.  We had to live with it. 
Interviewer: Regarding the checklists, obviously, these checklists are meant to ensure that all of your actions 
are legal and in accordance with the law.  But were these checklists designed to ensure that you are following the 
law, but not written in a legalistic way.  Or is the writing very legalistic? 
MRR Civil Servant 1:  Our system of management and control, our operational program, is constructed in such 
a way that the main aims of the project, you know if the project is according to the law, is being checked in 
another institution. We are an implementing body. Because, if the project is not in line with the target of the 
program, it would not be implemented. If we get an application for financial assistance, we do not check if the 
project is implemented according to the law because if it was done in our institution, we [will have already 
checked] the correctness of all of the data… 
Interviewer: I understand. So by the time you begin working on it, it is assumed that it already meets all legal 
requirements. 
MRR Civil Servant 1: The legality of the project is being checked at the beginning of the process.  This is when 
we decide whether the project could be implemented within our program or not. 
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Figure 8.7:  Excerpt of Interview with MTBiGM Civil Servants  
 
Figures 8.1-8.5 illustrate the concerns of Polish academics closely involved in the coordination 
of national roads and regional development policy.   Academic 2 (Figure 8.1) uses an example of 
a new motorway (the A2) being poorly accessible in Łódź due to the poor state of a national road 
connecting it to the city, which negates the positive impact of the Autostrada.  This is a clear 
example of the need of better coordination of activities.  Academic 2 (Figure 8.2) even suggests 
replacing many of the civil servants involved in motorway and expressway policy.   
Coordination between the objective of creating a network of motorways and expressways and 
regional economic development has also been slow to emerge (see Figure 8.4).  The slow 
changes in transport policy at the beginning of the transition and the frequent reorganizations of 
the ministry responsible for transport have also demonstrated the need for better policy 
coordination in this whole project (see Figure 8.3).  Academic 7 (Figure 8.5) notes the 
tremendous public pressure on the Polish government to implement the motorways program, 
which illustrates the necessity of creating the “infrastructure” for better performance in the future. 
Interviews with Polish civil servants pointed to areas where there is burgeoning policy capacity 
within the responsible ministries.  MTBiGM Civil Servant 1 (Figure 8.7) points to the increased 
responsibilities of the GDDKiA in the area of operations and management.  Although, these are 
not policy-making responsibilities in the strictest sense of the word, they do demonstrate that the 
MTBiGM seeks to increase its capabilities by centralizing specific powers in the appropriate 
places, thereby streamlining and rationalizing the entire process.  MRR Civil Servant 1 (Figure 
8.6) describes the capacity of the ministry to develop internal guidelines for the use of EU 
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1: I think the main difference is all the technical and operational responsibility for the 
national roads, highways, and motorways national roads are delegated to these separate offices. And within the 
ministry there is only the supervision of that structure.  And this is something different and also the National 
Road Fund has funded the construction of the roads. They are not the quite …budgetary funds.  [They are funds 
which are] gathering the money from the printing of new money or the release of bonds etc… 
Interviewer: But how would that make a difference that the GDDKiA does gather together the Autostrada, the 
national roads policy and, as you said, it is one organization within the ministry will be the consequences of that?  
MTBiGM Civil Servant 1:  I think that since the responsibility is exported to the GDDKiA, it is easier for 
linking the responsibility to different people. And within the ministry, I think that this decision-making process 
would become ingratiated. I think that it's good that all the work and the responsibility is in one place outside the 
Ministry, the Department for National Roads only supervises the process. 
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Cohesion Funds.  The system, developed internally, rigorously vets proposals by potential 
project beneficiaries throughout the entire process.  Civil servants in both ministries expressed 
confidence in the ability of their rules and procedures to competently ward against misuse of 
funds. 
 
8.4.3 Third Sequence of Evidence 
Organizational descriptions of the MTBiGM and MRR that demonstrate policy capacity 
are presented below.  These serve to enumerate (via reference to the appendices) the departments 
with specific responsibilities in the policy-making process.  The GDDKiA is not included as a 
separate entity as it is subordinate to the MTBIGM and implements policy rather than actively 
producing it.  Farazmand’s (2009) deconstruction of policy capacity is used as an analytical 
device.  Thus, these descriptions answer questions such as who, what, when, where, why, how, 
and how much. Also included are departments or other internal units that perform an auditing 
function.  Directly following the tables of organizational descriptions will be an analysis of how 
the reform towards greater policy capacity coalesces around the Improved Model of Public 
Management Reform.  
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Category of 
Policy 
Capacity 
 
Sub-Category 
 
Example 
 
Reference 
 
Governing and 
Policy Actors 
 
Who 
 
Office of the Minister
74
 
 
Appendix A-1 
Department of Roads and Motorways Appendix A-8 
Department of Transport Policy and 
International Cooperation 
Appendix A-9 
Department of EU Funds Appendix A-10 
GDDKiA  
 
Policy 
Directions 
 
What 
 
National Transportation Policy (NTP) for 
2006-2025 
 
 
National Roads Construction Program 2008-
2012 
 
 
Strategic 
Choices and 
Guidance 
 
When 
 
Timeframe of NTP 2006-2025 
 
Prioritization and Fast-Tracking of Projects  
 
Why 
 
Prioritization of Projects based on Merit 
(Rationalization) 
 
 
How 
 
The Law (via actions of Office of the 
Minister and Legal-Legislative Department) 
 
Appendix A-1, A-
6 
Transport Planning  Appendix A-8 
Financing of Projects Appendix A-9 & 
A-10 
 
How Much 
 
Merit-Based Evaluation of Proposals 
 
Appendix A-8 
 
Evaluation 
 
Institutions and 
Arrangements  
for Policy Review 
 
Internal Units of Most Relevant Departments 
 
Appendices A-1, 
A-8, A-9, & A-10. 
 
Table 8.3:  Policy Capacity and MTBiGM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74
 Although the Office of the Minister exists to meet the political needs of the Minister of Transport, not all positions 
within this office are political; in fact, many are filled with career civil servants. 
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Category of Policy 
Capacity 
 
Sub-Category 
 
Example 
 
Reference 
 
Governing and 
Policy Actors 
 
Who 
 
Office of the Minister
75
  
 
Appendix B-1 
Department of Structural Policy Coordination Appendix B-3 
Department for Infrastructure Program 
Coordination 
Appendix B-4 
Department of Coordinating the Implementation 
of EU Funds 
Appendix B-5 
Department of Spatial Policy Appendix B-6 
 
Policy Directions 
 
What 
 
National Spatial Development Concept (NSDC) 
2030 
 
Highway Transportation Issues  
 
Strategic Choices 
and Guidance 
 
When 
 
Timeframe of NSDC 2011-2030
76
 
 
Prioritization and Fast-Tracking of Projects  
 
Why 
 
Prioritization of Projects based on Merit 
(Rationalization) 
 
 
How 
 
3 Measures for Restoring Spatial Order in Poland    
Contained in NSDC 2030 
 
Legislation (via actions of Legal Department and 
Office of the Minister) 
Appendices B-1 
& B-7 
Control of Access to EU Cohesion Fund Appendix B-4 
 
How Much 
 
Merit-Based Evaluation of Proposals  
 
Appendix B-4 
 
Evaluation 
 
Institutions and 
Arrangements  
for Policy 
Review 
 
Internal Units of Most Relevant Departments 
 
Appendices B-1 
– B-6. 
 
Table 8.4:  Policy Capacity and MRR 
 
8.4.3.1 Use of the Revised Model of Public Management Reform 
 The evidence and information described above will now be presented using the Revised 
Model of Public Management Reform developed from Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) original 
model during the course of this research.  
                                                 
75
 Although the Office of the Minister exists to meet the political needs of the Minister of Regional Development, 
not all positions within this office are political; in fact, many are filled with career civil servants.   
76
 This must also take into account the timeframe of the Ministry of Transport’s National Transportation Policy 
2006-2025. 
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Figure 8.8 Revised Model of Public Management Reform Based on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) Original. 
 
  
 
  
B. Global 
Economic Forces 
H. Party Political 
Ideas  
C. Socio-
Economic Change 
F. New 
Management 
Ideas 
G. Pressure from 
Citizens 
D. Socio-Economic 
Policies  
J. Elite Decision-Making 
What is… 
1) desirable, and/ or 
2) feasible? 
  
I. Chance Events: 
Scandals, disasters 
A. Socio-Economic Forces E.  Political System 
K. Administrative 
L. Content of Reform Package 
N. Results Achieved 
M. Implementation Process 
 
S. European 
Union 
T. Other 
International Bodies 
 
F-1) Weberian 
Bureaucratic 
Theory 
O. Civil Service Institutions 
P.  Professionalism 
Q.  Policy Capacity 
R. EU and International  
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8.4.4 Reform towards Policy-Capacity Using the Revised Model of Public Management Reform 
Socio-Economic Forces (Box A) lay at the heart of the entire motorway and expressway 
policy area.  The transition from a planned to a free market economy after 1989 involved a 
fundamental restructuring of Poland’s economic institutions.  In the realm of transportation, 
economic forces initiated a modal shift from rail to road transportation (owing in part to relaxed 
restrictions on modal choice).  Pressures from Global Economic Forces (Box B) included 
increased competition from foreign industry as well as an economic reorientation towards the 
West. Relevant Socio-Economic Changes (Box C) were increased automobile ownership and 
desire for greater personal mobility.  However, increased economic vulnerability was also a 
result of the transition.  Global Economic Forces and Socio-Economic Changes provided the 
rationale for creating new Socio-Economic Policies (Box D) to address them.  Economic 
liberalization and a program to construct a modern system of motorways and expressways 
appeared to be the answer.  In accordance with the Revised Model, socio-economic forces 
directly influenced the Political System (Box E) via citizen pressure (Box G), Elites (Box J), and 
the Administrative System (Box K) via those employed in the Civil Service (Box O) who, after 
all, are affected just as other Polish citizens.   
Socio-economic change has compelled the Polish public to demand that the Political 
System (Box E) accommodate this new reality of mass car ownership.  Pressure from Citizens 
(Box G) served as impetus for the political parties to develop party programs supporting the 
expansion and improvement of the road network in Poland.   This would in turn pressure 
Political and Administrative Elites (Box J) to develop responsive policies.  As is already known, 
the concept of a national system of motorways had been debated before, but never given the 
resources to be implemented.  It was only with the transformed socio-economic circumstances in 
Poland after 1989 that the issue could no longer be delayed.  In 1992, the General Directorate for 
Public Roads (GDDP) had decided that the major urban centers should be connected with 
modern highways with corridors corresponding to the current paths of the national roads A1, A2, 
A4, S3, and the more unique Via Baltica.  The then Ministry of Transport and Maritime 
Economy created a specialized agency, the Agency for Motorway Construction (Agencja do 
spraw Budowy Autostrad) in 1992 for realizing the tasks essential to beginning a construction 
program. 
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During this time the influence of international institutions (Box R) also began to be felt.  
In March of 1994, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) (Box T
77
) 
determined that four of the nine trans-European transport corridors were to be located in Poland 
along axes largely corresponding to the tracks of the current A1, A2, A4, and Via Baltica.  Along 
with the European Community’s (and later European Union’s) PHARE program78 begun in 1989, 
the ECMT decisions on the Trans-European Network corridors were certainly encouragement for 
the Polish government to progress further towards the realization of their domestic network of 
national roads.  In March 1994, a newly refashioned Agency for Constructing Motorways 
(Agencja Budowy Autostrad) contributed towards preparing legal changes that would benefit a 
future motorway program.  In October of 1994, a law on tolled motorways was adopted by the 
Parliament that created the framework for a system of financing, building, and managing future 
motorways.  The law also created the Council for Highways (Rada do spraw Autostrad) and the 
direct predecessor of the current GDDKiA, Agency for the Construction and Exploitation of 
Motorways (Agencja Budowy i Eksploatacji Autostrad - ABiEA). 
The 1994 law also created the National Road Fund. The National Road Fund was meant 
to be a source of funding for a highway construction program outside of the state budget, which 
was thought to be unable to support such a construction program. Presently, the National Road 
Fund collects earmarked funds from a fuel tax, EU refunds of motorway projects, and tolls 
collected by the GDDKiA, and it may also borrow money from the markets, often facilitated by 
the European Investment Bank (EIB). Proponents of an authorization of tolled motorways 
believe that this would help pay for the enormous cost of constructing the motorway network in 
Poland. It also opens the door for private companies to construct and maintain motorways for-
profit (through the collection of tolls) after being awarded contracts following a competitive 
bidding process open to foreign, especially EU competitors. In 1995 the cabinet known as the 
Council of Ministers of Poland (Box J) approved the transportation policy produced by the 
transport ministry, known in Polish as Polityka transportowa – program działania w kierunku 
przekształcenia transportu w system dostosowany do wymogów gospodarki rynkowej i nowych 
warunków współpracy gospodarczej w Europie (rough translation: Transport Policy – a 
                                                 
77
 Box T denotes non-EU organizations as there are simply too many to neatly represent with their own boxes within 
the model. 
78
 The Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program was an early source of 
international assistance for Poland’s ambitions in the realization of a modernized national roads network. 
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Programme to Transform Transport into a System Adapted to the Requirements of Market 
Economy and New Conditions of Co-operation in Europe). The general goals of this policy were 
amended in the Polityka Transportowa Panstwa 2001- 2015 dla zrównoważnego rozwoju kraju79 
(National Transport Policy 2001-2015 for Sustainable Development of the Country), which was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2001.   
Although plans had been developed for beginning the construction of the network and the 
creation of mechanisms with which to finance it, sufficient financial resources were not available.  
These circumstances required the prioritizing of specific national roads and even of specific 
segments of these roads.  Going back as far as the tenure of Minister Bogusław Liberadzki 
(1993-1997), it had been decided in principle that priorities would be set in accordance with 
economically rational criteria (Kaliński 2011).  In order to ensure that projects were evaluated 
solely on their economic merit, the capability of the transport ministry to perform this task had to 
be further developed (Box K).  This was achieved through new recruitment and further training 
of employees.   
Pressure from the European Union and other international organizations (Box R) for 
administrative reforms in order to prepare the responsible ministries for using Structural Funds 
and Cohesion Funds was felt by Poland’s political and administrative elite (Box J), which then 
had to begin moving towards the enactment of civil service laws.  The Law on the Civil Service 
was passed in 1996 (Dz. U. z 1996 r. Nr 89, poz. 402)
80
 but was withdrawn after only a short 
period of time after a new center-right government was voted into office.  The new government 
(Box J) passed a new Law on the Civil Service (Dz. U. z 1999 r. Nr 49, poz. 483) in December 
18, 1998 containing many improvements over the 1996 Law, especially in the areas of job 
security for civil servants.  The actions of the political elite strengthened the position of the 
nascent civil service (Box O), which together with the growing significance of the National 
                                                 
79
 One of the notable changes in the National Transport Policy 2001 – 2015 was that the route to be known as the 
Autostrada A3 was downgraded to an expressway, becoming known as the Ekspresówka S3. This change in status 
was a result of studies which showed that the expected intensity of traffic along this route was not as heavy as 
forecasted earlier and was not expected to grow enough in the future to justify the cost of building a road up to the 
standards of the full Autostrada. 
80
 Bach-Golecka (2011) writes, “While technically one may consider CSA (civil service act) of 1996 a proper piece 
of legislation, nevertheless it was deprived of its legitimacy due to the instrumental, political use of its initiators. 
Moreover, some provisions, i.e. norms stating the required years of work experience, were explicitly designed for 
the benefit of public officials of the communist regime and to the detriment of the candidates who started work in 
state institutions after 1989” (9). 
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School for Public Administration (KSAP) began to instill greater professionalism
81
 (Box P) into 
the civil service.  With increased protections from politicization and additional training in both 
domestic and EU-sponsored programs, the predecessor of the current MTBiGM began to 
develop a policy-making capacity (Box Q) that was more independent of the political leadership.  
The civil service faced the specter of greater politicization once again during the presidency of 
Lech Kaczyński and concurrent premiership of his brother Jarosław Kaczyński.  In 2006 two 
laws were passed, the 2006 Law on the Civil Service (Dz. U. z 2006 r. Nr 170, poz. 1218) and 
the State Personnel Reserve Act (Dz. U. z 2006 r. Nr 170, poz. 1217), ostensibly for the purpose 
of increasing the efficiency of the civil service through measures reminiscent of New Public 
Management. However, they had the effect of increasing the politicization of the government 
administration.  Following elections in 2007, most of the effects of these two laws were reversed, 
and the provisions of the 1998 law were essentially reinstated by the Civil Service Act of 2008 
(Dz. U. z 2008 r. Nr 227, poz. 1505)  (see Back-Golecka 2011).   
Returning to the transportation policy area, a series of plans were adopted by the 
government (Box J) in the 2000s, including the Sectoral Operational Program in Transport 
(2004), National Development Plan (2004), National Transportation Policy for 2006-2025 (2005), 
National Roads Construction Program (2008-2012), and finally the National Spatial 
Development Concept 2030 (2011).  In these instances, the ministries involved in transportation 
planning had greater policy input than was previously the case.  As mentioned earlier in the first 
sequence of evidence, the MTBiGM and MRR both sought to recentralize some powers in order 
to rationalize the policy-making process and make it more manageable.  Thus Box L was 
collectively participating in the policy process along with the political elites (Box J).  However, 
in a reminder of the supremacy of political control over government administration, the 
MTBiGM and MRR were merged together in an action taken by the Council of Ministers of 
Poland on November 27, 2013 following the resignation of the Minister of Transport.  The then 
Minister of Regional Development, Elżbieta Bieńkowska, became Minister of Infrastructure and 
Development while the process of integrating the separate bureaucracies of the former MTBiGM 
and MRR is certainly underway. 
                                                 
81
 The concept of professionalism is very important as it creates the conditions for another layer of internal 
oversight. The legal obligations of civil servants in addition to their increasing education (in public administration) 
via the KSAP corresponds to Peter’s (2010) ‘normative methods’ mechanism of accountability.  
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The recent fusing of the MTBiGM and MRR into the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Development (Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju, MIR) under the leadership of Bieńkowska 
has been received with both enthusiasm and caution in the Polish media.  There is hope that 
combining the two ministries into the new MIR will cut redundancies in planning, the procedures 
for allocating EU funds, and monitoring.  However, Michał Beim (2013) expressed concerns to 
Rynek Kolejowy that combining the monitoring structures of the ministry which allocated funds 
(MRR) with the ministry which spent them (MTBiGM) could lead to a weakening of effective 
controls over the whole process.  Beim expressed hope that policymaking, by contrast, would be 
better coordinated now that the two ministries were joined together thereby reducing the risk of 
contradictory policies coming from two separate ministries.  Bałdys (2013) noted in Rynek 
Infrastruktury under Sławomir Nowak, the MTBiGM: 1) did not have stable medium- or long-
term planning as existing plans were updated too frequently, 2) did not have a policy which 
would help grow the transport construction sector, 3) did not retain knowledge from previous 
experiences especially after reorganizations, 4) allowed conditions to wreak havoc on the 
engineering profession in Poland, 5) did not provide for a predictable regulatory regime, 6) did 
not reform rules for allocating EU funds developed within the ministry, and 7) did not pursue a 
dialogue with the construction industry.  The grievances aired by Bałdys, if true, do not reflect 
well on the state of policy capacity within the MTBiGM before its reorganization.  Particularly 
worrisome are issues relating to medium and long-term planning as well as regulation of funds.  
Bałdys has a decidedly negative view of what may have been legitimate practices such as 
updating plans to reflect changing conditions and needs.  Thus this commentary, although 
revealing some thinking from within the construction industry in Poland, must be treated with 
some caution.  Elżbieta Bieńkowska’s statements about the necessity of opening a dialogue with 
members of the construction industry have been greeted by many, however, only time will tell if 
this dialogue is initiated and remains stable.  This dialogue could be one element that could 
increase the policy capacity of the new MIR, as civil servants and planners would be more aware 
of the needs and limitations of the construction industry.  Conversely, the construction industry 
may be able to better understand the government’s positions. 
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8.4.5 Supporting Reasons 
Below there are descriptions of four instances derived from the interviews with civil 
servants and academics that demonstrate need for or existence of policy capacity within the 
national roads transport policy sector in Poland.   
 
8.4.5.1 Reason 1: Burgeoning Capacity of Policymaking at MRR   
The MRR is a government entity charged with the coordination of EU funds for the 
spatial development of Poland. This coordinating effort is possible in part because of the 
capacity of the MRR to select and prioritize projects throughout the country.  The policymaking 
position of the ministry has been strengthened by the law on spatial planning of 2003 in addition 
to the civil service laws of earlier years. When the MRR produced the National Spatial 
Development Concept 2030 in 2011, it ensured that its civil servants are relevant in the policy 
debate on socio-economic development.   
 
8.4.5.2 Reason 2: Burgeoning Capacity of Policy-Making at MTBiGM 
 The MTBiGM has long possessed greater policy capacity than the MRR as its policy area 
had been centralized throughout the transition.  The technical expertise of the employees at the 
predecessors to this ministry as well as the expertise of the current civil servants has ensured that 
it can influence policy debates by possessing the needed information for policy decisions.  The 
number of transportation plans produced during the 2000s is indicative of the MTBiGM ability 
to shape national transportation policy in accordance with the rigorous criteria it espouses.   
 
8.4.5.3 Reason 3: Preemptive Development of Internal Procedures 
 Both ministries have developed detailed internal procedures in order to ensure the proper 
use of EU Cohesion funds.  The EU would state which protections it wanted in place and then 
the civil servants within the ministries would develop procedures that would fulfill the function 
desired by the European Union.  Rather than having detailed procedures imposed upon them by 
the European Commission, the ministries sought to design rules and procedures that would both 
function well in the Polish administrative setting and meet the expectation of EU officials. This 
demonstrates their ability to preempt orders from the political elite and other countries. 
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8.4.5.4 Reason 4: Prioritization of Projects   
Although this is in all likelihood a decision that would require political approval, the data 
produced to make an informed policy suggestion to the political leadership would have come 
from the ministries, demonstrating that some policy capacity must exist for them to be able to 
participate in this process.  The prioritization of construction projects demonstrates a level of 
maturity of judgment on the part of the civil servants tasked with preparing these 
recommendations to the Minister in the face of limited financial resources.  It also reflects the 
resolve necessary to move back projects over the objections of politicians within an interest in 
seeing their completion.   
 
8.4.6 Hypothesis  
 In light of the evidence presented in this analysis, the claim that the need for better 
coordination and activities and a rationalization of the developing and implementation of policy 
has nurtured the growth of policy capacity within the MTBiGM and the MRR is well-founded.  
The claim is supported both by a review of legislation and history as well as the information 
gained from the interviews with civil servants and academics.  Furthermore, the evidence also 
strongly suggests that there is an inverse relationship between policy capacity within the civil 
service and politicization by political elites could exist.   
 
8.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The rationality that is often attributed to Weber’s thoughts on bureaucracy is realized in a 
centralized and hierarchical structure that functions efficiently in the implementation of its duties. 
This description seems to be more appropriate for the implementation of policy versus the 
process of developing policy ideas, drafting policy documents as well as reviewing policy 
decisions already made. There is another kind of rationality that is appropriate in any discussion 
of the activities of the Polish ministries responsible for transportation policy, and specifically for 
highway transportation policy. This rationality is indeed value laden, with thrift and caution held 
in high esteem. This rationality would dictate that any projects undertaken would have to meet 
strict criteria following a cost-benefit analysis. And as has been demonstrated, the emergence of 
a policy capacity within the Polish government has contributed to more rational decision-making 
on the part of political leaders and government officials on the subject of the motorway building 
218 
program.  Not only did continual evaluation and review (the hallmarks of policy capacity) refine 
the transportation plans adopted by the Polish government, they serve to strengthen the precedent 
of involvement of such activities in the policy process.  
  Although it is very clear that the upper levels of the ministries are indeed politicized in 
Poland, meaning that ultimately politicians and politics control policy, the apparent rationality of 
some policy choices seems to demonstrate a technocratic approach to this policy process by the 
civil servants and politicians most closely involved. Of course, at times the rationality of policy 
choices may come under pressure by politicians wishing to promote or persuade the Polish 
government to undertake projects and their local districts for the benefit of their constituents.   
This chapter set out to demonstrate the existence of policy capacity as described by 
Farazmand (2009) within the Polish ministries responsible for transportation policy. As is clear 
from the research performed here, the documents and interviews analyzed, there does appear to 
be a stable and functioning policy capacity within the two ministries responsible for transport 
policy. The fact that through self-reflection policymakers (both civil servants and political 
appointments) within these ministries are able to suggest changes to be made in the statutes, 
which established their ministries and authorized their activities, demonstrates that at least some 
reform impulses originate from within the ministry itself.  Reform proposals originating from 
within the ministries may indeed be the preferable source of pressure for administrative reform 
as well as the source of pressure to which the bureaucracies are the most responsive.  It is also 
argued that policy capacity has a major impact on the rational choices made by public servants.  
Increasing policy capacity among the civil servants within the ministries does not support a strict 
dichotomy between politics and administration; however, it can in theory prevent a certain kind 
of politics from entering into the decision-making process.  Centralized policy-capacity comes at 
the expense of parochial concerns of regional and local politicians.  It rationalizes the process 
insofar as it is able to develop policy based on criteria that may or may not be favorable to 
particular local interests. Arguably, this might come closest to some aspects of bureaucratic 
neutrality espoused by Wilson and Weber because the criteria for decision-making are at least 
partially de-politicized, approved by the political leadership as binding policy, and then 
implemented in an impartial manner. 
The analysis within the chapter utilized the Revised Model of Public Management 
Reform, which was adapted from a model developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and is 
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suitable for examining administrative reform in Poland and ECE.  The development of this 
Revised Model constitutes the major theoretical contribution of this dissertation research, having 
been applied in this chapter to the evolution of policy capacity within the MTBiGM and MRR in 
Poland.  Policy capacity was ultimately shown as increasing at the same time that the threat of 
over-politicization was receding. A final discussion and conclusion for this dissertation research 
follows in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
9.1 ADMINISTRATIVE LEGACY EXPLANATION AND HIGHWAY TRANSPORT 
POLICY 
The basic question that inspired the research for this doctoral dissertation was whether a 
direct administrative legacy from state socialism exists which still influences the formulation and 
implementation of national roads policy in Poland.  It is not difficult to appreciate the complexity 
of policy choices in transportation planning, and therefore a fundamental understanding of this 
research has been that dynamics within administrative structures have had an unmistakable 
bearing on the whole of the policy process.  Any legacy explanation must include the 
phenomenon of politicization as its fundamental element.  Dimitrov, Goetz, and Wollman (2001) 
noted the irony of government administrations in ECE being both under-politicized and over-
politicized.  This can be explained by understanding that two different phenomena are referenced 
in this assertion.  Government administration in Poland has been affected by an over-
politicization in terms of personnel, especially in the most high-ranking positions within 
ministries and important agencies.  This is in keeping with trends noted throughout East-Central 
Europe by Meyer-Sahling (2009b) and Dimitrov, Goetz, and Wollman (2001) among others.  
Simultaneously, government administrations have been under-politicized insofar as the career 
civil servants staffing them have traditionally not had a strong role in formulating policy when 
compared to political staff who supervise and oversee the operations of the ministries or agencies. 
This lack of policy capacity has been steadily remedied by reforms in some countries, although it 
still remains an issue.   The binary of policy capacity within administration and politicization of 
the administration form the core of any viable explanation as to how a past legacy of state 
socialism can have an effect on the outcomes of administrative reforms today.   
A tendency to ignore formal rules and weak political institutions were two characteristics 
of an administrative legacy mentioned by Meyer-Sahling (2009b).  Both phenomena are 
mutually reinforcing thus making it difficult to determine which initially caused the other.  It has 
been argued that in a period of political transition such as was experienced by Poland in the 
1990s, old political institutions were undergoing transformation, and their replacements were not 
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yet strong.  It was weakened institutions that facilitated a lack of adherence to formal rules, 
compounded by the fact that political parties in power desired to bring the government 
administration under their control.  It was in this environment that politicization of the 
government administration by the new parties in power would continue this practice inherited 
from state socialism.  The prospect of politicizing the administration for the purpose of realizing 
party goals and rewarding political supporters was mentioned as another alternative by Meyer-
Sahling, acknowledging the important work on this topic was done by O’Dwyer (2004) and 
Grzymała-Busse (2007).  Grzymała-Busse (2007) contended that in response to what she termed 
“robust party competition”, incumbent politicians were not inclined to allow opposition parties to 
exploit the state for resources and therefore erected institutions to deter such use of the state.  
Politicization as a means to an end is apparent in this instance, strengthening the claim that 
politicization lies at the heart of an administrative legacy from the past.  
Verheijen’s (2012) four explanations for reform difficulties are also related to 
politicization when examined closely.  The first explanation, a lack of political consensus on 
exactly how the government administration should be configured, reflects uncertainty on the part 
of political elites as to how much de-politicization of the bureaucracy to allow. De-politicization 
would have obviously limited their power over the administration. It also alludes to an intra-
party struggle for power over the resources at the state’s disposal described by Grzymała-Busse 
(2007). The second explanation, problems with the reform design, indicates both real problems 
with reform outcomes and potential problems with reform plans from the point of view of the 
political elite in power.  The third explanation, contradictory signs from international 
organizations, specifically the EU, reflects the fact that the EU has had great difficulty in 
articulating a coherent reform strategy for government administrations in ECE beyond general 
principles on the one hand, and very specific reforms in preparation for managing EU funds on 
the other.  Although the EU has desired less political interference in the day-to-day operation of 
government administration, its old member states do not themselves possess a defined common 
standard.  The fourth explanation, a belief that the uniqueness of ECE present political conditions 
are not conducive to western models of administration, suggests that political elites in ECE do 
not believe that the important issues of the day can be addressed by government administration 
without the tight political control exercised over policymaking.  From the outset of this research, 
it has been vital to understand how potential alternatives to a legacy explanation might be 
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reconciled with one another.  The alternatives presented by Meyer-Sahling and Verheijen’s 
explanations of reform failure served as themes that were considered when identifying how a 
model of administrative reform that could address the complexities of the reform process.   
Any legacy explanation must include a description of how it was reproduced over time.  
This was Meyer-Sahling’s (2009b) main argument when analyzing administrative legacies in 
East-Central Europe.  He proposed two kinds of “mechanisms of reproduction” that needed 
further investigation.  These were 1) rational-historical institutionalism, and 2) social-
constructivist institutionalism.  The results of this research suggest that the administrative legacy 
of politicization is reflective of rational-historical instiutionalism whereas a lingering mentality is 
reflective of social-constructivist insitutionalism. Research Question 1 asked what mechanisms 
have reproduced the administrative legacy of state-socialism.  It was hypothesized that 
politicization was the main component of a legacy explanation and thus explained how the 
legacy was consistently reproduced throughout the hierarchy until the introduction of the Civil 
Service Law of 1998, which made significant progress in curtailing the most flagrant excesses of 
politicization, i.e. politicization of positions far down in the hierarchy.  While politicization of 
the higher positions (secretaries and undersecretaries of state, the General Director of the 
GDDKiA) continues, it has been very much reduced to the mid to lower levels of the 
administration thereby providing a minimum basis for a civil service.  Institutional capacity as 
described by Farazmand (2009) was slowly developed as political elites gradually pursued 
reform both due to necessity and the pressure brought upon them by accession to the European 
Union.  The elites did this once they were comfortable with the prospective results of reform that 
would not circumscribe their political control over the administration.  Their actions reflected a 
political rationality discussed by Diesing (1962).   
Understanding the mechanisms with which political elites hold the government 
administration accountable is vital for understanding how reform has proceeded.  Peter’s (2010) 
mechanisms of accountability were important guides in this respect. Research Question 2 asked 
whether mechanisms of accountability have successfully compelled the government 
administration in Poland to undertake reforms.  It was hypothesized that they have successfully 
done so.  The findings of the research and analysis conducted in Chapter 6 supported this claim.  
Through a variety of different institutions (such as political control and the Supreme Chamber of 
Auditors), the political leadership and elite have been not only been able to initiate wide-ranging 
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reforms of the administration when they decided which reforms to pursue, but also to verify the 
progress of reforms and the proper functioning of these ministries and agencies.  The European 
Union has also been able to influence the course of reforms by the mechanism of political control 
functioning through conditionality attached to the accession process and auditing functions 
performed during review of the use of Cohesion Funds for EU sponsored projects in 
transportation infrastructure.  The EU’s efforts to influence reform are not only in response to the 
perceived threat of lost financial assistance, but also they encourage the development of an 
administrative system conforming to the EU’s values, a clear example of substantive rationality.  
The applicable scales of this rationality are found both at the national and supranational levels.  
A national scale is relevant because this is the fundamental unit used to realize a greater “space” 
of EU values at the supranational scale (i.e. European Administrative Space). Farazmand’s (2009) 
description of politics as capacity adds form to this discussion as it shows how good political 
control is necessary for the proper functioning of a given bureaucracy.  The legal and political 
rationality of Diesing (1962) also contribute to understanding these arrangements by highlighting 
the logic by which these institutions of control are structured. 
A pronounced centralization of state institutions and political power was a hallmark of 
governance during state socialism.  Although a notable centralization of political power remains 
a legacy of communism in some East-Central European countries, it is not the case in Poland. 
Beginning early in the transition, there was a decentralization of powers to the newly formed 
independent local governments. In 1999 new regional governments were formed in Poland, 
which reduced the number of voivodships from forty-nine to sixteen.  The new voivodships did 
not possess the same legal separation from the central government that local governments did 
and therefore were dependent on the central government in many matters, including policies 
relating to highways. Although the policy area of national highway infrastructure remained 
centralized throughout the transition, some ancillary planning functions had been decentralized 
to the self-governments.  This state of affairs seriously impeded the progress of realizing a 
national network of motorways and expressways.  Conscious of the situation, the MTBiGM and 
especially the MRR have actively sought the recent rise in planning powers related to national 
highways infrastructure policy and spatial planning. The MRR now requires that local 
governments produce spatial plans that complement and are not at odds with the national spatial 
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development plan.  Research Question 3 asked whether or not decentralization
82
 had been very 
influential in present policymaking related to national highways. It was hypothesized that this 
would indeed be the case, although ultimate authority would still be vested in the central 
ministries.  Research and analysis from Chapter 7 could not support the hypothesis that 
decentralization has a significant role in the formulation of national highway infrastructure 
policy. All civil servants and academics interviewed were adamant in their assertion that this has 
been and remains a very centralized policy making area. Although the hypothesis could not be 
supported, an interesting implication of the results produced is that decentralization seriously 
impeded the capacity of the ministries to execute their primary tasks in the area of national 
highway policy. Thus the logic of recentralization was in fact a rationalization of the policy 
process from the point of view of the MTBiGM and MRR in the vein of possessing 
organizational capacity as described by Farazmand (2009) and a legal rational character 
described by Diesing (1962).  The logic of recentralization appears at least partially to stem from 
a desire on the part of the MTBiGM and MRR to have greater control over the process.  It cannot 
simply be dismissed as a power grab even by the most ardent supporters of decentralization.  The 
gminy and voivodships have not proven very consistent at planning and resource management in 
a coordinated manner.  There is a real perception that this will make the process streamlined and 
more efficient.  It is important to realize that in this instance the strongest advocates of a 
recentralization of power were the ministries themselves and not political elites who controlled 
the ministries. 
Policy capacity constituted perhaps the most interesting part of the discussion on the 
presence or absence of an administrative legacy in Poland.  As mentioned earlier, there is the 
irony of the simultaneous existence of the characteristics of under-politicization and over-
                                                 
82
 The place of decentralization-centralization in all of this is admittedly problematic.  The communist state was 
extremely centralized, and this would have been a characteristic of communism which remained in the early years of 
the transition.  However, political and administrative decentralization began in 1990 with the reestablishment of the 
gminy.  Privatizations were occurring also, albeit at a slow pace at times.  The extreme centralization of the 
communist model was certainly dismantled in its inherited form early on.  Thus, as a consequential legacy of 
communism, centralization is not particularly influential.  However, the rapid decentralization that was meant to 
remedy the extreme centralism of the inherited communist system was itself taken to an extreme, leading the 
government, especially the administration, to attempt to recentralize some functions and policy prerogatives.  
Dealing with the consequences of haphazard decentralization is not a legacy of communism, but instead a legacy of 
the transition.  That being said, this dilemma can be found within the other potential explanations in a way similar to 
that of politicization. 
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politicization described by Dimitrov, Goetz, and Wollman (2001).  The lack of policy capacity 
has made the ministries more vulnerable to politicization by political elites, while also making it 
more difficult to coordinate the activities necessary for the realization of the national network of 
motorways and expressways. In part because of the damage to this capacity caused by 
decentralization in the early 1990s, the ministries have consistently sought to increase their 
policymaking capacity in order to better implement infrastructure policy relating to the national 
network.  Research Question 4 asked whether or not the need for policy coordination and 
rationalization of policymaking has encouraged the MTBiGM and MRR to nurture policy 
capacity.  It was hypothesized that policy capacity was indeed developed in response to 
inadequate coordination capabilities and an irrational policymaking process.  Research and 
analysis from Chapter 8 support the hypothesis that the development of policy capacity was 
necessary for overcoming these very obstacles.  This helps ensure that the coordinating function 
that was once performed by the party and then lost after the party’s removal from power has 
been nurtured and developed within the ministries themselves, thereby lessening the need for 
tighter political control. 
It is interesting to note that some of the difficulties that have most plagued the 
implementation of the national highway policy have been results not of an administrative legacy 
from state socialism but a legacy of the transition itself.  The older generation of officials from 
the previous regime has largely been replaced now, mainly through retirements.  If an 
administrative legacy would be defined simply as the presence of the old guard, then this legacy 
would have been largely overcome already. When asked about an administrative legacy, most 
academics and civil servants seemed to have a definition like this in mind.  If an administrative 
legacy also included the preferred policies and political ideologies of those who had worked in 
the previous regime then this would also have been largely overcome because of the near 
universal loss of legitimacy suffered by socialist economic planning and ideology after 1989 in 
Poland.  This understanding of an administrative legacy is comprised of individuals forming a 
cadre within the administration, and their favored policies and past practices would indicate that 
there is not a strong continuity between the administration during state socialism and in the 
administration of the present.  The existence of an administrative legacy from state socialism 
defined in such a way can be supported neither empirically nor by a broad examination of the 
relevant literature.  Politicization of the government administration clearly has its roots in the 
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style of governance found in state socialism and can be considered to be a legitimate legacy of 
administration state socialism; however, it has not remain constant and is more affected today by 
the immediate political needs of the elite.  The problems of decentralization were created in 
reaction against this pronounced centralization of state socialism can constitute a legacy of the 
transition rather than a legacy of state socialism.  Other alternatives to a legacy explanation 
arguably coalesce around both the phenomenon of politicization and condition of 
decentralization.  Thus, while an administrative legacy defined as a definite continuity between 
the past and today in terms of personnel and the exact nature of ideology held by those employed 
in the administration could not be argued to exist as an influential factor on the outcome of 
reforms any longer, the phenomenon of politicization of the administration, which is amenable to 
any government in power, continues to be a major factor that influences the administration to this 
day, albeit one that has gradually been reduced through legal and structural reforms of the 
administration. The Revised Model of Public Management Reform developed for this 
dissertation provided the framework necessary for conducting the analysis in Chapter 8, which 
brought together the themes and research questions discussed in previous results chapters and 
resulted in a strong argument that increasing policy capacity curtails the external politicization of 
government administration.    
 
9.2 The Context of the EU 
The twin goals of greater economic and political integration have compelled the 
European Union to assist member states in their socioeconomic and political development.  In 
the sphere of transportation policy, the EU envisions a network of transportation links that will 
span the entire continent connecting all countries to major economic and population centers.  
Although these transportation links are not limited to highways, highways form one of the most 
important elements of the system.  Therefore, the EU has assisted Poland with billions of euros 
in financing the construction of a network of motorways and expressways which will be 
integrated with the rest of the Trans-European Network.  In the program period of 2007-2013, 
the EU Cohesion Fund allocated 8.8 billion Euros for the TEN-T road and air transport network 
in Poland.  Together with the Polish contribution of 1.74 billion Euros, the total public 
contribution was 10.54 billion Euros towards the TEN-T network in Poland (European 
Commission 2007).  Within the same program period, the European Regional Development Fund 
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(ERDF) allocated 2.94 billion Euros together with Poland’s nearly 520 million Euros for a total 
of 3.45 billion Euros towards transport safety and the national transportation network in Poland 
(Ibid.).   The EU’s assistance and policies are not directed solely at the construction of a network 
but also towards the quality of the network upon its completion and proper regulations and 
technical standards that will ensure the proper functioning of this network. From the point of 
view of the EU, the physical space of Poland still performs an important function as a transit 
country, although there is a greater realization on the part of EU and Polish officials that the 
emerging network in Poland must also aim to support Poland’s internal spatial structure of urban 
agglomerations. 
The strict standards and transparency expected by the EU for the use of its funds in the 
construction of the national highway network in Poland has had the added effect of influencing 
the course of administrative reform with within government administration in Poland. The EU 
was able to offer general prescriptions as to what government administration should look like in 
new member states as well as very specific desired outcomes in the area of transparency and 
accountability of the use of EU funds. Thus, there is considerable leeway on the part of 
government reformers and Poland to decide exactly how administration could be reformed in 
such a way that it would concur with the general principles espoused by the EU and meet the 
detailed requirements of accountability and efficiency and use of funds.  The fact that this leeway 
exists is in agreement with the contention of Heibredder (2009, 7), who, writing on the existence 
of the theorized European Administrative Space, states, a “European administrative space is 
indeed emerging; yet not as a process of convergence but in great part as coordinated divergence” 
(emphasis added).  Although the European Union may have great difficulty in dictating the 
specific shape that reform of the government administration in Poland might take, through the 
power of the purse and its legal position vis-à-vis the Polish government as a member state, the 
EU has been able to at least partially influence the outcome of reforms. The emerging policy 
capacity of the MTBiGM and MRR has in part been nurtured in an effort for these ministries to 
develop the necessary rules and procedures to safeguard EU funding.   
Given the role of the European Union in partially financing the construction of new 
transportation infrastructure in Poland, an interesting observation can be made concerning the 
redistributive nature of the EU’s assistance.  The Cohesion Funds are of course drawn from the 
EU’s budget, to which all member states must contribute.  However, the amount of aid a member 
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state receives from the EU is need based. Therefore, Poland receives a greater amount of money 
in the form of structural assistance from the EU than it pays in.  Wealthier member states, by 
contrast, receive less than they contribute to the EU.  In effect, wealthier member states are 
subsidizing less affluent member states.  The justification for this subsidy is that it will help less 
affluent member states catch up to the level of prosperity enjoyed by wealthier member states.  
Accordingly, assistance is targeted towards areas which would allow lagging regions within 
member states to improve economically and socially.  This rationality behind this policy is that 
improving struggling regions will lead to greater prosperity for the whole Union.   Whether or 
not this reasoning is irreproachable in terms of Diesing’s (1962) technical and economic 
rationality, it can find support in Weberian substantive rationality.  The EU promotes certain 
values and outcomes such as regional convergence despite the fact that they may not be easily 
attainable or have an immediate return.  Although the EU certainly expects a return in the long 
term, as it could not otherwise justify the investment, it does not limit itself to rationalizing 
policy in this area based on the narrow logic and indicators of formal rationality, which would 
correspond to Diesing’s concepts of technical and economic rationality.  Interestingly, the 
redistributive activities of the EU have broadly similar purposes to redistributive structures 
during state socialism.  Both espouse the goal of realizing greater prosperity by strengthening 
weaker elements of the economic system that they inhabit.  More research could be done in this 
direction comparing the redistributive roles of the EU and state socialism. An important part of 
such an analysis would be examining the role of the government administration implementing 
EU-backed programs and ascertaining the exact relationship between them and the European 
Union. This would undoubtedly illuminate issues of politicization, accountability, and policy 
capacity. 
 
9.3 Context of Transportation Policy and Transportation Geography and Mobilities? 
This research has proceeded under the assumption that policymaking and administrative 
form and structure are very much intertwined and that it is difficult to examine one without 
taking the other into consideration. The ability of the MTBiGM and MRR to produce meaningful 
and coherent policies regarding the emerging network of motorways and expressways and 
Poland are very much tied to the emerging policy capacity that has been a result of the reforms 
pursued over the last two decades.  The centralized nature of national roads transportation policy 
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stood in marked contrast to the expectation of decentralization, created in part by its 
pervasiveness as a theme in scholarly work on public administration and regionalization in the 
EU.  While a façade of decentralization has been often noted before in scholarship from various 
literatures and disciplines, approaching this topic from a transportation perspective revealed not 
only that decentralization in policymaking is not as common as might be thought, but that where 
it has existed, a recentralization of powers was necessary in light of the failures of decentralized 
governance in areas such as spatial planning.  An interesting topic worth mentioning is that of 
the disconnect between EU policies encouraging public transportation and a reduction in the use 
of personal cars and Polish government policies (co-financed by the EU) that seek to expand and 
improve the current roadway network thereby encouraging a growth in automobile ownership. 
Although it may seem counterintuitive to support the expansion of a road network (that would 
surely lead to higher car usage) while at the same time promoting sustainability, poor mobility is 
so intolerable that at least a basic network is necessary.  If new roadways facilitating new trade 
were not available, Poland might have to rely even more on major polluting industries for its 
economic base.  It would also seriously impede the prospects of Poland attaining a requisite level 
of wealth to implement sustainability programs on its own.  These concerns have justified the EU 
in providing assistance for Poland’s national program for building motorways and expressways 
based on economic rationatity. 
While Polish academics have studied current transportation policy in Poland extensively 
and indeed participate in its formulation (and understandably producing the major contribution 
on this topic to transportation geography and the study of transportation policy in general), it 
would be imminently useful to study the effects of administrative reform on the current policy 
process. Transportation geography does include the study of policy in addition to its economic 
and mobility components; however, it would benefit this sub-discipline to also take the role of 
public administration into careful consideration.  This research has been meant to be a first step 
in this direction, initiating a discussion as to how transportation geography may benefit from the 
inclusion of studies of government bodies that are engaged in transportation policymaking and 
implementation. In addition to adequate financing, sound institutions capable of guiding this 
process are necessary in order for transportation policy to be feasible.    
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9.4 Conclusion  
Research utilizing secondary sources of information indicated that the element of an 
administrative legacy that continues to be influential in Polish administration today is that of 
politicization. With this in mind, it was determined to identify which mechanisms could 
reproduce this element of the legacy over the course of two decades after the initial transition to 
democracy in 1989.  It was found that the institution of politicization is largely able to reproduce 
itself as it is both an end and a means to an end. The level and nature of politicization of the 
Polish government administration has fluctuated over time in accordance with institutional 
changes made by various political actors in the form of new legislation or simply new 
institutional arrangements. The growth of policy capacity has also lessened the need for strong 
politicization as policy capacity has enabled greater coordination of activities, a function that was 
formerly performed by the ruling party during state socialism.  An essential topic in the study 
politicization to examine is that of the mechanisms of accountability with which a political or 
ruling elite can control government administration which is subordinate to them. Research 
Question 2 asked whether or not mechanisms of accountability have successfully compelled the 
ministries responsible for transportation planning in Poland to successfully implement reforms.  
Although it was hypothesized that this would indeed be the case, as well as being confirmed as 
such, this answer is deceptively straightforward. There is a well-known tenet of the field of 
public administration that bureaucracies are not as responsive to political control as one might 
first assume. There are many reasons why a political elite cannot simply instigate administrative 
reforms without at least the passive acceptance of these reforms by those working in the 
administration.  There are indications in the literature that civil servants in the ministries 
welcome a strong and effective political leadership over their ministries so long as it was 
responsive to their concerns.  Research Question 3 examined the phenomena of decentralization 
in Poland proceeding with the assumption that decentralization indeed played a major role in the 
national highways transportation policy process, although it allowed that ultimate authority still 
remained centralized. This assertion could not be supported because the role played by the self- 
governments in the formulation of national transportation policy was quite minimal and what 
powers they did possess over ancillary planning functions were often contradictory and to the 
detriment of national planning.  The more interesting implication of this result was that a definite 
rationale for the recentralization of powers by the ministries existed and that this rationale has 
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strong connections to the growth in policy capacity.  Research Question 4 sought to determine 
whether or not the need for greater policy coordination and a rationalization of policymaking 
nurtured a growth of policy capacity in the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime 
Economy and the Ministry of Regional Development. It was hypothesized that this would indeed 
be the case, with the available evidence supporting this assertion.  The implication of growing 
policy capacity is that the need for politicization will be negated by the increased capabilities of 
the ministries in the area of policymaking.  Given the results of analysis in answering these 
research questions, it becomes apparent that politicization is indeed the chief surviving legacy of 
state socialism in government administration.  It is a flexible and adaptable legacy that no longer 
need take the exact form it had under state socialism. The malleability of this institution suggests 
that any legacy must be flexible in order to survive. And given the fact that much of the old cadre 
was replaced by the end of the 1990s at the latest, it can be stated with some certainty that a 
strong administrative legacy from state socialism in the form of the cadre of individuals holding 
onto past practices and beliefs cannot suffice as an explanation past the enactment of the 1998 
law on the civil service and the turnover of personnel during that period.   
A possible future direction of this research certainly lies in more closely examining the 
empirical relationship between politicization and emerging policy capacity within the 
government administration, for which the Revised Model of Public Management Reform could 
serve as a useful tool. It would also be useful to examine this contrast between politicization and 
burgeoning policy capacity within other EU member states especially in East-Central Europe, 
looking closely for its effect on the use of EU funds in member states.  Within the sub-discipline 
of transportation geography, it strongly suggests and demonstrates the need to consider the 
dynamics of public administration in relation to transportation policy and how this may affect the 
spatial patterns that emerge from both transportation infrastructure and the mobilities, which 
themselves result from the institutions of administrations themselves as well as.  This research 
may also be helpful to policymakers in the European Union for understanding some of the 
difficulties faced by Poland in the implementation of its national highway construction program.   
For yet a wider audience, it has offered the opportunity to consider the internal dynamics of the 
government entities responsible for planning and implementing one of the most ambitious 
highway construction projects currently underway the world, with all of its attendant economic, 
political, social, and spatial implications. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
DESCRIPTIONS OF MTBIGM DEPARTMENTS 
 
 
 
Description:  Brief organizational descriptions of MTBiGM departments were available in 
English.  Please note that the hierarchy definitions of the lists attempt to reflect the original 
formatting on the ministerial website. 
 
Source: www.transport.gov.pl (Accessed in September 2013) 
 
Contents: 
 
A-1:  Office of the Minister 
A-2:  Political Cabinet of the Minister 
A-3:  Office of the Director-General  
A-4:  Department of Budget and Finances 
A-5:  Department of Control 
A-6:  Legal-legislative Department 
A-7:  Department of Road Transport 
A-8:  Department of Roads and Motorways 
A-9:  Department of Transport Policy and International Cooperation 
A-10:  Department of EU Funds  
 
A-1:  Office of the Minister 
1. The overall aim of the Office of the Minister is to assist the Minister and his deputies, in 
cooperation with other organizational units, with delivering information policy of the Ministry. 
2. The office conducts the affairs related to: 
 1) attendance of the Minister and his deputies in plenary sessions of the Parliament and 
 related commissions; 
 2) preparation, consultation and adoption of: 
  a) operating plan of the Minister, 
  b) report on the implementation of the operating plan of the Minister, 
  c) Minister’s statements on management control in government administration, 
 3) coordination of the tasks performed by heads of units in the field management control 
 statements submitted to the Minister; 
 4) monitoring the way to organise management control in related units; 
 5) responses to interpellations, inquiries of national and EU parliamentarians, and 
 desiderata, opinions and addresses of parliamentarian commissions, and also addresses of 
 the Chancellery of the Prime Minister with regard parliamentary issues; 
 6) responses to addresses of the Office of the President and Chancellery of the Prime 
 Minister; 
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 7) attendance of the Minister and his representatives in the sessions of inter-ministry 
 groups, commissions and committees, councils, social dialogue institutions, 
 governmental and non-governmental organs, and also pertinent records; 
 8) councils, commissions, and working groups established by the Minister, including 
 their records and periodic performance appraisal; 
 9) domestic business trips of the Minister and his deputies; 
 10) handling visits and meetings in the presence of the Minister and his deputies, and 
 foreign delegations; 
 11) handling meetings, councils, and conferences and other appearances of the Minister 
 and his deputies; 
 12. sessions of the Minister and his deputies, and monitoring the implementation of 
 objectives set during the sessions; 
 13. invitations directed to the Minister or to his knowledge; 
 14) providing secretarial servicing to the Minister and Director of the Political Cabinet. 
3. The Office ensures information policy of the Ministry, especially by: 
 1) offering media service, including answering questions directed to the Office and at 
 general e-mail address of the Ministry, and responding to press critique and drafting 
 corrections; 
 2) providing public information in oral or written form, or at the request, including in the 
 Public Information Bulletin. 
 3) handling the matters resulting from the regulation of the council of ministers on 
 spokespersons and their functions in governmental units. 
4. The Office also: 
 1) provides media service to visits and meetings, press conferences, briefings in the 
 presence of the Minister and his deputies; 
 2) ensures daily record of key press releases for the Minister and his deputies; 
 3) administers the website of the Ministry; 
 4) conducts the affairs related to events, i.e. fairs, conferences and seminars, held under 
 the auspices of the Ministry, participation in honorary committees, and drafting 
 Minister’s entries to special publications; 
 5) communicates notices and announcements of the Minister to the press; 
 6) drafts publications in the field of transport, construction and maritime economy. 
5. The Office keeps record of regulations and decisions issued by the Minister, which do not 
conclude individual cases. 
 
 
A-2:  Political Cabinet of the Minister 
 
1. Political Cabinet of the Minister renders political advice on the issues within the competence 
of the Minister, and especially: 
 1) supervises drafting documents, including strategies and policies submitted to the 
 Minister; 
 2) upon instructions, renders substantive and formal appraisal of materials submitted to 
 the Minister and for the sessions of the Management; 
 3) within the scope determined by the Minister, keeps in touch with political parties in 
 and abroad, and trade unions and opinion-forming circles. 
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2. Individual tasks of the Political Cabinet are specified in detail by the Minister. 
3. Head of the Political Cabinet abides by the Rules of Procedure for heads of organisational 
units in the Ministry. 
 
 
A-3:  Office of the Director-General  
 
1. Office of Director-General is responsible for implementing the tasks of the Director-General 
regarding the organisation of the Ministry and its human resources management in order to 
ensure proper performance of organizational units of the Ministry. 
2. The Office especially deals with the issues related to: 
 1) internal regulations and procedures relating to the organization and functioning of the 
 Ministry; 
 2) periodic reviews of management control and introduction of improvements; 
 3) recruitment of employees and vocational training; 
 4) job descriptions and appraisals, and periodic assessment of employees; 
 5) administration of funds for salary and bonuses; 
 6) support services to the staff; 
 7) discipline-related services; 
 8) job contracts, on behalf of the Minister, with regard to those employed in units 
 dependent and supervised by the Minister, and as regards the Management; 
 9) office services to the Disciplinary Commission; 
3. The Office also handles the matters concerning: 
 1) public procurement procedures, under a separate regulation; 
 2) state decorations and badges of honour; 
 3) the personal data protection act; 
 4) the tasks of the Minister relating to the act on foundations; 
 5) office support to the State Commission for Investigation of Air Accidents and the State 
 Commission for Investigation of Railway Accidents; 
 6) office support to secretariats of Secretary of State, Undersecretaries of State and 
 Director-General. 
4. The Office keeps a record of foundations supervised by the Minister. 
 
 
A-4:  Department of Budget and Finances 
 
1. Department of Budget and Finances is responsible for drafting and implementing a part of the 
budget, which the Minister disposes of; provides financial servicing and book-keeping record of 
the budget; keeps accounts for EU funds; gives payments to EU beneficiaries; implements 
objectives regarding public assisstance and protection of competition. 
2. The Department mostly deals with the matters: 
 1) book-keeping record of the budget in scope of earnings and expenses, and funds for 
 financing science; 
 2) budget reporting of the main disponent and whole ministry, including objective budget;  
 3) drafting analyses of objectives completed, and earnings and expenses, including 
 activity based budget; 
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 4) elaborating materials for state budget draft, including activity based budget with regard 
 to those parts which the Minister disposes of; 
 5) planning earnings and expenses, including providing lower-rank disponents and other 
 authorised bodies with any information on planned earnings and expenses, and salary 
 limits; 
 6) financing investments; 
 7) allocation of funds to implement objectives, within the settled expenses for budgetary 
 organs and entrepreneurs; 
 8) schedule of budgetary expenses; 
 9) changes to the list of expenses for respective disponents within a budgetary year; 
 10) applications for target reserves form state budget, and pertinent reporting; 
 11) selection of a chartered auditor for examining financial reports of research and 
 development centres subordinate to the Minister, and their approval; 
 12) approval of financial reports of state enterprise of public utility „Poczta Polska” and 
 Transportation Technical Supervision, and also assessment of reports from PKP Group; 
 13) approval of financial plans from entities of public finances; 
 14) book-keeping record of EU funds; 
 15) payments into accounts of EU beneficiaries; 
 16) financial assessment: 
  a) application for loans to pre-finance projects funded from EU provisions, 
  b) applications for payments of projects co-financed from EU provisions, 
  c) reports from the progress of project implementation financed from Cohesion  
  Fund, 
  d) applications for payments of railway infrastructure renovation and maintenance, 
             e) applications for payments of concluded contracts for public service provision; 
 17) supervision of separate book-keeping of EU provisions conducted by beneficiaries, 
 which implement projects co-financed from structural funds; 
 18) cooperation with Department of EU funds in accounting and closing SOP-T, and 
 financial management of IEOP priorities; 
 19) funding entrepreneurs; 
 20) fare reductions in public transport; 
 21) monitoring of pay rise in companies subordinate to the Minister; 
 22) public assistance; 
 23) protection of competition; 
 24) public statistics. 
 
A-5:  Department of Control 
1. Department of Control conducts the matters relating to the act on control in governmental 
administration. 
2. The Department deals with the issues regarding: 
 1) planned and summary controls in organisational bodies; 
 2) control of: 
  a) offices and units subordinate or supervised by the Minister, 
  b) units subordinate to the offices mentioned in a), or supervised by them, 
  c) units, which are provided with public funds from the state budget to be at  
248 
 
  Minister’s disposal, 
 3) control of IEOP; 
 4) control of projects, including their durability, supported from state budget and EU 
 funds; 
 5) complaints and suggestions, including reception of applicants in question of related 
 complaints and suggestions – under the rules and as per separate regulation; 
 6) external audit conducted in the Ministry by control bodies, and monitoring of 
 organisational units in terms of timely transfer of draft opinions to respond to ex post 
 control remarks; 
 7) monitoring the performance of ex post recommendations and proposals from outer 
 control bodies. 
3. The Department contains the unit of internal audit, which operates under separate provisions. 
The unit implements objectives of internal audit and is obliged to provide the Management with 
an objective assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of management control. The 
internal auditor, which manages the unit of internal audit, is directly subordinate to the Minister, 
and in terms of organizational and employment relations - Director-General of the Ministry. The 
unit of internal audit is responsible for: 
 1) audit objectives, according to an annual audit plan, and in justified cases, also outside 
 an annual audit plan; 
 2) advisory activities; 
 3) checking activities; 
 4) outsourced audit objectives; 
 5) office services to the Audit Committee and other support activities, including: 
  a) collection of audit plans and reports on implementation plans and other   
  necessary information for the audit committee, 
  b) collective information about significant risks and weaknesses in management  
  control and proposed improvements to management control. 
 
 
A-6:  Legal-legislative Department 
 
1. Legal-legislative Department conducts the matters with regard to drafting legislative acts and 
providing legal services to the Ministry. 
2. The Department especially deals with the issues concerning: 
 1) legislation in the course laid down in a separate regulation; 
 2) monitoring organisational units in terms of drafting legislative acts and other 
 governmental regulations within the competence of the Minister, included in the record 
 of legislative works for the Council of Ministers, and record of legislative works in the 
 field of Minister’s draft regulations, and regulations to implement or adjust the Polish law 
 to the EU provisions; 
 3) materials for the Minister and his representatives at sessions of the Council of 
 Ministers and its committees - excluding the issues conducted by the Department of 
 Transport Policy and International Cooperation; 
 4) official stances on cases conducted before the European Court of Justice; 
 5) structure and functioning of internal market within the Community, especially 
 regarding free cargo flow and its informal problem-solving (SOLVIT); 
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 6) responses to statements of President of the Constitutional Tribunal, in cooperation with 
 due organisational units; 
 7) legal services, including: 
  a) give legal opinions on application of law and ceritification, and clarification of  
  current legal system, 
  b) give opinions on drafts of international agreements, contracts concluded by the  
  Minister or Ministry, statutes of units and entities dependent or supervised by the  
  Minister, authority letters and proxies issued by the Minister and Director-General, 
  c) give opinions on drafts of administrative decisions and resolutions, and drafts  
  of responses to complaints to administrative courts, excluding decisions,   
  resolutions and responses to administrative courts in affairs conducted by the  
  Department of Real Estate Management, Department for Facility Management  
  Regulations I, and Department of Spatial Development and Construction, with the 
  exception of decisions relating to the act of 24 April 2009 on investment in the  
  liquefied natural gas terminal in Świnoujście, 
  d) ensure legal representation for the Minister and Director-General in legal and  
  administrative proceedings, and before other courts, excluding the matters   
  conducted by the Department of Real Estate Management, Department for  
  Facility Management Regulations I and Department for Facility Management  
  Regulations II, 
 8) others, relating to the act on legal advisers; 
 9) consultations between ministries on draft acts and international agreements. 
3. The Department handles the affairs related to: 
 1) keeping record of legal proceedings, in which the Department provides legal 
 representation; 
 2) keeping record of authority letters, proxies and guidelines rendered by the Minister, 
 specified in the act on the Council of Ministers; 
 3) editing the Official Journal of the Minister of Transport, Construction and Maritime 
 Economy;  
4) notification of executive acts implementing the EU provisions within the competence  
 of the Minister. 
 
 
A-7:  Department of Road Transport 
 
1. The Department of Road Transport deals with the issues under the following provisions: 
1) the driver’s working time act; 
2) the act on vehicle drivers; 
3) the act on road transport of dangerous goods; 
4) the digital tachograph act; 
5) the road traffic act - excluding the issues handled by the Department of Roads and 
Motorways; 
6) the road transport act; 
7) the transport law - as regards road transport; 
 8) the public transport act - as regards road transport and other rail transport, i.e. 
tramways.  
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2. The Department executes the tasks of the minister for transport under the following provisions: 
 1) the act on prohibition of products containing asbestos; 
 2) the technical supervision act - regarding road transport; 
 3) the act on maintaining cleanliness and order in communes; 
 4) the act on recycling of end-of-life vehicles; 
 5) the act on registered pledge and the pledge register; 
 6) the act on state enterprises - as regards public utility state enterprises, namely the State 
Car Communication (PKS); 
 7) the labour code- as regards health and safety at work regulations in road transport. 
 3. The Department executes administrative proceedings within the competence of the minister 
for transport under the following provisions: 
 1) the act on principles for recognition of professional qualifications acquired in 
 the EU Member Countries; 
 2) the road traffic act, regarding: 
  a) deviations from technical conditions to be met by vehicles, 
  b) approval certificates, 
  c) confirming the powers to issue vehicle cards, 
  d) prohibiting the right to run a driver training centre by the business and   
  removing the business from the register of regulated activities - as an office of a  
  higher degree, 
  e) removing a driving instructor from the record of driving instructors - as an  
  office of an higher degree, 
  f) registering a vehicle belonging to a diplomatic mission - as an office of an  
  higher degree, 
  g) certifying the conformity of venue and equipment with requirements on the  
  basis of a technical examination performed by a vehicle inspection station - as an  
  office of an higher degree, 
 3) the technical supervision act, regarding: 
  a) the power to manufacture, repair, modernise technical equipment, materials and 
  components used in their manufacture, repair or upgrade; 
  b) maintenance of technical equipment, 
  c) manufacture and circulation of technical equipment as an office of an higher  
  degree in the field of road transport. 
 4) the act on vehicle drivers, regarding: 
  a) prohibiting the right to run a driver training centre by the business, 
  b) removing a driving instructor from the record of friving instructors - as an  
  office of an higher degree. 
 4. The Department also deals with the affairs, concerning: 
 1) supervision of traffic management on national roads; 
 2) auto appraisers; 
 3) verification committee to verify the qualifications of candidates for examiners to 
 examine applicants for the right to drive a motor vehicle; 
 4) examination board to check the qualifications of candidates for driving instructors and 
 driving technique instructors; 
 5) professional qualification certificates; 
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 6) mixed commissions for road international transport under bilateral and multilateral 
 international agreements; 
 7) the manufacturer’s blank registration certificates, temporary permits, license 
 plates, inspection stickers and vehicle cards; 
 8) provision of information on registration of vehicles, 
 vehicle identification characteristics, and detention of registration certificate(s) to the EU 
 Member States; 
 9) electronic information exchange systems and intelligent transport systems in the field 
 of road traffic management; 
 10) reports from governors of provinces on the tasks outlined in the act on vehicle drivers. 
 5. On behalf of the Minister, the Department supervises: 
 1) General Inspector of Road Transport, excluding the affairs dealt by the Department of 
 Road and Motorways; 
 2) Motor Transport Institute in Warsaw; 
 4) Transportation Technical Supervision - in the field of road transport. 
 
 
A-8:  Department of Roads and Motorways 
 
1. Department of Roads and Motorways deals with the matters related to: 
1) the act on public roads; 
2) the act on toll motorways and National Road Fund; 
3) the act on special-purpose road companies; 
4) the act on special rules for preparation and implementation of public road projects; 
5) the act on financing land transport infrastructure in the field of public roads; 
6) the act on concessions for construction works or services; 
7) the road traffic act, as regards road traffic safety. 
2. The Department executes the tasks of the minister for transport under the following provisions: 
1) the construction law, as regards technical conditions that must be met by building structures 
and their location, technical conditions and use of building structures, and authorizations in case 
of derogations from technical and building provisions in the field of public roads; 
2) the act on the income of local government units; 
3) the law on environmental protection, regarding the areas of limited use; 
4) the environmental protection act; 
5) the act on the management of agricultural property of the State Treasury – regarding the 
acquisition of property of the State Treasury Agricultural Property Stock within the road area. 
3. The Department conducts administrative proceedings within the competence of the minister for 
transport under the following provisions: 
1) the road transport act, regarding exemption from fees in case of humanitarian aid and medical 
assistance or disaster relief; 
2) the act on public roads, regarding exemption from fees in case of humanitarian aid and medical 
assistance or disaster relief. 
4. The Department deals with the issues related to: 
1) preparation and updating long-term programmes and annual plans, regarding national roads 
and monitoring their implementation; 
2) road projects supported from the state budget; 
3) cooperation with National Economy Bank, with regard to the National Road Fund; 
4) funding from foreign sources dedicated national roads, including: 
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a) credit contracts for financing national roads, 
b) cooperation with International Financial Institutions and commercial banks; 
5) the certificates of de minimis aid for exemptions from national road tolls; 
6) systems for electronic exchange and intelligent transport systems - regarding national roads; 
7) investments implemented under public and private partnership; 
8) cooperation with the Council for Motorways; 
9) mixed commissions for construction of road connections, mixed commissions for construction 
and maintenance of cross-border bridges and working groups, under the bilateral and multilateral 
international agreements on transborder transport. 
5. The Department contains the Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council, which is managed by a 
Secretary of the National Road Safety Council. The separate provisions determine the tasks and 
substantive subordination of the Secretariat. 
6. The Department calls on behalf of the Minister to supervise: 
1) General Director for National Roads and Motorways; 
2) General Inspector of Road Transport, as regards control systems of toll collection on national 
roads; 
3) Road and Bridge Research Institute in Warsaw. 
 
 
A-9:  Department of Transport Policy and International Cooperation 
 
 1. The Department of Transport Policy and International Cooperation ensures, in cooperation 
with due organisational units, delivery of objectives related to: 
1) transport strategies and programmes; 
2) horizontal concerns - resulting from national and EU documents, including: 
a) latest transport solutions, 
b) national energy security in the field of transport, 
c) energy performance in the field of transport, 
d) reducing the negative impacts of transport on the environment, including 
climate change, 
3) system-wide facilities to make the free movement of people with disabilities; 
4) electronic information exchange systems and intelligent transport systems; 
5) EU decision-making, including contribution of ministerial employees; 
6) monitoring cooperation between the Ministry and international organisations; 
7) preparation and delivery of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council; 
8) international cooperation - bilateral agreements; 
9) international cooperation - regional agreements; 
10) international agreements; 
11) technical harmonisation; 
12) standardisation. 
2. The Department executes the tasks relating to: 
1) the European corridors, transport networks and axes; 
2) the cooperation with the Standing Delegation of Poland to the European Union; 
3) the cooperation with the Parliament concerning the EU decision-making; 
4) the attendance of the Minister at sessions of the European Committee of the Council of 
Ministers; 
5) foreign business trips of ministerial employees - excluding the issues run by the 
Budget and Administration Bureau; 
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6) ministerial representantives abroad; 
7) Electronic Exchange System - Poland (EWD-P); 
8) attendance of ministerial representantives at sessions of the Standardisation Council 
and technical committees of the Polish Committee for Standardisation (PKN). 
3. The Department executes administrative proceedings within the competence of the Minister 
under the act on confirmity assessment, in order to grant, limit the scope or revoke authorisation. 
 
 
A-10:  Department of EU Funds 
 
1. On behalf of the Minister, Department of EU Funds, as an Intermediary Body in the 
management of SOP-T and IEOP, deals with the pertinent matters. 
2. The Department deals with the matters related to: 
 1) the act on the National Development Plan (NDP) - with regard to structural funds, 
 including technical assistance projects; 
 2) the development policy act - regarding IEOP. 
3. The Department conducts the proceedings related to: 
 1) project programming and projects financed from structural funds and Cohesion Fund 
 within IEOP, and Structural Funds within SOP-T, including: 
  a) updating IEOP priority/objective descriptions, 
  b) procedures/guidelines for implementation of SOP-T and IEOP, 
  c) list of IEOP key projects, 
 2) management and control of IEOP priorities; 
 3) appraisal of IEOP; 
 4) monitoring: 
  a) preparation and selection of IEOP projects, 
  b) implementation of SOP-T and IEOP, including: 
   - implementation of projects/objectives/priorities, 
   - participation/co-organisation of monitoring committees/subcommittees, 
  c) project durability and objectives accomplished; 
 5) supervision and monitoring of implemented projects partly financed from Cohesion 
 Fund under NDP, including: 
  a) reception, appraisal and coordination of applications turned to the European  
  Commission for financial support submitted by beneficiaries; 
  b) ex ante control of public procurement in the scope of cost eligibility; 
 6) reporting on SOP-T and Cohesion Fund under NDP and IEOP; 
 7) appraisal of projects not completed within the period of cost eligibility under SOP-T; 
 8) cost eligibility and appraisal of projects submitted to the European Commission for 
 grants from Cohesion Fund under NDP; 
 9) coordination of financial management at the level of IEOP priorities, especially 
 reporting on: 
  a) certifications and declaration of expenses, and application for payment, 
  b) forecasts with regard to applications for payments; 
 10) detection of inaccuracies and reporting discovered inaccuracies in SOP-T and IEOP 
 projects under NDP and IEOP; 
 11) imposing and accounting for financial corrections in SOP-T projects; 
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 12) cooperation with the European Commission to close SOP-T, including audits and 
 programmes; 
 13) implementation procedures for Cohesion Fund under NDP and TEN-T fund; 
 14) Cohesion Fund technical assistance under NDP, IEOP and POP-T; 
 15) information and promotion policy for IEOP and Cohesion Fund under NDP; 
 16) coordination actions within Computerised Monitoring and Control System (SIMIK) 
 and National Information System (KSI); 
 17) TEN-T fund; 
 18) monitoring activities and accounting within the scope of PHARE projects; 
 19) Polish-Swiss Cooperation Programme; 
 20) budget of the European Union, in cooperation with due organisational units. 
4. On behalf of the Minister, the Department supervises Centre for EU Transportation Projects. 
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APPENDIX B: 
 
DESCRIPTIONS OF MRR DEPARTMENTS 
 
 
 
Description:  Organizational descriptions of MRR available only in Polish.  Please note that the 
hierarchy definitions of the lists attempt to reflect the original formatting on the 
ministerial website. 
 
Source: www.mrr.gov.pl (Accessed in September 2013) 
 
Contents: 
B-1:  Office of the Minister 
B-2:  Office of the Director General 
B-3: Department of Structural Policy Coordination 
B-4:  Department for Infrastructure Program Coordination 
B-5:  Department for Coordination of Implementation of the EU Funds 
B-6:  Department of Spatial Policy 
B-7:  Legal Department 
B-8:  Department of Support for Infrastructural Programmes 
B-9:  Office of Human Resources Management 
 
B-1:  Office of the Minister 
Biuro Ministra odpowiada za organizacyjne wspomaganie Ministra i pozostałych członków 
kierownictwa Ministerstwa oraz realizację, we współpracy z innymi komórkami 
organizacyjnymi, polityki informacyjnej resortu. Ponadto, Biuro realizuje zadania Ministra w 
zakresie ochrony informacji niejawnych oraz odpowiada za realizację zadań w zakresie 
zarządzania kryzysowego i obronności w dziale administracji rządowej rozwój regionalny. 
 
Do zadań Biura należy w szczególności: 
1. koordynowanie współpracy z Sejmem i Senatem; 
2. obsługa udziału Ministra, sekretarza stanu oraz podsekretarzy stanu w posiedzeniach 
odpowiednio Rady Ministrów, stałego komitetu Rady Ministrów oraz Komitetu Rady 
Ministrów do spraw Cyfryzacji; 
3. koordynowanie współpracy z mediami; 
4. rozpatrywanie skarg i wniosków; 
5. realizacja zadań wynikających z podległości Ministrowi państwowej jednostki 
budżetowej – Centrum Projektów Europejskich (CPE), z zastrzeżeniem odrębnie 
podpisanych porozumień; 
6. realizacja obowiązków wynikających z ustawy o działalności lobbingowej; 
7. obsługa spraw związanych z wypełnianiem przez Ministra ustawowych zadań „ministra 
właściwego” dla fundacji; 
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8. realizowanie zadań wynikających z przepisów o ochronie informacji niejawnych, w tym 
prowadzenie kancelarii tajnej; 
9. zapewnienie realizacji zadań z zakresu zarządzania kryzysowego, obronności i 
bezpieczeństwa państwa oraz obrony cywilnej; 
10. obsługa sekretarska członków kierownictwa, 
a ponadto: 
11. realizacja obowiązków wynikających z ustawy o dostępie do informacji publicznej, w 
tym zadań określonych we właściwych aktach wewnętrznego stanowienia w 
Ministerstwie; 
12. opracowywanie i aktualizacja procedury samooceny i monitorowania systemu kontroli 
zarządczej w Ministerstwie oraz inicjowanie i koordynowanie corocznie 
przeprowadzanego w Ministerstwie procesu samooceny kontroli zarządczej; 
13. opracowywanie i aktualizacja procedury uzyskiwania zapewnienia o stanie kontroli 
zarządczej w dziale rozwój regionalny oraz coroczne przeprowadzanie procesu 
uzyskiwania zapewnienia o stanie kontroli zarządczej w dziale i przygotowywanie 
oświadczenia Ministra w tym zakresie. 
 
 
B-2:  Office of the Director General 
 
Biuro Dyrektora Generalnego realizuje zadania w obszarze zapewnienia ciągłości 
funkcjonowania Ministerstwa. 
 
Do zadań Biura należy w szczególności: 
1. realizacja zadań dotyczących organizacji urzędu w tym: 
a)  przygotowywanie projektów rozwiązań w sprawach organizacyjnych, 
b) wykonywanie zadań związanych ze sprawowaniem przez dyrektora generalnego 
bezpośredniego nadzoru nad komórkami organizacyjnymi urzędu w zakresie 
prawidłowego wykonywania przez nie zadań określonych przez Ministra, 
c) współpraca z zewnętrznymi instytucjami doradczymi w zakresie udoskonalania 
narzędzi zarządzania, w tym koordynowanie pilotażowych projektów z zakresu 
organizacji i zarządzania urzędem, w których uczestniczy Ministerstwo, 
d) koordynowanie w ramach Biura zadań związanych z dokumentowaniem kontroli 
zarządczej, w tym zadań związanych z zarządzaniem ryzykiem, 
e) prowadzenie Baz Lotus Notes: Regulacje wewnętrzne w MRR oraz Rejestr 
upoważnień i pełnomocnictw członków kierownictwa MRR, 
f) publikowanie w Dzienniku Urzędowym Ministra Rozwoju Regionalnego aktów 
normatywnych Ministra oraz innych dokumentów – na zasadach określonych w 
art. 12 ustawy z dnia 12 lipca 2000 r. o ogłaszaniu aktów normatywnych i 
niektórych innych aktów prawnych – po uzyskaniu akceptacji merytorycznej i 
formalnej Departamentu Prawnego, 
g) prowadzenie spraw związanych z procesem pozyskania niezbędnej Ministerstwu 
powierzchni biurowej; 
2. realizacja zadań dysponenta środków budżetu państwa III stopnia, w tym: 
a) obsługa finansowo-księgowa dochodów i wydatków Ministerstwa ujętych w 
planie finansowym dysponenta środków budżetu państwa III stopnia, 
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b) sporządzanie sprawozdań budżetowych i finansowych dysponenta środków 
budżetu państwa III stopnia, w tym w zakresie budżetu zadaniowego, 
c) dokonywanie okresowych i rocznych analiz wydatków dysponenta środków 
budżetu państwa III stopnia w zakresie kompetencji dyrektora generalnego, 
d) koordynacja przygotowania propozycji dotyczących wydatków dysponenta 
środków budżetu państwa III stopnia, pozostających w kompetencji dyrektora 
generalnego, do ujęcia w projekcie ustawy budżetowej, w tym w zakresie budżetu 
zadaniowego, 
e) koordynacja przygotowania planu finansowego dysponenta środków budżetu 
państwa III stopnia, pozostającego w kompetencji dyrektora generalnego, w tym 
w zakresie budżetu zadaniowego oraz planu zadań inwestycyjnych Ministerstwa, 
f) obsługa płatności dotyczących wynagrodzeń pracowników Ministerstwa oraz 
wynagrodzeń dotyczących umów cywilnoprawnych, 
g) prowadzenie ewidencji księgowej w zakresie gospodarki magazynowej oraz 
ewidencji księgowej majątku Ministerstwa; 
3. nadzór nad poprawnością procesu i koordynacja udzielania zamówień publicznych w 
Ministerstwie oraz koordynacja zagadnień dotyczących prawa zamówień publicznych, w 
tym opiniowanie i formułowanie propozycji zmian przepisów; 
4. prowadzenie kontroli wewnętrznej oraz koordynacja organizacji kontroli zewnętrznych 
realizowanych w Ministerstwie; 
5. koordynowanie spraw związanych z ochroną danych osobowych oraz prowadzenie spraw 
związanych ze zgłaszaniem do rejestracji zbiorów danych osobowych prowadzonych w 
Ministerstwie, z wyłączeniem wykonywania zadań w obszarze zbioru pod nazwą 
„Podsystem Monitorowania Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego 2007-2013 dla 
programu Operacyjnego Kapitał Ludzki”; 
6. wykonywanie zadań obronnych w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie 
stałego dyżuru, planowania operacyjnego i finansowania przygotowań obronnych 
 
Zadania w zakresie audytu wewnętrznego wykonuje znajdujące się w strukturze Biura 
funkcjonalnie niezależne i wyodrębnione Stanowisko do spraw Audytu Wewnętrznego, które 
odpowiada za przeprowadzanie audytu wewnętrznego w Ministerstwie zgodnie z 
obowiązującymi w tym zakresie przepisami i standardami audytu wewnętrznego w jednostkach 
sektora finansów publicznych. Audyt wewnętrzny może objąć swoim zakresem badania 
wszystkie obszary działania Ministerstwa, a w uzasadnionych przypadkach podejmować 
czynności audytowe w jednostce podległej Ministrowi – Centrum Projektów Europejskich (CPE). 
Stanowisko do spraw Audytu Wewnętrznego odpowiada ponadto za przeprowadzanie audytu 
wewnętrznego w obszarze wdrażania Europejskiego Instrumentu Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa 
(EISP), w zakresie i na warunkach wynikających z regulacji unijnych. 
 
 
B-3: Department of Structural Policy Coordination 
 
Departament Koordynacji Polityki Strukturalnej odpowiada za formułowanie głównych 
kierunków polityki rozwoju, wykonywanie zadań w zakresie koordynowania polityki 
strukturalnej, w tym polityki spójności, polityki rozwoju regionalnego i przestrzennego, polityki 
miejskiej oraz za przygotowywanie dokumentów programowych w ww. zakresie. 
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Do zadań Departamentu Koordynacji Polityki Strukturalnej należy w szczególności: 
1. monitorowanie realizacji średniookresowej strategii rozwoju kraju, z uwzględnieniem 
stopnia osiągnięcia celów długookresowej strategii rozwoju kraju w roku poprzednim; 
2. przygotowanie i wdrożenie dokumentów strategicznych z zakresu rozwoju społeczno-
gospodarczego i przestrzennego kraju oraz polityki miejskiej, w tym średniookresowej 
strategii rozwoju kraju, Krajowej Strategii Rozwoju Regionalnego (KSRR) i Koncepcji 
Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju (KPZK); 
3. koordynowanie przygotowania programowych dokumentów strategicznych z zakresu 
polityki spójności w Polsce; 
4. udział w pracach nad kolejnymi okresami budżetowymi i programowaniem polityk Unii 
Europejskiej; 
5. koordynowanie przygotowania dokumentów operacyjnych służących realizacji polityki 
spójności; 
6. koordynowanie procesu przygotowania dokumentów programowych, strategicznych 
związanych z perspektywą finansową Unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020; 
7. analizowanie zgodności strategii i programów sektorowych ze średniookresową strategią 
rozwoju kraju; 
8. monitorowanie realizacji dokumentów strategicznych dotyczących polityk rozwoju 
(Strategii Europa 2020, Wspólnej Polityki Rolnej oraz innych polityk horyzontalnych); 
9. sporządzanie raportów na temat polityki rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego i 
przestrzennego kraju, polityki spójności i polityki rozwoju regionalnego; 
10. analizowanie rozwoju regionów na tle trendów makroekonomicznych rozwoju 
społeczno-gospodarczego kraju; 
11. analizowanie stanu rozwoju miast w Polsce oraz formułowanie propozycji zasad i 
rozwiązań dotyczących kształtowania i prowadzenia krajowej polityki dotyczącej 
rozwoju miast − przygotowanie krajowej polityki miejskiej oraz instrumentów jej 
realizacji; 
12. prowadzenie działań w zakresie oceny skuteczności i efektywności realizacji polityki 
spójności oraz innych polityk publicznych mających wpływ na realizację polityki 
rozwoju, koordynacja prac w tym zakresie podejmowanych na niższych poziomach 
wdrażania; 
13. organizowanie, koordynowanie i prowadzenie prac ewaluacyjnych w ramach Krajowej 
Jednostki Oceny; 
14. realizacja i koordynacja prac w zakresie budowy zdolności ewaluacyjnych w Polsce; 
15. obsługa i koordynacja udziału w innych inicjatywach międzynarodowych związanych z 
zagadnieniami spójności terytorialnej, w tym VASAB (Wizja i Strategie Wokół Morza 
Bałtyckiego 2010) i CEMAT (Europejska Konferencja Ministrów odpowiedzialnych za 
Planowanie Regionalne/Przestrzenne); 
16. prowadzenie prac związanych z udziałem strony polskiej i współpracą z instytucjami 
Unii Europejskiej w zakresie terytorialnego wymiaru polityki spójności, w tym obsługa i 
koordynacja udziału strony polskiej w 2 programach współpracy międzyregionalnej Unii 
Europejskiej Celu 3 - ESPON i URBACT; 
17. koordynowanie udziału strony polskiej w komitecie rozwoju terytorialnego Organizacji 
Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju (OECD) oraz w wybranych grupach roboczych; 
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18. obsługa udziału strony polskiej w posiedzeniach Grupy Roboczej Rady Unii Europejskiej 
do spraw Środków Strukturalnych (B5) oraz innych komitetach i grupach roboczych 
zajmujących się polityką spójności i związaną z nią współpracą dotyczącą rozwoju 
miejskiego; 
19. koordynowanie realizacji zadań Ministerstwa w obszarze: statystyka publiczna; 
20. koordynowanie współpracy Ministerstwa z EUROSTAT i Głównym Urzędem 
Statystycznym, w szczególności systemu wskaźników dla polityki rozwoju oraz 
koordynacja prac nad systemem NUTS; 
21. organizacja procesu debaty strategicznej na temat wymiaru terytorialnego polityki 
rozwoju poprzez organizację prac i obsługę Krajowego Forum Terytorialnego oraz 
Krajowego Obserwatorium Terytorialnego; 
22. obsługa Komitetu Koordynacyjnego Narodowych Strategicznych Ram Odniesienia na 
lata 2007–2013; 
23. organizacja prac Komitetu Koordynacyjnego do spraw Polityki Rozwoju (KK PR); 
24. wykonywanie zadań w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie 
uwzględniania potrzeb obronnych w koncepcji przestrzennego zagospodarowania kraju. 
 
 
B-4:  Department for Infrastructure Program Coordination 
 
Departament Koordynacji Programów Infrastrukturalnych realizuje zadania wynikające z 
pełnienia przez ministra funkcji Instytucji Zarządzającej Programem Operacyjnym Infrastruktura 
i Środowisko (PO IiŚ) oraz funkcji Instytucji Zarządzającej Strategią wykorzystania Funduszu 
Spójności, w zakresie określonym w ust. 2. Departament pełni rolę wiodącą w zakresie ogólnego 
zarządzania i koordynacji działań w ramach PO IiŚ oraz Funduszu Spójności, a także 
nadzorowania i koordynowania realizacji Strategii wykorzystania PO IiŚ oraz Funduszu 
Spójności. 
 
Do zadań Departamentu należy w szczególności: 
1. przygotowywanie dokumentów programowych oraz innych dokumentów koniecznych do 
wdrożenia PO IiŚ, w szczególności treść programu operacyjnego, szczegółowego opisu 
priorytetów programu operacyjnego, a także przygotowywanie i uzgadnianie zmiany 
dokumentów programowych oraz innych dokumentów dotyczących wdrażania programu 
operacyjnego; 
2. inicjowanie, nadzorowanie oraz koordynowanie działań służących zapewnieniu 
prawidłowości programowania, realizacji oraz monitorowania projektów 
współfinansowanych z Funduszu Spójności oraz PO IiŚ; 
3. przygotowywanie i wdrażanie systemu wyboru projektów w ramach PO IiŚ; 
4. udział w uzgodnieniach z Komisją Europejską dotyczących przyznania środków w 
ramach Strategii wykorzystania Funduszu Spójności oraz PO IiŚ na zgłoszone wnioski; 
5. koordynowanie procesu przygotowania projektów indywidualnych, które uzyskają 
wsparcie z PO IiŚ, w tym ocena i przekazywanie wniosków o potwierdzenie dla dużych 
projektów w ramach PO IiŚ do Komisji Europejskiej; 
6. koordynacja procesu przygotowania projektów, wspieranych z Funduszu Spójności 2004-
2006, w tym sprawdzanie wniosków o dofinansowanie oraz ich zmian; 
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7. rozstrzyganie spraw związanych ze środkami odwoławczymi w procesie wyboru 
projektów konkursowych w ramach PO IiŚ; 
8. sporządzanie wytycznych dla Funduszu Spójności i PO IiŚ, w zakresie kompetencji 
Departamentu; 
9. udział w przygotowywaniu procedur dotyczących Funduszu Spójności oraz PO IiŚ, a 
także ich zmian; 
10. opracowywanie wzorów dokumentów, procedur wewnętrznych w zakresie działania 
Departamentu; 
11. opracowywanie i doskonalenie wskaźników monitorowania i oceny w ramach PO IiŚ; 
12. prowadzenie monitoringu i ewaluacji przebiegu PO IiŚ; 
13. monitorowanie realizacji projektów oraz Strategii wykorzystania Funduszu Spójności; 
14.  wnioskowanie do Instytucji Płatniczej o refundację poniesionych wydatków w ramach 
Funduszu Spójności w perspektywie 2004-2006; 
15. sporządzanie sprawozdań okresowych i rocznych z wdrażania PO IiŚ oraz po 
zakończeniu jego realizacji; 
16. weryfikowanie sprawozdań okresowych, rocznych i końcowych z wdrażania PO IiŚ 
sporządzonych przez instytucje zaangażowane w jego wdrażanie; 
17. koordynowanie i realizacja działań w zakresie informacji i promocji Funduszu Spójności 
oraz PO IiŚ, w konsultacji z Departamentem Informacji, Promocji i Szkoleń (DIP); 
18. współuczestniczenie w kontrolach przeprowadzanych w Funduszu Spójności i PO IiŚ; 
19. przygotowywanie wniosków do Ministra Finansów o uruchomienie rezerwy celowej na 
realizację projektów Pomocy Technicznej PO IiŚ, dla których IZ jest beneficjentem, a 
także weryfikowanie w zakresie merytorycznym wniosków przygotowanych przez 
dysponentów innych części budżetowych do Ministra Finansów o uruchomienie rezerwy 
celowej na realizację Strategii wykorzystania Funduszu Spójności i PO IiŚ; 
20. wdrażanie działań Instytucji Zarządzającej PO IiŚ w zakresie wykorzystania środków w 
ramach Pomocy Technicznej PO IiŚ, 
21. przygotowywanie propozycji materiałów do projektu budżetu w zakresie Instytucji 
Zarządzającej PO IiŚ i Insnytucji Zarządzającej Strategią wykorzystania Funduszu 
Spójności oraz wprowadzanie zmian w budżecie we współpracy z Biurem Dyrektora 
Generalnego/Departamentem Ekonomiczno-Finansowym; 
22. organizacja i obsługa Komitetu Monitorującego PO IiŚ oraz Strategii wykorzystania 
Funduszu Spójności oraz Komitetu Sterującego, podkomitetów i grup roboczych, a także 
udział w ich pracach; 
23. współpraca z Departamentem Koordynacji Wdrażania Funduszy Unii Europejskiej (DKF) 
w zakresie oceny stopnia wdrażania i rozwoju funkcjonalności Krajowego Systemu 
Informatycznego (KSI SIMIK 07-13) oraz funkcjonowania Systemu Informatycznego 
Monitoringu i Kontroli Funduszy Strukturalnych i Funduszu Spójności (SIMIK 2004-
2006) ; 
24. współpraca z Departamentem Przygotowania Projektów Indywidualnych (DIN) w 
zakresie zadań związanych z przygotowaniem projektów przez Inicjatywę JASPERS 
oraz  w zakresie projektów POIiŚ  w ramach inicjatywy project pipeline; 
25. koordynowanie realizacji zadań Ministerstwa w obszarach: transport, energetyka i 
zmiany klimatu; 
26. aktualizacja wytycznych dotyczących projektów indywidualnych; 
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27. przygotowywanie sprawozdań dla Rady Ministrów w zakresie projektów indywidualnych 
oraz dużych NSRO 2007-2013; 
28. udział w pracach związanych z przygotowywaniem dokumentów programowych, 
strategicznych, wdrożeniowych i instytucjonalnych oraz procedur związanych z 
perspektywą finansową Unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020. 
 
 
B-5:  Department for Coordination of Implementation of the EU Funds 
 
Departament Koordynacji Wdrażania Funduszy Unii Europejskiej odpowiada za 
wykonywanie zadań w zakresie koordynowania wdrażania funduszy UE  w Polsce i w tym 
zakresie realizuje zadania wynikające z pełnienia przez ministra funkcji Instytucji Zarządzającej 
Podstawami Wsparcia Wspólnoty oraz funkcji Instytucji Koordynującej Narodowe Strategiczne 
Ramy Odniesienia. 
 
Do zadań Departamentu należy w szczególności: 
1. koordynacja systemu monitorowania i sprawozdawczości Podstaw Wsparcia Wspólnoty 
oraz Narodowych Strategicznych Ram Odniesienia i poszczególnych programów 
operacyjnych realizowanych w ich ramach; 
2. sporządzanie i przekazywanie do Komisji Europejskiej rocznych raportów na temat stanu 
wdrażania Podstaw Wsparcia Wspólnoty; 
3. prowadzenie bieżącego monitoringu postępu finansowego oraz rzeczowego wdrażania 
Podstaw Wsparcia Wspólnoty i Narodowych Strategicznych Ram Odniesienia; 
4. prowadzenie prac nad okresowymi prognozami i formułowaniem celów dla poziomu 
wdrażania funduszy UE w ramach Narodowych Strategicznych Ram Odniesienia; 
5. sporządzanie raportów i sprawozdań na temat stanu wdrażania Podstaw Wsparcia 
Wspólnoty i Narodowych Strategicznych Ram Odniesienia dla władz krajowych; 
6. prowadzenie stałego przeglądu skuteczności i racjonalności różnych elementów systemu 
wdrażania funduszy UE oraz formułowanie propozycji i zaleceń zmian w tym zakresie; 
7. koordynacja prac w zakresie tworzenia, przeglądu i aktualizacji procedur  i dokumentów 
wdrożeniowych na lata 2007-2013, w tym wytycznych ministra w zakresie zagadnień 
będących w kompetencji Departamentu; 
8. wydawanie interpretacji i zaleceń w zakresie kwalifikowalności wydatków, 
sprawozdawczości i kontroli funduszy strukturalnych; 
9. obsługa prac Komitetu ds. Audytu i Kontroli Funduszy Strukturalnych i Funduszu 
Spójności; 
10. koordynacja zagadnień dotyczących kontroli krzyżowej w ramach programów 
operacyjnych; 
11. koordynacja zagadnień dotyczących zamknięcia pomocy 2004-2006; 
12. koordynacja udziału przedstawicieli strony polskiej w Komitecie Koordynującym 
Fundusze Unii Europejskiej (COCOF); 
13. monitorowanie zdolności instytucjonalnej instytucji uczestniczących we wdrażaniu 
programów operacyjnych; 
14. koordynacja prac w ramach Ministerstwa nad zagadnieniami pomocy publicznej  w 
programach operacyjnych współfinansowanych z funduszy UE; 
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15. koordynacja prac w ramach Ministerstwa nad założeniami, a także zmianami w 
Krajowym Systemie Informatycznym KSI SIMIK 2007-2013; 
16. zapewnienie wsparcia dla użytkowników KSI SIMIK 2007-2013; 
17. koordynacja wdrażania KSI SIMIK 2007-2013; 
18. administracja i audyt jakości danych w ramach KSI SIMIK 2007-2013; 
19. pełnienie funkcji MS Liaison w zakresie informatycznego systemu wymiany danych  z 
Komisją Europejską w okresie 2007-2013 (SFC2007); 
20. obsługa prac Międzyresortowego Zespołu do Spraw Wykorzystania Funduszy 
Strukturalnych i Funduszu Spójności Unii Europejskiej; 
21. koordynacja realizacji zadań wynikających z art. 31 ustawy z dnia 6 grudnia 2006 r.  o 
zasadach prowadzenia polityki rozwoju (Dz. U. z 2009 r. Nr 84, poz. 712), dotyczących 
ekspertów powoływanych w celu rzetelnej i bezstronnej oceny projektów; 
22. przygotowanie i realizacja projektów w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Pomoc 
Techniczna w zakresie kompetencji Departamentu; 
23. przygotowanie propozycji materiałów do budżetu oraz propozycji zmian w budżecie; 
24. opiniowanie projektów aktów normatywnych i innych dokumentów opracowywanych 
przez inne komórki organizacyjne Ministerstwa lub urzędy; 
25. koordynacja prac nad kształtem systemu wdrażania polityki spójności w perspektywie 
finansowej 2014-2020 oraz koordynacja wypracowywania stanowisk MRR w tym 
zakresie; 
26. koordynowanie realizacji zadań Ministerstwa w obszarze: prawo zamówień publicznych; 
a ponadto: 
27. obsługa prac zespołów i grup roboczych, dla których Departament został decyzją ministra 
wskazany jako sekretariat; 
28. organizacja spotkań i konferencji organizowanych przez Departament; 
29. bieżący monitoring dokumentów ujętych w Programie Prac Rządu w części dotyczącej 
Departamentu; 
30. administrowanie bazą projektów współfinansowanych w Polsce ze środków 
strukturalnych na lata 2004 – 2006; 
31. koordynacja udziału przedstawicieli Departamentu w wizytach audytowych Komisji 
Europejskiej; 
32. organizacja i merytoryczny udział w konferencjach dotyczących systemu kontroli i 
systemu informowania o nieprawidłowościach 
33. udział w pracach Międzyresortowej grupy roboczej ds. nieprawidłowości; 
34. współpraca z organami kontrolnymi, w tym instytucjami spoza systemu wdrażania 
funduszy (instytucja koordynująca kontrole wyrywkowe, Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 
Europejski Trybunał Obrachunkowy, służby audytowe KE, komórka audytu 
wewnętrznego Ministerstwa); 
35. opiniowanie wniosków instytucji zarządzających dotyczących zwiększenia limitu 
dopuszczalnej wartości podpisywanych umów (nadkontraktacja); 
36. koordynacja zadań Departamentu związanych z udziałem przedstawicieli strony polskiej 
w pracach organizacji międzynarodowych; 
37. utrzymywanie stałej współpracy z Komisją Europejską, z resortami i innymi partnerami 
w zakresie prowadzonych spraw; 
38. przygotowywanie odpowiedzi na interpelacje i zapytania organów krajowych  w zakresie 
kompetencji Departamentu; 
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39. wykonywanie zadań instytucji wspierającej wykorzystanie i obsługę projektu 
kredytowego Europejskiego Banku Inwestycyjnego przeznaczonego na finansowanie 
wkładu krajowego projektów  realizowanych w ramach NSRO 2007-2013; 
40. udział w realizacji zadań ministerstwa wynikających w wdrażania Krajowej Strategii 
Rozwoju Regionalnego; 
41. koordynowanie funkcjonowania wybranych elementów kontroli zarządczej w MRR; 
42. zgłaszanie do Biura Dyrektora Generalnego zapotrzebowania na środki pieniężne,  
na realizację zadań w ramach planu finansowego dysponenta III stopnia; 
43. wykonywanie zadań w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie planowania 
operacyjnego i stałego dyżuru. 
 
 
B-6:  Department of Spatial Policy 
 
Departament Polityki Przestrzennej realizuje zadania służące integracji planowania 
regionalnego i przestrzennego na poziomie krajowym i regionalnym oraz polityki miejskiej. 
Departament jest instytucją strategiczną w zakresie krajowej polityki miejskiej, realizacji 
koncepcji przestrzennego zagospodarowania kraju (KPZK), realizacji Agendy Terytorialnej dla 
UE oraz wprowadzenia do planowania strategicznego współzależności celów polityki 
przestrzennej z celami polityki regionalnej realizując podejście terytorialne w polityce 
spójności.  
 
Do zadań Departamentu należy w szczególności: 
1. realizacja, monitorowanie wdrażania i aktualizacja koncepcji przestrzennego 
zagospodarowania kraju: w zakresie ponadlokalnego planowania przestrzennego: 
a) tworzenie podstaw dla koordynacji planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego 
województw ze strategiami rozwoju województw, 
b) tworzenie podstaw dla koordynacji współpracy transgranicznej i przygranicznej w 
zakresie planowania i zagospodarowania przestrzennego, 
c) przygotowanie okresowych raportów o stanie zagospodarowania przestrzennego 
kraju oraz udział w pracach Ministerstwa i innych podmiotów, związanych z 
opracowaniem raportów i innych dokumentów związanych z rozwojem miast i 
obszarami miejskimi, 
w zakresie rozwoju miast: 
d) przygotowanie propozycji dotyczących rozwoju miast i obszarów funkcjonalnych 
(krajowej polityki miejskiej), także w ramach polityki spójności, w tym udział w 
pracach nad dokumentami programowymi dotyczącymi nowej perspektywy 
finansowej 2014 -2020, 
e) przygotowanie propozycji dotyczących wymiaru miejskiego polityki spójności i 
spójności terytorialnej w politykach sektorowych UE, innych strategicznych 
dokumentach rozwojowych UE oraz krajowych politykach rozwoju, 
w zakresie rozwiązań systemowych: 
f) inicjowanie działań dotyczących obszarów funkcjonalnych w celu stworzenia 
podstaw do pozyskiwania środków z Unii Europejskiej, w tym określenie sposobu 
i warunków delimitacji obszarów funkcjonalnych w tym systemu ich 
monitorowania, 
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2. przygotowanie rozwiązań systemowych w zakresie kształtowania ładu przestrzennego 
służących wypracowaniu systemu, w tym wprowadzeniu do planowania strategicznego 
współzależności celów polityki przestrzennej z celami polityki regionalnej oraz podejścia 
terytorialnego w polityce spójności dla zwiększenia efektywności systemu jej realizacji, 
w tym: 
     w zakresie ponadlokalnego planowania przestrzennego: 
a) udział w opracowaniu rozwiązań systemowych służących integracji planowania 
regionalnego i przestrzennego na rzecz budowania spójności terytorialnej, 
w zakresie rozwoju miast: 
b) udział w opracowywaniu rozwiązań systemowych służących integracji 
planowania społecznego, gospodarczego i przestrzennego na rzecz rozwoju miast 
i miejskich obszarów funkcjonalnych, 
w zakresie rozwiązań systemowych: 
c) analizowanie zasad, sposobu i warunków funkcjonowania instytucji, procedur i 
instrumentów w zakresie kształtowania ładu przestrzennego i zintegrowanego 
podejścia do rozwoju, 
d) opracowanie koncepcji systemu kształtowania ładu przestrzennego realizującego 
cele KPZK, 
e) inicjowanie działań zapewniających podstawy prawne dla programowania 
rozwoju obszarów funkcjonalnych, w tym możliwości wykorzystywania środków 
i instrumentów wspólnotowych, 
f) opracowywanie projektów aktów prawnych w zakresie systemu kształtującego ład 
przestrzenny, realizujących cele KPZK i służących zintegrowanemu podejściu do 
rozwoju; 
3. wzmocnienie potencjału instytucjonalnego, w tym wprowadzenie rozwiązań 
systemowych służących integracji planowania regionalnego i przestrzennego na każdym 
poziomie zarządzania, m.in.; poprzez udział w inicjatywach dotyczących spójności 
terytorialnej i rozwoju miast: 
           w zakresie ponadlokalnego planowania przestrzennego: 
a. reprezentowanie strony polskiej na forum UE, szczególnie w działaniach 
prowadzonych przez Komisję Europejską wynikających z wdrażania Agendy 
Terytorialnej UE 2020, w tym na spotkaniach Dyrektorów Generalnych ds. 
spójności terytorialnej i miast, 
b. reprezentowanie strony polskiej w organizacjach, programach i inicjatywach 
związanych z zagadnieniami spójności terytorialnej, w tym ESPON (Europejska 
Sieć Obserwacyjna Rozwoju Terytorialnego i Spójności Terytorialnej), VASAB 
(Wizja i Strategie Wokół Morza Bałtyckiego 2010), CEMAT (Konferencji 
Ministrów Rady Europy odpowiedzialnych za planowanie 
regionalne/przestrzenne), inicjatywy państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, Bułgarii i 
Rumunii; 
w zakresie rozwoju miast: 
c. udział w pracach dotyczących rozwoju miast, prowadzonych przez organizacje 
międzynarodowe, w tym Organizację Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju 
(OECD) w ramach Komitetu ds. Polityki Rozwoju Terytorialnego (Territorial 
Development Policy Committee). 
w zakresie rozwiązań systemowych: 
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d. prowadzenie analiz potencjału instytucjonalnego w zakresie realizacji celów 
KPZK oraz inicjowanie rozwiązań służących wzmocnieniu potencjału 
instytucjonalnego i wdrożenie w ramach systemu kształtowania ładu 
przestrzennego służącego zintegrowanemu podejściu do rozwoju, 
4. współpraca z samorządem terytorialnym oraz instytucjami i organizacjami krajowymi i 
międzynarodowymi w zakresie integracji systemu planowania regionalnego i 
przestrzennego: 
w zakresie ponadlokalnego planowania przestrzennego: 
a) udział w pracach dotyczących spójności terytorialnej, prowadzonych przez 
Komisję Europejską w ramach TCUM (Podkomitetu ds. spójności terytorialnej i 
kwestii miejskich działającego w ramach grupy COCOF) i innych forów KE, 
w zakresie rozwoju miast: 
b) inicjowanie i monitorowanie działań władz publicznych (jednostek samorządu 
terytorialnego, resortów i in.) w zakresie usprawniania działań związanych z 
rozwojem miast, 
c) współpraca z GUS w zakresie systemu monitorowania rozwoju miast oraz 
obszarów funkcjonalnych,  
d) współpraca z organizacjami krajowymi i samorządem terytorialnym w zakresie 
rozwoju miast, budowy systemu kształtowania ładu przestrzennego służącego 
zintegrowanemu podejściu do rozwoju, obszarów funkcjonalnych i rozwiązań 
instytucjonalnych, 
w zakresie rozwiązań systemowych: 
e) prowadzenie współpracy z Polską Akademia Nauk, tj. Komitetem Przestrzennego 
Zagospodarowania Kraju PAN i Instytutem Geografii i Przestrzennego 
Zagospodarowania PAN, innymi jednostkami naukowymi, w zakresie rozwoju 
miast, spójności terytorialnej oraz obszarów funkcjonalnych, 
f)  udział w pracach w ramach Krajowego Forum Terytorialnego i Komitetu 
Koordynacyjnego do spraw Polityki Rozwoju, w kontekście rozwoju miast, 
obszarów funkcjonalnych oraz w pracach Krajowego Obserwatorium 
Terytorialnego; 
5. obsługa ciał kolegialnych realizujących zadania z zakresu planowania przestrzennego, w 
których uczestniczy Minister Rozwoju Regionalnego, w tym:  
a) udział w przygotowywaniu stanowisk, 
b) współudział w pracach Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Prawa Budowlanego, 
6. wykonywanie zadań obronnych w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie 
planowania operacyjnego, stałego dyżuru oraz uwzględniania potrzeb obronnych i 
bezpieczeństwa państwa w planowaniu przestrzennym. 
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B-7:  Legal Department 
 
Departament Prawny odpowiada za obsługę prawną Ministra w zakresie wszystkich spraw 
objętych działem administracji rządowej – rozwój regionalny.  
 
Do zadań Departamentu należy w szczególności: 
1. współudział w realizacji zadań dotyczących polityki rozwoju; 
2. prowadzenie procesu legislacyjnego, w tym opracowywanie, również pod względem 
prawnym i redakcyjnym, projektów założeń projektów ustaw, projektów ustaw oraz 
współudział w przygotowaniu i redagowaniu projektów aktów normatywnych 
inicjowanych przez właściwe komórki organizacyjne, z zastrzeżeniem § 37 ust. 2 pkt 4 lit. 
a Regulaminu organizacyjnego Ministerstwa; 
3. opiniowanie, w tym uzgadnianie, przygotowywanych przez komórki organizacyjne 
projektów stanowisk Ministra do projektów aktów normatywnych i innych dokumentów 
rządowych opracowywanych przez naczelne i centralne ograny administracji rządowej, a 
także do projektów umów międzynarodowych inicjowanych przez te organy; 
4. świadczenie pomocy prawnej, w tym udzielanie porad prawnych, opinii, interpretacji i 
wyjaśnień dotyczących obowiązującego stanu prawnego, stosowania prawa i 
orzecznictwa; 
5. wykonywanie zastępstwa procesowego przed sądami administracyjnymi i powszechnymi 
oraz trybunałami, w tym podejmowanie działań z zakresu cywilnego postępowania 
egzekucyjnego, z zastrzeżeniem § 16 ust. 1 pkt 10 lit. a i c Regulaminu organizacyjnego 
Ministerstwa; 
6. udział w tworzeniu systemu wdrażania polityki spójności w perspektywie finansowej 
2014-2020, w szczególności jej podstaw prawnych; 
7. kierowanie do ogłoszenia aktów normatywnych i innych aktów prawnych podlegających 
ogłoszeniu w Dzienniku Ustaw i w Dzienniku Urzędowym „Monitor Polski” oraz 
prowadzenie Dziennika Urzędowego Ministra Rozwoju Regionalnego; 
a ponadto: 
8. opiniowanie projektów porozumień oraz umów, z zakresu właściwości Ministra, z 
wyłączeniem umów dotyczących zamówień publicznych; 
9. opiniowanie projektów aktów normatywnych i dokumentów rządowych inicjowanych 
przez naczelne i centralne organy administracji rządowej oraz wojewodów, w zakresie 
nie objętym właściwością żadnej komórki organizacyjnej; 
10. przygotowywanie stanowisk Ministra do projektów aktów normatywnych i dokumentów 
rządowych inicjowanych przez naczelne i centralne organy administracji rządowej i inne 
organy posiadające inicjatywę ustawodawczą, w zakresie nie objętym właściwością 
żadnej komórki organizacyjnej; 
11. prowadzenie spraw o charakterze horyzontalnym, związanych z zarządzaniem 
Sektorowymi Programami Operacyjnymi na lata 2004-2006, oraz Programami 
Operacyjnymi na lata 2007-2013 oraz na lata 2014-2020, w tym udzielanie porad i opinii 
prawnych, opiniowanie umów, opiniowanie aktów normatywnych w tym zakresie; 
12. opracowywanie wskazanych przez Ministra wytycznych o charakterze horyzontalnym 
dotyczących zagadnień formalnoprawnych, o których mowa w przepisach dotyczących 
wdrażania funduszy z zakresu polityki spójności; 
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13. wskazywanie właściwym komórkom organizacyjnym potrzeb zmian regulacji prawnych 
oraz monitoring przebiegu prac nad projektami aktów normatywnych; 
14. koordynowanie: 
a) spraw dotyczących notyfikacji norm i przepisów technicznych w Komisji 
Europejskiej, w zakresie właściwości Ministra, 
b) spraw związanych z Oceną Jakości Regulacji Prawnych i reformą regulacji; 
15. wykonywanie zadań punktu kontaktowego w Ministerstwie współpracującego z Centrum 
Koordynacyjnym systemu SOLVIT, a także zadań wynikających z obsługi systemu EU- 
Pilot; 
16. opiniowanie przygotowanych przez  zainteresowaną komórkę organizacyjną w zakresie 
spraw administracyjnych projektów decyzji oraz innych pism w postępowaniu 
administracyjnym; 
17. opiniowanie, na wniosek zainteresowanej komórki organizacyjnej, przygotowanych 
przez tę komórkę w zakresie postępowania sądowo-administracyjnego projektów skarg, 
odpowiedzi na skargi, a także zażaleń, z wyjątkiem spraw prowadzonych przez 
kancelarię prawną obsługującą tą komórkę organizacyjną; 
18. opiniowanie, na wniosek zainteresowanej komórki organizacyjnej, spraw z zakresu 
zagospodarowania przestrzennego oraz polityki miejskiej; 
19. opiniowanie wytycznych Ministra Rozwoju  Regionalnego wydawanych na podstawie 
przepisów dotyczących wdrażania funduszy z zakresu polityki spójności oraz 
prowadzenie w formie elektronicznej rejestru wytycznych Ministra; 
20. kompletowanie w bieżących aktach sprawy:  
a) papierowych egzemplarzy aktów normatywnych zawierających podpis Ministra i 
parafy dyrektora komórki organizacyjnej i Departamentu Prawnego wraz z 
potwierdzeniem wygenerowanym z elektronicznej skrzynki podawczej 
Rządowego Centrum Legislacji prowadzonej na platformie ePUAP o przekazaniu 
aktu do ogłoszenia,  
b) papierowych egzemplarzy komunikatów zawierających podpis Ministra i parafy 
dyrektora  komórki organizacyjnej, Departamentu Prawnego oraz właściwego 
członka kierownictwa Ministerstwa wraz z potwierdzeniem wygenerowanym z 
elektronicznej skrzynki podawczej Rządowego Centrum Legislacji prowadzonej 
na platformie ePUAP o przekazaniu komunikatu do ogłoszenia; 
21. wykonywanie zadań w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie planowania 
operacyjnego i stałego dyżuru. 
 
 
B-8:  Department of Support for Infrastructural Programmes 
 
Departament Wsparcia Programów Infrastrukturalnych realizuje zadania wynikające z 
pełnienia przez ministra funkcji Instytucji Zarządzającej Programem Operacyjnym Infrastruktura 
i Środowisko (PO IiŚ) oraz funkcji Instytucji Zarządzającej Strategią wykorzystania Funduszu 
Spójności, w zakresie określonym w ust. 2. Departament wspiera Departament Koordynacji 
Programów Infrastrukturalnych w zakresie zarządzania, koordynacji i kontroli działań w ramach 
PO IiŚ oraz Funduszu Spójności a także nadzorowania i koordynowania realizacji Strategii 
wykorzystania PO IiŚ oraz Funduszu Spójności. Ponadto, Departament odpowiada za ogólną 
koordynację przygotowania i zmian wytycznych, o których mowa w pkt 18. 
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Do zadań Departamentu należy w szczególności: 
1. realizacja szczegółowych zadań związanych z pełnieniem przez Ministra funkcji 
Instytucji Zarządzającej POIiŚ, w tym  
2. przygotowanie dokumentów programowych oraz innych dokumentów – w tym aktów 
normatywnych – koniecznych do wdrożenia programu operacyjnego, w szczególności 
treść programu operacyjnego, szczegółowy opis priorytetów programu operacyjnego, 
opracowywanie opisu systemu zarządzania i kontroli programu operacyjnego, a także 
przygotowywanie i uzgadnianie zmiany dokumentów programowych oraz innych 
dokumentów dotyczących wdrażania programu operacyjnego, 
a) koordynacja prac związanych z organizacją systemu zarządzania i kontroli 
programu operacyjnego, w tym sprawowanie nadzoru nad systemem zarządzania i 
kontroli oraz systemem instytucjonalnym, 
b) inicjowanie, nadzorowanie oraz koordynacja działań służących zapewnieniu 
prawidłowości programowania, realizacji oraz monitorowania projektów 
współfinansowanych w ramach programu operacyjnego, 
c) przygotowanie i wdrażanie systemu wyboru projektów w ramach programu 
operacyjnego (w zakresie pomocy technicznej), 
d) sporządzanie wytycznych w zakresie realizowanego programu operacyjnego, 
e) opracowanie porozumień i umów, wzorów dokumentów, procedur wewnętrznych, 
f) opracowanie i doskonalenie wskaźników monitorowania i oceny w ramach 
programu operacyjnego (w zakresie pomocy technicznej), 
g) prowadzenie monitoringu priorytetów pomocy technicznej i kontroli programu 
operacyjnego, 
h) weryfikacja wydatków poniesionych przez beneficjentów w ramach programu 
operacyjnego, przygotowanie poświadczenia i deklaracji wydatków oraz 
wniosków o płatność do Instytucji Certyfikującej w perspektywie 2007–2013 a 
także przekazywanie IC wszystkich niezbędnych informacji o procedurach i 
weryfikacjach prowadzonych odnośnie wydatków, na potrzeby poświadczania, 
i) weryfikacja wniosków przygotowanych przez dysponentów innych części 
budżetowych do Ministra Finansów o uruchomienie rezerwy celowej na realizację 
programu operacyjnego, 
j) przygotowanie decyzji o zwrocie środków wykorzystanych przez beneficjentów 
niezgodnie z przeznaczeniem lub z naruszeniem procedur albo pobranych 
nienależnie lub w nadmiernej wysokości jak również decyzji w przedmiocie 
udzielenia ulgi w spłacie należności, 
k) gromadzenie i opracowywanie informacji o nieprawidłowościach oraz 
przekazywanie ich do odpowiednich instytucji zgodnie z systemem wdrażania, 
l) przeprowadzanie oceny realizacji zarządzanego programu operacyjnego, w 
szczególności jego efektywności i skuteczności, 
m) sporządzanie prognozy wydatków w ramach programu operacyjnego, 
n) koordynacja i wdrażanie działania w zakresie wykorzystania środków w ramach 
pomocy technicznej programu operacyjnego, 
o) realizacja działania w zakresie procedury odwoławczej od decyzji o zwrocie 
środków wydawanych przez Instytucje Pośredniczące IP/IP2 (w zakresie 
procedury odwoławczej od decyzji o zwrocie środków wydawanych przez IP/IP2), 
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p) współpraca z Departamentem Koordynacji Wdrażania Funduszy Unii 
Europejskiej oraz Departamentem Informatyki w zakresie rozwoju Krajowego 
Systemu Informatycznego (KSI SIMIK 07-13) oraz budowy i rozwoju systemu 
informatycznego wspierającego realizację programów operacyjnych w 
perspektywie finansowej 2014-2020, 
q) współpraca z audytorami zewnętrznymi i wewnętrznymi, 
r) podejmowanie działań mających na celu prawidłowe zamknięcie pomocy w 
ramach programu operacyjnego; 
3. realizacja szczegółowych zadań związanych z pełnieniem przez Ministra funkcji 
Instytucji Zarządzającej Strategii wykorzystania Funduszu Spójności 2004-2006, w tym:  
a) przygotowanie i aktualizacja dokumentów programowych oraz innych 
dokumentów – w tym aktów normatywnych – koniecznych do wdrożenia 
Strategii wykorzystania Funduszu Spójności, w szczególności opracowanie opisu 
systemu zarządzania i kontroli oraz przygotowanie i uzgadnianie zmian 
dokumentów programowych oraz innych dokumentów dotyczących wdrażania 
Funduszu Spójności, 
b) koordynacja prac związanych z organizacją systemu zarządzania i kontroli FS, w 
tym sprawowanie nadzoru nad systemem zarządzania i kontroli oraz systemem 
instytucjonalnym, 
c) inicjowanie, nadzorowanie oraz koordynacja działań służących zapewnieniu 
prawidłowości realizacji oraz monitorowania na etapie rozliczania i zamykania 
projektów współfinansowanych w ramach Fundusz Spójności, 
d) opracowanie porozumień i umów, wzorów dokumentów, procedur wewnętrznych, 
e) prowadzenie kontroli realizacji Funduszu Spójności, 
f) weryfikacja wniosków przygotowanych przez dysponentów innych części 
budżetowych do Ministra Finansów o uruchomienie rezerwy celowej na pokrycie 
korekty systemowej w ramach Funduszu Spójności, 
g) gromadzenie i opracowywanie informacji o nieprawidłowościach oraz 
przekazywanie ich do odpowiednich instytucji zgodnie z systemem wdrażania, 
h) przeprowadzanie oceny realizacji Funduszu Spójności, w szczególności jego 
efektywności i skuteczności, 
i) podejmowanie działań mających na celu prawidłowe zamknięcie pomocy w 
ramach okresu finansowania 2004-2006, 
4. przygotowanie i zmiany wytycznych horyzontalnych w zakresie: 
a) postępowania w sprawie oceny oddziaływania na środowisko dla przedsięwzięć 
współfinansowanych z programów operacyjnych, 
b) dofinansowania z programów operacyjnych podmiotów realizujących obowiązek 
świadczenia usług publicznych w transporcie zbiorowym, 
c) reguł dofinansowania z programów operacyjnych podmiotów realizujących 
obowiązek świadczenia usług publicznych w ramach zadań własnych jednostek 
samorządu terytorialnego w gospodarce odpadami; 
5. koordynowanie realizacji audytów i kontroli w Funduszu Spójności oraz PO IiŚ; 
6. prowadzenie spraw związanych z pomocą publiczną w ramach PO IiŚ; 
7. koordynowanie realizacji zadań Ministerstwa w obszarze ochrona środowiska, z 
wyłączeniem zagadnień dotyczących zmian klimatu; 
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8. udział w pracach związanych z przygotowaniem dokumentów programowych, 
wdrożeniowych i instytucjonalnych oraz procedur związanych z perspektywą finansową 
2014-2020; 
9. współdziałanie z Departamentem Ekonomiczno-Finansowym, w tym w zakresie: 
- przygotowania materiałów do projektu ustawy budżetowej w zakresie PO IiŚ 
oraz Strategii Wykorzystania FS 2004-2006,    
- prowadzenia spraw związanych z przenoszeniem wydatków budżetu na 
programy; 
10. wykonywanie zadań w ramach powszechnego obowiązku obrony w zakresie planowania 
operacyjnego i stałego dyżuru; 
11. wykonywanie zadań związanych z kontrolą zarządczą. 
 
 
B-9:  Office of Human Resources Management 
 
Biuro Zarządzania Zasobami Ludzkimi dpowiada za sprawy wynikające z zadań dyrektora 
generalnego w obszarze dokonywania czynności z zakresu prawa pracy oraz realizacji polityki 
personalnej wobec osób zatrudnionych w Ministerstwie.  
 
Do zadań Biura należy w szczególności: 
1. opracowywanie i wdrażanie rozwiązań w zakresie zarządzania zasobami ludzkimi oraz 
prowadzenie spraw wynikających z nawiązania, trwania i ustania stosunku pracy 
pracowników Ministerstwa, w tym z obszaru rozwoju zawodowego: 
a) opracowywanie rozwiązań w zakresie polityki personalnej w Ministerstwie, 
b) zarządzanie projektami z obszaru polityki personalnej Ministerstwa, 
c) prowadzenie spraw wynikających z nawiązania, trwania i ustania stosunku pracy 
pracowników Ministerstwa, 
d) prowadzenie spraw w zakresie etatyzacji w Ministerstwie, 
e) obsługa administracyjna komisji dyscyplinarnej i zespołu antymobbingowego 
działających w Ministerstwie, 
f) prowadzenie spraw związanych z udzielaniem przez dyrektora generalnego zgody 
na dodatkowe zatrudnienie lub na podejmowanie dodatkowych zajęć 
zarobkowych przez członków korpusu służby cywilnej zatrudnionych w 
Ministerstwie, 
g) sporządzanie i weryfikacja opisów stanowisk pracy i prowadzenie procesu 
wartościowania stanowisk pracy, 
h) realizowanie rekrutacji zewnętrznych i wewnętrznych, 
i) monitorowanie sporządzania ocen pracowników, 
j) zarządzanie systemem kompetencji, 
k) zarządzanie indywidualnymi programami rozwoju zawodowego, 
l) organizacja i prowadzenie szkoleń/seminariów/konferencji/spotkań; 
2. zapewnienie pracownikom Ministerstwa doradztwa w zakresie etyki, w tym: 
a) wykonywanie zadań związanych z pełnieniem roli doradcy etycznego, 
b) prowadzenie spraw związanych z oświadczeniami majątkowymi i 
oświadczeniami lustracyjnymi pracowników Ministerstwa; 
3. prowadzenie działalności socjalnej w Ministerstwie, w tym: 
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a) udzielanie osobom uprawnionym świadczeń z zakładowego funduszu świadczeń 
socjalnych, 
b) udział w pracach komisji socjalnej, 
c) prowadzenie spraw związanych z wyborem podmiotów zewnętrznych 
realizujących na rzecz Ministerstwa usługi z obszaru działalności socjalnej oraz z 
zawieraniem i obsługą umów z tymi podmiotami; 
4. organizowanie praktyk studenckich, staży absolwenckich i wolontariatu; 
5. prowadzenie spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy, w tym: 
a) prowadzenie monitoringu warunków pracy oraz przestrzegania przepisów i zasad 
bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy, 
b) prowadzenie szkoleń wstępnych z zakresu bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy, 
c) udział w pracach zespołu powypadkowego do ustalania okoliczności i przyczyn 
wypadków przy pracy, w tym sporządzanie dokumentacji powypadkowej, 
d) prowadzenie spraw dotyczących wniosków pracowników o refundację za 
zakupione okulary do pracy z monitorem ekranowym, 
a ponadto: 
6. realizacja zadań związanych z finansami publicznymi, w tym: 
a) przygotowywanie propozycji materiałów do budżetu oraz propozycji zmian w 
budżecie,  
b) wykonywanie zadań związanych z nadzorowaniem prawidłowości wykorzystania 
środków budżetowych oraz windykacją należności Ministerstwa, 
c) przygotowywanie i realizacja projektów finansowanych ze środków pomocy 
technicznej. 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
CONSENT FORMS AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
Description:  Consent forms and interview questionnaires used during field research. 
 
Contents: 
 
C-1: Consent Form for Polish Government Officials 
C-2: Consent Form for Polish Officials (Polish Version) 
C-3: Interview Questionnaire for Polish Government Officials 
C-4: Interview Questionnaire for Polish Government Officials (Polish Version) 
C-5: Consent Form for Polish Academics  
C-6: Consent Form for Polish Academics (Polish Version) 
C-7: Interview Questionnaire for Polish Academics 
C-8: Interview Questionnaire for Polish Academics (Polish Version) 
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C-1:  Consent Form:  Polish Government Officials 
 
 
Administrative Reform and the 
Provision of Transportation 
 
The purpose of this research project is to investigate the relationship between administrative 
reform and the capacity of government to provide transportation infrastructure in Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  This study is interested in the views and experiences of Polish officials 
working in different levels of government in the context of European Union integration.  The 
Study is being conducted by Devon Lechtenberg under the supervision of Dr. Julie Cidell of the 
Department of Geography at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the United States.  
With your permission this interview will be digitally recorded in order to maintain accuracy.  
The recordings will then transcribed and translated into English by the primary researcher.  
 
Please be aware of the following: 
 
1) Your participation is completely voluntary. 
 
2) You will be asked to relate your professional experiences in narrative form to the 
interviewer with minimal direction from the interviewer. 
 
3) Should you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer questions such as appear on 
the next page.  You may decline to address specific questions in your response. You may 
choose to end the interview at any time. If you choose not to address specific questions/ 
issues or withdraw from the interview, no negative repercussions will occur. 
 
Your professional and personal views are central to this research.  Your extended responses are 
certainly encouraged.  Your participation will be anonymous.  I will make every effort to ensure 
that your responses will not be traced to you in any publications that may result from this 
research.  All records of this interview will be accessible only by the primary researcher.  There 
is minimal physical risk in your participation in this research; however, there may be 
professional risk.  This research is not intended to be politicized; however, the work and 
professional views of civil servants may have political consequences and there for put their 
reputation and employability at risk in the eyes of their superiors. The precautions described 
above will greatly minimize the possibility of any potential repercussions to you personally.  
Although there are no direct personal benefits to you for your participation, you may request a 
copy of the final research report. 
 
The primary researcher in this study is Devon Lechtenberg, PhD student in the Department of 
Geography at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in the United States.  Please feel 
free to contact me via e-mail at lechten1@illinois.edu if you have any questions.  You may also 
contact Dr. Julie Cidell, who is supervising Devon Lechtenberg’s research, at 
jcidell@illinois.edu or (01) 217 244 – 4665. 
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If you  have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or 
complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at (01) 217-33-
2670 (Collect Call will be accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via e-
mail at irb@uiuc.edu.  A copy of this form will be provided to you.. 
   
 
If you agree to the interview, please sign below. 
 
Signature ____________________ Date _______ 
 
I give permission for my interview to be audio recorded.  (Circle one)  Yes   No 
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C-2: Consent Form: Polish Government Officials (Polish Version) 
 
Transport i reforma administracyjna 
 
Wstęp dla polskich urzędników 
 
Celem tego projektu związanego z moją pracą doktorską jest badanie relacji między reformami 
administracyjnymi w Polsce i Czechach a zdolnością tych państw do zapewnienia infrastruktury 
transportowej.  Badanie jest prowadzone przez Devona Lechtenberga pod nadzorem Pani Doktor 
Julie Cidell w Zakładzie Geografii na Uniwersytecie Illinois w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Jeśli 
Państwo zgodzą się na tą rozmowę, będzie ona nagrywana żeby zapewnić dokładność podczas 
analizy.  Po rozmowie nagranie będzie przetłumaczone na język angielski przez głównego 
badacza.  Procesy reform administracyjnych (w tym decentralizacji, profesjonalizacji) w Polsce i 
Czechach odbywały się w ciągu wielu lat podczas integracji europejskiej. Celem badania jest 
pozyskanie wiedzy na temat doświadczenia polskich urzędników pracujących na różnych 
szczeblach administracji publicznej w kontekście integracji europejskiej.   Konkretna metoda 
badawcza wykorzystana w tym badaniu nazywa się w języku angielskim narrative inquiry (tj 
analiza opowiadania).  Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się na uczestnictwo, to proszę podczas wywiadu 
zaakcentować te elementy, które są dla Państwa najważniejsze. 
Proszę zwrócić uwagę na następujące kwestie: 
 
1) Państwa uczestnictwo w tym badaniu jest całkowicie dobrowolnie. 
 
2) Państwo będą proszeni o udzielanie odpowiedzi osobie pytającej zgodnie z własną 
wiedzą w formie narracyjnej, z minimalnymi wskazówkami pytającego. 
 
3) Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się na udział w tej  rozmowie, proszę o odpowiadanie na pytania, 
znajdujące się w ankiecie. Mogą Państwo nie opowiadać na poszczególne pytania w 
swojej wypowiedzi. Mogą Państwo zakończyć rozmowę w dowolnym momencie.  Jeśli 
Państwo nie odpowiedzą na wszystkie pytania lub zakończą wcześniej rozmowę, nie 
spowoduje to negatywnych konsekwencji.  
 
Państwa zawodowe oraz własne opinie są dla tego badania bardzo istotne.  Będziemy wdzięczni 
Państwu za udzielanie długich wypowiedzi. Państwa udział w badaniu jest anonimowy. 
Uczestnictwo w tym badaniu wiąże się z minimalnym ryzykiem zawodowym.  To badanie stara 
się być apolityczne, ale wypowiedzi pracowników Służby Cywilnej mogą mieć polityczne 
konsekwencji. Wypowiedzi te mogą stawiać pracownika w niekomfortowej sytuacji wobec 
kierownictwa. Dołożę wszelkich starań, by przedstawione wypowiedzi nie można było powiązać 
z Państwa osobą w jakiejkolwiek publikacji, będącej wynikiem tego badania. Dostęp do 
wszystkich notatek tej rozmowy będzie mieć tylko główny badacz.  Nie przewiduje się żadnych 
konsekwencji dla Państwa w trakcie lub po zakończeniu uczestnictwa w tym badaniu. Nie 
przewiduje się również żadnych świadczeń finansowych dla Państwa w związku z 
uczestnictwem w niniejszym badaniu.  Państwo mogą prosić o kopię gotowanego raportu 
badania. 
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Głównym badaczem w tym badaniu jest Devon Lechtenberg, doktorant w zakładzie Geografii na 
Uniwersitecie Illinois w Urbana-Champaign, USA. Uprzejmie proszę o kontakt ze mną przez e-
mail lechten1@illinois.edu, jeśli mają Państwo pytania.  Możecie Państwo także kontaktować się 
z Dr. Julie Cidell, która jest doradcą akademickim Devona Lechtenberga i kontroluje jego 
badania (jcidell@illinois.edu), lub pod numerem telefonicznym (01) 217 244 – 4665.  
Jeśli państwo mają jakiekolwiek pytania na temat waszych praw jako uczestników w tym 
badaniu oraz jakiekolwiek obawy lub skargi, prosimy kontaktować się z Intsitutational Review 
Board na Uniwersytecie Illinois pod numerem telefonicznym (01) 217-33-2670 (rozmowa będzie 
opłacona przez Uniwersytet w Illinois po identyfikacji rozmówcy jako uczestnika w tym badaniu) 
oraz pod emailem irb@uiuc.edu.  Kopia tego formularza dostają Państwo. 
Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się z uczestnictwem w rozmowie, proszę podpisać poniżej. 
 
Podpis ____________________ Data_______ 
 
Zgadzam się z nagrywaniem mojej rozmowy. (Zakreślić jeden wybór)  Tak  Nie 
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C-3: Interview Questionnaire: Polish Government Officials 
 
 
Questionnaire for Polish Officials 
 
However, please remember to address the following issues in your response: 
 
1. Given your capacity as a _______________ (job description:  engineer, manager etc…), 
how might this have shaped your experience in a changing administration? 
 
2. How have (or have not) the organizational structure and procedures of the GDDKiA and 
Ministry of Transportation facilitated the use of EU Structural Funds?   
 
3. Is there a past legacy from the communist era present in Polish transportation/ motorway 
policy?  How has this past legacy affected the GDDKiA? What preserved the past legacy?  
People?  Structures? 
 
4. There are various kinds of accountability within any organization, for example 
organizational methods (hierarchy), normative control (professional standards), and 
group and public pressures, how do these affect the fulfillment of an official’s duties?  
Have these controls changed overtime in the course of reform?   
 
5. What has been the effect of decentralization on the transportation/motorway policy and 
the GDDKiA?  How much power do the voivodships really have in the area of motorway 
policy? 
 
6. How has European integration affected your organization?  If your organization has 
adopted new policies and procedures at the behest of the EU, have these contributed to 
integration with the EU? Cooperation with your contemporaries in the Czech Republic? 
 
7. How is the administration of transportation infrastructure, specifically of highway 
programs, different from other government administration?  
 
8. Do you believe that policy-makers in the EU and North America understand the 
challenges facing Poland/ ECE in the implementation of transportation policy? 
 
9. Other questions which may arise. 
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C-4: Interview Questionnaire: Polish Government Officials (Polish Version) 
 
Ankieta dla polskich urzędników 
1. Biorąc pod uwagę Państwa stanowisko ____________ (inżynier, kierownik itd.), w jaki 
sposób zmieniła się administracja w ostatnich dwóch dekadach? 
2. Czy struktura organizacyjna oraz procedury GDDKiA i Ministerstwa Budownictwa, 
Transportu i Gospodarki Morskiej, oraz Ministerstwa Rozwoju Regionalnego ułatwiły 
wykorzystanie środków unijnych? W jaki sposób? 
3. Czy Państwa zdaniem, istnieje lub istniał wpływ czasów komunistycznych w obecnej 
polskiej polityce transportu (autostradowej)?  W jaki sposób miało to wpływ na GDDKiA 
i inne ministerstwa?  Co lub kto przyczyniło się do trwania tego wpływu?  Ludzie?  
Struktury? 
4. W każdej organizacji istnieją różne rodzaje odpowiedzialności (np. wobec przełożonych - 
hierarchia, wobec standardów zawodowych, wobec grup nacisku oraz odpowiedzialność 
społeczna).  W jaki sposób te rodzaje odpowiedzialności miały wpływ na wypełnienie 
zadań przez Państwa jako urzędników?  W jaki sposób te odpowiedzialności zmieniały 
się w czasie? 
5. Jaki był wpływ decentralizacji na politykę transportu (autostradową) i GDDKiA?  Czy 
województwa mają uprawnienia w zakresie polityki autostradowej? 
6. Jaki wpływ ma integracja europejska na Państwa organizację?  Na ile wdrażane nowe 
polityki i procedury były zgodnie z wolą UE? Jak wyglądała współpraca Polskiej i 
Czeskiej administracji w zakresie transportu? 
7. Na ile kwestie administracyjne związana z polityką infrastrukturalną różnią się od 
administracji w innych zakresach państwa? 
8. Czy według Państwa politycy oraz fachowcy w UE i Ameryce Północnej rozumieją 
trudności w okresie realizacji polityki transportu, które mają Polska i inne kraje Europy 
Środkowej?    
9. Inne pytania, które pojawią się podczas rozmowy.  
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C-5: Consent Form: Polish Academics 
 
 
Administrative Reform and the 
Provision of Transportation 
 
The purpose of this research project is to investigate the relationship between administrative 
reform and the capacity of government to provide transportation infrastructure in Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  The Study is being conducted by Devon Lechtenberg under the supervision of 
Dr. Julie Cidell of the Department of Geography at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign in the United States.  With your permission this interview will be digitally recorded 
in order to maintain accuracy.  The recordings will then transcribed and translated into English 
by the primary researcher. The processes of administrative reform (including decentralization, 
professionalization) in Poland and the Czech Republic have occurred over many years during the 
process of European Integration.  This study is interested in the views of Polish academics. The 
specific research approach being used is known as narrative inquiry.  Should you agree to 
participate, you are encouraged to formulate your responses emphasizing those elements which 
you find to be the most significant.   
 
Please be aware of the following: 
 
1) Your participation is completely voluntary. 
 
2) You will be asked to relate your professional experiences in narrative form to the 
interviewer with minimal direction from the interviewer. 
 
3) Should you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer questions such as appear on 
the next page.  You may decline to address specific questions in your response. You may 
choose to end the interview at any time. If you choose not to address specific questions/ 
issues or withdraw from the interview, no negative repercussions will occur. 
 
Your professional and personal views are central to this research.  Your extended responses are 
certainly encouraged.  Your participation will be anonymous.  I will make every effort to ensure 
that your responses will not be traced to you in any publications that may result from this 
research.  All records of this interview will be accessible only by the primary researcher.  There 
are not anticipated to be any risks to your participation in this research beyond those risks that 
exist in daily life. Although there are no direct personal benefits to you for your participation, 
you may request a copy of the final research report. 
 
The primary researcher in this study is Devon Lechtenberg, PhD student in the Department of 
Geography at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in the United States.  Please feel 
free to contact me via e-mail at lechten1@illinois.edu if you have any questions.  You may also 
contact Dr. Julie Cidell, who is supervising Devon Lechtenberg’s research, at 
jcidell@illinois.edu or (01) 217 244 – 4665. 
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If you  have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or 
complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at (01) 217-33-
2670 (Collect Call will be accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via e-
mail at irb@uiuc.edu.  A copy of this form will be provided to you. 
   
 
If you agree to the interview, please sign below. 
 
Signature ____________________ Date _______ 
  
I give permission for my interview to be audio recorded.  (Circle one)  Yes   No 
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C-6: Consent Form: Polish Academics (Polish Version) 
Transport i reforma administracyjna 
Wstęp dla polskich naukowców 
Celem tego projektu związanego z moją pracą doktorską jest badanie relacji między reformami 
administracyjnymi w Polsce i Czechach a zdolnością tych państw do zapewnienia infrastruktury 
transportowej. Badanie jest prowadzone przez Devona Lechtenberga pod nadzorem Pani Doktor 
Julie Cidell w Zakładzie Geografii na Uniwersytecie Illinois w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Jeśli 
Państwo zgodzą się na tą rozmowę, będzie ona nagrywana żeby zapewnić dokładność podczas 
analizy.  Po rozmowie nagranie będzie przetłumaczone na język angielski przez głównego 
badacza.  Procesy reform administracyjnych (w tym decentralizacji, profesjonalizacji) w Polsce i 
Czechach odbywały się w ciągu wielu lat podczas integracji europejskiej. Celem badania jest 
pozyskanie wiedzy na temat punktów widzenia i doświadczenia polskich pracowników 
naukowych.  Konkretna metoda badawcza wykorzystana w tym badaniu nazywa się w języku 
angielskim narrative inquiry (tj analiza opowiadania).  Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się na uczestnictwo, 
to proszę podczas wywiadu zaakcentować te elementy, które są dla Państwa najważniejsze. 
Proszę zwrócić uwagę na następujące kwestie: 
1) Państwa uczestnictwo w tym badaniu jest całkowicie dobrowolnie. 
2) Państwo będą proszeni o udzielanie odpowiedzi osobie pytającej zgodnie z własną 
wiedzą w formie narracyjnej, z minimalnymi wskazówkami pytającego. 
3) Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się na udział w tej  rozmowie, proszę o odpowiadanie na pytania, 
znajdujące się w ankiecie. Mogą Państwo nie opowiadać na poszczególne pytania w 
swojej wypowiedzi. Mogą Państwo zakończyć rozmowę w dowolnym momencie.  Jeśli 
Państwo nie odpowiedzą na wszystkie pytania lub zakończą wcześniej rozmowę, nie 
spowoduje to negatywnych konsekwencji.  
Państwa zawodowe oraz własne opinie są dla tego badania bardzo istotne.  Będziemy wdzięczni 
Państwu  za udzielanie długich wypowiedzi. Państwa udział w badaniu jest anonimowy. Dołożę 
wszelkich starań, by przedstawione wypowiedzi nie można było powiązać z Państwa osobą w 
jakiejkolwiek publikacji, będącej wynikiem tego badania. Dostęp do wszystkich notatek tej 
rozmowy będzie mieć tylko główny badacz.  Nie przewiduje się żadnych konsekwencji dla 
Państwa w trakcie lub po zakończeniu uczestnictwa w tym badaniu. Nie przewiduje się również 
żadnych świadczeń finansowych dla Państwa w związku z uczestnictwem w niniejszym badaniu.  
Mogą Państwo prosić o kopię gotowego raportu z badania. 
Głównym badaczem w tym badaniu jest Devon Lechtenberg, doktorant w zakładzie Geografii na 
Uniwersitecie Illinois w Urbana-Champaign, USA. Uprzejmie proszę o kontakt ze mną przez e-
mail lechten1@illinois.edu, jeśli mają Państwo pytania.  Możecie Państwo także kontaktować się 
z Dr. Julie Cidell, która jest doradcą akademickim Devona Lechtenberga i nadzoruje jego 
badania (jcidell@illinois.edu), lub pod numerem telefonicznym (01) 217 244 – 4665.  
Jeśli Państwo mają jakiekolwiek pytania na temat Państwa praw jako uczestników w tym 
badaniu oraz jakiekolwiek obawy lub skargi, prosimy kontaktować się z Intsitutational Review 
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Board na Uniwersytecie Illinois pod numerem telefonicznym (01) 217-33-2670 (rozmowa będzie 
opłacona przez Uniwersytet w Illinois po identyfikacji rozmówcy jako uczestnika w tym badaniu) 
oraz pod emailem irb@uiuc.edu.  Państwo otrzymują kopię tego formularza. 
Jeśli Państwo zgodzą się na uczestnictwo w rozmowie, proszę podpisać poniżej. 
 
Podpis ____________________ Data_______ 
Zgadzam się z nagrywaniem mojej rozmowy. (Zakreślić jeden wybór)  Tak  Nie  
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C-7: Interview Questionnaire: Polish Academics 
 
 
Interview Questions for Polish Academics 
 
Please remember to address the following issues in your response: 
 
1. Given your capacity as an academic and expert on one or more of the issues mentioned 
above, how have you perceived the reforms of administration in the context of 
transportation? 
 
2. How have (or have not) the organizational structure and procedures of the GDDKiA and 
Ministry of Transportation facilitated the use of EU Structural Funds?   
 
3. Is there a past legacy from the communist era present in Polish transportation/ motorway 
policy?  How has this past legacy affected the GDDKiA? What preserved the past legacy?  
People?  Structures? 
 
4. There are various kinds of accountability within any organization, for example 
organizational methods (hierarchy), normative control (professional standards), and 
group and public pressures, how do these affect the fulfillment of an official’s duties?  
Have these controls changed overtime in the course of reform?   
 
5. What has been the effect of decentralization on the transportation/motorway policy and 
the GDDKiA?  How much power do the voivodships really have in the area of motorway 
policy? 
 
6. How has European integration affected these organizations?  If an organization has 
adopted new policies and procedures at the behest of the EU, have these contributed to 
integration with the EU? Cooperation between Polish and Czech administrations? 
 
7. How is the administration of transportation infrastructure, specifically of highway 
programs, different from other government administration? 
 
8. Has Polish research on these topics been represented in the Anglo-American literature? 
 
9. Other questions which may arise. 
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C-8: Interview Questionnaire:  Polish Academics (Polish Version) 
 
Ankieta dla polskich naukowców 
 
1. Biorąc pod uwagę Państwa wiedzę i doświadczenie, jaka jest Państwa opinia o reformach 
administracyjnych w kontekście transportu w ostatnich dwóch dekadach i wcześniej? 
 
2. Czy struktura organizacyjna oraz procedury GDDKiA i Ministerstwa Budownictwa, 
Transportu i Gospodarki Morskiej, oraz Ministerstwa Rozwoju Regionalnego ułatwiły 
wykorzystanie środków unijnych? W jaki sposób? Czy współpraca tych instytucji była 
właściwa? 
 
3. Czy Państwa zdaniem, istnieje lub istniał wpływ czasów komunistycznych w obecnej 
polskiej polityce transportu (autostradowej)?  W jaki sposób miało to wpływ na GDDKiA 
i inne ministerstwa?  Co lub kto przyczyniło się do trwania tego wpływu?  Ludzie?  
Struktury? 
 
4. W każdej organizacji istnieją różne rodzaje odpowiedzialności (np. wobec przełożonych - 
hierarchia, wobec standardów zawodowych, wobec grup nacisku oraz odpowiedzialność 
społeczna).  W jaki sposób te rodzaje odpowiedzialności miały wpływ na wypełnienie 
zadań przez  urzędników?  W jaki sposób te odpowiedzialności zmieniały się w czasie? 
 
5. Jaki był wpływ decentralizacji na politykę transportu (autostradową) i GDDKiA?  Czy 
województwa mają uprawnienia w zakresie polityki autostradowej? 
 
6. Jaki wpływ ma integracja europejska na te organizacje?  Na ile wdrażane nowe polityki i 
procedury były zgodnie z wolą UE? Jak wyglądała współpraca Polskiej i Czeskiej 
administracji? 
 
7. Na ile kwestie administracyjne związana z polityką infrastrukturalną różnią się od 
administracji w innych zakresach państwa? 
 
8. Czy polskie badania na te tematy znajdują się w anglosaskiej literaturze naukowej? 
 
9. Inne pytania, które pojawią się podczas rozmowy.  
 
 
 
 
